# PROSPECTS FOR PEACE IN DARFUR

# HEARING

BEFORE THE

# COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

MAY 18, 2006

Serial No. 109-209

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations



Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international\_relations

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

27–647PDF

WASHINGTON : 2006

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800 Fax: (202) 512–2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402–0001

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# **PROSPECTS FOR PEACE IN DARFUR**

## THURSDAY, MAY 18, 2006

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, Washington, DC.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m. in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher H. Smith presiding.

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. The Committee will come to order, and good morning to everyone.

Following 3 long years of death and destruction, the deployment of more than 7,000 African Union peacekeepers, the passage of 10 Security Council resolutions, and the conduct of seven rounds of peace talks in Abuja, Nigeria, the Government of Sudan and the Sudanese Liberation Army finally signed a peace agreement on May 5th, 2006. The Darfur Peace Agreement, modeled after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, which ostensibly ended the over 20 years of war in southern Sudan, addresses such critical matters as security arrangements, power sharing, and wealth sharing. It has been hailed as an important opportunity for peace in Darfur.

has been hailed as an important opportunity for peace in Darfur. Let me just say very clearly and unambiguously that the Administration of President Bush—and Jendayi Frazer obviously will be speaking to this momentarily—deserves to be commended for its tenacious efforts to help broker this agreement and to ease the suffering of those most affected by the genocide in Darfur. The African Union obviously played a central role, as well as a number of nongovernment organizations, various agencies of the UN and the multitude of activists around the globe who have worked tirelessly to help bring an end to this heinous conflict.

But while we celebrate this important development, we must remind ourselves that the hardest part is yet to come. Experience shows that the real challenge lies not in getting the peace agreement signed, although that has been extremely difficult, they are even getting the remaining holdouts to embrace an agreement they have rejected. We know there is a deadline of the 31st of May, and hopefully all players will sign, but the real challenge lies in implementation.

The war in southern Sudan began immediately following independence in 1956 and lasted until the Addis agreement of 1972. That peace held for a decade but was never fully implemented, so the South rebelled again in 1983. The war continued until 2005, and at that time, an estimated  $2\frac{1}{2}$  million men, women and children died, while 4 million others were displaced. Greg Simpkins and I visited Kalma and Mukjar camps in south and west Darfur last year; and we spoke to dozens, really hundreds of people during those visits whose lives had been utterly devastated. I would just say parenthetically that we heard so many expressions of gratitude to the international community, and to the United States especially, and USAID, because so much of the food and the medicines were provided directly from United States' taxpayers.

And I was struck, as was Greg, as to how healthy, relatively speaking, obviously, despite being traumatized by the Janjaweed, so many of these people were. They were stabilized. But they knew if they took one step outside of that camp, the Janjaweed was there waiting with AK-47s, waiting to rape and to kill and to maul. So security, obviously, was another issue as well, but they were stabilized, and they were in a relatively safe haven.

Let me point out that this agreement will be welcomed by those people—those very people that we met and countless others who are in those IDP camps and refugee camps in Chad if it is genuinely implemented. They want and need to return home in peace. That is what we heard over and over again, and I know our two distinguished witnesses have heard that as well from the people themselves. They want to go back, but they want to go back under circumstance where they will not be attacked and abused.

Part of the responsibility for making the agreement work comes from the Administration's ability to work with our allies, to make it happen.

The other responsibility falls on this body, the House and our colleagues in the Senate. Congress must now complete its reconciliation of the Darfur Peace and Accountability Act and provide the funding necessary for the AU mission until the United Nations takes over.

The Darfur rebellion began just 3 years ago, as we all know. But already hundreds of thousands have perished, and more than 2 million others have been displaced as a result.

Both the southern rebellion and the Darfur rebellion have now perhaps ended, and we have the signed peace agreements to prove it. We are grateful for this glimmer of hope and opportunity, but Sudan's history of strife and failed peace agreements cannot help but make us cautious in our optimism.

In a half century of independent nationhood, Sudan has endured 40 years of civil war. One must ask what is the character of a government, a society and nation that has lived four-fifths of its independent existence engaged in civil war; and what will it take, assuming there is all of the international good will and support in the world, to fundamentally change a place so accustomed to strife?

I am anxious to hear from our distinguished witnesses today, who will no doubt inform us on what has been accomplished and the many significant tasks that lay ahead in an effort to promote a truly comprehensive and lasting peace in Sudan.

With that, I turn to my good friend and colleague, the distinguished Ranking Democrat Member Tom Lantos, for his opening remarks. Mr. LANTOS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman; and let me first commend you for your personal leadership on this most important and pressing issue.

I want to welcome Ambassador Frazer and Mr. Pierson.

Mr. Chairman, Members of our Committee have been engaged in the heart-rending situation in Sudan for many years as it has faced famine, internal strife and outright civil war; and since the start of the appalling crisis in the Darfur region you have repeatedly spoken out. Our colleague and my friend, Mr. Payne, offered groundbreaking legislation in 2004, calling the situation in Darfur genocide.

Mr. Chairman, you led the way on the Darfur Peace and Accountability Act of 2006 now being discussed in House Senate negotiations; and, just yesterday, our colleague, Ms. Lee, and six other Members of the Congressional Black Caucus subjected themselves to arrest on the steps of the Sudanese embassy, as I and other colleagues had done in April, to keep attention focused on Sudan's brutal prosecution of its own people in Darfur.

Ultimately, though, Congress can do only so much. The Administration must use its international clout to see to it that words become deeds, that agreements are enforced, and that countries around the world can no longer ignore what is happening in Darfur, and we will put a stop to that.

Mr. Chairman, the task of bringing peace to Darfur has been daunting. The Sudanese Government and its notorious Arab militia, the Janjaweed, have massacred hundreds of thousands of civilians, raped girls and women in a brutal intimidation campaign, displaced over 2 million people, burned 60 percent of their villages, destroyed their livestock and crops, and poisoned their wells. While international pressure, led by the United States, continued

While international pressure, led by the United States, continued to mount during the past few months, the Government of Sudan opposed every possible proposal to bring stability and relief to Darfur. Sudan rejected a proposal in March to deploy UN peacekeepers to Darfur and threatened to resign from the African Union if the African Union Peace and Security Council voted to hand over the mission to the United Nations.

To maintain the pressure, in April, the President ordered a freeze on the assets of anyone who posed a threat to stability in Darfur and barred United States citizens and companies from doing business with them. Meantime, the United Nations Security Council imposed travel and financial sanctions against four Sudanese thugs suspected of involvement in atrocities against civilians.

Mr. Chairman, international pressure on Sudan finally paid off 2 short weeks ago. I was pleased to be able to discuss this at length with Secretary-General Kofi Annan just a few days ago, and I want to pay tribute to Deputy Secretary of State Zoellick for his extraordinary efforts in reaching this agreement.

The agreement that we have reached is not perfect, but it does lay the foundation to move Darfur forward in the same way as the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between Khartoum and southern Sudan.

In spite of this historic agreement, the situation in Darfur is very far from being resolved. Two small rebel groups have refused to sign, demanding more concessions from the Khartoum Government. The Arab Janjaweed must be disarmed and rebel forces integrated into the national army.

Mr. Chairman, the work of transforming the African Union mission into a larger, more robust and more mobile United Nations operation has begun with the passage of the UN Security Council resolution. According to Secretary-General Kofi Annan, this follow-on UN force will be much bigger than the current African Union force, but it will need major logistical support from member states that are in a position to provide it. NATO is just the entity to coordinate the necessary support for the Darfur mission.

I have introduced House Resolution 723, calling on the President to take immediate steps to help improve the security situation in Darfur, with specific emphasis on civilian protection through NATO involvement.

I hope we can approve this resolution in the very near future, but we can't wait until a truly effective civilian protection force is established in Darfur. The international community has a moral imperative to ensure that tens of thousands of civilians don't perish waiting for help to arrive. But that is precisely what may occur.

waiting for help to arrive. But that is precisely what may occur. Earlier this week, the World Food Program announced it would have to cut rations in Darfur in half due to lack of financial support. I find this particularly appalling in view of the fact that the oil-exporting countries had suddenly received tens of billions of windfall revenues as a result of sky-high oil prices, but their help to Darfur is nil. The people of Darfur are experiencing a genocide, and the international community is cutting their food supplies in half. Did the world learn nothing from the Holocaust, from Cambodia and from Rwanda?

We contributed 85 percent of the funding for the World Food Program's efforts in Darfur. When a pledging conference is belatedly held next month, the Administration must make it clear to other donors, and potential donors, that turning a blind eye to starvation in Darfur is simply unacceptable.

Mr. Chairman, thank you for convening this important and timely hearing. The road to this fragile peace agreement has been long and hard, but the people of Darfur have suffered horribly and are desperate for help. With the Darfur peace deal, there is reason to hope that the end to this human tragedy has begun, but we are only at the beginning.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Mr. Lantos, thank you for your eloquence but, more importantly, for your commitment to human rights and humanitarian issues in Darfur and around the world. Thank you for your leadership.

As all of my colleagues know, we may be fractured on budget priorities, tax policy, but when it comes to human rights and especially to Darfur there is absolutely no division between Democrat and Republican; and that is how it should be. Thank you, Mr. Lantos.

Mr. Tancredo?

Mr. Payne, Ranking Member of the Africa, Global Human Rights and International Operations Subcommittee.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for calling this very important hearing; and let me commend my good friend, Mr.

Lantos, for the interest that he has taken in the issue in Darfur. Being a Holocaust survivor, he knows better than anyone here the daunting challenges and the commitment that must be made by all of us so that we can perhaps at one time say never again; and I appreciate your commitment to this and to Ms. Lee who, as was mentioned by our Ranking Member, was arrested this past—several days ago with six other Members of the Congressional Black Caucus.

And, of course, I am very pleased that this issue is finally getting the attention it should get. I was arrested a year or so ago and had to spend time in jail and also to court for a long day explaining why I continued to trespass on the property. As a matter of fact, I was told by the judge that if I went back on the property I would get 6 months in prison, period.

But I guess we are in a democracy, and I guess justice says that you can't trespass. But anyway, I am pleased that we are moving this agenda item to the fore.

Let me first express my appreciation for all of you and the millions of Americans and other citizens who tirelessly fought against genocide and stood with the helpless people of Darfur. Irrespective of the enormous challenges and difficulties, we stood together and called the atrocities in Darfur by its rightful name, genocide.

I would also like to welcome the representatives of the Darfur people who are at the hearing today. Senior members of the Sudan Liberation Movement, I might ask them, why don't you stand for a minute? They have come here. Thank you very much. They are the ones who have been fighting and trying to protect their people and their women and their children. Several came here from Abuja talks, and we have had some talks yesterday.

Many of their families, many families of these young men here died in the genocide and many of their friends died fighting the brutal regime in Sudan and their Janjaweed allies. Let me thank you, men, for your courage for defending your helpless friends and neighbors and families.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit a statement from the SLM for the record so that their perspective is known to all.

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Without objection, so ordered.

[The information referred to follows:]

### STATEMENT OF MR. BAHRELDIN ARABI

Honorable Members of the Congress.

I feel deeply honored to present this statement to the hearing of the world's greatest democratic legislative institution. May I begin by expressing our deepest appreciation to you and through you to the people of the United States of America for all the help and the good work that has been done to the people of Darfur.

Distinguished Members the people of Darfur always have you in mind in their suffering and thank you endlessly for all the help America has given in the hour of their need.

Distinguish Members,

Since our independence from the British colonial rule in 1956, the Sudan has been ruled by a minority of particular ethnic group comprising three Arabized tribes; let us call them Jaaleen, the Shaygia and the Danagla.

This minority group inherited the power from the British and effectively monopolized it for fifty years. It used the power to advance the conditions of its members economically and socially, largely through public service employment and monopoly of the economic opportunities of the entire nation to the benefit and empowerment of its members and determent and exploitation of the rest of the indigenous population whether in the South, the West or the East. As a result of the exclusion and marginalization of the indigenous Africans in the political and socio economic scheme of things fostered by memories of slavery (pockets of which still existed to this day in Sudan) people lost their dignity and a spirit of un belonging developed.

Today, this section of the population which constituted less than fifteen percent of our total population controls politics of the Sudan and the entire economy. Their culture and way of life has become the official culture and way of life of the country, largely through their control and direction of the national socio-cultural policy and the media.

Our people in the regions are so excluded and marginalized that more than sixty ercent do not aspire to send their children to primary schools, due to abject pov-erty. Of the forty percent that might go to school, less than fifty percent continue to high school level and of this less than twenty percent might proceed to the university level.

In view of this injustice, our brothers in the South took up arms on several occa-sions, lastly was in 1983. Their struggle continued till 2004 when a comprehensive peace agreement of power sharing, wealth sharing and security arrangements was signed in January 2005.

In the circumstances of the day it seemed that the only language this minority establishment understood was armed opposition.

Our people in Darfur revolted in August 2002 to demand equitable share in power and wealth. But the Khartoum regime instead of listening to our legitable demands resorted to genocide and outright ethnic cleansing. It decided to wipe out entire communities by using its ground and air forces against innocent civilians and their property and by arming and funding Arab tripes men and giving them license to kill, rape, loot, destroy and burn whole towns and villages. This resulted in killing more than 300,000 innocent civilians between 2002 and 2005, raping thousands of women and displacing more than three million, some 200,000 of them refugees in Chad.

The situation became so dire and catastrophic that could only be described as (the world worst humanitarian crises). This disaster moved the international community and the good people and government of the United States of America became actively involved and brokered a humanitarian seize fire in April 2004, and there after the protocols for the delivery of the humanitarian relief and improvement of security situation in Darfur.

But the government and its Arab militias (Janjaweed) have never respected or

honored the agreements. On May 5, 2006 with the active mediation of the United States government the Darfur peace agreement (DPA) was signed between the government of Sudan and the main faction of Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM). The other two movements refrained to sign the agreement.

SLM main faction signed the agreement to put an end to the suffering of the mil-lions of the displaced people and refugees and to avoid going back to war which could be a new pretext for Khartoum regime to continue the genocide.

The agreement itself achieved little to the people of Darfur, but it is hoped that the international community and the people of the United States stand by the people of Darfur to achieve their just objectives through peaceful democratic means.

Once again I thank you for the honor and your patience.

Mr. PAYNE. Let us thank you. Let us remember the victims of the Rwanda genocide. Twelve years ago today, to this day, innocent citizens in Rwanda were butchered and maimed, raped, hacked to death, same kind of atrocities we witnessed over the past 3 years in Darfur.

Almost 2 years ago, the United States Congress declared the atrocities genocide. How we were so elated and proud believing that we were going to do something to save lives. I was so sure that this time around it was going to be different, assuming that we learned from Rwanda. I must confess that I never thought I would even succeed in getting the resolution passed through the House; 421 to zero declared that genocide was going on. So we did the right thing in 2004.

But I must also make admit publicly today that we have failed. We declared genocide. We gave hope to people of Darfur that it was going to be different. Instead, what do we have? Those that could have been saved are dead. Those that are in camps continue to suffer, irrespective of this declaration.

And we have done a lot. However, it is not enough. We declared genocide, but we continue to wine and dine the architects of genocide. As we speak today, one of the architects of the genocide is here in Washington, DC, Ali Ahmed Karti, the former PDF coordinator, right here today.

In 2004, I met a woman in a refugee camp on the border of Chad and Sudan. I wanted to ask her what happened to her and her family. She told us how she witnessed her neighbors being put in a hut and sealed and burned. She talked about the Janjaweed and government security people killing a pregnant woman. She talked about the fact and showed the mark on her chest where a Janjaweed hit her with the butt of a rifle and said, that is because your children are black and you gave birth to black children. And we looked at the despair in this woman.

She also said could I help find her sons that were somewhere? Of course, an impossible task, but I went back 6 months later to look for her to tell her we believe we were unable to find her sons.

But these are the human stories that occur day in and day out and day in and day out, but the beat just goes on.

So, hopefully, we will see some change.

What does this agreement that was recently signed in Abuja or the declaration of genocide mean to her and her family? Very little now, because they are dead.

But imagine being told that the Janjaweed killed your brother the same day being pressed to sign an agreement. That is what happened to Minni Minnawi. The leader of the SLA at the Abuja talks got the word that he was being pressed to sign the agreement, but his father had already been killed and his sister died in an accident trying to reach the father. So these human tragedies are what we have to remember when we talk about never again.

As United Nations pulled its peacekeeping force out of Rwanda at the height of the genocide in Rwanda, the people of Darfur have seen very little of the UN over the past 3 years. In fact, there are 9,000 troops currently in Sudan, but not one of them did a single thing to save a life in Darfur because they were assigned to the south. Even though my late friend Dr. John Garang requested that the UN go to the Darfur region, they were not.

Yet they still debate about what type of force to deploy to Darfur. Once again, too little, too late.

So as we move forward, I am sure Darfur will face the same fate as other tragedies did in the past. I fear that it will soon be forgotten and abandoned. Only a few dedicated people will remain to fight to protect the helpless.

Agreement or no agreement, we must continue to demand accountability. Those who committed those atrocities in Darfur are the same ones who killed hundreds of thousands of people in the south in the Nuba Mountains and currently in Eastern Sudan. We must also help the displaced and the refugees to go back home so that they can once again start to have their lives reconstructed.

So, Mr. Chairman, once again, I thank you for having this hearing; and I look forward to hearing the testimony of our witnesses. Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Thank you very much.

Before going to my remaining colleagues, in consultation with Mr. Lantos, we would ask that Members—if we could keep their opening comments to about a minute or so it would be helpful. We do have votes scheduled for 11:30, and we do want to get to our witnesses.

Mr. Wilson.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to thank you for pointing out that this is a bipartisan concern and initiative.

I had the great privilege of accompanying Congressman Payne and Congresswoman Lee to visit Darfur in January. As I was there, I was so impressed and appreciative of what the United States Agency for International Development is accomplishing for the people. There was shelter, there was food, there were educational items for the children. It just made you so proud to see a very visible and very significant and meaningful presence of USAID.

Mr. Chairman, I also want to commend you on your good judgment in securing and providing for the employment of Greg Simpkins.

Greg, who is the staff person sitting next to you, was invaluable in my visit to Africa. He has great insight of the issues, he has great compassion for the people, and he is on a first-name basis with President Mbeki of South Africa, President Kufuor of Ghana and President Sirleaf of Liberia. So we should be very fortunate to have staff persons who are so capable.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Wilson. Chair recognizes Mr. Blumenauer.

Mr. BLUMENAUER. Thank you.

I do appreciate this opportunity that you have given us to reflect on the optimism surrounding the Darfur Peace Agreement, but, as our Ranking Member said, we need to consider the reality on the ground.

As we have seen the recent news accounts, the cease-fire is not being felt on the ground in Darfur; and I personally have deep concerns and look forward to hearing from our distinguished witnesses about how we are putting the provisions for disarming the Janjaweed. The security of the people of Darfur will remain in the hands of the people who are their oppressors, having integrated many of these people into the Sudanese army.

I have a personal bias that I am hopeful we will be able to deploy a well-trained, well-armed international force with a strong mandate for active civilian protection, instead of regular UN Chapter 6 peacekeepers. I am hopeful that we can hear what we can do to try to change the nature and character of the Sudanese regime.

Our policies of holding the International Criminal Court at arms level troubles me, because I would like to see the highest levels of accountability in the Sudanese Government before the International Criminal Court.

And last but not least, I share in my colleagues' words of praise for Ambassador Zoellick, who has injected himself personally in ways when you talk to him you see that this goes beyond his job. But we have seen peacekeeping accords and agreements before in Rwanda, and I am interested in getting a sense of how this is different. I hope that we will be able to continue, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member, to focus on ways that our Committee can continue to be an effective ally in capitalizing on the promise of this agreement.

Thank you very much.

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Thank you.

Mr. Issa.

Mr. Issa. I would waive. I want to listen to the hearing.

Mr. Smith of New Jersey. Okay. Ms. Lee.

Ms. LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me thank you again for your leadership and for your commitment to working in a bipartisan way to make sure that our country continues to recognize the horrific genocide taking place in Darfur.

I want to just say to our Ranking Member, Mr. Lantos, how remarkable your leadership has been. You have led with your intellect, your heart and with your experiences as a Holocaust survivor; and I want to thank you for bringing that rich experience to this on behalf of ending the genocide in the Darfurian people.

To Mr. Payne, I continue to say that it has been you who has been the lone voice in the wilderness; and over the last 4 years I have just seen how Congressman Payne oftentimes alone has just moved forward day-by-day making sure this Committee and this country recognize that this is a genocide that is taking the lives of hundreds of thousands of people.

So we are here today, at this point, because of these great leaders who have forced our country to stand up and be counted.

I visited the refugee camps in Darfur on two occasions with a bipartisan delegation. Let me tell you, what we saw changed our lives forever.

I think that one of the reasons why we believe that we have to turn the heat up on the Sudanese Government is that we can't see another genocide taking place like Rwanda and we continue to say, "Not on our watch"; and for that reason Mr. Lantos, myself, Mr. Payne, many will continue to be arrested. Members of the Congressional Black Caucus believe it is time to stand up and be counted.

I thank the witnesses for being here, for your daily work to end the genocide. Let's hope that the door that has been opened with this peace agreement will open widely and will solidify and move forward the kinds of requirements that we need to stop the killing so people can go home and regain their lives.

Thank you very much.

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Chairman Royce.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good to see you.

I want to say hello to Ambassador Jendayi Frazer and Mr. Pierson.

I also had an opportunity to be in Darfur. We took a Nightline television crew in, along with Don Shield, and had an opportunity to go into a village that had been attacked; and we talked to survivors about what had happened there. Without question, the African Union observer team that we later met up with told us two things: One, there had been an attack that day in another village further south; and, second, that the Government in Sudan was involved in the attack, the government was involved in the bombing, the government was involved in the half tracks of military vehicles that swept in after the Janjaweed made their attack.

And the thing we heard from the victims that survived, including the children, they drew us pictures of the aircraft that were heading off. You could see what type of aircraft it was. They drew us pictures of, you know, the national Islamic front government forces and the Janjaweed.

One young boy put out his hand, and his hand was missing. It was bandaged you see. The Janjaweed had cut off his hand.

I think—and you can address this during your testimony—but given the fact that the Sudanese Government has been so slow in rolling out the provisions of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement that was signed in the south to end that country's long, long winds of war, I think we have to ask ourselves, do we believe the Government of Sudan will be more committed to living up to the commitments of this Abuja agreement?

I think the other thing that our policymakers have to consider is that numerous agreements that intended to bring peace to Sudan have been signed in the past, and they have been violated and ignored.

So we have to be thinking about the repercussions for non-compliance with the terms of Darfur Peace Agreement. We have to think about who is going to be the guarantor and what enforcement mechanisms will the guarantor have at its disposal.

So for us to be realistic—I very much appreciate the good work Ambassador Frazer has done on this and Mr. Pierson, but I think these are questions we have to address.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Mr. Delahunt.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Yes, I just want to echo the sentiments that have been expressed about Secretary Zoellick. I think it is reflective of a desire to address this issue which we are all concerned about.

I also want to commend Members of this Committee, particularly Don Payne and Barbara Lee and Diane Watson and Joe Wilson and Mr. Royce and yourself, Mr. Chairman, and, of course, the Ranking Member, for continuing to make this issue a priority not just for the Committee but for the American people.

I yield back.

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Thank you, Mr. Delahunt.

Ambassador Watson.

Ms. WATSON. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity to express my feelings.

I stand in awe of my colleagues, starting with our Ranking Member, Mr. Lantos, and Ed Royce, Barbara Lee, Joe, all the rest of you who have put your, more or less, lives on the line. Those who went to Darfur, those who stood out in front of the Sudanese embassy and were arrested, that is really standing up for what we believe in. Because we have failed, Mr. Chairman. Despite our years of repeating the words, never again, we have permitted genocide to happen right in front of our eyes.

And I know during the Second World War, Mr. Lantos, Americans said they didn't know. The people of Germany said they didn't know. Well, we know; and we cannot allow it to continue. It is true that we have taken many actions over the last 2 years, and we might pat ourselves on the back and say we have done all that we can. But the reality is that we have not done all that we should be doing.

Stopping the genocide now would be a relief to the Darfurians left alive. But it would be a cold message and comfort to the quarter of a million already killed and millions displaced and maimed.

We saw the drawings of the children when we were there, and they showed very clearly the government planes in their drawings. They showed us machetes with blood dripping from them.

They showed us machetes with blood dripping from them. We were told by the actual manager of the hotel that the Janjaweed would go in, and they wouldn't kill the people all at one time. They chopped their feet off. Then they would come back the next day and chop their arms off. And then they would leave them there to bleed to death. This is the kind of atrocity that is existing on our watch.

So we might have a peace agreement, and it is the product of tireless diplomacy and fervent arm twisting. It is yet to be seen if it is also a product of true compromise.

I hope that it is, but I fear it is an agreement built on sand, the product of not weary combatants desperate for peace but of weary western diplomats desperate for a piece of paper. We have got to do more.

I hope that Mr. Zoellick's agreement holds, but my greatest concern now is this, that we do not let this agreement mean that we deny justice for the millions of victims of this genocide. We must not repeat the mistakes of the past and trust the architects of slaughter as the defenders of peace, for they are not.

This agreement in no way absolves Omar Bashir of ultimate responsibility for this genocide, and there should be no destination for Mr. Bashir other than a criminal war court.

So I want to thank our panelists, because you are looking at the future United States policy toward this nation as we are looking at the policy as our obligation to the rest of that area, Middle East. So I wish you well. I thank you for what you have done. We have much more to do.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the time.

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Thank you, Ambassador.

Eliot Engel.

Mr. ENGEL. Well, thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

A lot of our Members have said it, but I want to add my voice. I think that our generation has many challenges, and I think that what is going on in Darfur is certainly one of them, and I don't want to sit idly by and allow this genocide to continue. I think it is just a travesty and a tragedy and it is one of the just tragic events of our lifetime that we are letting this happen.

Ten years ago, in Rwanda, some of us got onto the House Floor before a million people were slaughtered and said that this should not stand and if we did nothing a million people would die; and we were told that we were all overblowing the situation. Unfortunately, it is one of the things that came to pass; and we now know the tragedies going on in Darfur.

So I think that—I commend all my colleagues who are working on this and holding these hearings today. We have got to do everything that we can to focus attention and to get our Government and the world to not allow this to continue. It is absolute—it is just imperative that we do this.

Genocide can never be allowed to happen. You know, the Holocaust, as Ms. Watson pointed out, was something that people allowed to happen; and when America stepped in about bombing the Serbs in Kosovo that was our way of preventing genocide from happening. Here genocide is genocide; and the world's attitude, because it is happening in Africa, somehow or another it is—we turn the other way. It is just not something that we should allow to stand.

Ambassador Frazer, could you comment please on NATO and the role that NATO has been playing and should be playing? NATO has provided logistical support to the African Union until now. Do you think that a more robust NATO effort, including support for logistics, communications, intelligence, command and control and headquarter support would be available to the AU during this transitional phase?

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. She will get to your question.

Mr. ENGEL. I didn't realize. I will ask that later. I apologize.

So let me just conclude and say that I think history is going to judge all of us by what we do or don't do here; and I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Lantos for focusing attention on this.

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Thank you, Mr. Engel.

The Committee is very fortunate to have two very distinguished Administration witnesses with us today. In her current capacity as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Dr. Jendayi Frazer has played an indispensable role in advancing United States efforts to find a just and lasting peace not just in Sudan but across the African continent. She is tough and resourceful, and is truly making a difference. Prior to assuming her current position, Dr. Frazer worked as

Prior to assuming her current position, Dr. Frazer worked as United States Ambassador to South Africa and as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director of African Affairs at the National Security Council. She has enjoyed an auspicious career in both policy and academia, and we are pleased to have her here today.

Also joining us is the Honorable Lloyd Pierson, who currently serves as Assistant Administrator for Africa in the United States Agency for International Development and as the government representative on the Board of Directors of the African Development Foundation. In his capacity as Assistant Administrator, Mr. Pierson oversees USAID's largest and most complex operation in sub-Saharan Africa.

Prior to joining USAID, Mr. Pierson served as Chief of Staff and Chief of Operations at the Peace Corps and as Director of the Africa Division at the International Republican Institute. He, too, has enjoyed a long and highly distinguished career.

We are fortunate to have both of you here with us today.

Dr. Frazer, if you can begin.

# STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JENDAYI E. FRAZER, AS-SISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Ms. FRAZER. Thank you very much.

Good morning and thank you, Chairman Smith and Ranking Member Lantos, for calling this morning's hearing; and thank you, Members of the Committee, for your continuing concern for Sudan.

Mr. Chairman, with your permission, I would like to submit my written testimony for the record.

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Without objection, so ordered.

Ms. FRAZER. Thank you.

I am pleased to join you to discuss this important topic of the prospect for peace in Darfur. President Bush has directed the Members of his Administration

President Bush has directed the Members of his Administration to play a leadership role internationally in the effort to resolve the situation in Darfur. Just as United States Government commitment and leadership helped to resolve the 22-year long north-south element of the Sudan conflict, the President's goal has been for the United States to lead the way toward stability and peace in the Darfur region.

Darfur has been a crisis of major humanitarian proportions. Over 220,000 civilians have fled their homes and become refugees in neighboring Chad. There are approximately 2 million Darfurians who are internally displaced; hundreds of thousands have died from famine, disease and violence. In response, the U.S. Government has worked to find a political solution that will pave the way to a just and lasting peace.

The first week of May marked an important turning point in the negotiations that had been under way in Abuja, Nigeria, for some time. On May 1st, I joined Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick on a trip to Abuja to support the African Union mediation and work out a settlement on the established timeline. On May 5th, the Sudanese Government and the largest military rebel group in Darfur, led by Minni Minnawi, signed the Darfur Peace Agreement, the DPA.

This agreement is the culmination of sustained and successful mediation by the African Union, bolstered by senior level United States and international diplomatic efforts. This agreement represents an important step toward an historic opportunity to build a peaceful, democratic and secure future for the people of Darfur.

This comprehensive agreement is built around three key elements. The first involves security arrangements, the second involves political power sharing, and the last one involves wealth sharing.

With regard to security, this agreement requires the Government of Sudan to present a plan within 37 days for disarming the Janjaweed; and it calls for a complete verifiable disarmament of the Janjaweed militia by mid-October 2006. Various milestones on the way to this goal are delineated, as is the sequence requiring the Janjaweed and other armed militias to completely disarm before the rebel forces must do likewise.

Congressman Royce and Congressman Engel both asked how we can be sure that this is going to occur. It is important to note that President Bush has directed his Administration—Secretary Rice in particular—to go to the UN Security Council to get a resolution to pave the way for a UN peacekeeping operation which will be key to the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement.

We had a resolution passed on the 16th of May, UN Security Council Resolution 1679, which does pave that way. It will be an important element of implementation.

Congressman Engel, President Bush has also called for, and worked with, NATO to provide the various types of assistance that you outlined, enabling assistance which would include logistics, planning, intelligence, and communication—all so that we can immediately support and assist the African Union mission, AMIS, which is on the ground now.

So we are looking both in the immediate term to use NATO enablers to beef up the capability and in the longer term, i.e., within the next 6 months or so, to get the UN peacekeeping operation on the ground.

The second element of the Darfur Peace Agreement is in the political sphere. The agreement outlines a power-sharing consensus that gives the fourth most senior position within the Sudanese Government of National Unity presidency to the rebel movement.

This new job of Senior Assistant to the President and Chairperson of the Transitional Darfur Regional Authority is designed to allow the officeholder to oversee implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement. There will be 10 commissions of this Darfur Regional Authority, eight of which are to be led by movement members. This chairperson will also serve as Darfur's senior representative in Khartoum.

Again, when you ask about how we can ensure implementation, what is built into power sharing is that the movement will have the primary responsibility for overseeing that implementation in the region through this Darfur Regional Authority and through its 10 commissions, of which eight will be led by the movement.

The agreement also establishes a democratic process for the region to choose through popular referenda no later than July 2010 whether to establish a regional government or retain the status quo of three regions in Darfur.

Third, the agreement outlines a wealth-sharing plan within Sudan. The Government of National Unity is slated to create a forum for Darfur's reconstruction and development. The government's first contribution of \$300 million will be followed by \$200 million contributions for each of the following 2 years.

The agreement additionally established a commission to work with the United Nations to help refugees and displaced persons return to their homes, while also creating a commission to provide compensation to victims of the conflict.

Clearly, the international community will continue to provide the humanitarian assistance, the development and reconstruction assistance that will help to implement this third element of the Darfur Peace Agreement on wealth sharing.

This agreement is comprehensive in its reach. When it will be implemented, it will be a great accomplishment and enormously beneficial to civilians who have suffered so much in this conflict.

The Administration remains committed to working with Congress to end the suffering in Darfur and will continue to provide the extension of substantial food aid, development and reconstruction assistance and support for the creation of a robust United Nations peacekeeping operation that will protect civilians and create the conditions for displaced persons to return safely to their homes.

With this agreement, we have charted a path to lasting peace. There is much work to be done, as Congressman Watson says, but there is also good reason to believe that we will reach our common goal of peace and stability in Darfur.

Thank you again for inviting me to testify about this important issue, and I look forward to answering your questions.

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Thank you, Dr. Frazer.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Frazer follows:]

#### PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JENDAYI E. FRAZER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

### INTRODUCTION

Good morning, and thank you Chairman Hyde and ranking Member Lantos for calling this morning's hearing. I am pleased to join you and speak on behalf of the Administration. President George W. Bush takes the issue of Sudan seriously. For that very reason, he has made the push for peace in Sudan a centerpiece of his Africa agenda. President Bush has directed the members of his Administration to play a leadership role internationally in the effort to resolve the situation in Darfur. Just as U.S. government commitment and leadership helped to resolve the 22-year-long North-South element of the Sudan conflict, the President's goal has been for the United States to lead the way toward stability and peace in Darfur.

On April 30, I had the opportunity to speak for the Administration to the thousands of concerned Americans who gathered for the Save Darfur rally. Given this nation's history of supporting freedom and fighting against oppression and genocide, these citizens are right to be engaged. I affirmed to those assembled that bringing peace to Darfur is a top priority for their elected officials, and that the Administration is working diligently toward a resolution.

Darfur is a severe humanitarian crisis of major proportions. Over 220,000 civilians have fled their homes and become refugees in neighboring Chad. There are approximately two million Darfurians who are internally displaced. Hundreds of thousands have died from famine, disease, and violence. Hundreds of villages have been burned and looted, and there has been and continues to be widespread, egregious violence against women and girls, including rape. The U.S. government has demonstrated bold leadership on Darfur in a number

The U.S. government has demonstrated bold leadership on Darfur in a number of ways, including the official determination of genocide in September 2004. The United States remains the only nation to make such a determination, and U.S. government officials have aggressively sought a political solution for Darfur as the best way to implement a just and lasting peace.

#### FROM NEGOTIATION TO SETTLEMENT

The first week of May marked an important turning point in the negotiations that had been underway in Abuja, Nigeria, for some time. On May 1, I joined Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick on a trip to Abuja in an effort to support the African Union (AU) mediation and work out a settlement on the established timeline.

On May 5, the Sudanese Government and the largest military rebel group in Darfur led by Minni Menawi signed the Darfur Peace Agreement. The Darfur Peace Agreement was the culmination of sustained and successful mediation by the African Union, bolstered by senior level U.S. and international diplomatic efforts. The Agreement represents an important step forward in this process toward peace and reconciliation. It also marks an historic opportunity to build a peaceful, democratic, and secure future for the people of Darfur.

The international community is making a concerted effort to persuade those groups that have not signed the DPA, namely the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Abdel Wahid-led faction of the SLM, to sign. These parties must understand that failure to sign the DPA will mean they have no voice in the reconstruction and political leadership of Darfur. We are working steadily to bring these groups back into the process and onto the side of peace.

Much work lies ahead to successfully implement the Darfur Peace Agreement. U.S. efforts will be focused on a number of areas in the coming days and months. The first involves strengthening the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) in the short term, while also pressing for immediate United Nations Security Council action to authorize deployment of a peacekeeping mission for Darfur. President Bush asked Secretary Rice to go to the United Nations Security Council last week to push for a UN Security Council Resolution to move the process forward. A resolution was passed on May 16th. President Bush also instructed U.S. government officials to work with the AU and NATO to finalize details regarding the bolstering of AMIS. AMIS should be commended for its efforts to date.

We are also working to identify areas where we can provide immediate assistance for successful implementation of the political and wealth-sharing aspects of the Darfur Peace Agreement. It is important to bring the people of Darfur into the peace process. This includes offering a clear explanation of the Darfur Peace Agreement and what it means for peace in the region. The Darfur-Darfur Dialogue, a key element of the Agreement, will be critical to the success of this process. The United States also plans to support those who stand for peace.

At the same time, we are working with the African Union to encourage all parties to sign the agreement. They must seize the opportunity to achieve peace and democratic change in Sudan.

#### THE AGREEMENT ITSELF

The May 5 Abuja Agreement has three key elements. The first involves security arrangements, the second involves political power sharing, and the last involves wealth sharing. With regard to security, this Agreement requires complete, verifiable disarmament of the Janjaweed militia by mid-October 2006. The Agreement delineates various milestones toward this goal, and there is a detailed sequencing that requires the Janjaweed and other armed militias to completely disarm before rebel forces assemble and prepare for their own disarmament. Following this process, there will be strong rebel force representation in the leadership positions—officers and commanders—of the Sudanese Armed Forces.

In the political sphere, the Agreement outlines a power-sharing consensus that gives the fourth most senior position within the Sudanese Government of National Unity (GNU) Presidency to the rebel movements. This new job, Senior Assistant to the President and Chairperson of the Transitional Darfur Regional Authority (TDRA), is designed to allow the person who performs it to oversee the implementation of the DPA in Darfur, while also serving as the senior representative of Darfur in Khartoum. The Agreement also sets out a democratic process for Darfurians to choose their leaders and determine the status of Darfur as a region. Specifically, no later than July 2010, a popular referendum will allow the people of Darfur to choose whether to establish Darfur made up of the current three states with a regional government or retain the status quo of three states with no regional government.

Lastly, the Agreement offers a plan for wealth sharing within Sudan. The GNU is slated to create a fund for Darfur's reconstruction and development. Initially, the GNU will contribute \$300 million, and then the GNU will contribute at least \$200 million for each of the following two years. The international community is additionally committed to holding a donors' conference to pledge additional funds for Darfur, and the Chairperson of the TDRA will be invited to present a summary of the region's needs and priorities at this donor gathering. The Agreement establishes a commission to work with the UN to help refugees and displaced persons return to their homes, while also creating a commission to provide compensation to victims of the conflict. The GNU has agreed to make an initial \$30 million deposit into this compensation fund.

This Agreement is comprehensive in its reach. If this Agreement is implemented as it is written, this will be a great accomplishment and enormously beneficial for the civilians, who have suffered so much in this conflict.

#### WORKING TO END THE SUFFERING

The Bush Administration's commitment to a political solution in Darfur reflects the American people's fervent desire to see an end to the suffering of the people there. As President Bush recently noted: "Osama bin Laden attacked American efforts in Sudan and urged his followers to kill international peacekeepers in Darfur. Once again, the terrorists are attempting to exploit the misery of fellow Muslims and encourage more death. Once again, America and other responsible nations are fighting misery and helping a desperate region come back to life. And once again, the contrast could not be more clear."

The Bush Administration strategy for Darfur has operated along three tracks. There has been a political negotiation track ongoing in Abuja, a large-scale humanitarian and peacekeeping effort to help affected individuals in the region, and a diplomatic track at the United Nations in New York. The United States has played a leading role in the UN Security Council for action on Sudan and Darfur, and we seek a speedy transition from the African Union's force to a larger UN peacekeeping operation. The U.S. has also pursued targeted sanctions on individuals who have sponsored violence, as well as any individuals who impede the peace process.

### WORKING WITH CONGRESS

Congressional support for U.S. government assistance in Sudan has been critical. It has allowed us to be the number one provider of assistance to Sudan. Our current estimates for fiscal year (FY) 2006 envision a continuation of the \$1.3 billion funding level obligated in FY 2005. The Administration remains committed to providing such assistance.

such assistance. On behalf of the Bureau for African Affairs and the U.S. State Department, I would like to thank the House of Representatives for its continued generous support. We will use funds provided to continue our support to AMIS, to strengthen its ability to protect civilians, and to implement the Darfur Peace Agreement. Strong support for AMIS is vital right now. As the mission transitions from an African Union to United Nations-led operation, such support buoys and helps with the implementation of the recent Agreement.

#### COMPREHENSIVE PEACE AGREEMENT

Darfur has clearly been an urgent and pressing issue on the international stage. It is appropriate that we have rallied our resources and offered a strong response. However, it is also important that we not only focus on Darfur but remain focused on implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), which ended the 22-year civil war between the north and south of Sudan. This is critical to ensuring lasting peace and democracy throughout Sudan.

The CPA has reached a series of milestones. These include: the inauguration of the Government of National Unity and the formation of the Government of Southern Sudan, the formation of the Assessment and Evaluation Commission, and revenue sharing between the North and South regions of Sudan. Key flashpoints remain ahead, including the East and Abyei, and the United Sates continues to urge the Sudanese Government of National Unity to address these issues. The U.S. is also urging the rapid formation of the Joint Integrated Units called for by the CPA, which have been slow to develop, but will be important for maintaining security in the years ahead.

U.S. bilateral and multilateral assistance in southern Sudan is supporting key ministries in the Government of Southern Sudan; building schools, health centers, water points, and roads; helping refugees and displaced persons return and reintegrate into home communities; training the Bank of Southern Sudan; and helping with demining. The U.S. also supports the national census, which is critical for elections to proceed, assists with the transformation of the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) from a guerilla force into a viable national army, and training for nascent political parties. In sum, we are supporting the goal of a Sudan that is at peace and prosperous. These elements underscore the comprehensive nature of U.S. assistance to the people of Southern Sudan, as well as the institution building nature of such aid. This work is laying the foundation for democratic rule and stable, good governance for many years into the future.

#### CONCLUSION

The Darfur Peace Agreement helps chart a path for lasting peace in yet another region of a country too long ravaged by war. It will establish a framework for a democratic process that will allow the people of Darfur to choose their own leaders and determine the final status of Darfur as a region. While this is an important step forward, Darfur remains a violent and very troubled place where individuals' suffering has not yet ended.

Much hard work remains. The United States intends to continue assisting the people of Sudan as the President committed in his May 8th speech to increase food assistance to Darfur, even though the U.S. government is already providing 85 percent of the food distributed by the World Food Programme. The U.S. also urges other donor nations to join in providing: substantial food aid, development and reconstruction assistance, and support for the creation of a robust United Nations peacekeeping operation to protect civilians and create the conditions that will allow displaced persons to return safely to their homes.

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Mr. Pierson.

# STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE LLOYD O. PIERSON, ASSIST-ANT ADMINISTRATOR, BUREAU FOR AFRICA, UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Mr. PIERSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and to the Ranking Member, Mr. Lantos.

I have a brief oral statement I would like to read but a written statement that I request be included in the record.

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Without objection, your full statement will be made a part of the record.

Mr. PIERSON. Thank you.

Thank you for the opportunity to be here today to testify on Sudan. My colleague, Assistant Secretary Dr. Jendayi Frazer, has covered the political and security aspects of the United States Government policy in Sudan. My testimony seeks to summarize the United States Agency for International Development response to the crisis and the plans for the future.

Peace agreements in Darfur and Southern Sudan present USAID with the challenge of translating the political settlements into improved lives for all Sudanese citizens. The United States Agency for International Development is pursuing a parallel track. One is to aggressively do everything we can, despite the obstacles, to provide humanitarian assistance. The other is to assess the needs and provide longer-term development assistance. Peace and security are key to both.

Food assistance is illustrative of USAID's commitment to Sudan. This month, because of contributions from other donors to the UN World Food Program that have not kept pace with Darfur's continuing need, the World Food Program was forced to halve food rations to the region. In response, USAID is immediately shipping 47,600 metric tons of food, valued at \$48 million, to help restore full rations later in the summer, in addition to our current contributions, which are sizable.

To chart the course for the future, USAID is actively engaged with the Department of State on the Joint Assessment Mission to coordinate recovery and reconstruction in Darfur. However, no real progress can be made while the operating environment remains so precarious. Humanitarian operations in Darfur have been inhibited by ongoing violence and Government obstructionism. Factional fighting, banditry and lawlessness all put the flow of the assistance in jeopardy; and humanitarian organizations are increasingly targets of the attacks.

In addition, the Sudanese Government has resumed placing burdensome bureaucratic requirements on NGOs and often uses outright harassment against victims, witnesses and community leaders who report human rights violations. With these constraints, it will be a challenge to translate peace into reality.

In conclusion, I would like to thank you, Mr. Chairman, and the Ranking Member and other Members of this Committee for your continued interest and for all of the work and support that you have dedicated to Sudan and the region. Thank you as well for this opportunity to share USAID's commitment to Sudan's future.

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Pierson. [The prepared statement of Mr. Pierson follows:] PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE LLOYD O. PIERSON, ASSISTANT ADMINIS-TRATOR, BUREAU FOR AFRICA, UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVEL-OPMENT

#### INTRODUCTION

Good morning, Mr. Chairman, and Members of the Committee. Thank you for the opportunity to be here today to testify on Sudan. My colleague, Assistant Secretary Jendayi Frazer, has covered the political and security aspects of the U.S. Government policy in Sudan. My testimony seeks to summarize the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) response to the crises in Sudan and plan for the future.

Peace agreements in Darfur and Southern Sudan present USAID with the challenge of translating the political settlements of power brokers into improved lives for all Sudanese citizens. Sudan has been at war for the majority of its 50 years of independence. Its infrastructure is decimated, unable to serve its resident populations, much less the millions who hope to return to their homes as peace takes hold. At this critical time, USAID must not only continue to provide extensive, lifesaving assistance to Sudan's most vulnerable people, but also assist the Sudanese in their transition to a stable, secure country that serves its citizens equitably and ably.

The signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the Darfur Peace Agreement have ushered in a new era of American assistance to Sudan. USAID assistance was less than \$200 million in fiscal year (FY) 2003. In FY 2005, USAID oversaw obligations of more than \$855 million, including USDA's Bill Emerson Humanitarian Trust food aid, making it the USAID's largest and most complex program in Sub-Saharan Africa. In Darfur, USAID has been a leader in the massive international assistance program, providing extensive humanitarian and food aid, working to ensure humanitarian access, and preparing for eventual reconstruction. In Southern Sudan, USAID provides an integrated program of humanitarian and reconstruction assistance that is helping to strengthen the foundation of the peace agreement. In Eastern Sudan, where malnutrition and maternal mortality rates are among the highest in the country, USAID funds general food rations, supplementary and therapeutic feeding, and food-for-work activities. USAID also provides food aid to more than 80,000 vulnerable women, children, and the elderly in camps around Khartoum.

To allow more direct management of our massive countrywide program, USAID is reestablishing its mission in Sudan, and we have posted a director to Khartoum. Mission staff will be located in Khartoum and the southern city of Juba. USAID also will maintain a field presence in Darfur.

#### DARFUR

On May 5, 2006, Sudan's Government of National Unity and the main faction of the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army signed a historic peace agreement to bring an end to conflict in the Darfur region. The conflict has raged since 2003, and the resulting violence affects an estimated 3.8 million people, more than 2 million of whom have been driven from their homes. This peace agreement has finally brought some hope to Darfur's people by addressing their long-standing marginalization and charting a path for lasting peace.

USAID has been a leader in the humanitarian effort in Darfur and the rest of Sudan. In FY 2005, USAID oversaw obligations of nearly \$467 million to Darfur including \$347 million in food aid, \$108 million in other humanitarian assistance, and \$11.6 million toward conflict resolution. Each USAID activity aims to support life-saving interventions, protect civilians, and promote conditions for recovery. Twenty partners implement USAID programs in Darfur in a variety of sectors, including health and nutrition, food security and agriculture, water and sanitation, emergency supplies, income generation, and community and infrastructure rehabilitation.

Food assistance is illustrative of USAID's commitment to Sudan. This month, because contributions from other donors to the UN World Food Program (WFP) have not kept pace with Darfur's continuing need due to violence and displacement, WFP was forced to halve food rations to the region. In response, USAID is immediately shipping 47,600 metric tons of food, valued at \$48 million, to help restore full rations later in the summer. This rapid response was made in addition to our current contributions, which are sizable. Over the last six months, the United States has provided 85 percent of contributions received by WFP, and the pending supplemental appropriations bill contains provisions for \$225 million in food aid for Sudan, including \$150 million for Darfur, that would allow the United States to meet half of WFP's total 2006 appeal for Sudan. Despite these actions, immediate gaps in food assistance will remain. The Govern-

Despite these actions, immediate gaps in food assistance will remain. The Government of National Unity and other major donors must continue to stand with the United States in helping alleviate the suffering of people in Darfur.

To lessen the need for emergency food assistance, it is essential to improve food security. In North Darfur's camps, 83 percent of residents relied on agriculture for income before they were driven from their homes. Now, because of scarce resources and expanding populations, only 4 percent are able to earn money farming. USAID is working with residents of the camps and surrounding communities to create cropsharing partnerships that benefit both groups. The initiative has not only improved agricultural yields in the area, but also helped reduce conflict between host communities and displaced people.

Strong communities are a necessary element of sustainable peace. USAID is supporting reconciliation efforts throughout Darfur that minimize tensions among displaced people and host communities by improving local capacity and supporting livelihood development. Young men and women in Darfur's camps are learning trades and vocational skills, like sewing and shoe-making, that improve their ability to generate income for their families.

Our initiatives aim to meet needs that cross sectors. One USAID activity trains midwives in South Darfur—which not only creates a source of income for the midwives, but also provides residents a much-needed service and improves maternal and child health. Our fuel-efficient stove program lowers the risk of violent attacks on women by reducing the amount of firewood they have to collect outside the relative safety of their camps. At the same time, fuel-efficient stoves improve family health by producing less smoke than traditional stoves, and they are easily and cheaply constructed by camp residents.

USAID has provided skills training to more than 67,000 displaced people in Darfur, including 700 community health workers. We have supported the construction of more than 16,000 latrines in Darfur, and our water and sanitation programs benefit 5 million people countrywide. Due to the timely provision of humanitarian assistance, overall global acute malnutrition rates fell from nearly 22 percent in September 2004 to less than 8 percent today.

To chart the course for the future, USAID will participate in the Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) for Darfur. This will build on the 14-month JAM process carried out by the World Bank and United Nations in support of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement that resulted in a detailed assessment of recovery and development needs. The framework focused on key themes crucial to consolidating North-South peace and facilitating broad-based human and economic development. USAID programs support the JAM's priorities and bolster the CPA by addressing the underlying structural causes of conflict and underdevelopment.

The Darfur Peace Agreement calls for a similar JAM process, with two phases: recovery and reconstruction. The United Nations is leading the first phase to determine and assess Darfur's immediate needs, then develop a preliminary action plan to take place alongside ongoing humanitarian assistance. Planning for the second phase, focusing on development and reconstruction, has also begun, led by the World Bank and African Development Bank. Efforts will be coordinated at a Netherlands-hosted donors' conference at The Hague in early October. USAID is actively engaged in planning and will be deeply involved in implementation of recovery and reconstruction efforts. At the same time, USAID and the State Department are discussing a coordinated U.S. reconstruction strategy for Darfur, which will initially coexist with ongoing humanitarian efforts.

However, no progress can be made while the operating environment remains so precarious. Humanitarian operations in Darfur have been inhibited by ongoing violence and government obstructionism. Military operations, factional fighting, ethnic conflicts, banditry, lawlessness, and janjaweed actions all put the flow of assistance in jeopardy, and humanitarian organizations are increasingly targets of attacks on compounds and vehicles. In December, these factors led the United Nations to suspend non-lifesaving programs in central and northern West Darfur, leaving only 47 percent of the population accessible to humanitarian agencies. Accessibility rates were higher elsewhere in Darfur—87 percent in North Darfur and 82 percent in South Darfur—but open conflict persists in all three states. While the largest military faction has signed on to the Darfur Peace Agreement, as the Assistant Secretary has said, much work needs to be done on the ground to bring an end to the violence, displacement, and fear that continues to plague the people of the region. In addition, the Sudanese government has resumed placing burdensome bureau-

In addition, the Sudanese government has resumed placing burdensome bureaucratic requirements on NGOs. Aid organizations are now subject to lengthy visa renewal processes, travel permit requirements, interference in staff hiring, fuel embargoes, and requests for internal financial information. A new bill requires all NGOs to clear project proposals, including funding levels and sources, through a Sudanese government system. The Sudanese government often uses outright harassment, including imprisonment, against victims, witnesses, and community leaders who report human rights violations.

With these constraints, can peace in Darfur become a reality? President Bush said, "we are still far away from our ultimate goal . . . but now we can see a way forward." The agreement offers Darfur's people the first signs hope that peace may finally be attainable. It also brings great expectations that positive signs of recovery, security, and development emerge as soon as possible. USAID aims to help Darfur's people achieve that goal through both our larger programs, like food assistance, and our smaller programs, like the Violence Against Women initiative.

As villages were razed and homes destroyed throughout Darfur, many women were forced to flee with only the clothes on their backs. As time passed, their clothes became worn and threadbare. Unaccustomed to such immodesty, many women and girls resorted to conducting their chores and daily activities during the evening hours, under the cover of darkness, when the risk of assault was at its greatest. USAID worked with a local organization to procure and distribute 76,000 traditional dresses throughout Darfur's camps. These women and girls can now move around during the day without shame. All it took was a bit of adequate clothing to restore a measure of safety and dignity to so many people who have had to go without for so long.

Whether it is through agriculture, training, or even just basic clothing, USAID will continue to support the needs of Darfur's people as they take the next steps toward peace.

#### SOUTHERN SUDAN

Two decades before violence consumed Darfur, a civil war erupted between Sudan's north and south. On January 9, 2005, the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), officially ending Africa's longest running civil war. During the two-decade conflict fighting, famine, and disease killed more than 2 million people and forced more than 4 million from their homes, creating the largest population of internally displaced people in the world. The CPA ended the devastating North-South violence and provided for a new constitution and protocols for power sharing, wealth sharing, security.

However, as in Darfur, the CPA also brought with it high expectations from the Sudanese people. Millions who were driven from their homes and millions more excombatants and orphans must be reintegrated into communities with weak institutions and infrastructure. Inter- and intra-ethnic tensions over power and natural resources persist. Joint integrated forces have not been established. And the nascent Government of Southern Sudan lacks the institutional capacity and structures required to respond to the needs of its citizens with roads, schools, hospitals, and water and sewage systems, and an end to insecurity.

To address these challenges, USAID is working with new government entities to forge a path to development. USAID reconstruction programs in Southern Sudan are integrated with humanitarian programs to help reduce suffering, promote stability, and mitigate the causes of conflict. Every activity seeks to build human and institutional capacity, increase access to accurate and reliable information, and cultivate systems for good governance and infrastructure development. Our efforts support the implementation of the CPA and seek to reduce risks that could put peace in jeopardy.

To assist in the establishment of a transparent and accountable government in Southern Sudan, USAID is working to improve the capacity of key ministries and supporting the development of political parties and civil society. Creating a legal framework for the Southern government, developing structures that minimize corruption, and completing a national census will also enhance governance. Our programs work to build understanding about the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, inform citizens of their roles and responsibilities, cultivate a peaceful dialogue, and establish an independent media. To increase access to basic health services, USAID trains county medical officers and conducts national immunization days and polio eradication campaigns. HIV/AIDS prevention activities, especially targeting highrisk areas, promote changes in behavior and voluntary testing and counseling. Our support for economic recovery in southern Sudan aims to improve agricultural practices, promote exports, and empower community-driven development.

Education is another area of focus—and one that will be key to overcoming past conflicts and building toward the future. The legacy of inequality and exclusion that drove the North-South conflict also marked the broken, rudimentary schools of the South. Education never reached the majority of the Southern Sudanese, and schools were erratically run by missionaries or the central government. Over the last four years, USAID has worked with dedicated Sudanese to create the first ever unified curriculum for Southern Sudan, which will for the first time enable schools to teach standard themes from standard materials that are equitable and accessible. To support the curriculum, USAID is rehabilitating schools, developing educational materials, training teachers, and mobilizing communities to get involved with their local schools. Our activities aim to cultivate local ownership of vital institutions—and develop the local capacity to sustain those institutions over the long term.

#### CONCLUSION

Sudan stands at a critical juncture. Peace agreements create hope, but they also create challenges. We and others in the international community are excited at the prospect of pursuing security and stability, for the good of both Sudan and the broader region.

In conclusion, I would like to thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the Committee for your continued interest, and for all the work and support that you have dedicated to Sudan and the region. Thank you, as well, for this opportunity to share USAID's commitment to Sudan's future.

I welcome your questions on my testimony or any others you might have for me at this time.

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Let me begin the questioning.

First, on the African Union mandate—because, obviously, there will be a gap before the mission is blue-helmeted. We all remember the terrible outcomes of UNPROFOR in the Balkans when the mandate was insufficient, did not have a protection component to it.

Interestingly enough, when Greg and I met with African Union troops, one of those troops, Colonel Ojumbo, actually served in Sarajevo; and it was interesting that his mandate that he had was not unlike the mandate that UNPROFOR had during the Balkan crisis.

So my first question deals with will the blue-helmeted mission and will the AU mission as it exists—because it will have to deal with a gap here before the blue helmets arrive or before this mission is blue-helmeted itself—have an enhanced mandate to protect? That is the number one issue we heard over and over again, that the individuals, the civilians be protected.

Secondly, on the issue of food, Mr. Pierson, you just mentioned by this summer that \$48 million worth of foodstuffs—we are all aware that WFP said on April 13th that they had reduced their food rations by 46 percent of normal levels beginning in May, which is obviously now. Will there be a gap there between when the food arrives as the U.S. Government contemplates so that people do not become sicker and more malnourished in the interim?

And, finally, on the issue of trafficking, you know Mr. Payne and I have held in our Subcommittee a number of hearings on peacekeepers who engage in sexual exploitation and trafficking in the Congo. We know it is a problem worldwide. We know it is a problem with every military on the face of the Earth.

The Trafficking Victims Protection Act requires, as you know, the Secretary of State, in the annual TIP report, to include a report on measures taken by international organizations in which the U.S. participates, and that includes the AU, to prevent the involvement of their personnel in trafficking and sexual exploitation.

We also included in that law what steps a deployment—peacekeeping deployment plans on taking protections for the women and children so that we don't have a repeat of the atrocities that were committed against Congolese children.

My question is, especially in light of the allegations in Refugee International on April the 7th that put out a statement, an allegation of exploitation by African Union peacekeepers, and they, you know, say they are gravely concerned but not surprised to hear of reports of exploitation and abuse by African Union peacekeepers.

Now I don't know if those allegations are true or false. I don't know if they have been investigated. But what has been our response to those allegations when we met and continue to meet over the course of the last year with AU leaders?

I asked them every time what steps are being taken to mitigate and hopefully end any kind of exploitation by the peacekeepers so that they do not engage in exploitation of the local population, which obviously hurts them—they being the individuals that are exploited—but also does grave and maybe irreparable damage to a peacekeeping mission.

You can—if you can answer those three.

Ms. FRAZER. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman Smith.

On your question about the AU mandate and whether it would be an enhanced mandate, as well as the UN mandate on the AU mandate, I have actually read it because it has been debated quite a lot; and that mandate does provide for the protection of civilians in imminent danger. The problem is one of communication of the mandate; not all of the troops on the ground understand their mandate clearly.

It has also been a problem in command. Not all of the sector commanders have enforced that mandate aggressively; and most importantly, it has been a problem in capability, which is that even if they have the mandate, they often don't have the communications, intelligence and especially the airlift to get to a place of atrocity quickly to protect the civilians. They come after the fact.

And so I think that we really need, and with the UN, we will have, is the ability to increase the capability quickly. All of the paths, Security Council resolutions on Sudan have been under Chapter 7, and 1679 is also Chapter 7, which would give that robust mandate to protect civilians. That would be the intent of the UN peacekeeping mission there. So, yes, I would expect, certainly, that the United States support an enhanced mandate and also try to provide the NATO assistance to AMIS immediately so it can actually carry out its mandate.

I think I will leave to my colleague the question on the humanitarian situation.

[The information referred to follows:]

WRITTEN RESPONSE RECEIVED FROM THE HONORABLE JENDAYI E. FRAZER TO QUESTION ASKED DURING THE HEARING BY THE HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH

The Department takes issues of sexual exploitation seriously, especially in the context of the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS). The African Union's (AU) Women, Gender and Development Directorate (WGDD) is leading an ongoing investigation by an AU board of inquiry into the allegations you referenced. The AU is also pursuing longer-term corrective measures through the WGDD with plans to run a larger program of gender issues training for African peacekeepers. In addition, the international community has shown its support for dealing with potential problems of exploitation. The European Union has dispatched a senior civilian police expert

to Darfur to assist the AU with its investigation and Sweden has devoted funding for AMIS gender issues training as well.

Ms. FRAZER. On the issue of trafficking, Mr. Chairman, I will look into it to try to find out about those allegations.

The one area in which I think the United States, particularly, can be supportive is to call the AU to have some accountability to remove any soldiers that have been—there has been an allegation against them, to call for national accountability as well from the governments of those soldiers.

I know that the South Africans have taken very aggressive action against many of their peacekeepers in the Congo that have been involved in exploitation, and I think also we can more directly deal with this because we have helped to train, and we will train, some of the African Union forces that go into Darfur and our training of them can emphasize the responsibility of peacekeepers not to exploit.

Mr. PIERSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

In terms of the question on food aid and will there be a gap, the short answer is, yes, sir, there will be a gap. Under the instructions of the President, there is an emergency amount of food aid that USAID is getting to Sudan. There are 2,850 metric tons of noncereal commodities that are in Dubai and are being shipped on an immediate basis to Sudan. They were on the seas, that were going to be pre-positioned, a total of 4,650 metric tons of noncereal. By "noncereal" in this case, I mean vegetable oil, that was going to be pre-positioned for delivery, but those ships had been rerouted and they are going to Port Sudan.

In addition, there are 40,000 metric tons of cereals that are being purchased in the United States on an emergency basis. A total of \$36.2 million—the value of that 40,000 metric tons is \$36.2 million—that is being purchased on an emergency basis, and then that will be shipped.

Within the last 2 weeks—in many situations such as this, the United States makes a very strong commitment, and the United States fulfills that commitment. The challenge often is to make sure that others who have made the commitments, that they fulfill them, and within the last 2 weeks, there have been demarches that have gone to 24 other countries, requesting that they fulfill on an immediate basis the food aid that they had committed.

Our staff, including our new Administrator, our Director of Foreign Assistance, are making personal calls to try to ensure that these commitments are made; and it is also my understanding that the Government of Sudan has, we are told, a sizable amount of food stocks and has committed 20,000 metric tons of food to Darfur. That is the first commitment they have made. There is no assurance at all that that commitment will be fulfilled, but nevertheless, that is the picture.

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Thank you.

Mr. Lantos?

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me commend our two witnesses.

I want to follow up on the last part of this discussion because the whole tragedy in Darfur also reminds one of the lunatic irrationality of anti-Americanism on this planet. We have done more than the rest of the global community combined to assist. At the highest levels of our Government, involving Secretary Rice and Deputy Secretary Zoellick, your own work, 85 percent of the food aid which has gone is American, and yet of the extra petrol billions flowing into the coffers of Putin and Chavez and the Saudis, not one dime has gone to deal with this global disaster.

I am not asking you to explain this, because it is inexplicable, but it is appalling that as the United States leads the way in yet another humanitarian crisis, in an almost exclusive fashion, the criticism, from all quarters, of our international actions continues unabated.

Now, I would be the first one to recognize we have made plenty of mistakes, but let me just say—if you would care to comment to my knowledge, Libya is the only Arab country which has provided some assistance to Darfur. Not one of the countries of the Islamic Alliance has done anything. Saudi Arabia has done nothing.

The Saudi foreign minister is in town. Several of us were to have dinner with him last night, which we had to cancel because Congress was in session, and I am just wondering if you can expand on this set of demarches to 24 countries which should have responded—in many cases, promised—and have done nothing so far.

So Ambassador Frazer or Mr. Pierson, I would be happy to hear from either of you.

Mr. PIERSON. There is no question, Congressman, that in this situation, and I think in virtually every other humanitarian situation that exists in the world, the United States is the most generous. It does not mean that others do not participate and participate very strongly.

In this situation, it is very grim, and there have been, and will be, continuing efforts to try to ensure that other commitments from other countries have been made. EU countries—any country that has made a commitment so far has been contacted or is in the process of being contacted.

In terms of any of the Arab states, I would have to request that I include that in the record. It is my understanding that Saudi Arabia has made a \$10 million commitment, but I cannot confirm that. I would like to provide that for the record.

Mr. LANTOS. In view of the extra billions in petrol dollar earnings that go to the oil-exporting countries from Venezuela to Saudi Arabia to Russia, their lack of participation in this global humanitarian crisis is absolutely appalling; and I would be grateful if you would submit for the record before the end of the day, the 24 countries where demarches have been made by our Government.

Again, although we are leading the way, the United States is the butt of global criticism; and I think it is important that we on this Committee stand up and reject this as an outrageous singling out of the country which is doing more than the entire world combined to deal with this crisis.

Thank vou, Mr. Chairman.

[The information referred to follows:]

# WRITTEN RESPONSE RECEIVED FROM THE HONORABLE LLOYD O. PIERSON TO QUESTION ASKED DURING THE HEARING BY THE HONORABLE TOM LANTOS

#### OTHER DONOR CONTRIBUTIONS TO WFP

Thus far in 2006, no Arab states other than Libya and the Government of Sudan itself have contributed to the U.N. World Food Program's operation in Sudan. Attached is a resourcing update which shows all donor contributions to the World Food Programme "Food Assistance to Populations Affected by Conflict" to date.

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\* Calculation does not include carryover Difference in USAID vs. WFP figure due to cargo preference - WFP does not count value of commodifies shipped on US flag vessels as a contribution to their operation.

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Donor	Previous Contribution*		Increase	New Total**
Australia		s.	3,010,241 \$	3,010,241
Belaium	\$ 604,595	\$	<del>د</del> ۱	604,595
Canada	\$ 3,947,368	÷	8,849,558 \$	12,796,926
Denmark	•	€	1,712,329 \$	1,712,329
EC	۰ ج	ю	1,834,675 \$	1,834,675
France	۰ ج	θ	788,707 \$	788,707
Germany	۰ ب	φ	2,551,020 \$	2,551,020
Ireland	\$ 1,184,834	69	17,308 \$	1,202,142
Italy	\$ 1,176,470	θ	8,440 \$	1,184,910
Libya	\$ 4,514,792	ω	<del>دی</del> ۱	4,514,792
Luxembourg	' \$	θ	255,102 \$	255,102
Multilateral	' \$	ю	7,276,000 \$	7,276,000
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Total (WFP)	\$ 237,138,632	ŝ	117,909,698 \$	355,048,330
Total (USAID)	\$ 246,263,632	\$	119,210,100 \$	365,473,732
* As of 8 May 2006 ** As of 27 June 2006				

DONOR RESPONSE TO WFP ANNOUNCEMENT OF HALF RATIONS

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Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Mr. Tancredo.

Mr. TANCREDO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just a couple of questions.

First of all, could you give us an update on the status of any of the ongoing investigations of the International Criminal Court? I believe that that is a very important part of the solution, should we ever reach one in Sudan, that somebody actually be brought to justice.

There is a certain degree of fear, I think, on the part of the people who are involved with the atrocities here that we may actually pursue them, and something like this might be helpful. So I would just be interested to know what is happening on that front.

The other thing is, what is the situation in Chad? What is the relationship between Chad and the Khartoum Government? What can we expect? What can we—or should we fear some sort of, you know, continuation of hostilities or beginning of hostilities, maybe I should say?

And then, lastly, what are the events in eastern Sudan that we may be wanting to watch for, because I know that it is another hot spot beginning to develop.

Ms. FRAZER. Thank you, Congressman. On the ongoing investigation for the International Criminal Court, as you know, the United States has said that we would provide assistance to the International Criminal Court if they asked for it. They haven't asked the United States for assistance, so we assume that those investigations are going on and that they are, I guess, not needing our assistance at this time.

Mr. TANCREDO. So we are not in communication? Even though there is no request for assistance, we don't communicate with them on that basis?

Ms. FRAZER. As far as I know, Congressman, they haven't come back to us and asked us for any type of assistance in terms of information on any particular individuals.

We continue to work with the UN Security Council under Resolutions 1591 and 1593, and as you know, we have put sanctions on four individuals, and I know that that investigation with the highlevel panel was continuing. And we provide information; we provide names to the UN Security Council.

But on the ICC, to my knowledge, Congressman, they haven't come to us and asked us for any assistance. But—I will try to find out more and see if there is anything more that we can do, but we stand ready to assist them.

[The information referred to follows:]

WRITTEN RESPONSE RECEIVED FROM THE HONORABLE JENDAYI E. FRAZER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE TO QUES-TION ASKED DURING THE HEARING BY THE HONORABLE THOMAS G. TANCREDO

In March 2005, the UN Security Council passed resolution 1593 referring the situation in Darfur to the International Criminal Court (ICC). Pursuant to this referral, the ICC Prosecutor is in the process of investigating crimes committed in Darfur, but has not yet issued any indictments in connection with such crimes. The Prosecutor is scheduled to make his next semiannual report to the UN Security Council on his work in connection with the Council's referral of the Darfur situation on June 14. The United States has not received any request from the ICC for cooperation with its Darfur investigation. As Deputy Secretary Zoellick stated in his September 2005 testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in the event that the ICC made such a request, the United States would work to make sure that it was fully pursued.

Mr. TANCREDO. I understand, and I appreciate that, but if we could just get some indication of where they are in the process, I would certainly like to know.

Ms. FRAZER. Thank you.

As far as the situation in Chad and in Sudan, the African Union, particularly Libya and Sassou-Nguesso, the President of Congo, Brazzaville, have tried to broker some understanding between President Deby and President Bashir to try to reduce the tension on their border.

We think that it is important to get that UN Peacekeeping Operation there, which would be able to help to secure that border. You know, a larger force is necessary so that you don't have the movement of rebels back and forth.

Clearly, the Government of Chad has made allegations that the Government of Sudan has been funding and supporting an army of some of the rebels that attacked in N'Djamena, and I think the African Union is investigating those charges.

And, again, we will be providing information. If we have any information on those allegations, we will provide it to the AU at their request.

But we are working with the AU in terms of trying to get both parties to not support rebels in each other's territory; and I think ultimately, as I said, it is important to get the African Union and transition to a UN peacekeeping operation so we can increase the numbers. As a matter of force generation, AU simply doesn't have the numbers to secure that border.

And on the eastern front, this is clearly a case where we need to do all that we can to prevent the type of insurgency, that has taken place in Darfur because of the marginalization of the people, from occurring in the east; and we are working, again, partly with the AU.

They have looked to Libya and to Eritrea to try to broker negotiations between the government, particularly the Beja community. But I also think it is important for the Government of Sudan to take a strategic decision, which we haven't seen yet. Most of the decisions are tactical and based on pressure from the international community. They haven't yet taken a strategic decision to end the marginalization of the people across Sudan, and that is what is needed.

It is not pressure from outsiders; it is for the government to recognize that when they signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and ended the 22-year civil war, implementation of that agreement as a national document in which all elements of Sudanese society have a role in power-sharing and role-sharing in the country is important. And that type of strategic decision is something, I think, perhaps a country like Libya could help the Government of Sudan to understand.

When Libya was trying to acquire weapons, they changed. They said, okay, no more, you know, and they made a fundamental strategic decision to change; and that is what is really needed from the Government of Sudan.

But in the meantime, as they take tactical decisions, the United States will continue to work with the AU to try to facilitate any mediation to prevent another outbreak in eastern Sudan.

Mr. TANCREDO. Do either of you think that the potential for continued violence throughout Sudan and at various parts, if we are successful in bringing peace to Darfur-it does seem to me, I must admit to you, looking at this now for the 8 years that I have been here and the travels that I have had with Mr. Payne to Sudan, that the Government of Sudan either has a policy of continual

strife in the country, for reasons that I am not sure I understand. But it does seem that way, and/or they are unable to actually de-vise a coherent strategy for the country. I am not sure which, but I fear that it may be a mixture of both. And it puts us in this precarious position of again going to hot spots and anticipating the next one that is coming, because it certainly has been the modus operandi of the government.

Ms. FRAZER. That is right.

Mr. TANCREDO. Quite disconcerting. Thank you very much.

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Mr. Payne.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. I really value Mr. Tancredo's support. As indicated, his first trip as a freshman Member of Congress, within, I think, the first few months of his tenure to the U.S. House, was to go to southern Sudan with us. And I really commend him for that and for his interest right along in capital market sanctions, that we really wanted to hit the Government of Sudan very hard, but we were unable to keep capital market sanctions in our legislation.

But like I said, I would like to commend him for his strong support-and Congressman Wolf who, over the years, has really been a voice there, very clearly.

On the agreement, as we know, the Sudan Government is known best for its lack of living up to agreements. The Comprehensive Peace Accord, revenue sharing, troop deployment, many of the issues have not happened in the CPA.

Now we have a new agreement here. So if we follow logically, we have a logical syllogism, then we would almost certainly conclude, therefore, we will not have any more cooperation in this than we had for the South-North Accord.

However, you said that 8 of the 10 commissions will be headed by insurgent forces' leadership and that this transitional Darfur Regional Authority that the fourth person, Senior Assistant to the President.

Now, these—I understand that there was an interest in a position that would seem to be stronger, perhaps on a vice president level, which was rejected by the Government of Sudan, but do you feel that the government will, in your opinion-or what could be done to make the government, if we assume already that they will not comply, to allow these commissions that sound good on paper to really function, this Senior Assistant to the President and these 10 AID chairpersons of these 10 commissions?

Ms. FRAZER. Thank you, Congressman Payne.

I think that the Senior Assistant and Chairperson on the transitional Darfur Regional Authority is actually a position that is very powerful. As you say, it is still on paper; it has to be implemented. We believe that we will have to continue to have international support and monitoring to push for whoever is selected for that position to support their role, just as we support the Government of Southern Sudan and the First Vice President, Salva Kiir, in his role within the Government of National Unity.

Clearly, it is not a matter of us saying, okay, go forth and do your job based on the authorities given to you by the agreement. It is a matter of us providing assistance, of providing support.

The movements, as you know, will need quite a lot of capacitybuilding, quite a lot of training. We are, right now, looking at how we can support them, how we can even help them communicate the elements of this agreement back in Darfur. So there is going to be continuing interaction and support of this individual. Also, the movements will have to nominate an individual for this position, and you know that the movements aren't completely unified at this point.

So it is both within the movements themselves and getting them coherent, as well as pushing the Government of National Unity, which will have Vice President Salva Kiir there, who, I believe, will help us to ensure the implementation. But the international community's role will be critical.

The United States, the European Union, the U.K., and the Arab League were all witnesses to this agreement, which gives some responsibility for working with all parties to ensure its implementation.

Mr. PAYNE. Very good. Thank you.

What about the disarming of the Janjaweed? That is really going to be very interesting. We are asking the Government of Sudan to disarm the people that they have armed, where they even denied they armed them—not only armed them but encouraged them.

they armed them—not only armed them but encouraged them. And what kind of integration has been proposed for a military component in Darfur?

Ms. FRAZER. Yes. Thank you.

The plan for the disarming of the Janjaweed includes the government, as well as the movement overseeing a commission to see that disarmament, so it is not just the government itself monitoring, but the movement will have a critical role to play as well as the international community.

The AU is supposed to verify that, and we would say, slash, the UN. And the United States is committing to work with the AU in the immediate term to try to create some type of civilian protection unit, verification unit, to help with that process.

As far as the integration of the rebel forces in the Sudan Army, the agreement provides for 4,000 former combatants to be integrated into the army; 1,000 former combatants can be integrated into the police and 3,000 who will work with the government to support education and training programs, to assist the civilian reconstruction and development in Darfur.

The percentages are, about 33 percent of groups in the units, as was described at the talks in Abuja.

Mr. PAYNE. All right.

Well, since we are running out of time, I will just ask Mr. Pierson, what are your prospects for the immediate 6 months as relates to food security for the IDPs and refugees in Darfur and Chad? And I understand there are about 200,000 new displaced people from January 1 of this year that are also in need. Will there be enough provisions to get them through the rainy season and back into next year, in your opinion?

Mr. PIERSON. It is my understanding, Congressman, that with the emergency shipments, the additional ones that are currently being made, that that will fulfill about 70–75 percent of the individuals' food and non-food requirements. Within Darfur, that would be 2.8 million beneficiaries of the food—food aid and non-food. Nonfood aid is also going to the IDP and refugee camps in Chad through both Libya and through Cameroon, and I am told that while there are obstacles, those shipments are continuing.

In the south of Sudan, there is enough food and non-food that is pre-positioned throughout the rainy season and for the next 6 months to fulfill the requirements there. But it is essentially within Darfur, certainly in neighboring Chad and other areas, but essentially the 2.8 million beneficiaries of food and non-food aid within Darfur—the additional food aid and non-food aid that is currently being moved is expected to get its first shipment within the next couple of weeks to the port, on up until July. And then once it is at the port, it generally will take 2 to 4 weeks to get to its delivery sites.

A major part of the problem is the obstacles that occur with the Government of Sudan. We are constantly working on that. There was a promising announcement yesterday, but there have been other promising announcements.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much.

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Barbara Lee.

Ms. LEE. Thank you very much. Let me say, it is good to see you again, Ambassador Frazer, and also you, Mr. Pierson. Thank you for being here and for your testimony, but most importantly, for your work. You both are pivotal points in this tragedy, and it is a defining moment for our country, for the people of Darfur, and you certainly are critical and key in what you are doing to make sure this ends and ends quickly.

I wanted to ask you a couple of questions. First to Ambassador Frazer, prior to our last visit to Darfur, Secretary Rice was here, and I asked her, as she was before this Committee, because we hadn't heard for a while, for a reaffirmation of our statement of policy that genocide was taking place. And, of course, she restated that very clearly.

And when we arrived in Sudan, of course that was in the press and was the talk of the town, for the most part.

And I wanted to ask you with regard to pressure from the international community, the public protest, the agitation, the civil disobedience, the work that young people in the faith community are doing throughout our country, what kind of pressure and leverage does that have on the Khartoum Government? And what do you think in terms of how this works?

I did an interview yesterday, and it was interesting. Someone called and asked me, what does this have to do with my constituents in Oakland? So I am wondering if you see this as part of the overall strategy as necessary to end this genocide. Ambassador Frazer, let me just ask you that. And, Mr. Pierson, I just wanted to ask you about the food, the 40,000 metric tons of food. In terms of cost of shipping it there versus, say, perhaps buying it on the continent, buying the food locally, could that be a more effective and efficient and expeditious way to get the food to the people who are really, quite frankly, starving?

And finally, let me ask you, just in terms of the trauma and the mental health needs, of course when we were there, we saw it over and over and over again, the fact that people will need post-traumatic treatment when they return home. I mean, this has been so devastating for them; and I am wondering what kind of efforts by NGOs are being put in place, or are in place, to deal with the trauma associated with genocide. Thank you very much.

Ambassador Frazer.

Ms. FRAZER. Thank you very much, Congresswoman Lee.

I very much think that the community and grassroots movement that is putting pressure on ending this genocide in Darfur is critically important, and it makes Americans—it makes me, as an American, very proud. I mean, I think it reflects how this community and its government are together on an international issue of grave concern to the entire community.

As Secretary Rice said—as she was before the UN Security Council last week, she said that the world will judge us for our actions as an international community, and the United Nations, as a body, for peace and how we respond to the challenges in Darfur. So I think that it is absolutely critical.

I was struck by—I have gone across the country. I was at Howard recently, then I went to Harvard. I was at New York University. I have been out and talking to the community about the situation in Darfur and in Africa as a whole; and every single time in the United States, the majority of the questions I get are about Sudan and Darfur.

I was just in the U.K., at Chatham House, and I had one question on Sudan, and it made me realize how important it is not only for our community to reach out to other Americans, but to reach out to community organizations across the world to build an international coalition to end this genocide in Darfur. That is critically important.

It is important, one, so that we speak with one voice as an international community to the Government of Sudan. And it is also important so that that those communities can get their governments to provide more assistance—food aid, humanitarian assistance and support for the United Nations peacekeeping operation—which we all know is critical both to implementation of the Darfur peace agreement, but just for saving lives today, immediately.

So I think that it is, one, a moral responsibility. I think it is also practically important. And I think the next phase for American communities is to reach out to constituents globally, in African countries, in European countries, in the Middle East.

Egypt is extremely important to us in terms of its role in the Security Council, in terms of pushing the Arab League to push the Government of Sudan to allow the UN to come in.

So it is key, and I am very proud of the role that Americans are playing.

Ms. LEE. Thank you. Let me just follow up with that very quickly with regard to divestments, because of course now students, Congressman Payne, myself, others are really pushing in terms of divestment of pension funds from companies doing business in the Sudan; and we are really going to try to put the squeeze on the Sudanese Government in terms of their pocketbook until this ends.

Ms. FRAZER. Right.

Ms. LEE. May Mr. Pierson respond very quickly?

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Yes. And then Ms. McCollum. Mr. PIERSON. The issue of local purchase was and continues to be widely discussed. We think in this situation that the most expeditious way to get the non-food aid and the food aid that is necessary to Darfur is through the existing mechanisms that we have.

Much of the food is pre-positioned. That occurs on a very routine basis. So in this situation, we are either a part of it, either able to move from pre-positioned areas or that was already on the ocean being pre-positioned.

The emergency assistance of 40,000 metric tons, I understand, is being purchased now, and will be shipped in early June. So that is happening very promptly, and we feel in the situation it is the most expeditious way.

In terms of your question on mental health, for any of the NGOs—and much to the credit, I think, of the Administration, of this Committee and Congress-the moneys that have been appropriated for Sudan, the number of humanitarian workers in the Darfur area alone in the last 2 to 3 years since 2003, has gone from approximately 200 humanitarian workers with NGOs in 2003 to over 14,000 now. The majority of those are either host country nationals or third-country nationals, but a good portion also are expatriots. And a major part of what any of those NGOs do either through United States agreements that we have with the NGOs or other ways with the international community is to address health, education, income generation, and mental health issues.

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Ms. McCollum.

Ms. McCollum. Thank you, Mr. Chair. My question is to the Ambassador.

We know that there can be no peace, no long-lasting peace in Darfur without justice. Hundreds of thousands of innocent people are in graves, yet not one single person has been prosecuted who supported the terrorism, the mass murder, the genocide, the rapes. Not one person has been prosecuted. The Government of Sudan and the Janjaweed militia, I believe, need to be held accountable for these crimes against humanity that have been committed.

The Government of Sudan is a state sponsor of terrorism, as it armed the Janjaweed. And I believe the State Department should be listing the Janjaweed as a foreign terrorist organization.

Only 3 weeks ago, however, the State Department released the 2005 Country Report on Terrorism, and State Department reports the following:

'Sudan continued its cooperative commitment against known and suspected international terrorist elements. Sudan has cooperated with the international community and demonstrated in support of regional and global terrorist organizations, calling for a stronger condemnation of terrorism."

The report said, "There is no current data indicating international terrorists operate in Darfur." The report also said:

"The Sudanese Government has increased its participation in international events aimed at defining and preventing terrorism and has pledged to strengthen its laws to better combat acts of terror."

Madam, I am very sure that the displaced people of Darfur, who—many I have had the opportunity—whom I have met, who have been raped, watched their husbands and their children murdered and their homes burned, their wells polluted with bodies of family members, are glad that—to know that the United States Government says there will be no terrorists operating in Darfur.

But yet, only 10 days ago, President Bush said that Sudan's regime armed and unleashed the horse-mounted militia called the Janjaweed, which targeted not only rebels, but tribes that they thought were supporting them. The Janjaweed murdered men, raped women, beat children to death. They burned homes, farms and poisoned wells; they stole land to graze their own herds and hundreds of villages were destroyed, leaving burnt and barren landscape.

That is what the President said 10 days ago. So that sounds like terrorism to me. I agree with the President.

I am very concerned of what I just heard about the integration of the Janjaweed, 4,000 into the army, 1,000 into the police, 3,000 working side-by-side with people in Darfur. These are the very people who came in, murdered, raped and destroyed villages.

So my question is, when will the Secretary of State come out and designate the Janjaweed militia as a foreign terrorist organization? And when will this Administration—are you willing to maintain sanctions and deny full diplomatic relations with the Government of Sudan until such time as the Janjaweed terrorists and their sponsors in the Government of Sudan are brought to justice?

I am very concerned about this, in light of the fact—especially that in southern Darfur, Khartoum still has a very strong military presence, which doesn't make the people in the southern part of Darfur really feel that the peace is that at hand while the military is still present.

So what are we going to do as the United States to make sure that the Janjaweed are brought to justice?

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. If I could, before you answer, Dr. Frazer, we have four Members who have not had an opportunity to ask a question. There are three votes pending on the Floor. I understand you have to leave by 12 o'clock.

I would ask if we could just go through all of the Members—Mr. Delahunt, Ms. Watson, Mr. Payne, and Ms. Jackson Lee—if you could succinctly pose whatever questions you have, and then we will shut down and then whatever has not been answered, if you could provide a written answer for Mr. Delahunt.

Mr. PIERSON. Sure.

Ms. McCollum. Mr. Chair, a point of information. We have asked for that before in the past and maybe the majority party has received the information and correspondence back, but there have been other times that I have posed questions, and I have not received written testimony back.

So I know that you will keep track of this one.

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Okay, sure. It is usually added at the end of the record. But Mr. Delahunt—

Mr. DELAHUNT. Yes, my question is, I think we are looking to this UN peacekeeping force with hope and optimism that it will play an effective role. Yet, simultaneously, there appears to be a crisis in terms of the budget for the United Nations occurring sometime in June or July.

Is the U.S. Mission in New York at the United Nations coordinating with the UN Ambassador—you, Mr. Pierson—in terms of dealing with this issue? I think it is very, very critical that everybody is on the same page, and that we stand up and resolve it so that this particular peacekeeping operation, which is probably one of the largest ever, is successful.

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Ambassador Watson?

Ms. WATSON. I probably should address this to the Chair, but I want to thank Donald Payne for driving this issue in front of Congress and getting us all very much involved. Thank you for your hard work. And, Betty, thank you for being a sister in these efforts, and all of you who have shown such a tremendous heartfelt empathy toward what is going on.

And my question is, could we ask our panelists to join us in a codel? And I was very compelled by the fact that you have been moving around, Ambassador Frazer, among the NGOs. I think we ought to bring in some psychologists as well as educators and folks that not only could address the physical ills but those internal.

When we saw the mothers with their children sitting out in the desert, blank stares, the children with malaise, they have been so traumatized, we need to do something about that. So my request is, can we put together a codel at the end of the year or maybe the beginning of next year to take some of the experts with us so we can start the NGO activities?

Thank you very much. I will receive—

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. One word answer: Yes.

Mr. Engel.

Mr. ENGEL. Yes, thank you; and I will be happy to get my answers written. First of all, Ambassador Frazer, thank you for answering my question about NATO and the NATO involvement. I think that is very, very important.

I have two questions. I want to touch upon what Mr. Lantos said involving the Arab League and involving the tremendous oil revenues. In March, President Bashir got a commitment from the Arab League to fund the African Union Mission when its funds run out, and I wanted to know if the Arab League has provided any support to the AU; and had any member of the Arab League played a constructive role on the Darfur negotiations process?

In southern Sudan, a majority of the population is either Christian or practice traditional religion. The people of Darfur are Muslims, and I want to know if the Arab League has been approached to provide humanitarian assistance to the refugees and internally displaced persons. So those are all related to the Arab League and the countries that have vast oil resources.

And the second question is about the Sudanese Government itself. In the past, they have put up a lot of blockades, you know, they have required numerous permits and authorities needed, to be obtained to move anything anywhere, including travel staff and humanitarian supplies. Obviously it is part of a deliberate strategy to starve the people of Darfur by the Khartoum Government.

So I wanted to know if the international community has any real assurances from Khartoum that it will cooperate in expediting humanitarian relief to people from here on in.

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Ms. Jackson Lee. Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

And to Mr. Payne, thank you for your courtesy in allowing me to be a guest. Let me thank this Committee for the heavy lifting that you did on the genocide bill and, obviously, Don Payne, who has led us on this issue. We cannot give him more appreciation, but this Committee has really been tough.

I want to associate myself with the words of Ambassador Watson. A codel would be excellent, but a working codel and one in which we could generate the collaboration between State Department, USAID, and Members of Congress.

I sat down with the refugees in Chad and looked at the extreme desperation and the-obviously, the brutality against the women. I asked the question about the implementation, which I think is so key, and that is that we expect General Kofi Annan to have before the Security Council a proposal. And I believe that this has to be the United States's shining moment; we cannot allow the Security Council not to pass a strong recommendation for peacekeepers, African Union collaboration and others.

And so my question would be, the detailed action plan that we will engage in to make sure that we go from A to Z.

And my second question is, the humanitarian aspect of it. It was tragic to hear that we are now cutting funding in half because donors have cut in half their money-the food supplement to starving people in Chad and, of course, in the Darfur camps as well in the southern region.

So I would be eager to hear what we are doing to reengage the international family to ensure that we get the right amount of money for that engagement, and adding to that, the engagement of the Arab leagues, what we can do to push them toward humanitarian relief.

And I thank you. I hope we can have the codel we spoke about it, and I think it would be crucial. And I thank you again for allowing me—I ask for unanimous consent to submit my statement, my opening statement in the record.

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Without objection, so ordered.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you. I yield back.

[NOTE: The prepared statement of Ms. Jackson Lee was not received prior to printing.]

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. And we have a minute or 2. You might want to begin with Ms. McCollum or any questions that have been asked.

Ms. FRAZER. Thank you. I will start with Congresswoman McCollum, although she is not here. I just want to be very clear, for the record, there is no suggestion that the Janjaweed would be integrated. I was talking about the Sudan People's—the SLM, Sudan Liberation Movement and the Sudan Liberation Army, which is led by Minni Minnawi, who has signed the agreement; Abdel Wahed, who we hope will sign the agreement.

But not at all the Janjaweed. The plan for the Janjaweed is to disarm them.

I also would just like to respond to her question about why hasn't the Janjaweed been designated as a foreign terrorist organization. Obviously, there is a legal process for designation that one would have to go through.

And we share her outrage about the atrocities that have been carried out by the government and its support for these militia groups, but what we need to do is end these atrocities. That doesn't preclude looking at how—if—whether we can treat them as a foreign terrorist organization of an international order, like al-Qaeda and others.

The references in the report that she talked about are clearly designated international terrorist organizations, legal definition. So outrage, yes, about the atrocities, but let us deal with those atrocities on their own.

On the question of the—the question that Congressman Jackson Lee asked—and she is still here—let me answer that. On the detailed action plan for getting a robust peacekeeping mission, we have been working very closely with the United Nations and Kofi Annan. Secretary Rice and President Bush both have had many conferences with him. Secretary Rice, as you know, last week went to the UN Security Council to get a resolution passed, 1679, that will pave the way for those peacekeepers to get there, including calling on the Government of Sudan to allow the assessment mission to go so that Kofi Annan can write his plan of action.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I asked her about that in a meeting, and let me thank her for accepting the recommendation that we made, and she obviously went immediately to the UN. Thank you. Ms. FRAZER. Yes, absolutely. And also the United States is cur-

Ms. FRAZER. Yes, absolutely. And also the United States is currently reaching out to force-contributing countries, potentially force contributing countries. And we also have in that, that the AU should reach out both to the UN and working with other regional and international organizations, like NATO, to provide that enabling assistance immediately, which can carry over to a UN operation so it can stand up rather quickly. So we do have a plan of action for addressing it.

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Dr. Frazer, thank you. I hate to say this, but we are out of time.

Without objection, a statement submitted for the record by Refugees International will be made a part of record.

[The information referred to follows:]

## PREPARED STATEMENT OF REFUGEES INTERNATIONAL

Refugees International welcomes the signature of the Darfur Peace Agreement in Abuja on May 5, 2006, and commends the US government for its substantial commitment, especially through the presence and engagement of Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick, to ensure that an agreement was reached.

The agreement in Abuja is only a first step, a necessary but insufficient condition for the creation of peace and stability in Darfur. In particular, Refugees International is concerned about the matters of civilian protection and the return of displaced people in Darfur and Chad. The peace agreement touches on several key issues, including the disarmament and demobilization of the Janjaweed militia, the integration of the rebel groups into the armed forces, and the creation of buffer zones around camps for internally displaced persons.

The Peace Agreement is still weak. Non-compliance is a huge risk and there are many possible spoilers. Only one faction of the Sudan Liberation Movement is a party to the agreement and the Justice and Equality Movement has refused to sign. Minni Minawi's SLM faction, which did sign the agreement, is already attempting to distance itself from it. The African Union Ceasefire Commission recorded numerous violations of past ceasefire agreements by all sides, including the Government of Sudan, and the power of the international community to ensure that all sides to the agreement act in good faith is limited. The internally displaced people who have been the victims of this conflict have very little trust that this agreement will hold. There have already been demonstrations by them, resulting in an attack on the African Union civilian police officer and the death of a Sudanese translator.

In order to improve the situation for the people of Darfur and insure compliance, the following steps must take place over the next few months:

Strengthen the African Union Mission in Sudan. AMIS is providing the only protection for the people of Darfur right now. Humanitarian agencies have noted that there are serious security concerns, particularly in West Darfur and Gereida, which are hampering their ability to deliver humanitarian assistance. Some humanitarian agencies are planning to downsize their programs or even withdraw unless security improves immediately. AMIS, which is already under-funded and overstretched, has been given an important verification and monitoring role in the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement. Any proposed UN peacekeeping mission will not be in place until near the end of 2006. The AMIS donor's conference, which had been postponed, needs to be held this month. Major donors, such as the US, need to transform pledges into commitments and AMIS needs full and immediate logistical assistance from NATO.

Increase humanitarian assistance. In addition to the security problems which are hampering delivery of aid, there is still a serious shortfall in funding for humanitarian assistance, most critically with regards to food. In May, rations were halved from 2,100 calories a day (the minimum required to stay in good health) to 1,050 calories in order to stretch the food stocks through the rainy season. Over the last several days, the US has reported that it has directed immediate resources to Sudan; much of this assistance, however, had already been requested by the Administration in February. European donors also need to increase their contributions to equal that of the US. For its part, the Sudanese government has announced the welcome step of applying 20,000 tons of its own food stocks to Darfur. If this gesture is genuine, it is important that it be reciprocated by the US and European donors.

*Get UN troops to Darfur.* To date, the government of Sudan has resisted all attempts to allow for AMIS to transition to a UN peacekeeping mission, despite the African Union's declaration that they authorize a handover in principle. Sudan has insisted it would consider a transition only after a peace agreement was in place. But now there have been reports that government officials are saying that the Darfur Peace Agreement removes the need for a UN peacekeeping mission. This is clearly unacceptable. Refugees International welcomes the recent resolution by US to accelerate the process of moving UN troops to Darfur. We urge the UN and the African Union to abide by this proposed timeline.

With the signing of the agreement, there is momentum to move forward. Over two million people have been living in desperate conditions for nearly three years. Nevertheless, it is important that donors and the Sudanese government do not pressure the people of Darfur into hasty returns. A year and a half ago the Sudanese government forced displaced persons to return to their villages as proof that the situation was stabilizing. In August of 2005, donors and UN agencies planned for major returns in 2006 because of projected funding cuts and an overly optimistic analysis of the humanitarian and security situation in Darfur.

The US has made many pledges, promises and commitments over the past several days to the rebel parties, to the Sudanese government, and to the people of Darfur. The signature of accords in Abuja is just the beginning; the role of the US in bringing peace to Darfur is not yet over.

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Again, thank you so much. The hearing is adjourned.

Ms. FRAZER. Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 11:48 a.m., the Committee was adjourned.]

# APPENDIX

## MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

RESPONSES FROM THE HONORABLE JENDAYI E. FRAZER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BU-REAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, TO QUESTIONS SUB-MITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE JOSEPH CROWLEY, A REPRESENTA-TIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK

#### Question:

Sixteen months after the historic peace agreement between Sudan government and the Sudanese Liberation Army that ended 21 years of civil war in the south came the Abuja agreement: Given these ethnical conflicts, do you predict more fighting to appear in the East of Sudan? Do you think that these peace agreements work better than a supposed state of federation in Sudan?

#### Response:

Eritrean-facilitated framework discussions for political settlement talks between the Government of National Unity and Eastern Front began in mid-April in Asmara. A cessation of hostilities was signed by the parties and holds to this day. Peace talks focused on the situation in Eastern Sudan—and the subsequent settlement expected from such discussions—further strengthens the North/South Comprehensive Peace Agreement, and extends its viability as a mechanism through which Sudan can achieve comprehensive democratic transformation. The establishment of federated states in Sudan would do little to reverse decades of marginalization imposed by a Khartoum-centric national government. Cross-cutting power-sharing and wealth-sharing arrangements and security arrangements oriented toward integration are embodied by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, mirrored in the Darfur Peace Agreement, and likely to be a component of any settlement in Eastern Sudan. These peace agreements could rectify past decades of neglect by forcing Khartoum to be accountable to the periphery.

#### Question:

The al-Nur faction of the Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) have not signed the peace accord and are demanding more concessions from the government of Sudan. What additional concessions do they want and why?

#### Response:

Exhaustive efforts were made by both the African Union and the international community, including the United States, to mediate a fair and just peace settlement for the people of Darfur. We believe the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), signed May 5, 2006 in Abuja, Nigeria, addresses the core concerns of the rebel movements. We highly commend the courageous step of the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM), led by Minni Minawi, to sign the DPA and continue to encourage other parties to become signatories.

Come signatories. Despite indications that the Sudan Liberation Movement led by Abdelwahid El-Nur would sign the DPA on May 5, Abdelwahid ultimately decided not to sign. Several of his delegation, including his chief negotiator, split from him and signed a declaration of commitment. Abdelwahid El-Nur has not been consistent in articulating the additional concessions he wants. His primary concerns—including greater compensation from Khartoum for Darfur war victims, more political representation for the movement, and greater SLA involvement in the disarmament of Janjaweed militias—are addressed in the DPA.

The Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) have shown no serious interest in peace in Darfur. They have advocated a fundamentalist Islamist agenda that is not consistent with the interests of the Darfur people or with the compromises required to make peace. At the conclusion of the Abuja talks, they gave no indication that they knew what provisions were contained in the DPA or what would be required for them to agree to it.

The United States will continue to work with the Government of Sudan, international partners, and rebel leaders to address the parties' concerns, encourage constructive dialogue, and bring about a lasting peace and stability to Darfur.

#### Question:

If we recognized the situation in Sudan as genocide; why haven't we taken substantial measures against the Central government in Khartoum?

#### Response:

The United States has taken a strong stance against atrocities in Darfur. As the only government to call the crimes committed in Darfur genocide, the United States was active in moving the United Nations Security Council to adopt Resolution 1672 requiring States to take measures to sanction a number of individuals, including one member of the Sudanese Government, alleged to have been involved in or responsible for crimes in Darfur. This resulted in an asset freeze and travel ban for those sanctioned. In the context of UNSCR 1593, the United States abstained from the vote allowing the situation in Darfur to be referred to the International Criminal Court (ICC), despite our longstanding concerns with the ICC, reflecting our strong commitment to end the climate of impunity there. Also, the United States has provided \$220 million to date to support the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS)'s peacekeeping efforts, and is working diligently towards a rapid and robust transition to a United Nations peacekeeping operation. In addition, the United States maintains a strong domestic sanctions regime against the Government of Sudan. American businesses are, as a general matter, strictly prohibited from investing in Sudan without a license from the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), and U.S. government assistance may only be provided to the Government of Sudan in limited areas, such as humanitarian assistance or to support the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

## Question:

Human rights groups have accused State Foreign Minister and former paramilitary commander Ali Ahmed Farki of crimes against humanity in Southern Sudan and Darfur. Why did the U.S. grant Farki a visit to the U.S.? Do you expect to be granting more visas to senior Sudanese officials in the near future?

#### Response:

Deputy Foreign Minister Karti came to the United States on a private visit as a guest of former Congressman Mark Siljander of Michigan. He was not invited by the United States Government and did not meet with anyone at the Department of State.