U.S. POLICY TOWARD SUDAN AND SOUTH SUDAN

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

OF THE

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U.S. POLICY TOWARD SUDAN AND SOUTH SUDAN

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 26, 2014

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH,
GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:34 p.m., in room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher H. Smith (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. SMITH. The subcommittee will come to order and good afternoon. I, first of all, want to apologize to all, including our distinguished witnesses. We did have a series of votes and, unfortunately, you can never plan for that. So I do apologize.

Good afternoon. Today's hearing is very important, and not only because the United States Government has been involved in Sudan and its various crises for the past three decades.

Many of us first became interested in Sudan in the 1980s because of the persistent reports of modern-day slavery in which northern Arabs enslaved African southerners.

I would point out parenthetically I held my first hearing when I was chairman of the subcommittee that dealt with human rights after we took control in 1994 on slavery in Sudan and we had freed slaves come and testify and it was a very telling experience to hear them tell of the atrocities that they had suffered.

My office also more recently helped to bring one of the unfortunate people who had been enslaved to America for medical treatment after he was freed, and his story affected me deeply once again.

Ker Deng had been kidnapped into slavery while still a child, and while he was an adolescent the man who held him in bondage rubbed peppers in his eyes, blinded him, and later abandoned him.

Ker is studying here in the United States thanks to his benefactor, Ellen Ratner, and is awaiting a second operation to help him recover at least some of his eyesight. The question always is posed how many other Sudanese will never have that opportunity or even achieve their freedom. Ker's mother has never been freed from bondage.

We began supporting southern Sudanese efforts to end the oppression from the North in the mid-1990s. In 2005, we helped—the United States did—both North and South achieve the Comprehen-

sive Peace Agreement to end this long civil war and provide the steps for a mutually beneficial peace and productive coexistence.

Unfortunately, the rebellion in the Darfur region distracted from efforts to fulfill that agreement. Khartoum's alliance with the Janjaweed Arabs resulted in mass killings and displacement in Darfur.

An estimated 1.9 million people were displaced, more than 240,000 people were forced into neighboring Chad, and an estimated 450,000 people—nobody knows for sure what the real number is but it is extraordinarily high—were killed.

At the time, Congress insisted that this was a genocide. Eventually, the Bush administration concurred, but the United Nations declined to go so far in their terminology, calling what happened in Darfur crimes against humanity.

A peace agreement between the main rebel force in Darfur and the Government of Sudan was signed in May 2006 but it did not last.

In fact, no sustained agreement has been reached between the government and Darfur rebel groups partly because these groups have continued to split and form offshoots but also because the Khartoum Government has not appeared willing to resolve the Darfur situation constructively.

In June 2005, the International Criminal Court initiated an investigation that resulted in arrest warrants for Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir and three other government officials and militia leaders.

None of these warrants have been served, none of the four have been taken into custody and the Government of Sudan has refused to cooperate with the ICC. Meanwhile, the CPA remained unimplemented.

In January 2011, South Sudan, which had been a semi-autonomous region of the country since the signing of the CPA, voted in a referendum on whether to remain part of Sudan or become independent.

Having been marginalized and mistreated for decades, it was not surprising that southern Sudanese voted overwhelmingly, at the level of 98.8 percent, to become an independent nation.

On July 9, 2011, South Sudan became the world's newest nation. However, these unimplemented elements of the CPA would bedevil the new country from its birth. A referendum in the disputed Abyei region and consultations on the status of Sudan's Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States were never completed.

In May 2011, Sudanese Armed Forces assumed control of the towns in Abyei, quickly forcing at least 40,000 residents to flee. Within weeks, fighting spread to Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States as Khartoum sought to crush the Sudan People's Liberation Army-North, which had fought with southerners in the north-south civil war.

Northern attacks on residents in those areas continued unabated. Last year, Sudan and South Sudan engaged in a conflict over oil supplies from South Sudan involving allegations that Khartoum was undercounting the level of oil flow to cheat South Sudan, as well as South Sudan's seizure of the oil town of Heglig.

Again, this dispute was largely the result of unresolved issues from the CPA. South Sudan continues to be engaged in a conflict that began last December, despite a cessation of hostilities agreement.

Thousands have been killed. Tens of thousands have been displaced. Exact figures are constantly shifting because this conflict continues. I will soon introduce a resolution offering a sequenced approach to reaching a lasting solution to this newest crisis.

This conflict also is the result of too little attention paid to the warning signs because of a preoccupation with one of the many other crises in the two Sudans.

Over the last three decades, I and other members of the subcommittee and subcommittee chairs have held numerous, numerous hearings on Sudan and, of course, we have all traveled there.

Mr. Wolf, who is joining us from the Appropriations Committee, was there back in 1989, I think even before that, but certainly in 1989 and has been a steadfast voice and a power in trying to bring relief to that troubled region.

In fact, too often, however, each crisis is seen as a problem unto itself when these things break out, unrelated to other issues, then we move on to other things, it seems, even notwithstanding the good work of our Special Envoy.

In fact, successive administrations and Congresses, advocacy groups, and humanitarian organizations have focused so much on individual crises and issues that no one has created a panoramic view which shows us all these individual crises and how they interrelate with each other.

This stovepiping of government policy and public attention and focus and prioritization has meant that long-term solutions have been neglected while short-term eruptions have had to be dealt with.

In reality, the two Sudans are inexorably linked and no crisis in either can be resolved successfully without taking into account the entire Sudan-South Sudan panorama.

We must end this cycle of myopic policy formulation based on the crisis of the moment and adopt a longer-term, holistic vision of what the best interests of the people of Sudan and South Sudan demand—indeed, what would be in the best interests of the entire region.

As we learned in our subcommittee hearing on the Sahel crisis last May, Islamic extremists have their sights set on making inroads wherever there is conflict, across the belt of Central Africa, stretching from Senegal to Sudan and beyond. Continuing unrest in the two Sudans only serves to provide training grounds or bases of operation for terrorists.

Hardened ethnic conflicts can spread to long-term enmity that no peace agreement alone can resolve. Hopefully, this will not be the case in South Sudan, but that conflict is headed in that ominous direction.

Two years ago, I held a meeting in my office with representatives from Sudan's Nubian, Darfuri, Beja, and Nuba communities, who all believe that Khartoum is engaged in a long-term effort to exterminate non-Arab Sudanese.

Have we missed such a pernicious campaign while hopping from one crisis to another as each appeared? The purpose of today's hearing is to examine current U.S. policy toward Sudan and South Sudan to see how we can unify our policy in order to more effectively end long-term running tragedies that appear to get worse despite all the attention to which we pay them.

This involves more than what the Department of State and other executive agencies do and even what Congress can do. Advocacy and humanitarian organizations also must join the government in seeing the forest and not just the trees, so to speak.

And let me also say the importance of engaging the faith community remains a very important component if we are to bring, or help bring, a lasting and sustainable peace to that troubled part of the world.

I would like to now yield to my friend and colleague, Ms. Bass, for opening comments.

Ms. BASS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for today's hearing and as always thank you for your leadership on this issue.

I want to thank our witnesses today. I had the pleasure of working with the U.S. Special Envoy before he was the Special Envoy but when he was the Ambassador to Ethiopia. So it is a pleasure to see you here at the committee today.

The U.S. engagements in the Sudan, government officials in both diplomacy and development have faced tremendous challenges in devising holistic and unified approaches to grappling with each nation's concerns.

These include, of course, issues of governance, human rights, international justice and the seemingly intractable conflicts that continue with tragic consequences in the Sudan and South Sudan.

The context of the post-9/11 world heightened these challenges as our Government increasingly focused on regional stability in East Africa and the counterterrorism cooperation of regional governments including the Government of Sudan.

In dealing with these varied obstacles, U.S. foreign policy efforts have often been crafted to address specific issues which in some instances raises the question of our approach and my question as to whether or not it has actually been problematic.

For example, focusing on the status of Abyei, the conflicts in Darfur and the Blue Nile, often at the expense of broader comprehensive approaches which seek redress of the root causes of conflict in South Sudan and in Sudan. So addressing the crisis individually as opposed to looking at both nations together.

The separation of Sudan and South Sudan—these root causes continue to stoke internal conflict, threaten regional stability, produce hundreds of thousands of refugees and IDPs, and bring about massive loss of life.

I hope today from the witnesses that we can learn the lessons of the past and formulate new ways to work through our Special Envoy and his international counterparts as well as regional bodies such as IGAD and the AU to find sustainable solutions which bring peace, stability and economic growth to Sudan and South Sudan.

I am, of course, committed to continuing to work toward these ends and look forward to engaging my colleagues here in Washington and on the continent to make this a reality.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much.

I would like to now yield to Chairman Frank Wolf.

Mr. WOLF. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to second what Ms. Bass said about you. I appreciate your good efforts and I think you have probably done more on this issue, on most issues than any other Member of the Congress since I have been here.

I am not a member of the subcommittee and I have an appointment at 3 o'clock but I want to put on the record a question that I hope that someone would follow up on.

On December 30th, Ambassador Booth, I wrote Secretary Kerry urging that the administration, and at that time it was at a crisis point—December 30th—and now we are ready to go into March—urging that the administration enlist the aid of former President George W. Bush and his team at the Bush Library whose administration was absolutely pivotal in birthing South Sudan.

I was there in 2005 when Colin Powell and John Danforth were with President Bush where they appointed the Special Envoy that led to the new South Sudan. I noted that South Sudanese President Salva Kiir's trademark black cowboy hat was in fact a gift from President Bush.

President Bush and his team forged lasting relationships with Salva Kiir and the South Sudanese leadership and would be well positioned with the full blessing, obviously, working under you, working under Secretary Kerry, working under the President to engage in diplomacy and rebuilding the efforts at this critical time.

I have had conversations with senior administration officials over the last 2 months and yet nothing has happened. I would urge you to take this request back to the Secretary. Such an overture would send an important message to the suffering people of South Sudan.

And the closing paragraph of the letter dated December 30, 2013, to Secretary Kerry said, "It's been said that politics stops at the water's edge." While perhaps not always the case, I would hope that this administration, despite its past differences with the Bush administration, would recognize the wisdom of inviting former President Bush and key members of his team who forged a lasting relationship with the leadership of South Sudan to engage in high-level diplomacy with the various actors involved in the current crisis and to do so with the full support and blessing of the U.S. State Department and, of course, the White House.

Such an overture would send a clear message to the people of the fledgling nation that they have not been abandoned. And also, President Clinton was used in Haiti. President Obama took President Bush to Mandela's funeral. President Bush has fallen in love with Africa, HIV/AIDS, PEPFAR.

So I would ask you, and maybe you ought to talk to Mr. Smith at the next vote what your answer is, tell us will the administration, will you, will Secretary Kerry, will the President do this, and I think this picture of President Bush with President Obama in the White House saying we are going to engage and use all the resources, working with people like John Prendergast and so many others, all the resources I think would make a tremendous difference.

I appreciate Mr. Smith having this hearing. Yield back.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Chairman Wolf.

And before I do introduce Ambassador Booth, I would just echo his concern. When I read the letter in the op-ed that Mr. Wolf wrote, it made a very compelling case.

It would really, I think, send a message to the key players including Salva Kiir, who greatly esteems President George W. Bush, and that kind of working side by side with you and Secretary Kerry and, of course, President Obama would show a unity on the part of the United States but also on the ground. Senator Danforth worked wonders and we all credit him with pulling an amazing feat with the CPA.

So perhaps, you know, in your opening comments you could address the feasibility of that and I think it could act as a tourniquet to this ever-worsening crisis.

Now, if I could introduce the Ambassador, our U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan and South Sudan, Ambassador Donald Booth, who was appointed Special Envoy August 28, 2013.

He previously served as Ambassador to Ethiopia, Zambia, and Liberia. Prior to that, he was director of the Office of Technical and Specialized Agencies at the Department of State's Bureau of International Organization Affairs.

Ambassador Booth has also served as director of the Office of West African Affairs, deputy director of the Office of Southern African Affairs, economic counselor in Athens and division chief for Bilateral Trade Affairs at the U.S. Department of State.

Mr. Ambassador.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DONALD BOOTH, SPECIAL ENVOY TO SUDAN AND SOUTH SUDAN, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. BOOTH. Chairman Smith and Ranking Member Bass, members of the committee, Chairman Wolf, I want to thank you very much for the opportunity to testify before you here today. I am going to summarize what has been submitted for the record.

This hearing comes at a tumultuous time for both Sudan and South Sudan. South Sudan is mired in a devastating internal conflict that has already caused widespread death and destruction, and threatens to unravel the social fabric of that young nation.

With the interests of other regional neighbors so heavily in play, any increase in tensions has the potential to foment broader regional instability. To the north, Sudan continues to respond to the grievances of marginalized groups with violence, particularly in Darfur and the "two areas" of Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States where government forces have engaged in indiscriminate aerial bombardments.

Linked by geography and resources, Sudan and South Sudan's interdependence could be a source of stability, but recent steps toward resolving bilateral issues have been overshadowed by the conflict in South Sudan.

As someone who has been in the region almost continuously since December 21, I can assure you that the U.S. Government has and will continue to be fully engaged in support of the President's goals of two countries at peace internally and with each other and with the region.

We stand ready to help both Sudan and South Sudan build a peaceful and prosperous future in which all their citizens are respected, protected and have a say in the governance of their respective countries.

On South Sudan, 3 years after its historic referendum for independence, South Sudan is again riven by conflict—not with Khartoum, however, but with itself. This is devastating for all of use who hoped to see it escape the terrible cycles of violence that marked its past.

The cessation of hostilities signed by the parties on January 23rd was a critical step. But, unfortunately, both parties have continued to violate this agreement.

A true cessation of hostilities is our most pressing priority and we are providing significant support to the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, IGAD, the monitoring and verification mechanism that they lead which will monitor the cessation of hostilities and identify violators.

We are also deeply focused on moving the parties to a meaningful and inclusive political discussion of the root causes of the problem. Looking back, the government attempted to contain intercommunal violence without fully committing to the hard work of addressing its causes.

On top of this, the Government of South Sudan progressively reduced the space for political competition within and outside the ruling party as well as for the independent media and civil society.

IGAD mediators have proposed meaningful political dialogue between the two sides with a broad representation of others in South Sudanese society.

Their premise, one with which I agree, is that a return to business as usual with a quick fix and political accommodation for the main protagonists will not restore peace.

Peace will require a process of national reconciliation and a transparent mechanism for accountability for gross violations of human rights committed during the conflict. The African Union is establishing a commission of inquiry that will help deliver both justice and reconciliation.

Finally, we are pressing all parties in South Sudan to permit immediate and unconditional humanitarian access to the hundreds of thousands of South Sudanese who are the real victims of this violence.

The humanitarian crisis will only intensify in the coming months with the coming of the rainy season, and to help the United States has already committed close to an additional $60 million in lifesaving humanitarian assistance and we have sent our disaster assistance team into South Sudan to assess what, in addition, needs to be done.

Now, on Sudan and South Sudan relations, I would like to note that in the months just prior to the conflict there were signs of an improving relationship between Juba and Khartoum and it appears that Sudan has so far played a constructive role with the IGAD-led mediation.

But greater involvement by Sudan could cause friction with other regional actors as well as opposing sides in South Sudan and we will continue to press for restraint.

There are still unresolved issues between the two nations that cannot be allowed to fester. They need to implement the September 2012 agreements and also endeavor to resolve the final status of Abyei.

Turning to Sudan, as I mentioned, the country continues to suffer from internal conflicts. Economic and social tensions last fall was a result of cuts to subsidies and resulted in the largest protest seen under the National Congress Party's rule.

Unfortunately, the government responded with a violent crackdown on the protestors, resulting in hundreds of deaths and injuries. In South Kordofan and Blue Nile States, despite the resumption of talks between the SPLM-North and the Government of Sudan earlier this month, fighting continues.

And I will continue to work with both parties as well as the umbrella opposition group of the Sudan Revolutionary Front to urge them to achieve a cessation of hostility and humanitarian access.

In Darfur, peace remains elusive as violence and insecurity have increased. Last year alone, more than ½ million people were newly displaced primarily as a result of intertribal conflicts and lawlessness.

The United States has provided $7 billion to date in humanitarian, transition, and reconstruction assistance to the people of Darfur and we continue to press the Sudanese Government to allow greater or open humanitarian access and to engage with all parties in Darfur for a comprehensive political solution.

Against the backdrop of continued conflict and repressive response to public demonstrations in September, we do take note of President Bashir's speech of January 27 in which he called for an inclusive process to redraft the constitution, a process that would include both armed and nonarmed opposition groups and that would address issues of peace, economic development, political reform, and a dialogue about Sudanese identity.

The world will be watching Sudan carefully to gauge the seriousness of this initiative which, if truly holistic, inclusive and comprehensive, offers an opportunity to address the underlying causes of Sudan's tragic history of war between its center and its periphery.

Along with other senior U.S. Government officials, I have endeavored to coordinate international engagement with key partners such as China, the United Kingdom, Norway, the African Union, the European Union, Ethiopia, Egypt, Qatar, and Russia, among others.

While it is critical that we continue engagement, improvement of our relations with the Government of Sudan will continue to be predicated on genuine and sustained improvements in how Sudan treats its citizens and adheres to its international obligations.

So in conclusion, despite the horrendous conflicts that have continued and erupted over the past months, opportunities for peace do exist. The Government of Sudan can make the choice to undertake a truly comprehensive and inclusive constitutional process and national dialogue on the country's future.

Similarly, the Government of South Sudan has a crucial opening to establish an inclusive peaceful nation representative of all.

Mr. Chairman, I thank you for this opportunity and for your continued commitment to the peoples of Sudan and South Sudan and I look forward to your questions.

And if I could, Mr. Chairman, just to answer the question posed by Chairman Wolf, the administration indeed did take on board that recommendation and, indeed, even before, early in the stages of the crisis before the 30th of December, had reached out to previous administrations—the previous Presidents and members of their senior leadership and had tried to engage them.

And some of them did, indeed, intervene, make calls out to the Government of South Sudan to try to put an end to the conflict, to try to call for an early cessation of hostilities and to sit down at the peace table. So I would be happy to go into that further if you would like.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Booth follows:]

Testimony of
Special Envoy for Sudan and South Sudan Donald Booth
before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Human Rights, and International Organizations
"U.S. Policy Toward Sudan and South Sudan"
February 26, 2014

Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Bass, and Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today.

This hearing comes at a tumultuous time for both Sudan and South Sudan. South Sudan continues to be mired in a devastating internal conflict that, while relatively recent in its emergence, has already caused widespread death and destruction, and threatens to unravel the social fabric of this young nation. With the interests of other regional neighbors so heavily in play, any increase in tensions has the potential to foment broader regional instability. To the north, Sudan continues to respond to the grievances of marginalized groups with violence, particularly in Darfur and the "Two Areas" of Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States where government forces have routinely engaged in indiscriminate aerial bombardments. Linked by geography and resources, Sudan and South Sudan's interdependence could be a source of stability, but recent steps towards resolving bilateral issues have been overshadowed by the conflict in South Sudan.

Speaking as someone who has been in the region almost continuously since December 22, working to bring an end to the fighting and to bring the warring parties to the negotiating table, I can assure you that the U.S. Government has and will be fully engaged to support the President's goals of two countries, at peace internally, with each other, and with the

region. We stand ready to help both Sudan and South Sudan build a peaceful and prosperous future in which all Sudanese and South Sudanese citizens are respected, protected, and have a say in the governance of their respective countries.

SOUTH SUDAN

Three years after South Sudan's historic referendum for independence and nine years since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, South Sudan is again riven by conflict – not with Khartoum, however, but with itself. It is devastating for the people of South Sudan, and for those of us in the U.S. government and broader international community, who have all made enormous investments in this country in the hope of seeing it escape the terrible cycles of violence that marked its past and that now threaten to destroy its future.

The cessation of hostilities that was signed by the parties on January 23 was a critical step. Unfortunately, hostilities and attacks against civilians continue. We are deeply concerned by reports of serious human rights abuses and violations that have been committed throughout South Sudan by both parties to the conflict, including those reported in the UN's first report on abuses committed since the conflict began. Both parties have continued to violate this agreement and commit abuses against civilians, most recently with the anti-government forces' assault on Malakal, and before that pro-government forces' attacks on Leer and Godiang. A true cessation of hostilities is our most pressing priority, and the United States Government is providing significant financial support to the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)-led Monitoring and Verification Mechanism which will monitor and identify violators of the cessation of hostilities agreement.

In addition to getting both sides to adhere to the cessation of hostilities agreement, we are deeply focused on moving the parties to a meaningful and inclusive political dialogue. The roots of this crisis run deep. The government attempted to contain inter-communal violence without fully committing to the hard work of addressing its causes which include trauma from decades of war, economic disparity, historical grievances between communities, human rights abuses, and political grievances due to real or perceived underrepresentation. On top of this, the government had also progressively reduced the space for political competition, within and outside the ruling party, and for independent media and civil society voices to be heard.

The IGAD Mediators have proposed meaningful political dialogue, between the two sides with a broad representation of others in South Sudanese society. Their premise, one with which I agree, is that the government must not be given the space to return to business as usual with a quick fix and political accommodations for the main protagonists, for the simple reason that this will not bring about a sustainable peace. A number of other senior U.S. officials and I have made clear that we, too, are not engaged in business as usual; as one sign of this, I would note that our security assistance to South Sudan is not going forward at this time, and that some of it is being re-programmed to support the regional verification mechanism.

In parallel to these political negotiations, it will also be critical to start what could be a very long process of national reconciliation that allows multiple and diverse voices to be heard, and to encourage the development of a transparent mechanism for accountability for serious human rights abuses on all sides of the conflict. The African Union is

currently establishing a Commission of Inquiry for South Sudan, which we believe could serve as an important step towards ensuring accountability and preventing the recurrence of such abuses. We hope this mechanism will move forward expeditiously, and are looking for ways to support this and other initiatives to deliver justice to the people of South Sudan.

Finally, we are pressing all parties to permit immediate and unconditional humanitarian access to all in need, to the hundreds of thousands of South Sudanese men, women, and children who are the real victims of this violence. More than 883,000 have fled their homes including some 167,000 who have sought refuge in neighboring countries and tens of thousands who are sheltering at UNMISS facilities. Both parties bear the responsibility to begin creating the security conditions and confidence that will allow those who fled to return to their homes and communities. Given the essential role that UNMISS has played in protecting civilians, we are continuing our strong support for the mission, and have repeatedly demanded that all parties cease attacks and threats against the U.N. mission. Additionally, the conflict has disrupted agricultural cycles and will have lasting effects on food supplies. This humanitarian crisis will only intensify in the coming months with the return of the rainy season. To help stem the crisis, in fiscal year 2014 the United States has already committed an additional $59.6 million in life-saving humanitarian assistance to help those affected by the recent violence in South Sudan.

SOUTH SUDAN-SUDAN RELATIONS

South Sudan's relationship with neighboring Sudan is fragile. In months just prior to the conflict there were positive signs of an improving

relationship between Juba and Khartoum, and it appears that Sudan has so far played a constructive role with the IGAD-led mediation efforts to resolve South Sudan's internal conflict. However, we are concerned about the potential for Sudan's involvement, especially given their interest in South Sudan's oil fields, and we are urging Khartoum to continue demonstrating caution. Greater involvement by Sudan could cause friction with other regional actors as well as opposing sides in South Sudan, and we, along with other partners, will continue to press for restraint. We are also urging Sudan to allow international humanitarian agencies to provide assistance to the tens of thousands of South Sudanese refugees who have fled into Sudan.

Additionally, there are still unresolved issues between the two nations that cannot be allowed to fester indefinitely. Both nations need to work to implement the September 27, 2012 agreements, particularly on the disputed border regions, while also endeavoring to resolve the final status of Abyei. Unresolved these issues remain potential flash points for further violence – and indeed, there has been renewed tension in Abyei in recent days.

SUDAN

Sudan also continues to suffer from internal strife and conflicts. In addition to multiple insurgencies, economic and social tensions escalated last fall as cuts to oil subsidies resulted in the largest protests seen under the National Congress Party's rule. Unfortunately, the government responded with a violent crackdown on the protestors, resulting in hundreds of deaths and injuries, as well as nearly 2,000 arrests and detentions.

In Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile, despite the resumption of talks between the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North and the Government of Sudan earlier this month, fighting continues. The fighting has taken an unacceptable toll on lives and livelihoods, with people unable to safely farm or access social services. Indiscriminate bombing of civilian areas continues. I will continue to work with both parties, and the umbrella opposition group of the Sudan Revolutionary Front, to urge them to take the necessary steps through the AU-led effort to achieve a cessation of hostilities and humanitarian access—the latter of which has been denied by the Sudanese government since the outbreak of the conflict over two and a half years ago, resulting in a serious humanitarian crisis.

In Darfur, peace remains elusive as violence and insecurity have increased, resulting in further deterioration in the humanitarian situation. Last year alone, more than half a million people were newly displaced, primarily by inter-tribal conflicts and lawlessness, though fighting between government forces and rebel movements also increased. The United States has provided $7 billion to date in humanitarian, transition, and reconstruction assistance to help the people of Darfur. The United States continues to press the Sudanese government to allow greater humanitarian access in Darfur, and to engage with all parties for a comprehensive political solution.

Reversing the cycle of violence in Sudan will require accountability for perpetrators of human rights abuses and violations. The United States will continue to urge the regional and international community to call for Sudan to cooperate fully with the International Criminal Court, as required by UN Security Council Resolution 1593.

Against the backdrop of continued conflict and the repressive response to public demonstrations in September, we took note of President Bashir's speech on January 27 in which he called for an inclusive process to redraft the constitution—a process that would include both armed and non-armed opposition groups and that would address issues of peace, economic development, political reform, and a dialogue about Sudanese identity. The world will be watching Sudan carefully to gauge the seriousness of this initiative, which, if truly holistic, inclusive, and comprehensive, offers an opportunity to address the underlying causes of Sudan's tragic history of war between its center and its periphery.

I strongly believe that one key instrument to engendering peaceful, democratic transformation in Sudan is strengthened engagement—by the entire international community but particularly the United States. Through sustained, deliberate dialogue with a range of actors—including the government, opposition groups, civil society, and the Sudanese people more broadly—the United States can reinforce its position of support for the Sudanese people in realizing an end to decades of violence and repressive governance. Sudan's conflicts are indicative of a widespread failure to govern equitably and inclusively, and the international community must not allow Khartoum to continue obscuring national issues by painting them as isolated regional conflicts, nor can we allow them to pass off as credible any superficial national process that does not include and empower representation and participation from all levels and regions of Sudanese society. As part of this engagement, it is critical that we unite the international community to show Khartoum that change is both necessary and beneficial.

To this end I, along with other senior U.S. government officials, have endeavored to coordinate and strengthen international messaging with

key partners such as China, the United Kingdom, Norway, the AU, Ethiopia, Egypt, Qatar, and others. While it is critical that we continue engagement with Sudan, improvement of our relations with the Government of Sudan will continue to be predicated on genuine and sustained improvements in how Sudan treats its citizens and adheres to its international obligations.

CONCLUSION

As I said at the beginning, despite the horrendous conflicts that have continued and erupted over the past months, out of the turmoil lies opportunity for both Sudan and South Sudan. The Government of Sudan can make the choice to undertake a truly comprehensive and inclusive constitutional process and national dialogue on the country's future. Similarly, the Government of South Sudan has a crucial opening to establish an inclusive, peaceful nation, representative of all, the kind of nation that is worthy of all they sacrificed in its creation.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman for this opportunity and for your continued commitment to the people of Sudan and South Sudan. I look forward to your questions.

Mr. SMITH. I would appreciate that. Did President Bush make a phone call? And I think, again, what Mr. Wolf is suggesting and I think, you know, sometimes thinking outside the box while working inside the box as robustly as possible helps yield a result.

The Danforth team, obviously, Bush's team, brings another layer of people who were there when many of these things were hammered out. So did George Bush make a call but, more importantly, will you engage even more thoroughly?

Mr. BOOTH. Well, I will certainly take the engagement of former President Bush back to the Secretary for further consideration. It was former Secretary Rice who tried to engage President Kiir. Former President Carter did as well.

Mr. SMITH. Okay. Let me just ask a couple of questions. Again, if you could get back to us, you know, perhaps by early next week. Time is of the essence.

I mean, there was an article in Voice of America a day ago about Malakal deserted, destroyed and new South Sudan fighting. The article points out, and I am sure you know this, that Oxfam has pulled out and said that the streets were littered with bodies.

And the comment was made in the article fighting resumed in Malakal, the capital of the largest oil-producing state in South Sudan, weeks after the two sides in the conflict signed a cessation of hostilities agreement.

Certainly, it hasn't reached that town and many, many others. So, again, the sense of urgency you might want to comment on this because I know many of our witnesses do call and make very persuasive argument on the need, and you said it as well, of being able to get humanitarian workers in.

One, people are being killed, absolutely innocent women, men and children who happen to be Sudanese or visitors there, perhaps even some Americans. But now we have Oxfam and others pulling out. So if you could maybe speak to that now, Mr. Ambassador.

Mr. BOOTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Clearly, both sides have not respected the cessation of hostilities agreement that they signed. Fighting continued after that agreement was signed in late January in Addis.

There were attacks on the towns of Leer in Unity State and other areas, in Gadiang in Jonglei State by the government forces, and then as you rightly mentioned, last week was the attack on Malakal by the opposition forces.

One of the critical things to make the cessation of hostilities a reality is to deploy the monitoring and verification mechanism that IGAD had foreseen in the cessation of hostilities agreement and we have been working day and night with them.

I have secunded a member of my staff to work with the IGAD mediation to get that team established. They have been into South Sudan. They have visited numerous sites where the teams will operate out of. They have verified that it is indeed possible for those teams to operate.

We are working on a memorandum of understanding with the U.N. Mission in South Sudan to provide some support to that team, and just this week money that we had made available was put on a contract to provide the services and support needed for those teams to deploy.

So I understand the headquarters team will deploy this week to Juba and as the other staff are brought on board from IGAD member states and international partners the monitoring and verification teams will be out there.

Now, these are monitoring teams and they will not be able to enforce the cessation of hostility. The enforcement will really come primarily from the political clout of the region—the countries in the region that both parties in South Sudan will need to live with and deal with.

And so the premise of the monitoring and verification mechanism is that once good information is available the Presidents of the countries in the region will be able to intervene to ensure that those violations stop.

Mr. SMITH. You have said that ominous signs in South Sudan have been visible for quite some time. Matter of fact, on February 7th in your remarks before the Africa Center for Strategic Studies you suggested that, including internal political tensions, shrinking political space, and intercommunal tensions.

In light of the U.S. commitment to the world's newest country, what can we do differently now to address these issues that we have not done previously and what new direction is likely to succeed at this point?

Mr. BOOTH. Mr. Chairman, I think the—as you mentioned, there were signs that there was closing political space in the country. We and others in the international community engaged with the government to try to reverse that, to slow that down.

I personally was in Juba in early December and was very active in lobbying the government to modify an NGO bill that they were on the verge of passing, trying to keep this space open. I also spoke out about the need for space for press freedom at that time.

Now, clearly, the issue is not sort of what more might have been done but what can we do to avoid a repetition of this, and this is why the IGAD mediators with our full support and encouragement have proposed that there be a very broad dialogue going forward, that the solution to the crisis in South Sudan is not going to be one that is a stitch up between a couple of politicians to decide who gets what share of power but, rather, something that is going to involve the civil society of South Sudan, the religious leaders, the traditional leaders, the business community, women, youth, as well as the political class, as well as the political parties.

In order to look at the issues of how South Sudan should be governed, there is already a constitutional process underway that needs to be revised and invigorated. That is one of the proposals from the IGAD mediation.

There are also proposals that the—this discussion needs to look at some of the contributing causes to the current conflict such as the security sector. The SPLA became a military force which continued to grow after independence as more and more militias were incorporated.

How can the security sector be reformed so that you don't have an army that at the first sign of trouble will fracture, as the SPLA did on the night of the 15th of December and subsequently?

Issues of financial accountability and transparency, allocation of resources that the government does have and how do they actually

get out to benefit more broadly the people of South Sudan—those are all issues that have been put on the table by IGAD.

We fully support that and we believe that by addressing all of those issues with a broad range of stakeholders from South Sudan to reach a consensus, at least a sufficient consensus among those stakeholders on the way forward will be what will address these ongoing issues.

There will also be a need, frankly, for an accountability and a reconciliation process. People need to know what was done. Those most responsible for gross violations of human rights will need to face justice.

But there will above all need to be a reconciliation process among the communities. Some things that have been an issue in South Sudan are tensions between ethnic groups. These are issues that we were working on before the conflict.

We spent a lot of time, particularly over this past summer, in dealing with the crisis in Jonglei State which was a conflict there between ethnic groups and we will continue to try to work on this issue of reconciliation.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Ambassador, are faith leaders actively involved in the reconciliation part in the pursuit of peace? Are they included in the discussions?

Mr. BOOTH. Most definitely. In fact, there were a number of the religious leaders from South Sudan who came to Addis Ababa to talk with the mediators, to talk with the delegations that were there.

When I was in Juba in late December, I met with several of the religious leaders and was probing with them for their views on how they might be able to contribute.

The religious community has long been a respected pillar of South Sudanese society and I think definitely needs to part of any ongoing efforts at both reconciliation but also at the issue—addressing the issues of governance and the constitution.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Akwei from Amnesty International points out that Darfur is awash in small arms and he says that the U.N. Security Council needs to immediately expand the current U.N. arms embargo to cover the whole of Sudan in order to stop military-related supplies reaching all parties of the conflict of Darfur.

Is that something that you are looking at, that you think should be done?

Mr. BOOTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

It is, indeed, something that we think should be done and it is something that we have proposed in New York in the Security Council. We have, unfortunately, not had cooperation from some of the other permanent members of the Security Council and so we have not been able to succeed in expanding that.

But we believe that the arming of so many people in Darfur is, indeed, what is contributing now not just to the organized fighting between tribes but also the general lawlessness in the area.

Mr. SMITH. Among his many suggestions and recommendations, Mr. Prendergast points out that Eritrea needs to be investigated "for its support of the opposition forces." Are arms flowing from Eritrea?

Mr. BOOTH. We have certainly heard those allegations and we are trying to verify whether there is any reality to them.

They have been brought to our attention by a number of governments in the region. There is certainly a concern about regionalization of this conflict, and it is not just Eritrea but it is the potential for this conflict, as I mentioned in my opening remarks, to spread because of the fundamental interest that the neighboring countries have in the region. And so we are working very hard to try to get this conflict contained without the intervention of outside forces.

Mr. SMITH. Dr. Phares, in his testimony, suggests that there needs to be Presidential statements on the crisis and I have read both of those that have been posted on the White House Web site, and they were good but one was two paragraphs and one was four.

Not much length to it, and length doesn't necessarily convey lack of substance but it suggested to me that more could have been there.

But he asked for that but he also says that there should be an invitation to representatives from both sides or factions, I should say, to come to Washington for consultations with the goal of finding a definitive solution to the divisions.

Sometimes when you take a group out of Addis, at least out of Sudan, but sometimes when you come even a further distance it has the consequence of sharpening the mind.

I mean, we have done that with so many players from so many different countries over the years, including Northern Ireland. When the disparate parties there would meet here, all of a sudden things were improved.

Is that something you are looking at?

Mr. BOOTH. We believe the IGAD mediation, which is being led by former Foreign Minister Seyoum Mesfin as well as General Sumbeiywo who led the CPA process, are doing an outstanding job. We have been fully supportive of them and we have been working very closely with them.

There is a danger in opening multiple channels of negotiation and that you open then the parties up to forum shopping. And so we, at this point, are committed to supporting the IGAD mediation and we will continue to do so as long as it continues to make progress and has the trust of both parties.

Mr. SMITH. Well, frankly, I am not suggesting multiple venues. I mean, he is recommending and it sounded like it had some merit to it, that—the idea of bringing people here, perhaps to the White House, you know, where things could be—the ball could be moved further down the field.

Mr. BOOTH. Well, we are certainly open to all ideas and we can take that under advisement.

Mr. SMITH. Appreciate that. Could you also tell me when the last time you briefed the President personally on matters relating—was it in the Oval Office or was it by phone and when was that?

Mr. BOOTH. I believe the date was the 24th of January and it was in the Oval Office.

Mr. SMITH. And is it your recommendation that the President should call the players including Salva Kiir?

Mr. BOOTH. We have had many calls to Salva Kiir as well as to Riek Machar by senior administration officials and we are cali-

brating when we need to use which official to try to move the issue at the particular time.

So that is something that is certainly on the table and that will be used when we consider that that would be the best way forward at that time to move the—move us off of a sticking point or otherwise breaking a log jam.

Mr. SMITH. But, again, the fact that Oxfam has vacated one of the larger cities, things are not moving, certainly not in the direction as fast as we would like.

I don't think we wear out our welcome if the President makes that phone call. I really don't. You know, maybe multiple phone calls would be advisable. So please take that back, if you would.

Mr. Cicilline.

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to begin by thanking you and Ranking Member Bass for holding today's hearing on this very important issue and thank our witness for being here.

For several years, U.S. foreign policy focused on addressing tensions and instability in the Sudan and South Sudan and today we remain concerned about the civility of these countries and the quality of life of their citizens.

As we all know, South Sudan is engulfed in conflict and terrible violence and the United States Government continues and must continue to work to achieve a peaceful solution and in particular I believe we must ensure that U.N. peacekeepers in South Sudan who are working to protect people seeking refuge are provided with the resources they need.

I think our approach should be to craft a foreign policy that focuses on Sudan and South Sudan and promotes democratic values including respect for human rights, the necessity of enfranchisement and equal protection under the law.

Religious tensions, ethnic tensions, and economic tensions all underscore the need for a comprehensive approach that can take these into account and I thank you, Ambassador Booth, for the work that you are doing.

I would like you to focus, if you would, on the humanitarian relief efforts in South Sudan and to what extent you see them being constrained by the evacuation of foreign aid workers, whether there are pro-government or anti-government forces that are seeking to actually restrict relief efforts or humanitarian air access, and what is the status of the refugees that have taken refuge in U.N. compounds—are their most urgent needs being met and what can we do to be of assistance?

And finally, if you would speak about the capacity of the U.N. peacekeepers in South Sudan, their ability to protect those civilians sheltering at U.N. bases and those beyond.

I asked this question last time during the last hearing, and that is due to the legislative cap on peacekeeping contributions that is currently in place and is set to remain in place unless Congress acts, the U.S. did not pay its full assessed rate for any of the peacekeeping missions, and for UNMISS alone the shortfall amounted to about $10 million.

This funding shortage, I believe, continues to deny critical resources to the missions and it means top troop-contributing coun-

tries like Bangladesh and Ghana are not fully reimbursed for their services.

And so would you talk a little bit about what it means for this funding to not be in place, what impact it has on the mission and what the long-term responsibilities that we have in terms of our supporting U.N. peacekeeping work?

Mr. BOOTH. Well, thank you, Congressman.

You had a lot of questions there but let me try to see if I can answer most of them.

UNMISS, I think, should be credited with savings tens of thousands of lives during this current crisis in South Sudan. They have given refuge in their own compounds to close to 80,000 South Sudanese.

Now, that is just a fraction of the number of South Sudanese who have been displaced internally in the country but they were able to offer protection. Not foolproof protection in all cases, as some of their compounds actually were in the path of fighting that moved back and forth, particularly in the town of Bor.

And so the administration and other members of the Security Council voted in late December to increase the troop ceiling and the number of foreign police with the UNMISS mission, almost doubling the size of the mission to give it capacity.

Despite efforts to recruit those forces very quickly, unfortunately, I have to report that to date only several hundred have actually arrived in country. More are on the way, but it does take a number of the troop-contributing countries, those countries willing to contribute, time to organize their forces, provide the appropriate equipment and get them transported to theater.

I think the top priorities of the U.N. Mission in South Sudan are three, really. One is the protection of civilians including the protection of civilians in their own compounds. Two is to monitor the human rights situation and report on it, and there was an UNMISS interim human rights report that was just issued I believe the end of last week. And then three is that of assisting the rest of the U.N. community there and others in ensuring humanitarian access to those in need.

The U.N. I think has estimated that humanitarian need in the country will be about $1.27 billion this year of which only about $225 million has been pledged to date. So there, clearly, is, if the U.N. estimates are accurate and we have no reason to challenge them at this point, there will be a funding shortfall in providing humanitarian assistance.

Our Embassy has been drawn down to de minimis staffing but the first people that we sent in in addition to de minimis staff we have there was our disaster assistance team—our DART team—and they went in and they spent over a week working with the U.N. and others to come up with a plan and an assessment of what needs to be done and how to get it done.

In terms of the actual access on the ground, there have been places and instances where the U.N. Mission has not been able to fly in at particular times. We understand that the cooperation now from both the opposition and the government is improving though it is not foolproof yet in trying to move humanitarian assistance.

There is an urgency to all of this as South Sudan will soon enter its rainy season and if particularly bulky items—heavy items such as food cannot be prepositioned in time, this will result in either having to deliver this in a much more expensive manner by air or that people will be on exceedingly short rations.

So there is a huge humanitarian need that needs to be met there. We are working with the U.N. and other humanitarian agencies to try to meet that, and actually the humanitarian access was one component of the cessation of hostilities agreement and one that we indeed will hold both the government and the opposition to their word on that to allow humanitarian assistance.

Mr. CICILLINE. Would you just spend a moment and speak about the U.N. peacekeeping, the funding and our failure to pay the assessed amount, and what impact that is having on both the participation of other countries and our position in that part of the world?

Mr. BOOTH. Well, I am not the expert on the U.N. peacekeeping budget. I would really ask that I pass your question to our international organization bureau that we work very closely with, obviously, and perhaps have them come back to you on that impact as they are the ones who are working through the Department of Peacekeeping Operations in New York and would have a better sense of what the impact of the shortfall of U.S. funding is.

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you.

Mr. Ambassador, thank you very much for your testimony.

Mr. BOOTH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. A pleasure.

Mr. SMITH. I would like to now introduce our second panel, beginning first with Mr. John Prendergast, who is a human rights activist, best-selling author and co-founder of the Enough Project, an initiative to end genocide and crimes against humanity.

He has worked for the National Security Council under President Clinton, the State Department, and in several congressional offices.

He has also worked for the National Intelligence Council, UNICEF, Human Rights Watch, the International Crisis Group and the U.S. Institute of Peace.

He has helped fund schools in Darfurian refugee camps and have launched the Satellite Sentinel Project with actor and activist George Clooney. Mr. Prendergast has worked for peace in Africa for more than 25 years and has frequently appeared before our subcommittee to provide his expert advice.

We will then hear from Dr. Walid Phares, who is co-secretary general of the Transatlantic Legislative Group on Counter Terrorism, a position he has held since 2008. He has also been an advisor to the U.S. House of Representatives Caucus on Counter Terrorism since 2007.

He is an expert on conflicts and terrorism, and lectures on campuses nationwide as well as internationally. He has testified before and conducts briefings in Congress, the European Parliament and the European Commission, the U.N. Security Council, the U.S. Department of State, and other foreign ministries worldwide. Again, for 25 years he has written books and articles on various developments in Sudan and South Sudan.

We will then hear from Adotei Akwei who rejoined Amnesty International as the managing director for government relations. He was a senior policy advisor for CARE where he also worked as regional advocacy advisor in Asia.

Before joining CARE, Mr. Akwei worked with Amnesty International for 11 years. He also served as Africa director for the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, now Human Rights First.

Prior to that, he served as research and human rights director for the American Committee on Africa and the Africa Fund.

Mr. Prendergast, please proceed.

STATEMENT OF MR. JOHN PRENDERGAST, CO–FOUNDER, ENOUGH PROJECT

Mr. PRENDERGAST. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for the chance to address this subcommittee and for your steadfast concern for the people of Africa for many years.

I just returned last week from South Sudan and I saw the aftermath of some horrific atrocities perpetrated by both sides in this conflict. I also in 2013 went to the Darfur-Chad border as well as into the Nuba Mountains in rebel-held territory in the Nuba Mountains and met with the survivors of equally horrific atrocities.

I think Adotei will focus on the human rights issues, rightly so, as Amnesty, so I would like to spend my time just zeroing in on possible solutions.

I think the U.S. needs a real peace strategy for both Sudans, something that is much more comprehensive and proactive than the existing approach that we have taken, and I think I would focus today on just four areas—on peace, democracy, accountability, and then the leverage the U.S. needs to build in order to make progress on those first three.

So the first element of a peace strategy for both countries would be—I hate to use this term because of its overuse—but a diplomatic surge. When the pre-referendum crisis was unfolding, the U.S. dramatically upgraded its diplomatic strategy.

We had the President, the Secretary of State, the National Security Advisor and the U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. all working the issue. We had three envoys, effectively. We had former Senator Kerry, who was chairman of the SFRC, we had Princeton Lyman, who then became the Special Envoy, and we had Scott Gration, who was the Special Envoy. You know, we were all over it, a full court press, and it paid off. This alliance that was forged included China and other countries to pressure Khartoum into allowing the referendum to occur, and averted what many of us worried would be a catastrophic conflict.

The same could be said for the Bush administration's efforts during the 2002 to 2005 period, which Congressman Wolf was referring to and you were supporting, in that the full court press the administration undertook with a very senior envoy supported by a number of senior Foreign Service Officers, one of whom is in the room right now, Jeff Millington, who has experience doing these things. I mean, that model works so we need to do it. We need to use it.

The escalating crises in both of those countries today I think demand a similar diplomatic surge. One Special Envoy, no matter

how capable Ambassador Booth is, pales in comparison, I think, to the current diplomatic requirements.

The wars in both countries are so complicated they require their own envoys, and the interplay between these two conflicts in the broader region demands a deeper political team upon which these two envoys could rely.

So either a second Special Envoy or this kind of approach that has been discussed already today where a senior political figure, whether it is a former President like President Bush or a former Secretary of State like Secretary Rice, Secretary Albright, Secretary Clinton, these are all people who have a very deep history and concern with what is happening in Sudan and a direct participation in the history of the events when they served publicly.

And so I think that dispatching somebody like Senator Danforth back in those days, that could make a big difference. Who exactly it is let us talk about it but, definitely, let us put it on the table with something that could really make a difference.

In South Sudan, I think—all right. Let us start with Sudan, and Congresswoman Bass said it very clearly in your opening remarks, you know, we need—there needs to be one unified peace process for Sudan.

There are all these—we have talked about it for so long—there are all these truncated stovepiped approaches, to Darfur over here to—there is Nuba Mountains there to eastern Sudan to—there are all these different initiatives, precisely what Khartoum wants—divide and conquer, divide and conquer.

We can't play into that and, again, I don't think that an envoy, again, no matter how capable Don Booth is, there is not time to be able to work the—develop the international coalition to pressure Khartoum to allow for a comprehensive peace process to occur.

I think we understand it needs to happen. Well, how do you make it happen? You have to operationalize the diplomatic strategy to do it.

In South Sudan, one of the things I definitely wanted to note is that well over half the countries in the world that are in war go back to war once they have a peace deal. So it is not crazy and unusual that this is happening in South Sudan. It is a tragedy, but it is somewhat predictable.

South Sudan has its chance now to reboot and I think the odds for developing a real sustainable track is in what everyone has said today, which is there needs to be an inclusive peace process.

We have all these civil society groups and you mentioned religious leaders, the political parties, youth groups, women. They all have to be included. We agree on that, but you have to operationalize the diplomatic strategy to make that happen.

We have to be much more proactive in pushing and building the countries that have leverage with South Sudan and the rebels to encourage that they allow that to happen.

We can talk all day about the importance of this but if those guys block it they won't do it and will sit there with, again, a little closed room with the people with the biggest guns deciding the future of the country and probably leading to another war.

So I think, again, a huge push on something like that from whether it is former President Bush, whether it is Secretary

Condoleezza Rice, Albright, Clinton, or someone with stature can make a strong push.

The second element I would put forward for a comprehensive peace strategy would be democracy promotion. DG Program—Democracy and Governance Programs globally are going down.

This is, obviously, a bigger issue than what we have today. But in Sudan and in South Sudan, both countries, the need to get in there and support and be in solidarity with the civil society groups and the opposition parties and independent voices, the media, those that are pushing for solutions, is more, I think, vital than ever.

And so I think figuring out a way that we can get some more resources and support to the independent sector in both countries, and I know that USAID grapples with this and I think, again, with Congress' support there could be more done in that regard.

The third element of a peace strategy is accountability, justice and reconciliation. You know, I think, again, who disagrees? We have a problem. In Sudan and South Sudan, no one has ever been held accountable for any crime—war crime or crime against humanity they have ever committed.

At least there are a few people who have been issued arrest warrants in The Hague. That is a beginning. But I think what, and particularly now with South Sudan exploding as it has with these terrible crimes being committed by both parties, ensuring that there is some kind of a mechanism, we suggest in our testimony a hybrid court or a mixed court, you know, where—when a justice system of a country, especially an embryonic country 2½ years old, is dwarfed by the needs, well, some international support—still South Sudanese-led—it is not a violation of sovereignty, it is support for sovereignty—to build up the capacity of the judicial sector, to try the worst cases of these crimes, I think, would be terribly important.

And on the flip side of that, a lot of Africans and people who work on justice around the world talk about restorative justice and, you know, in South Sudan, for example, when somebody kills someone or when someone steals something in a community, the restorative judicial mechanism is compensation.

So negotiating a form of compensation in this regard where there is truth telling about who did what to whom and then there is some compensation involved in addition to the more formal accountable measures is the kind of thing you can see underlying a solution going forward.

And then on Sudan itself, another push, whatever the politics are in the ICC—the push for holding those people that have already been indicted to—holding them accountable. President Bashir's visiting the Congo today—that is a signatory to the ICC. Of course, he will skate in and skate out with no problem. Redoubling our efforts—again, another reason why understanding one lonely envoy is not enough for the enormity of these crises.

The fourth and final element of a peace strategy is building the leverage so that we can get some of these things done. We often say in a lot of these crises, well, the U.S., we don't have any leverage anymore—we don't have any influence anymore. I just don't buy that at all, and I think what we suggest here in—is a number of things.

First and foremost, you always got to really, really examine what are the incentives and the pressures—what are the sticks and the carrots that can be put forward in this kind of an environment.

Creating real penalties—when I say creating I mean they don't exist. You have to create them. This requires imagination and it requires some real discussion about what would actually hurt some of these folks that are undermining peace or committing terrible human rights atrocities.

We have to look at this, and so developing those sticks and carrots, and we can talk a little bit about what they might be. Working with other countries that have significant leverage. You know, let us be honest about it. China has more leverage than anyone.

China has dipped in and out of the diplomatic efforts and the peace efforts in somewhat mildly encouraging ways. In other words, not like it was a few years ago where they wouldn't even engage at all—they wouldn't even—that is an internal matter, it is not our business.

Their economic stake is so at risk now because of what is happening that they have begun to, out of pure self-interest, get involved in the—in supporting negotiations. Very generally, I would like to see a senior person from Washington go to Beijing and talk to China about how we can work together on this in limited ways.

We have maybe the same end goal, which is peace. What our interests are may be wildly different. Doesn't matter. Let us figure out how we can work together.

Going in with China with the parties in both Sudan and South Sudan on particular things—even if it is just humanitarian issues, that would make a difference. That would bring leverage. That would build leverage that we don't have now or that we are lacking now.

Targeted sanctions is something that I think we need to use more liberally in this case for war crimes and crimes against humanity and folks that are undermining the peace process.

So the African Union has already put targeted sanctions on the table for South Sudan. That is encouraging. We need to get behind that very strongly as well and build, again, a coalition of countries that are willing to—so it is not just the U.S. standing alone.

Build the coalition who is willing to exact a price for those that would commit terrible atrocities to achieve their political objectives and likely the U.N. Security Council once again will not be amenable to this because of China and Russia. Again, this is where it is.

So we go around it, build the coalition that is willing to do this kind of stuff and push it and jam some of these actors who are doing—undertaking the kind of actions that they are.

Sudan has a particular vulnerability, I think. Given the loss of revenue from oil, not just the post-2011 loss but now even more because of the revenues declining even further, they have turned to gold.

Last year in 2013, they committed terrible ethnic cleansing crimes in Darfur—north Darfur in order to consolidate control or to gain control over the exports of gold from Darfur.

At the very least, the U.S. should lead a multilateral effort to target the Khartoum Government's lifeline by labelling Sudan's

gold as conflict-affected and work with the U.N. sanctions committee to see if there are particular people that are involved in that gold trade that can be sanctioned to hurt their business interests, to hurt their economic interest, and then definitely working multilaterally to ensure that any offer of debt relief, which many countries are constantly bringing up the possibility of providing debt relief to Sudan even in the midst of all the terrible atrocities that they are committing, making that debt relief contingent on an end to the wars inside and transformative political reform.

Thanks so much for the time that you have given me.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Prendergast follows:]

U.S. Policy Toward Sudan and South Sudan

Testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs

Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Human Rights, and International Organizations

February 26, 2014

John Prendergast

Thank you for the opportunity to testify, Chairman Smith and Ranking Member Bass, at this extremely vulnerable moment in the history of Sudan and South Sudan.

A little over three years ago, in advance of the referendum for South Sudan's independence, the great fear of Sudanese and the broader international community was the potential for a return to war between the north and south of the country, a war that was perhaps the second deadliest globally since World War II. That crisis was averted because of immense international pressure, which resulted in a peaceful referendum and the birth of the world's newest country, demonstrating the power of preventive U.S. diplomacy when the international community is united, proactive, and engaged.

Today, however, the biggest threat to the people of Sudan and South Sudan are raging civil wars within their own countries. Mass atrocities, war crimes and crimes against humanity are being committed in the context of wars in both countries. Although the headlines for the last two months have been dominated by conflagration in South Sudan, conditions in Sudan's Darfur region have deteriorated, and government's bombing campaigns have intensified in the Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile. The potential for a complete interruption in oil production threatens economies in both countries with implosion and bankruptcy. Conflict has interrupted the planting season, and with the rainy season fast approaching, humanitarian crises are spiraling out of control in both countries.

The threat does not end at the two countries' borders, however. South Sudan's eruption has threatened to regionalize the war in ways not seen since the 1990s. On the one hand, Uganda has overtly intervened militarily in support of Juba's government. On the other hand, allegations are increasing that both Eritrea and Sudan are covertly providing support to the South Sudanese opposition forces, though firm evidence has yet to emerge. Sudan's history of supporting some of the ringleaders of South Sudan's armed opposition is deep, and South Sudan-supported Sudanese rebels are alleged to be siding militarily with Juba's forces in areas near the border of the two countries. Both countries still remain deeply interconnected and in many ways interdependent, and neither can be at peace if its neighbor is at war. Ethiopia has strongly warned Uganda to pull out its forces, with an unknown "or else" attached.

WANTED: A PEACE STRATEGY FOR THE SUDANS

A nightmare scenario is unfolding in this region. To counter it more effectively, the United States and broader international community need to construct a peace strategy for the Sudans. At this juncture, the U.S. is largely reacting to fast-developing events on the ground, primarily by deploying its very capable Special Envoy to the region and by providing generous amounts of humanitarian aid. Given the escalating crisis being faced by the two countries and the threat posed by a regionalization of the wars, a much more robust and proactive approach is needed. A broader strategy for the two Sudans would at a minimum beef up efforts on four fronts: peace, democracy, accountability, and the leverage to impact these goals.

Diplomatic Surge

When the pre-referendum crisis was unfolding, the U.S. dramatically upgraded its diplomatic strategy. In addition to deep engagement by President Obama, Susan Rice and Hillary Clinton, the U.S. deployed as many as three envoys at the time: General Scott Gration, Princeton Lyman, and then-Senator John Kerry. All the diplomatic work paid off, when an alliance was forged with China and other countries to pressure Khartoum into allowing the referendum to occur on-time and peacefully, averting a return to deadly conflict at the time.

The escalating crises in Sudan and South Sudan today demand a similar diplomatic surge. One special envoy, no matter how capable Ambassador Don Booth is, pales in comparison to the current diplomatic requirements. The wars in both countries are so complex they require their own envoys, and the interplay between the two conflicts and the broader region demands a deeper political team upon which the two envoys can rely. Therefore, a second special envoy should be named for the escalating regional crisis, with duties divided between the new envoy and Ambassador Booth. Senior Foreign Service officers, including retired ambassadors, and regional experts should be deployed to embassies in the region and Beijing to support the work of the two envoys.

Specifically, the United States needs to become more deeply engaged in the efforts to forge effective peace processes in both countries. We've learned over and over the lessons of failed peace processes over the last decade in Sudan, and at a minimum past mistakes need to be avoided. In Sudan, that means no longer accepting the stove-piping of conflict resolution initiatives in Darfur, eastern Sudan, and the Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile. What is required there is one unified peace negotiation process for all of Sudan's conflicts, which includes both armed and unarmed opposition groups and civil society organizations to discuss democratic governance and transition issues. Will that be difficult to create? Yes. But anything less

ensures continued war. So the U.S. needs a full-time envoy working on the construction of such a process.

In South Sudan, it's important to remember that well over half of the countries in the world that emerge from conflict return to war within a few years. South Sudan has had its explosion, and now has a second chance to reboot. The odds for a sustainable peace in South Sudan increase proportionately with the degree to which the overall peace process is inclusive of political parties, civil society groups, and regional interests. This necessitates a broader peace strategy. We will need to look beyond the examples of the deals previously constructed in the Horn or East Africa, and certainly in the Sudans, where deals lacking any transparency or accountability are cut between the men with the biggest guns are the norm. National dialogue, SPLM reform, elections, constitution making, and governance will all presumably be discussed in the peace process, but everything is put at risk if these efforts aren't inclusive. Most analysts agree that the closing of political space was instrumental in raising tensions with no release valve. Just as with Sudan, a full-time envoy is needed to work non-stop with regional governments in helping to craft such an inclusive process and ensure its success.

Democracy Promotion

Globally, U.S. support for Democracy/Governance (DG) programming is down sharply. In Sudan and South Sudan, the need for this kind of support is greater than ever. In both countries, the U.S. should consider a substantial increase in assistance to Sudanese and South Sudanese civil society actors, women's associations, youth groups, and political parties (including the civilian wings of the Sudan Revolutionary Front coalition) to build their capacity and bolster efforts to promote political transformation. In order to support the SRF's development of political, negotiations and humanitarian aid delivery capacity, the State Department needs a legal authorization from this Congress in the form of a notwithstanding authority. This will remove the legal handcuffs currently preventing this assistance from going forward.

In both Sudan and South Sudan, civil society could benefit substantially from a shift in US policy. It is essential that a premium is placed on amplifying independent voices and giving them the tools to effectuate change within their unique contexts. In both countries, there is a strong case for the inclusion of civil society at the negotiating table, instead of leaving the big decisions to those carrying guns. In both, it makes sense to empower local actors to monitor for human rights violations, distribute humanitarian assistance and organize themselves. In Sudan, it makes sense to offer civil society activists seeking to use American communications tools and technologies a boost by issuing a General License D. In South Sudan, it makes sense to support a feedback loop between the Addis process and the countryside. It remains essential that the countries' leaders are confronted by their populations' viewpoints and perspectives.

Accountability, Justice and Reconciliation

No peace process in Sudan or South Sudan has ever held anyone accountable for any crime committed in the context of war. For sustainable peace to have a chance in both countries, impunity has to end for war crimes and crimes against humanity. The flip side of the coin requires inter-communal mechanisms of reconciliation that can provide a bridge back to coexistence between local communities that have been divided and mobilized against each other for years. That process is becoming more urgent by the day particularly in South Sudan, where mobilizing and recruiting soldiers and militia is occurring in some places along ethnic lines. Compensation for crimes will be key to ensuring justice is restorative, not just punitive.

Forging a cohesive national identity remains the greatest challenge facing both the Sudanese and South Sudanese people. This challenge has only been heightened by the atrocity crimes ongoing in both places. True accountability will require components of both justice and reconciliation. South Sudan needs a truth-telling process focused on building social cohesion and peace messaging. However, it also needs justice and accountability. Since its justice system is embryonic, a "hybrid court" is the most appropriate model. The U.S. government and the broader international community can't leave this to the African Union's Commission of Inquiry, which is not a prosecutorial tool. In Sudan, ICC indictee Ali Kushayb, who was spotted at the scene of new crimes in Darfur in the last year, must be held accountable. The U.S. should work internationally and regionally for his arrest as one step towards ending impunity.

Leverage Building

To achieve the objectives above, much greater U.S. leverage must be built through a variety of avenues. In both countries, the U.S. and broader international community must be prepared to deploy incentives and pressures in support of serious negotiations. Creating real penalties for those undermining peace prospects and support for those who demonstrate serious resolve would be an important assist to the mediators and democracy-building processes like the constitutional reviews in both countries and hoped-for credible elections.

The U.S. should be working with a number of other countries to begin to develop these instruments of leverage. This includes high-level engagement with China to see what is possible for the U.S. and China to do jointly. Some consideration should be given to the expansion of the Troika (the U.S., UK, and Norway) to include Beijing in a Quartet aimed at greater influence.

Targeted sanctions are one instrument to create some accountability for the commission of war crimes and undermining of peace efforts. The African Union has already put targeted sanctions

on the table for South Sudan, and the U.S. should do so as well. If the UN Security Council is not amenable to utilizing this tool, the U.S. should work with interested countries to deploy them in coalition with others.

In response to Sudan's war crimes, the U.S. should lead a multilateral effort to target the Khartoum government's economic lifelines by labeling Sudan's gold as "conflict-affected," supporting additional sanctions designations by the UN Sudan Sanctions Committee, and ensuring that any debt relief is made contingent on an end to the wars inflaming Sudan's periphery and transformational political reform.

Neighboring countries involved or potentially involved in the South Sudan conflict also need to be subject to international pressure. Currently, Eritrea is covered by sanctions for its support for armed elements inside Somalia. A credible investigation should be initiated to determine whether Eritrea is providing resupply support to South Sudanese rebels as has been alleged. If evidence corroborates these reports, those sanctions should be expanded from Somalia to South Sudan. Such an investigation should also attempt to determine if Sudan is providing similar support as has been alleged.

In order to move talks forward in Addis, one of the sticking points will be the degree to which Ugandan forces remain visibly deployed in South Sudan. The U.S. relationship with President Museveni could influence Uganda to redeploy its forces, which in turn would deliver a positive atmospheric improvement for the peace talks. This issue is increasingly threatening both the forward movement in the Addis talks and the possibility of further regionalization of the conflict, so the U.S. should bring to bear its influence to ensure a rapid redeployment of Uganda's forces. Just as important, though, the U.S. should be exploring with Uganda how to use their joint influence with the Juba government to move it to more constructive positions regarding the governance issues that helped lead to the current crisis.

CONCLUSION

The track record of the U.S. Congress, and particularly this Subcommittee, has been clear over the past three administrations regarding Sudan and South Sudan. Congress has often led on the policy front, pressing successive administrations to do more to achieve American objectives in this war-shattered region. Sudan and South Sudan need such leadership more than ever before. It is not an exaggeration to say that millions of lives hang in the balance.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much.
Dr. Phares.

STATEMENT OF WALID PHARES, PH.D., CO–SECRETARY GENERAL, TRANSATLANTIC LEGISLATIVE GROUP ON COUNTER TERRORISM

Mr. PHARES. Chairman Smith, Madam Ranking Member Congresswoman Bass, thank you very much for this invitation. It is a pleasure and honor to be speaking to your subcommittee about it. I would like to ask the chairman to add my written testimony to the record.

Mr. SMITH. Without objection, so ordered, and anything else you would like to add to the record—you know, additional papers and what not.

Mr. PHARES. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, over the past 35 years from 1979 until this year I have been monitoring, analyzing, and publishing about Sudan, north and south, and about the ethnic conflicts taking place inside Sudan.

The first work was in 1979. That was in the first war, after the first war of Sudan before the second one and my last work will appear in a month in a new book, "The Lost Spring" in 2014.

Based on my research, what I would like to address today is a global strategic assessment rather than going into the actual case by case. I know my colleagues have addressed human rights. We will also address the humanitarian issue.

I divide my findings in three—1) dealing with Sudan, i.e. northern Sudan, the Republic of Sudan, 2) about South Sudan and, 3) a few suggestions, as you have requested, on how to adapt U.S. foreign policy to these two crises.

On Sudan, as I show in map number two—if you have the opportunity to show it, at least I will show the chairman—what is very important for the American public and also our bureaucracy and our Government to understand is that the map of Sudan is one of a central government, a central regime which has an ideology, at war or at conflict with five other ethnic communities that happen to be African minorities in Sudan.

If we don't understand that concept, it will be very difficult to deal—to jump from one area to the other area without understanding that there is a grand design, a grand architecture of the regime trying to implement it on the ground and in a very dramatic way.

In Sudan, you have the center, of course, which is Arab-Sudanese. The regime in that center has an ideology. It is a jihadi regime. It has been involved in the past in the—as of 1989 and, of course, throughout the 1990s in supporting jihadist organizations around the world.

Dr. Turabi, but also the regime of Mr. Bashir, have convened conferences in Khartoum in 1992, 1993 with many organizations, some of which are on our terrorist list and the terrorist list of other countries as well.

The problem is that you have four issues this regime is involved with. Number one, it is at war with five ethnic communities. One is Darfur that my colleagues have mentioned. Despite all the agree-

ments on Darfur, the regime is still involved in arming forces and factions against the population of Darfur.

The labeling of these are factions fighting against each other is not as much accurate as the regime arming the neo-Janjaweed because you had the Janjaweed in the past and now the new forces with a different name to stop the implementation of human rights or protection of Darfur.

Darfur still is a open wound. Darfur is as large as Syria, though in Syria you had 120,000 people killed. In Darfur, more than 200,000 people killed.

Then you have the issue of the Kordofan in the south where the government—the regime, as it was mentioned several times, is conducting air raids. This is a military activity against a civilian population, not just against the SPLM in that area.

The regime is also engaged in a third ethnic confrontation with the Nubians in the north both on the political and on the cultural fronts. What we see coming in all these four ethnic conflicts is the fact that the regime is denying the African identity of these communities.

That is the bottom line. It is denying them their school, their languages, their political representation and as a result you have a rebellion, as was the case with South Sudan.

Last but not least, the Beja area, which is across eastern Sudan including Port Sudan, this is a community—an African community—which also is suppressed by this regime. And the fifth group basically is located in between South Sudan and northern Sudan. Map number four would show that. It is the area of Abyei.

We do know that it is about oil and petrol and political control of this area but there is a population and that population, as you just said in your statement, has not been consulted yet about its future, as South Sudan has been consulted before.

So one aspect that U.S. foreign policy needs to address is to put pressure on the Sudan-Khartoum regime to recognize the basic rights of these four or five ethnic African communities in Sudan, and if need be this issue, as I recommend, should go to the United Nations.

This is an issue that is very similar to what has happened in East Timor, to what has happened in Kosovo and to what has happened, as you just mentioned, in Northern Ireland.

B, inside the north Arab Muslim country, as map number two shows, you have an actual opposition to the Khartoum regime. So it is not just an issue of ethnicity, of Arab versus non-Arab.

Inside the Arab Muslim Sunni area of northern Sudan you have a civil society rising. You have something similar to what happened in Tunisia or in Egypt or in Syria. People are opposing the Bashir regime—not just that he has been responsible for genocide against African neighbors and co-citizens but because it is suppressing them. This is something that also should be added to all U.S. foreign policy thinking and policy about Sudan.

There are two more crises that the north is generating—the northern regime. One, a constant support by the Bashir regime to jihadist organizations. Bases are being established there.

Our intelligence and security committees in Congress should request more reports from our intelligence agencies about the back-

ing that the Bashir regime has been supplying, has been bringing not just to jihadi organizations including Hamas, which is on our list of states—of organizations that are terrorists.

Last but not least, what is very worrisome, as we show in map number eight, is the rise of Iranian military activities on the eastern coast of Sudan on the Red Sea.

We now know that Iranian military presence in Port Sudan and the regions around Port Sudan is now facilitated by that regime. That regime is engaged in five ethnic conflicts, suppressing its own community, backing Hamas and other jihadist organizations, and now opening its own coast and ports to Iranian facilities.

These should be the basis of our policy with regard to that regime, with regard to South Sudan, if I may. South Sudan is a drama that should not exist.

The way we are handling it, as if this is a conflict—this is a conflict that's going to last for many years and we are trying to look at the humanitarian issue. This is a conflict that should have not even existed.

We should have reacted to it in a very firm way. The loss of South Sudan would be the loss of the latest independent country in the world, would be the loss of a very promising African democracy, would be the loss of an ally which has huge experience in fighting terrorism.

These forces, the SPLM, SPLA, despite the fight that they have now inside Southern Sudan, are the most experienced African forces on the continent against jihadi forces for the last 30 years.

We will be losing this experience, and if that goes down then many—as you just mentioned, Mr. Chairman, many jihadi organizations in central Africa, in Somalia and other parts of the Sahel will be converging to Sudan to create those bases.

So in my recommendations, which I am going to go over very quickly and you have mentioned one, I would strongly recommend that the President of the United States, President Obama, will address in public the issue of Sudan.

He has visited the continent of Africa twice. He has delivered speeches in Cairo and other places. He should, in my view, modestly, deliver a speech and the reason is simple.

We need high energy. People in South Sudan, those commanders on the ground, needs to have a very high important personality that would address them from Washington that would ask them to cease fire.

This is a civil war, and in civil wars they are not going to listen to diplomats. They are going to listen to the highest personality, especially Mr. Obama. President Obama is well seen in Africa, well seen in the Sudan.

He should be, as was mentioned by Congressman Wolf, have with him a delegation and leaders such as President Bush, who had in the past been working on the issue.

Leaders like yourself, like the madam and others should be present so that the psychological message being sent to the South Sudan, not just to the President and the former Vice President but to the fighting forces on the ground—the commanders, when they will see that the President of the United States is addressing them.

As you just mentioned, inviting representatives to Washington, we had the Israelis and the Palestinians. We had the Irish here. We had many other people. Let us take them to Camp David or bring them to the Congress and put that psychological pressure so that they will understand it is a U.S. priority.

On Sudan, we are dealing with not one, but four or five Darfurs. What I would recommend at this point in time is that the President, when addressing the issue of South Sudan, would call on Khartoum, would call on Mr. Bashir and tell him you are under international indictment and you are responsible for the security and the rights of these four African communities in Sudan.

Second, we need to invite to Washington representatives of the Beja, of the Nubians, of the Darfuris, and of the Kordofan, and other areas in northern Sudan so that the American public will understand what are their claims and what are their difficulties.

When we have issues of conflict, especially ethnic conflict, it is very important that our foreign policy would be backed by the public. Lawmakers represent the public and the public needs to see them.

That is why I would recommend as well that there will be another hearing in this committee and other committees where representatives from Sudanese NGOs will be here at this table and then making those statements.

Beja people, American citizens, and people from Darfur and people from the Nubians will be actually addressing the American public and explaining their situation.

Last but not least, we are funding a significant amount of aid and help to U.S. media. We have Voice of America. We have Radio Free Europe.

It is time now that we would instruct Voice of America to start addressing the issue of Sudan using ethnic languages.

If we want to have any leverage by sending our diplomats, fine. The diplomats are going to be meeting few people. We need to speak with their languages, and we have significant budgets.

We have significant bureaucracies. You don't need to add any additional budget. Just giving instructions to VOA to start addressing these ethnic communities with their language.

Thank you very much for giving me that opportunity.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Phares follows:]

Dr. Walid Phares
Co-Secretary General
Transatlantic Legislative Group on Counter Terrorism

"U.S. Policy Toward Sudan and South Sudan"

House Committee on Foreign Affairs
Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and International Organization

Wednesday, February, 26, 2014

Written Testimony on "Sudan's Five Crises and U.S. Policy"

Honorable Chair Representative Chris Smith
Honorable members of the Sub Committee

I would like to thank you for extending to me an invitation to address the sub-regional Sudan-related crises involving the violent history of the North-South confrontation, the lingering tensions between the Khartoum regime and the Juba government, the present and ongoing crisis within the state of Southern Sudan, and the large-scale human rights abuse inside Northern Sudan also known as the Republic of Sudan. I hereby request from the Chair to include my written testimony in the record.

It is my honor and pleasure to testify before this Congressional subcommittee based upon three decades of personal research published in several languages, on my close observations regarding the ethnic-religious and ideological roots of the Sudan-related conflicts, and on my own communications with NGOs and researchers from the six groups engaged in tensions with Khartoum: The nation of South Sudan, Darfur, the Nuba Mountains in the south, East Sudan minorities, Northern Sudan Nubians, and the reformer and democratic opposition inside Northern Sudan.

This assessment will briefly review the historical evolution of the several Sudan-related crises over the past two decades and will address the latest strategic findings regarding each crisis separately while connecting the relationship between each crisis and the regime in the center. My testimony will also note a growing concern over a regional threat in the Red Sea area in connection to Sudan's government, and last offer suggestions for a U.S. policy reevaluation regarding Sudan.

Long standing work on Sudan

My testimony is based on twenty five years of publishing, research and observation of the Sudan conflict. Following are selected examples: My first book, published in Arabic in 1979, *"al Taadidiya fil Aaalam"* (Pluralist societies in the World), included a section on South Sudan secession; a series of articles on South Sudan was published in the weekly magazine *Mashreq International* in the 1980s; I served as an advisor for an NGO federation dedicated to the rights of ethnic minorities in the Middle East, including Sudan, in the 1980s; I advised the student organization Slavery Watch at Florida Atlantic University and was a board member of the American Anti-Slavery Group in Boston during the 1990s; I testified on the persecution of Christians and other minorities to the U.S. Senate in 1997; my scholarly article on the Struggle for South Sudan was published in the *Middle East Quarterly* in 1998 [1]; I was appointed rapporteur to a Conference on Middle East and North Africa minorities in the U.S. Senate in June 2000; I served as academic advisor for the Coalition for the Defense of Minorities in the Muslim World 1994-2004 and then as advisor to the Middle East American Coalition for Democracy, including on South Sudan and Darfur affairs 2004-2014; a chapter on South Sudan's self-determination was included in my book *The Coming Revolution: Struggle for Freedom in*

[1] Walid Phares, "The Sudanese Battle for American Opinion" Middle East Quarterly, March 1998, pp. 19-31

the Middle East, 2010; Sudan's several crises were analyzed in my book (in French) *Du Printemps Arabe a l'Automne Islamiste* published in Paris in November 2013; my forthcoming book next month, *The Lost Spring*, also dedicates segments to the democracy struggles inside North and South Sudan. Regarding the nature of the Jihadi regime in Khartoum, I have covered its ideology and strategies in several works including: *Future Jihad: Terrorist Strategies against America,* 2005; *The Confrontation: Winning the War against Future Jihad*, 2008; briefings to the Anti-Terrorism Caucus of the U.S. House of Representatives, 2007-2013; briefings to the Transatlantic Parliamentary Group on Counterterrorism, 2008-2014; briefings at the European Parliament in Brussels and to legislative assemblies and think tanks in Madrid, Prague, Paris, London, Berlin, Bucharest, Budapest and Rome, 2005-2014. In January 2011, I monitored the participation of American-Sudanese communities in the popular referendum which granted independence to the state of South Sudan.

Historical background

As Congress, the current administration, and the public knows from over three decades of developments the essence of the conflict in Sudan and its evolution, I will begin by summarizing the historical background of the confrontations in Sudan and their persistence despite the several international and U.S. attempts to address them and solve their causes. The state of Sudan was granted independence by the British in 1956, and that same year the country began its first civil war, ending in 1972 as a result of the Addis Ababa peace agreement. The civil war exploded again in 1983 as a result of an uprising conducted in Juba, the administrative capital of the south, against the imposition of Sharia law by the government of President Nimeiri on the entire country—including its southern provinces where the majority of residents were non-Muslim. The second Sudan war, the most devastating, lasted until Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005 was signed in Nigeria, granting southern Sudan its legitimate right to self-determination. As a result of an internationally monitored referendum on January 9, 2011, South Sudan was recognized by the United Nations as a separate and independent country and new member of the United Nations. The two devastating wars between 1956 and 2011, the longest conflict in Africa, took the lives of more than two million south Sudanese while also witnessing the enslavement of about 500,000 Africans from South Sudan and the displacement of another three million or more men, women, and children inside and outside the southern provinces of the country.

The two conflicts were rooted in identity crises and ideological clashes. Between 1956 and 1972, the south rose against the ruling elite in Khartoum as the latter imposed an Arab ethnic identity over the south, which is primarily African Nilotic. The southern leaders had been promised during the British occupation that a federal system would be created to absorb and recognize the ethnic differences. However, after the departure of the colonial power, the northern elites in Khartoum negated their commitment and enforced one Arab culture and language over the African south. The first Sudan war ended with the Addis Ababa agreement, which granted the south the right to establish its own provinces with Juba as a district capital. In 1983, President Numeiri decided to enforce Islamic Sharia across all of Sudan, including the mostly Christian south, prompting another rebellion and generating a second bloody war. In 1989, a military coup in Khartoum brought an Islamist regime to power in Sudan under the leadership of General Omar al Bashir and his ally, Dr. Hassan al Turabi, an Islamist Salafi ideologue and a former member of Sudan's branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. Dr Turabi launched the National Islamic

Front, as political support group to General Bashir. The new regime waged a war of ethnic cleansing against the south, pushing the rebels almost to the international borders with Uganda, Ethiopia and Kenya. Bashir and Turabi aimed at eliminating the southern rebellion and imposing an Islamist state even on the southern mostly non-Muslim provinces. Their policies were opposed not only by the southern rebellion but also by northern moderate groups.

In the 1990s, as the war against the south was escalating, the Khartoum regime hosted a number of Jihadist organizations and leaders, including Osama Bin Laden who was Turabi's guest in the country. In 1992-1993, Turabi, under the auspices of Bashir, gathered an international conference of Jihadists, attended by almost all operational radical Islamist groups in the world, including Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Muslim Brotherhood, the Algerian FIS, and many groups who would later form the Taliban and al Qaeda. The conference, among other goals, decided to support the campaign by the Sudanese regime against the southern rebels as they were seen as an obstruction to the erection of the Caliphate in Africa. However, toward the end of the 1990s and around the turn of the century, the southern rebellion represented by the Sudan Popular Liberation Movement (SPLM) and led by Dr John Garang made notable advances liberating a number of towns and villages in the south. More peace talks were generated as a result. Since the 9/11 attacks and as the United States declared War on Terrorism, particularly after the Afghanistan and Iraq campaigns, the Sudan regime agreed to seriously negotiate, agree on several steps during the talks at Lake Naivasha, and eventually signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement CPA in January 2005 in Nayayo Stadium in Nairobi, Kenya, granting the south its right to self-determination.

While Khartoum pragmatically moderated its position on south Sudan, however, it also hardened its stance on several African ethnic minorities inside the Northern part of the country. In 2004, the world learned with horror about another genocide perpetrated in the Western provinces known as Darfur when more than 250,000 civilians had been killed. The highly publicized Darfur Genocide eventually led the International Criminal Court in The Hague to indict President Omar Bashir and some of his aides. During the same period of time, the Jihadi regime waged other suppression campaigns against three more ethnic communities in the country. In the south of what became Northern Sudan, Khartoum suppressed another rebel African community in the Nuba Mountain region (also known as the South Kordofan) and in Blue Nile State, conducting military operations and air raids against their villages and towns and flooding their land and ancient artifacts by damming the Nile River. In the Eastern provinces, Bashir deployed his security services and troops in Port Sudan and along the coasts of the provinces to suppress yet a third ethnic community rejecting his attempts of forced Arabization and land grab, the Beja tribes. Last but not least, in the north of the country along the borders with Egypt, the Sudanese regime is suppressing a fourth African community, the Nubians, depriving them of their native language and culture. Even as South Sudan was released, four more African peoples have been oppressed by a regime under international war crimes indictment. In addition, inside the northern central areas, including Khartoum and Um Durman, a notable anti-regime movement is rising, attempting to unsettle the regime or at least force the government to concede to major reforms. At this point, the Islamist regime of Bashir is meddling in the security and stability of the independent Republic of South Sudan, suppressing four African uprisings, and clamping down on its own political opposition, all while granting facilities to the Iranian regime and its terror-connected organizations.

Southern Sudan: Two Crises

Until the beginning of domestic strife inside the Republic of South Sudan this year, the main tension since independence in 2011 between Khartoum and Juba had been over the oil rich province of Abyei, controlled by the northern forces and claimed by South Sudan. The population of Abiei, mostly Dinka, have wholeheartedly stood with the south and have been an integral part of the decades-long southern struggle. Khartoum is claiming the province to be part of the north because a number of Arab tribes have been settling the area for years. Despite the independence of South Sudan, the Islamist northern Government has dispatched its troops to occupy Abiei and from time to time conducts air attacks against SPLM units and civilians. The Abiei clash is rooted in two issues. First is a struggle between north and south over resources, particularly oil. Both Khartoum and Juba's elites wish to receive oil dividends from the vast reserves in that province. But another issue remains at hand. Although the Khartoum regime has accepted the secession of the south in the legal sense, they have not yet accepted the loss ideologically and theoretically. Hard core northern elements believe that a failed state in the south would eventually accept a form of tight economic and political cooperation, leading to a confederation between the two countries. The Jihadi ideology ruling the north refuses to concede that a land that was ruled by an Islamist state, and thus potentially part of a future Caliphate, could break away from the center. Only a new democratic regime in the north willing to opt for a pluralist and secular government would truly recognize South Sudan as a legitimate entity.

But the Republic of South Sudan has been plagued with a worse internal confrontation since its access to independence in 2011. According to the most credible reports from the ground, the country's former Vice President Riek Machar has led a military coup attempt against President Salva Kiir. Both Machar and Kiir were aides to the founder of the SPLM movement and leader of the southern resistance, John Garang, but Machar defected to Khartoum in 1991, and his forces were responsible for the killing of thousands of civilians in Bor, in Jonglei State, in what is now known as the Bor Massacre. The current clashes between the forces loyal to the president and those supporting Machar have left thousands of victims dead and wounded. Tragically, Machar's White Army has committed another massacre in Bor in the current crisis.

But the Republic of South Sudan has been plagued with a worse internal confrontation since its access to independence in 2011. According to the most credible reports from the ground, the country's former Vice President Riek Machar has led a military coup attempt against President Silva Kiir. Both Machar and Kiir were aides to the founder of the SPLM movement and leader of the southern resistance, John Garang. But according to open sources from the time, Machar had defected to Khartoum in 1991, and his forces were accused of killing thousands of civilians in Bor, in Jonglei State, in what is now known as the Bor Massacre. However as of the independence in 2011, a reunification took place under the new Government in Juba under President Silva Kiir. Sadly, the recent clashes between the forces loyal to the president and those supporting Machar have left thousands of victims dead and wounded. Tragically, Machar's "White Army" has been accused of committing another massacre in Bor in the current crisis. Violence from all sides has caused civilian casualties across the country.

The country's fragile economy is in decline, oil production is threatened, and hatred between tribes is increasing, particularly between the Dinka close to Kiir and the Nuer close to Machar. Note that while the opposition has leveled corruption charges against the government led by Kiir, critics of Machar remind us of his past collaboration with the Khartoum regime against John Garang, leader of the south Sudanese struggle and the dramatic consequences on the southern population, even during their resistance against the Khartoum regime. In principle, both leaders have responsibility for the deterioration of security in the south and should at once stop the confrontation and go back to the negotiation table. However, there is still a need for a commitment from Machar's forces to ceasing hostilities and ending the endangering of the cohesion of the new country.

South Sudan is the newest country in the world, a republic whose people have suffered genocide at the hands of a Jihadist regime and whose future was promising because of natural resources and internal unity against the terror inclinations of the north. On a strategic level, the destruction of South Sudan is detrimental to peace in the region and to the national security interests of the United States. This country is an ally in the war against the terrorists; its forces have had the longest experience in resisting the Jihadi forces and, as a young African country, it was poised to become a voice of moderation and democracy in the area linking the Sahel to the Horn of Africa. South Sudan is blessed with water and oil as well as other natural resources. Its population is ready for progress and prosperity, and its political culture is immune to the radicalization effects of Jihadi ideology. The ongoing quasi civil war over power can only harm this promising future and profit the strategic interests of the Khartoum regime.

It is unfortunate that the United States administration did little on diplomatic and political levels to pressure the two factions inside South Sudan into a cessation of hostilities and a reunification of the country. While envoys were dispatched to the region and to both North and South Sudan and talks have been generated, the treatment of such a crisis needs direct involvement of the President of the United States personally. In view of his stature as the leader of the free world, and in view of the fact that the United States has contacts with both factions, I had suggested months ago that the White House might call on a cease fire in South Sudan and invite the two fighting leaders to come to Washington for talks with the administration and Congress on how to end this unnecessary and bloody conflict. The president can impose greater pressure on the two fighting sides because the U.S. is the primary political partner of South Sudan. Regrettably, short of such unusual pressure coming from the top, the fight may go on inside the Republic of South Sudan. Not only will this conflict empower Khartoum to expand its nefarious activities outside its borders again, but it allows the northern government to focus on its support to terror organizations and increase the suppression of its own populations.

Darfur's drama

While the question of Darfur was highly publicized ten years ago, thanks to American diplomacy and celebrities, there have been no significant advances toward the resolution of this drama as of yet. According to Darfur's civil society leaders, on the ground and in exile, the government of Sudan is still equipping and arming factions reminiscent of the feared Janjaweed militias in order to conduct raids inside Darfur and kill civilians. Over the past five years, Khartoum has been

successful in splitting the Darfur liberation movements, engaging some and isolating others, in a maneuver to weaken their cause. Furthermore, the Jihadi regime of Bashir has pressured neighboring countries such as Chad and the Central African Republic to cease their both logistical and humanitarian support to Darfur's liberation movements. Khartoum's propaganda machine tries to convince international public opinion that it is conducting talks with the Darfur movements while in reality it is waging systematic campaigns against them. Darfur's civilian conditions are deteriorating and the Western media visibility given to their cause has waned. Darfur leaders in exile have reported that the talks moderated by Qatar have only served to divide delegations and have had a negative effect on the cause of Darfur. Civil society NGOs have been telling us that the past international publicity for Darfur has created an impression that their conditions have improved while in reality the regime moved against them and has been indicted by the ICC on those very grounds continues to harass this African population despite international sanctions.

South Kordofan: Nuba Mountains

The region of South Kordofan is technically inside the north, within the Republic of Sudan, but its population is ethnically non-Arab and identifies as African—and mostly Muslim. More importantly, they have fought with the southern Sudanese against a regime they perceive as extremist and oppressive. Like the Dafuris, they have been submitted to oppression at the hands of Khartoum for decades. A local resistance based inside what is known as the Nuba Mountains continues to resist Khartoum forces, which occupy their lands and bomb them from the air. The cause of the Nuba Mountains population is not well known in the West but is no different in nature from that of Darfur.

East Sudan: The Beja

Between the Egyptian and Eritrean borders, a band of land forming the East Sudan region with Port Sudan as its local capital is inhabited by the African population known as Beja. This community, part of the African and marginalized segments of the northern Sudan population has also been rebelling against the Islamist regime of Bashir. The Beja, Black Muslims, have formed their own resistance movement but have been under tremendous pressure by government troops who reign in their province. Beja civil society leaders have been accusing Khartoum of ethnic cleansing—eliminating their tribes and replacing them with settlers brought from the center of the country. The Beja population lives under dire economic conditions and its members are deprived of jobs and opportunities in their own regional capital, Port Sudan, the largest maritime outlet of the regime.

Northern Sudan: Nubians

Last but not least, another African population living in the north of the country is also submitted to a systematic persecution and cultural suppression by the same regime at the center of the other crises. The Nubians, well-known in ancient history, are the original population of northern Sudan and have been marginalized, pushed into smaller areas by the systematic flooding of their land by Khartoum's damming of the Nile, and deprived of their own language and community

identity. The Nubians, another African Muslim community of northern Sudan, are calling on the international community to pressure Khartoum to stop the cultural genocide of their community.

Arab Sudan's Civil Society

We can conclude that the Khartoum regime has been conducting an all-out multidimensional campaign of persecution against the southern Sudanese, who are mostly Christians, and four of its own marginalized populations—mostly Black Muslims, with Christians and Muslims in the Nuba Mountains. However, in addition to the ethnic warfare waged by this regime, which is already indicted by the ICC, Khartoum is suppressing its own Arab Sudanese population in the center of the country. Sudanese political opposition and civil society NGOs have been reporting, at least since 2011, several demonstrations and uprisings by students, workers, women and liberal groups calling for a change of regime, or at least of those representing it. The northern democratic opposition stigmatizes the persecution of marginalized African groups in the country and is calling for a new democratic pluralist Sudan. The opposition inside northern Sudan is a parallel movement to that of Egypt, which rose against the Muslim Brotherhood regime. The civil society movement in Khartoum is not recognized, nor is it sufficiently engaged by the West in general or the United States in particular. Moreover, the U.S. government is insisting on adding Islamist parties as part of the "opposition" that also have the agenda of establishing a Caliphate and imposing strict Sharia Such pressures aren't helping in supporting the rise of a reformer civil movement. Instead the U.S should be encouraging the Salafi Islamists to consider reforms and join the democratic pluralist culture.

Iran presence

Sudanese opposition sources and Beja leaders have been warning the international community about an increasing activity in and around Port Sudan by Iranian operatives and envoys. According to the Beja NGOs, there is a sporadic maritime presence of Iranian military and an increasing network of Iranian backed terror groups in eastern Sudan. This route, used in parallel to the Red Sea, has been utilized by parties shipping weapons from the Indian Ocean to Hamas in Gaza and to the Jihadists fighting in the Sinai. Beja leaders have also noted that the Muslim Brotherhood organization is building their own bases of operation in that area with the goal of backing their insurrection in Egypt. But the presence of Iranian assets and networks in Eastern Sudan, while the buildup of missiles continues in Iran is not only dangerous to the region, but also to the United States and its allies.

U.S. Policy on Sudan

U.S policy has been limited on solving South Sudan's internal conflict, weak on Darfur and almost nonexistent regarding the four marginalized African populations within northern Sudan. The United States has a vested regional interest and a significant national security interest in adopting a stronger, more assertive policy toward Sudan, both the north and the south. We recommend the following guidelines and suggestions to considered:

1) On South Sudan, we strongly recommend a U.S. presidential statement on the internal crisis in that country, backed by a Congressional statement and a clear call from Washington's highest leadership for both factions to immediately stop the violence. These calls should be followed by an invitation to representatives from both factions to come to Washington for consultation with the goal of finding a definitive solution to the divisions. Constitutional order in South Sudan, issued from the first democratic elections, should be respected until the next election. Early elections or referendums can be considered.

2) On the four marginalized populations of northern Sudan, we also recommend a call by the President and Congress on the regime in Khartoum to cease its suppression of the Darfur, Nuba Mountains, Beja, and Nubian populations and to recognize their identities and their demands. Washington should call a UN Conference to gather representatives from the central government in Khartoum as well as from the four regions in order to initiate talks on the future of the Sudan in light of its multiethnic identity.

3) We also recommend that the administration and Congress extend moral and logistical support to the civil society NGOs of northern Sudan to enable them to flourish and expand and spread the political culture of democracy.

4) We recommend instructing U.S. funded foreign broadcast media to address these questions and to develop special programs in the ethnic languages of the marginalized populations of northern Sudan.

5) We recommend to your committee to call a special hearing on the marginalized population of northern Sudan and invite representative NGOs from their communities in the U.S. as well as leaders from these groups from inside Sudan or those in exile. The voices of the marginalized peoples of Sudan must be heard by lawmakers directly and, through them, by the American public.

Walid Phares, PhD
Washington DC
February 24, 2014

APPENDIX MAPS

MAP ONE: SUDAN AS CREATED BY THE BRITISH: 1956-2005



Map Two: Main ethnic groups and regions in Sudan



MAP NUMBER THREE: THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN

Map Number Four: The Abyei Province of South Sudan



MAP NUMBER FIVE: DARFUR

Map Number Six: Nuba Mountains and Southern Kordofan



MAP NUMBER SEVEN: THE FOUR ETHNIC UPRISING INSIDE NORTHERN SUDAN

MAP EIGHT: IRANIAN ACTIVITIES IN EASTERN SUDAN

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Dr. Phares.
Mr. Akwei.

STATEMENT OF MR. ADOTEI AKWEI, MANAGING DIRECTOR FOR GOVERNMENT RELATIONS, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL USA

Mr. AKWEI. Thank you, Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Bass. It is an honor to be testifying before you today. Your long record of engagement in Africa continues to be an inspiration and we look forward to working with you going forward.

I am going to go straight to my conclusions and to the recommendations, given the very strong recommendations from my peers on the panel. I think these hearings, first of all, come at a critically important time.

Maybe they bring into focus the crisis in South Sudan but they certainly should serve to remind Washington of its long history of engagement and the investment that it has made in Sudan and in South Sudan and also on the issues of promoting human rights and freedom for the people in South Sudan.

The U.S. has been heavily engaged in Sudan since the 1970s, first providing support to the government in Khartoum and then in 1989 leading the international effort to end the protracted bloody civil war between the SPLM and the Government of Sudan.

The United States also has responded to different humanitarian crises that have cost millions of lives. The U.S. played a key role in brokering the end of the civil war and orchestrating the process that resulted in the secession of South Sudan, its birth as an independent nation and has been the single largest donor to the new government in addition to providing support to a government formed from an armed group that had been fighting over 20 years.

In other words, the near collapse of the new government in Juba represents not only another tragedy for the people of South Sudan unless resolved in a manner that leads to sustained improved governance and respect for human rights, it sends a chilling message for the entire continent and, arguably, here in Washington. This is why the peace talks in Addis, as John mentioned, must not be conducted in a business as usual manner, leaving the shaping of the cease fire, its implementation and hopefully ensuring its longevity only to the Government of Sudan and the forces of former Vice President Riek Machar and their supporters.

The manner in which a peace agreement is reached will be as important as the agreement itself because it will help cement the legitimate and critical role of civil society in affairs of their country and include historically marginalized populations.

It will also underscore the concept of accountability for governments and the people in those governments to meet the ceasefire and to live and abide by it.

So for Amnesty International, it is important that policy makers in Washington deliberate on the steps going forward and that there is clarity on the nature of the issues that both countries face individually that are similar but that are in different context, and those where seeking to address an issue in one country would benefit from better coordination or efforts to address that with the other.

In this category, we would include improving the delivery of humanitarian assistance and expanding and robustly informing the U.N. arms embargo which, Chairman Smith, you referred to.

While over 800,000 people have been displaced by the current crisis in South Sudan with over 700,000 of those internally displaced and either seeking shelter in U.N. bases or staying in rural open settings with little to no access to food or water, sanitation or shelter, in Sudan the delivery of essential humanitarian assistance to civilian populations in conflict-affected areas has been severely hindered due to government restrictions and widespread insecurity.

The United States and the international community must prioritize getting the Governments of Sudan and South Sudan to facilitate the unrestricted work of humanitarian organizations.

This includes removing obstacles to their operations, working to ensure the safety of staff delivering humanitarian assistance, ensuring access to at-risk communities, and ensuring the safety and protection of refugees and internally displaced.

Second, the destructive role of the glut of small arms in both South Sudan and Sudan has contributed to conflicts, loss of life and destruction of livelihoods.

This is despite the U.N. Security Council's imposed arms embargo on Darfur. We all know that there has been compelling evidence that arms have been and continue to be used to commit serious violations of international humanitarian and human rights law in Darfur and other parts of Sudan.

As such, the U.N. Security Council must immediately expand the current U.N. arms embargo to cover the whole of Sudan in order to stop military and related supplies reaching all parties of the conflict in Darfur.

The flow of small arms to the region has not stopped and the civilian populations continue to suffer the consequences. Reducing the availability of these weapons will be critical to helping curb abuses in Darfur, Blue Nile and southern Kordofan and will be essential for conducting effective DDR processes in South Sudan where abuses carried out by soldiers and armed civilians in the last few months have underscored the dangers of unrestricted easy access to weapons.

However, as these bilateral challenges must be taken up, there must be continued focus on the human rights challenges inside each of these countries. In Sudan, the United States must work with the international community to immediately cease all attacks in violation of international humanitarian law and human rights in Darfur, southern Kordofan, and Blue Nile, including deliberate attacks on civilians and indiscriminate aerial bombardments in civilian areas.

The United States must also push the Sudanese Government to promptly, independently and impartially investigate all allegations of attacks against civilians by members of the Sudanese paramilitary forces in line with the requirements of international law, standards of fair trial, and to ensure that perpetrators are held to account.

The Government of Sudan must comply with the arms embargo in Darfur including stopping all offensive military flights and seek-

ing prior authorization with the Security Council sanctions committee to move military equipment to Darfur or into Darfur.

And the United States must also express concern over the ongoing restrictions on basic civil and political rights and the continued harassment of critics of the government including through the practice of arbitrary detention, torture, ill treatment, restrictions on freedom of expression, association, and assembly.

And I would point out that the civil society groups in Sudan have issued statements calling for a comprehensive response and approach to the situation in the country. We must build on that, as my colleague has just said. That is going to be the critical actor and agent to sustain reform inside Sudan.

In South Sudan, I think we have all reached fairly easy agreement that the consensus is that the cease fire and implementing an effective cease fire is the priority.

We must ensure that the peace negotiations and the establishment of the AU Commission of Inquiry prioritize accountability, as well as reconciliation, ensuring that those responsible for abuses during the conflict are brought to justice and ending the cycle of impunity that John referred to.

The negotiations in Addis have to be opened up. Representatives of all stakeholders—women, civil society groups, and other marginalized communities—must be allowed to participate and, as John said, we must work to facilitate that.

If there is going to be a lasting peace, there has got to be broader ownership, and the protection of human rights in the country is helped and strengthened by all of their involvements.

I will thank you there.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Akwei follows:]

Breaking the Circle of Violence: US policy toward Sudan and South Sudan
Testimony by Adotei Akwei, Amnesty International USA before the
House Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and International Organizations
February 26, 2014

Thanks for invite, for holding the hearing and acknowledgements of activities MOCs
Intro AIUSA who we are, what we do and our history of work
Review of US engagement in the region positive and negative
Overview of ongoing and current crises in both Sudan and South Sudan and their impact on human rights in both countries, (talk to Jasmine about individual cases)
Recommendations

On behalf of the members of Amnesty International USA I would like to thank the subcommittee for this opportunity to testify. Chairman Smith your continued efforts to improve the respect and protection of human rights in Africa and around the world are well known and continue to be an inspiration to all of us. Ranking member Bass your record of advocacy in support of justice and rights for the continent goes back to the anti-apartheid struggle. AIUSA looks forward to working with both of you as we continue to support and strengthen efforts with Africa to build societies where the dignity and rights of individuals are protected and individuals can achieve their full potential.

Amnesty International and our work on Sudan and South Sudan
Amnesty International is the world's largest human rights organization, with more than 3 million supporters in more than 150 nations and territories. There are 80 country chapters of Amnesty International and here in the United States we have nearly 500,000 supporters whose dedication to human rights has impacted both policy and practice around the world.

Amnesty International has been seeking to protect and improve human rights in Sudan since its formation in 1961 and on South Sudan since it seceded from Sudan and gained its independence in 2011. We have issued reports, held meetings with the government representatives for Sudan and South Sudan and have also submitted reports to various UN bodies.

These hearings take place at an important time for the United States regarding its engagement with Sudan and South Sudan.

Sudan

The situation in Sudan remains critical. Over two years after the secession of South Sudan, armed conflict continues to devastate large parts of Darfur, Southern Kordofan, and Blue Nile. The government

has continued to repress fundamental rights and freedoms including through widespread arbitrary detention of perceived opponents and stifling independent media and civil society.

Restrictions on Civil and Political Rights

Sudan continues to apply restrictions on freedoms of expression, association and assembly in what appears to be a concerted effort to shut down all dialogue opposing the views of the ruling National Congress Party (NCP). The government continues to use the National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS) and other security forces to arbitrarily detain perceived opponents of the NCP, censor media and shut down public forums and protests.

Over the years, Amnesty International has documented the arbitrary arrest and detention of critics of the government by the NISS and other security forces. For example, Tajeldin Ahmed Arja, a 26-year-old Darfuri student, has been detained without charge since 24 December 2013. Presidential security guards arrested him after he criticized both the Chadian and Sudanese presidents during a conference. Amnesty International believes that Tajeldin is at serious risk of torture and other ill- treatment.
Amnesty International is particularly concerned about the extensive discretionary powers provided to NISS agents and the explicit exemption from accountability granted under the National Security Act of 2010, and has repeatedly called for its reform. The NISS has with broad discretionary powers of arrest and detention for up to four and a half months without judicial review, broad powers of search and seizure, and grants NISS agents with immunity from prosecution and disciplinary action for all acts committed in the course of their work. These provisions have contributed to creating a culture of impunity where NISS agents can commit human rights violations without accountability.

Security forces continue to use excessive force to disperse protests and gatherings.
More recently, during nation-wide protests against cuts to fuel subsidies in September 2013, security forces used excessive force – including lethal force, killing upwards of 200 protestors. The NISS also censored and shutdown newspapers, and arrested hundreds of activists, members of political opposition parties, and journalists who were suspected of participating in the protests. Although the Government of Sudan set up two committees in December 2013 to investigate allegations of human rights abuses that occurred during the events of September 2013, no findings have been issued to this day.

Sudanese authorities continue to stifle independent print and electronic media. In the past year, the NISS ordered pre- and post-print censorship of newspapers, blocked websites and harassed or threatened journalists with prosecution for work considered to fall outside of "red lines" drawn by the ruling NCP such as for instance reporting on the situation in Darfur, Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile. For instance, in February 2014, the NISS prohibited three newspapers of distributing printed copies of their daily issue.

Armed conflict: Darfur

Intensified violence and international human rights and humanitarian law violations and abuses forced more than 300,000 people to flee their homes in the first five months of 2013 alone. Government forces, and allied militias, and various armed opposition groups continue to clash.

Inter-communal violence over land and other natural resources surged causing deaths, injuries, destruction of villages and massive displacement. Amnesty International has documented the involvement of members of the government paramilitary forces in attacks against civilians in North and Central Darfur in 2013.

The government continues to restrict UNAMID and non-governmental groups from accessing conflict affected areas to provide humanitarian assistance, protect civilians, or monitor the human rights situation. These restrictions severely hinder UNAMID from monitoring and carrying out its civilian protection mandate in areas most affected by conflict. In March 2013, the government issued a directive denying all humanitarian organizations access to conflict-affected areas in Darfur. Restricting the provision of humanitarian assistance to civilians is prohibited by international humanitarian law.

Armed conflict: Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile

In Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile states, more than a million people have been forced to flee from their homes in the two years since conflict started between government forces and the Sudan People's Liberation Army-North (SPLA-North). Many remain in Sudan but more than 200,000 live in refugee camps in South Sudan or Ethiopia.

The armed conflict continues in both states with indiscriminate attacks by both parties, including aerial bombardments by the Sudanese Armed Forces, which has killed and injured men, women, and children; destroyed schools, clinics, and other buildings; instilled fear in the population, disrupted livelihoods and forced people to flee. The human rights situation remains concerning with almost daily indiscriminate bombardments which have resumed since the rainy season ended in November. Sudan also continues to obstruct humanitarian access to areas controlled by the SPLM-North, leaving many civilians in a dire situation.

While an agreement between the Sudanese government and the SPLA- North has not been reached, both parties to the conflict have an obligation to facilitate humanitarian access, and the Sudanese Government should not interfere with civilians' right to access basic goods and services.

South Sudan

Armed conflict

South Sudan's armed conflict broke out on the evening of 15 December. An exchange of fire between factions of the Presidential Guard loyal to different members of the ruling Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) spread into conflict throughout the capital city and within days had expanded beyond the city to other states. President Salva Kiir, accused his former Vice President, Riek Machar, and a group of senior politicians that were sacked in 2013 of being behind an attempted coup. Machar fled and went into hiding but 11 politicians were arrested.

Civilians have borne the brunt of this fighting, which has been characterized by indiscriminate use of heavy weapons, killings of civilians and captured soldiers, sexual violence and destruction of property, including looting and the destruction of civilian homes. During the first days of fighting in Juba mortar and tank fire was reported in civilian areas and evidence also emerged of targeted killings, with soldiers

loyal to the government killing Nuer soldiers and civilians in the street and during house to house searches in areas predominantly population by Nuer. The majority of the casualties in Juba's Teaching Hospital resulted from rifle fire, some of it close-range, and some of the casualties showed signs of being bound before being killed. On 16 December at least 200 men of Nuer origin are alleged to have been killed after being rounded up by security forces, detained in a police facility and then shot at through the windows.

The violence during the week of 16 December resulted in civilians, among them a large number of Nuer, fleeing their homes, either out of Juba or into the city's two United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) compounds. Two months later Nuer areas of Juba are deserted and 36,000 civilians remain sheltered in the two bases. The news, or perception, that pro-government forces were targeting Nuer in Juba, was also cited by opposition forces as the motivation for killings of Dinka by defecting Nuer soldiers and armed civilians in Jonglei State, which has a large Nuer population. On 18 December opposition forces entered Bor, the capital of Jonglei state, and began shooting randomly, prompting Dinka civilians to flee in large numbers to UNMISS bases and to neighboring Lakes State. Some of those crossing the White Nile between Bor and Awerial County in Lakes State drowned, while those that made it to Awerial County ended up living in open areas with little access to food, water, sanitation and shelter. There are currently 92,000 internally displaced people sheltering in Lakes State. Opposition forces in Bor are alleged to have carried out several prominent abuses, including the killing of several civilians, including at least six female members of the clergy, at a church compound, and the rape and killing of several patients at the hospital. Attacks on civilians were also carried out in other parts of Jonglei State. On 19 December, a large group of armed Nuer civilians stormed the UNMISS base in Akobo, which was sheltering Dinka civilians, killing two peacekeepers and an estimated 27 civilians sheltering in the base.

Between late December and early January the major towns were seized by anti-government forces and then retaken by the government, including Bor, Bentiu, the capital of Unity State, and Malakal, the capital of Upper Nile State. The fighting for control of these towns and human rights violations carried out by forces occupying them resulted in mass displacement of civilians, high numbers of civilian casualties by indiscriminate and targeted violence, and evacuation of staff of humanitarian agencies, who would then struggle to gain access to the cities to provide humanitarian assistance.

Bentiu, capital of Unity State, was taken by anti-government forces around 21 December. While under rebel control parts of Bentiu, including civilian homes, markets and other buildings, were destroyed. Human rights monitors received testimonies of sexual violence, extra-judicial executions, destruction of Dinka property, looting of resources belonging to UN and humanitarian agencies and attacks on foreign nationals. Government forces retook control of Bentiu on 10 January, firing heavy artillery into the town from outside and firing light weapons indiscriminately upon entering. Control of Malakal, capital of Upper Nile State has been exchanged at least three times between government forces and the opposition since 25 December. While under the control of opposition forces people from the Dinka and Shilluk communities are alleged to have been targeted and killed in the street and during house-to-house searches, along with foreign nationals from Ethiopia. After government forces retook control of the town on 20 January they were reported to have killed Nuer and civilians from other communities in their homes.

By late January the government had retaken control of major towns with the assistance of Ugandan troops. A cessation of hostilities agreement brokered by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) was signed on 23 January but broken almost immediately by both sides as fighting

continued, mainly in rural areas, and continued to be accompanied by attacks on and unlawful killings of civilians. On 31 January Médecins Sans Frontières staff based in Leer, Unity State, were forced to flee their hospital with their patients. On 5 February 28 civilians were killed in the village of Kolnyang in Jonglei State in a coordinated attack in which armed men surrounded the village and then entered, firing at civilians.

In February, UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) announced that it had found the remains of several cluster bombs on a stretch of road between Bor and Juba. UNMAS asserted that these cluster bombs had been used during the current conflict and had been dropped by either fixed wing aircraft or helicopters, both of which the South Sudanese and Ugandan armies possess. Cluster munitions are indiscriminate weapons that leave unexploded bomblets behind, which put lives and livelihoods at risk long after a conflict may have ended.

Harassment of political opposition, human rights defenders, independent journalists and civil society

Four of the 11 opposition politicians detained between 16-19 December 2013 remain in detention in Juba. Although the Minister of Justice announced that the four had been charged with treason on 28 January, they and their lawyers have not been given written charges, seen the evidence behind the charges or been informed of a date for a trial. Treason in South Sudan carries the death penalty or life imprisonment.

CSOs and independent journalists have been increasingly pressured by the government and opposition forces. Some, like the Executive Director of the South Sudan Human Rights Society For Advocacy, have left the country after threats by the National Security Service and anti-government forces, while others, such as staff from the independent Radio Tamazuj or the United Nations supported Radio Miraya, have had to flee to UN bases or go into hiding. Not only is this harassment and suppression of the right tofreedom of expression a human rights concern in itself, but it will also be a stifle independent voices that could contribute to a post-conflict phase.

Ongoing peace talks in Addis Ababa, and any future discussions during the transition to a post-conflict environment, will require the involvement of civil society and an environment where ideas can be exchanged freely without fear of harassment. Since the start of the conflict, civil society organizations based in South Sudan and the diaspora, including church networks and coalitions of civil society organizations have been releasing statements with proposals to resolve the conflict and manage issues of justice and reconciliation. Past reconciliation process, including the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, emphasized negotiations between political parties at the expense of civil society, and therefore failed to account for structural problems and underlying human rights concerns that ultimately helped cause the current conflict.

Investigating abuses carried out during the conflict

On 30 December 2013, the African Union Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) issued a communiqué in response to the fighting in South Sudan. This communiqué requested the Chairperson of the Commission, in consultation with the Chairperson of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, to establish a Commission of Inquiry (CoI) to investigate abuses perpetrated during the conflict. The CoI would ensure accountability, reconciliation and healing among all South Sudanese communities.

As of 21 February, AU negotiators were still drafting its terms of reference, but reports from inside the AU discussions on the CoI suggested that member states disagreed over the mandate of the commission, including the extent to which it would have power to bring perpetrators to justice. A strong CoI would need to:

1. Contain terms of reference that expressly require the CoI to assess the underlying causes of the conflict.
2. Be an open inquiry, in which all aspects of the CoI's work are made public. So far as possible, the media and public should be given access to the proceedings and to the evidence on which the CoI bases its findings.
3. Have powers to identify those suspected as responsible for abuses perpetrated during the conflict with a view to bringing them to justice, and contain follow-up measures to ensure justice.
4. Identify measures to ensure full reparation to victims including measures for non-repetition. These measures would include truth, justice and reconciliation.
5. Have express authority to obtain all the information it needs, with full freedom of movement and freedom of inquiry to carry out its tasks.
6. Have the authority to require South Sudanese authorities to suspend from duty any officials involved in matters it is investigating, if there is reason to believe that they may interfere with witnesses or otherwise interfere with the inquiry or other proceedings.
7. Contain people of demonstrable/proven integrity, independence, impartiality and competence and have a balance of men and women.
8. Consider the impact on all people and groups affected by the conflict, including women or other marginalized people.

Conclusion

Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee the United States government has been heavily engaged in Sudan since the 1970's first providing support to the government in Khartoum and since 1989, leading the international effort to end the protracted and bloody civil war between the SPLM and the government of Sudan as well as responding to different humanitarian crises that have cost millions of lives. The United States played a key role in brokering the end of the civil war and orchestrating the process that resulted in the secession of South Sudan, its birth as an independent nation has been the largest single donor to the new government in addition to providing support to a government formed from an armed group that had been fighting for over 20 years. In other words the near collapse of the new government in Juba represents not only another tragedy for the people of Southern Sudan unless resolved in a manner that leads to sustained improved governance and respect for human rights, it sends a chilling message for the entire continent and arguably here in Washington. This is why the peace talks in Addis Ababa must not be conducted in a "business as usual" style, leaving the shaping of the ceasefire, its implementation and hopefully ensuring the longevity of the peace afterwards to only the Government of South Sudan and the forces allied to former Vice President Riek Machar and their supporters. The manner in which a peace agreement is reached will be as important as the agreement itself because it will either help cement the legitimate and critical role of civil society in affairs of their country, and include historically marginalized populations, it will also underscore the concept accountability for governments and the people in those governments.

Recommendations

It is important that as policy makers in Washington deliberate on steps going forward there is clarity on the nature of the issues that both countries face individually that are similar but in different contexts and those where seeking to address the issue in one country would benefit from better coordination of efforts to address the same issue with the other. In this category we would include

- improving the delivery of humanitarian assistance and
- expanding and robustly enforcing the UN arms embargo

Well over 800,000 people have been displaced by the current crisis in South Sudan, with over 700,000 of those internally displaced and either seeking shelter in crowded UN bases, or staying in rural, open settings with little or no access to food, water, sanitation and shelter.

In Sudan, the delivery of essential humanitarian assistance to civilian populations in conflict-affected areas has been severely hindered due to government restrictions and widespread insecurity in the region.

The United States and the international community must prioritize getting the governments of Sudan and South Sudan to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance.

This includes removing obstacles to their operations, working to ensure the safety of staff delivering humanitarian assistance, ensuring access to at risk communities and ensuring the safety and protection of refugees and the internally displaced.

The destructive role played the glut of small in arms in both Sudan and South Sudan has contributed to conflicts, loss of life and destruction of livelihoods.

Darfur is awash with small arms, with their widespread availability viewed as one of the main contributing factors to insecurity. Despite the UN Security Council imposed arms embargo on Darfur, there has been compelling evidence that arms have been and continue to be used to commit serious violations of international humanitarian and human rights law in Darfur, and other parts of Sudan. As such, the UN Security Council needs to immediately expand the current UN arms embargo to cover the whole of Sudan, in order to stop military and related supplies reaching all parties to the conflict in Darfur.

The flow of small arms in to the region has not stopped and the civilian population continues to suffer the consequences. Reducing the availability of these weapons will be critical to helping curb abuses in Darfur, Blue Nile and Southern Khordofan states and will be essential for conducting effective DDR processes in South Sudan where abuses carried out by soldiers and armed civilians in the last few months have underscored the dangers of having easy access to arms.

Even as these larger bi-lateral challenges should be taken up, renewed focus on human rights issues in both countries must be continued.

For Sudan, the United States must:

- Call on the Sudanese authorities to immediately cease all attacks in violation of international human rights and humanitarian law in Darfur, Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile including deliberate attacks on civilians and indiscriminate aerial bombardments in civilian areas.
- Urge the Sudanese government to promptly, independently, impartially and efficiently, investigate all allegations of attacks against civilians by members of the Sudanese paramilitary forces, in line with the requirements of international law and standards of fair trial, and to ensure that perpetrators are held to account.
- Demand that the government of Sudan complies with the existing UN arms embargo on Darfur, including by stopping all offensive military flights and seeking prior authorization from the UN Security Council Sanctions Committee to move military equipment and supplies into Darfur.
- To express concern over the on-going restrictions of basic civil and political rights, and the continued harassment of critics of the government, including through the practices of arbitrary detention, torture and ill-treatment, and restrictions on freedoms of expression, association and assembly.

For South Sudan, the United States and the International community must:
Continue efforts to ensure a durable ceasefire is achieved.
Ensure that ongoing peace negotiations and the establishment of an AU Commission of Inquiry prioritize accountability, as well as reconciliation, ensuring that those responsible for abuses during the conflict are brought to justice.
Open up ongoing negotiations in Addis Ababa between the Government of South Sudan and representatives of the opposition so that all stakeholders, women, civil society groups and other marginalized communities can participate in building lasting peace and ensure that there is broader ownership protecting human rights in the country as well as helping to strengthen national institutions charged with this work.

Thank You

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Akwei.

We do have votes again occurring so I will just ask two questions and then yield to my colleague.

You mentioned, Mr. Akwei, that hundreds of activists were arrested in September 2013 and we haven't, I don't think, brought enough attention to what has become of them.

Has there been access by NGOs or other humanitarian groups or the Red Crescent, the Red Cross, anyone, to any of those people? Are they being tortured, do we know?

Mr. AKWEI. No, and in fact, unfortunately the history of the country is that people who are arrested in Sudan are very much at risk of ill treatment if not torture. So this has to be prioritized in terms of not letting the spotlight completely drop away from what is going on.

Mr. SMITH. No, I appreciate you underscoring it in your testimony.

Let me ask you, Mr. Prendergast, you talked about the diplomatic surge very diplomatically and, I believe, very sincerely. You talk about how, you know, a very capable Special Envoy could only do so much. It has to be all hands on deck.

This has to happen now. It seems to me that we are in an absolutely urgent situation. Which way is this trending? I mean, can this get significantly worse in days, weeks, and months if something is not done that would really signal U.S. full, all-in, type engagement?

Mr. PRENDERGAST. Yes. To address both of those points, on the one hand, I do think it could get worse. I think it could get much worse.

I think if there isn't a stoppage with a real cessation of hostilities that is respected that it is really about the nature of the attacks.

So if there were just two armies battling each other, like we saw in Ethiopia and Eritrea—they fought each other, civilian damage was not insignificant but minimal and the losses were to the armed forces. That is one thing.

It is not what is happening here. It is not what happened when they fought the war—the North-South war when there was the intra-south war from '91 to '96.

They attack each other's communities and when I went into some of the neighborhoods that had been where soldiers from the government had gone house to house looking for particular people from a particular ethnic group, the Nuer, and pulling them out of houses, executing them, I mean, this reverberates throughout the country.

And then I just—we went up to Bor after that and in that place the rebel groups led by, sadly, Nuer—young Nuer people who were recruited into these militias, these paramilitary forces principally called the White Army, and the kinds of atrocities they committed there—going into the hospital killing everybody in the hospital, going into the church compound killing the female pastors, raping and killing—like very, very terrible atrocities that, again, send major signals to each other's communities.

So you have this war between a government and an opposition but you also have—underneath that is a developing problem be-

tween Nuer and Dinka and that is—you know, these are politicians using ethnicity as a mobilizing force.

And so that is what worries me about things getting worse. So yes, I do believe we need to do more than what we are doing now. What we are doing now in standard diplomatic terms makes sense. But this isn't a standard diplomatic problem.

Mr. SMITH. Now, is it time for the President to call Salva Kiir and Machar?

Mr. PRENDERGAST. Yes. There are gradations of things. He should definitely be engaged. We need additional firepower, diplomatically, to go out.

I think all these ideas are good and let us see if President Bush or Condoleezza Rice or Hillary Clinton or Madeleine Albright or somebody of a significant stature who has a history of doing things positively in Sudan to be deployed out there, to bring a message, to push forward for the process to begin in earnest.

Mr. SMITH. Ms. Bass.

Ms. BASS. Yes. I am sorry that we will have to go because I have at least 100 questions. But just real quickly—one, I just really appreciate, you know, the quality of your comments and recommendations and all, and you mentioned that inside of South Sudan that there would be a call from folks for a comprehensive response and I am wondering with what Mr. Prendergast said if that is an example.

So in other words, I love the term diplomatic surge. You know, if we really went in with full force would that be responsive to what you feel people are calling, and then also, you know, with you, Dr. Phares, you know, you described all of the different struggles that are taking place within Sudan. How do you feel that type of response could help?

Mr. PHARES. For Southern Sudan, may I recommend a shock treatment at this point in time. As my colleagues have mentioned, we are way beyond the traditional confrontation on our border line.

And the shock treatment—I am going to repeat one more time—the President of the United States has immense weight in the eyes not just of the two leaders on the ground but other commanders on the ground.

They look at him as he is the head of the free world, and if he can include in his speech directed to them I will make you responsible if you continue to kill civilians, and then we could have our diplomats, former Presidents, so on and so—we need that shock treatment.

And number two, we need to invite representatives. I am not sure at what level but bring your representatives here. Sending that message—that image back by TV into South Sudan will create an energy that is different.

Because now people are killing people. They think that the international community and United States are just sending one diplomat.

Mr. AKWEI. I would think that having that kind of political representation that speaks directly to these civil society groups would be one of the most powerful things we could do because it would send a statement to the "leaders" of the major armed forces that these groups matter, these groups have to be listened to, these

groups have a legitimate stake in the future of the country and you are not the only ones driving the future.

Mr. PRENDERGAST. And one footnote to that is part of what you surge diplomatically for is to ensure those voices are at the table and heard but you also want to surge because in South Sudan itself the trend line in the year before the conflict started was a closing of space.

Freedom of speech, freedom of assembly—all those were under siege and that space needs to be reopened for people to have the confidence that anything that is agreed to in Addis Ababa can be brought back to the country and people will have a chance to really build this country with and have a free and fair electoral process that will allow for everyone to be able to participate in an equal way.

So I think that is what we are really missing here is the pressure—the high-level pressure that says this matters to us deeply and in the absence of that inclusivity and those rights how can you build this country, and you won't get our help because that means it is going the wrong way if you are not doing those things.

Mr. SMITH. I want to thank our distinguished witnesses. Thank you for your expertise, your very significant recommendations we will follow up on.

I hope the administration takes to heart all that you have said as well.

And without any further ado, the hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:04 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

APPENDIX

Material Submitted for the Record

SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6128

Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and International Organizations
Christopher H. Smith (R-NJ), Chairman

February 26, 2014

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, to be held by the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and International Organizations in Room 2172 of the Rayburn House Office Building (and available live on the Committee website at www.foreignaffairs.house.gov):

DATE: Wednesday, February 26, 2014

TIME: 2:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: U.S. Policy Toward Sudan and South Sudan

WITNESSES: Panel I
The Honorable Donald Booth
Special Envoy to Sudan and South Sudan
U.S. Department of State

Panel II
Mr. John Prendergast
Co-founder
Enough Project

Walid Phares, Ph.D.
Co-Secretary General
Transatlantic Legislative Group on Counter Terrorism

Mr. Adotei Akwei
Managing Director for Government Relations
Amnesty International USA

By Direction of the Chairman

The Committee on Foreign Affairs seeks to make its facilities accessible to persons with disabilities. If you are in need of special accommodations, please call 202/225-5021 at least four business days in advance of the event, whenever practicable. Questions with regard to special accommodations in general (including availability of Committee materials in alternative formats and assistive listening devices) may be directed to the Committee.

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

MINUTES OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON *Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and International Organizations* HEARING

Day *Wednesday* Date *February 26, 2014* Room *2172 Rayburn HOB*

Starting Time *2:34 p.m.* Ending Time *4:04 p.m.*

Recesses [*0*] (____to____) (____to____) (____to____) (____to____) (____to____) (____to____)

Presiding Member(s)

Rep. Chris Smith

Check all of the following that apply:

Open Session [✓]
Executive (closed) Session [ ]
Televised [✓]

Electronically Recorded (taped) [✓]
Stenographic Record [✓]

TITLE OF HEARING:

U.S. Policy Toward Sudan and South Sudan

SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT:

Rep. Karen Bass, Rep. David Cicilline, Rep. Randy Weber

NON-SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: *(Mark with an * if they are not members of full committee.)*

*Rep. Frank Wolf**

HEARING WITNESSES: Same as meeting notice attached? Yes [✓] No [ ]
(If "no", please list below and include title, agency, department, or organization.)

STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD: *(List any statements submitted for the record.)*

Statement for the record from Catholic Relief Services and the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops

TIME SCHEDULED TO RECONVENE _____
or
TIME ADJOURNED *4:04 p.m.*

Gregory B. Simpkins
Subcommittee Staff Director

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Written Statement for the Record
of
Catholic Relief Services (CRS) and
The United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB)
for
the U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights and International Organizations
February 26, 2014

Two and half years after the birth of South Sudan, violence has erupted as a result of a political dispute that has devolved into fighting between the nation's largest ethnic groups – Dinka and Nuer. There is a fear that if the fighting does not end soon, South Sudan will descend into civil war. Tragically, the effects of civil war could spread into the wider region should peace efforts fail and humanitarian needs remain unmet.

The USCCB has worked with and supported the Catholic Church in South Sudan for many years. Working with Catholic Relief Services (CRS), the USCCB has made many solidarity visits to Juba and Khartoum. CRS and USCCB have hosted numerous South Sudan Church delegations in the United States and helped facilitate meetings with Congressional and Administration leaders.

CRS, founded by the U.S. bishops in 1943 as the official relief and development agency of the Catholic community in our nation, has been working in South Sudan since 1983. CRS works closely with the Catholic Church and Caritas/South Sudan to assist those in need. Unfortunately, the lack of security and limited humanitarian access have greatly limited our response, and existing programs in the insecure states of South Sudan have been halted. While CRS negotiates modifications of these programs, CRS is providing shelter, hygiene, and assistance in the form of blankets, soap and other necessities to 4,000 vulnerable internally displaced (IDP) households in Awerial, an area that is more secure. CRS continues to assess the situation in Jonglei and Malakal, and plans to extend assistance to vulnerable populations once access opens up and security is in place. CRS is currently preparing and positioning supplies which will allow us to reach up to 12,000 IDP households, with the capacity to increase numbers as new areas are assessed.

As of February 17, approximately 716,100 people are reported as displaced in South Sudan, and 156,800 people have fled to neighboring countries[1]. In the past week, the number of people estimated to have left the country to Ethiopia or Uganda has risen by 27,000. The actual death toll is unconfirmed, but suggested to be around 10,000.[2] The Sudan Catholic Bishops' Conference has called this period in their history, "a time of crisis, perhaps one of the gravest situations we have ever faced." (#3) This is a telling statement coming from a Church and a people who survived 40 years of civil war.

The humanitarian situation in many areas is extremely grave. NGOs such as CRS and international organizations have difficulty accessing the worst hit locations due to insecurity in the towns and on the roads. Access for humanitarian aid, especially in the opposition controlled areas is a significant challenge. There are serious concerns for food security in 2014 and going into 2015. If people in conflict affected areas are not able to sow crops before the end of the planting season (April) the situation will become dire. The UN reports that this could place over 3 million people at severe risk of acute food insecurity[3].

The bishops call for major change in the way the country should be run: "South Sudan must never be the same again. There is no longer 'business as usual'. Now is the time for our nation to rise from the ashes, but not to take up were the old one left off. Now is the time for a new nation." (#5)

CRS and the USCCB make the following recommendations to the U.S. Government:

[1] OCHA – South Sudan Crisis Situation Report #20 (17 Feb 2014) - http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/South%20Sudan%20crisis_situation%20report%2020_as%20of%2017%20February.pdf
[2] New Estimate Sharply Raises Death Toll in South Sudan. New York Times. 9 February 2014.
[3] South Sudan Crisis Response Plan – January to June 2014 (03 Feb 2014) - http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/South%20Sudan%20Crisis%20Response%20Plan_January%20to%20June%202014%20%281%29.pdf

1. **Affirm U.S. Government commitment to South Sudan.** The U.S. Government must show strong leadership in South Sudan, as it traditionally has, through its full presence in addition to robust funding. Currently, the United States is sending mixed messages through its wavering physical presence in the country. We recommend that the U.S. Government re-establish its diplomatic presence in Juba to help better coordinate implementing partners and to promote effective communication between U.S. policymakers and key local, national and international actors in the conflict.

2. **Provide adequate humanitarian assistance.** As violence continues, the need for humanitarian assistance is growing, yet humanitarian access is uneven. With over 3 million persons at risk of hunger, we call for the U.S. Government to provide adequate and immediate resources directly to NGOs that are on the ground and operating, with a recognition that development activities, such as agriculture and livelihoods, are also essential to stave off an impending food crisis. Funding should not just be reprogrammed, but additive, so that humanitarian relief can take place alongside essential livelihood activities.

   We also call for the U.S. Government to provide the necessary resources and attention to urgently attend to the pockets of displaced people stranded in areas surrounded by other ethnic groups, putting them in great danger.

   Addressing humanitarian needs should not wait for any political process to advance. The lives of those in dire need should not take a backseat to any other priority.

3. **Prioritize reconciliation.** If the country is to have any chance for a stable peace, priority must be given to reconciliation processes. CRS is providing major support for the Church-led Committee for National Healing, Peace and Reconciliation and plans to support the Catholic Secretariat to engage more in higher level advocacy and dissemination of critical messages to help restore societal relationships.

   The Bishops of South Sudan said: "Our history is an open wound that desperately needs healing… Negative narratives fester and poison our social relations. We retell them in our villages to our children. Let us end these vicious cycles by creating space where we can speak and work towards peaceful coexistence and reconciliation." (#9.d.)

   We urge the USG to work with the Government of South Sudan, the international community and other donors to strengthen reconciliation efforts through institutions such as the National Justice and Peace Commission and the Committee on National Healing, Peace and Reconciliation. These processes are essential to heal wounds that have been reopened.

4. **Pressure all sides to ensure that the leaders from the Church and civil society take part in the IGAD talks in Ethiopia.** It is important to include civil society and religious leaders formally in the peace process. Currently, Church and civil society leaders are being excluded from the IGAD talks in Ethiopia, and those at the table are the political leaders who have instigated the crisis. The bishops of South Sudan "are critical of the exclusion of the Churches and other civic forces from the peace talks in Addis Ababa…despite the leading role the Churches had played in advocacy and working for peace." (#11.)

   In addition, the U.S. Government, alongside the international community, should work with South Sudanese government leaders to prioritize and facilitate negotiations and dialogue to resolve internal political disputes. South Sudan must avoid reverting back to a default military style of leadership that cannot "be allowed to destabilize the nation" (#9) for personal gain, as the Bishops said.

5. **Call for much needed military reform.** Many of the military entities engaged in the current strife are less organized forces and more collections of units with loyalties to individuals and their ethnic groups. All armed groups not part of the SPLA must go through a DDR program.

6. **Support investments in infrastructure, and promote the role of civil society.** South Sudan will continue to need investments as a nascent government. The U.S. Government should continue to recognize the importance of strengthening civil society, and leadership despite the current turmoil, and where possible, continue to fund development programs that had been working to build the capacity of these institutions.

PASTORAL EXHORTATION

FROM THE CATHOLIC BISHOPS OF SUDAN AND SOUTH SUDAN

Meeting in Juba from 21st – 31st January 2014

LET US REFOUND OUR NATION ON A NEW COVENANT

1. *The Lord said to Moses, 'Go down at once! Your people, whom you brought up out of the land of Egypt, have acted perversely; they have been quick to turn aside from the way that I commanded them'. (Exodus 32:7-8)*

Preamble

2. The Catholic bishops of Sudan and South Sudan, meeting in Extraordinary Plenary assembly of the Sudan Catholic Bishops' Conference in Juba, South Sudan, from 21st to 31st January 2014, address this Pastoral Exhortation to the people of the two nations and to all people of good will who journey with us. We welcome the new Papal Nuncio to South Sudan, Archbishop Charles Daniel Balvo. We are grateful for the presence amongst us of our brother bishops from the Association of Member Episcopal Conferences of Eastern Africa (AMECEA) and for their message of solidarity. We encourage them to advocate on our behalf with the member governments of the African Union and IGAD as they lead international peace efforts.

3. We meet at a time of crisis, perhaps one of the gravest situations we have ever faced. Our vision of a liberated nation in which all people will be equal and live in peace appears to be shattered. The blood of the innocent, in their thousands, cries out from the ground! The Lord will judge harshly those who continue to murder, rape and loot his innocent children, and even more harshly those who incite this violence and fail to prevent it in their greed for power. We affirm the dignity and right to life of every human being created in God's image and likeness. The cease-fire signed on 23rd January 2014 must be implemented in good faith. There are no excuses for not doing so.

4. *Then the Lord said to Cain, 'Where is your brother Abel?' He said, 'I do not know; am I my brother's keeper?' And the Lord said, 'What have you done? Listen; your brother's blood is crying out to me from the ground! (Genesis 4:9-10)*

5. At this time more than ever, the bold Prophetic Voice of the Church needs to be heard, and we speak from our hearts. You *are* your brother's and sister's keeper! In November 2010 and again in April 2011 we wrote, "Sudan will never be the same again"; in January 2014 we say, "South Sudan must never be the same again". There is no longer "business as usual". Now is the time for our nation to rise from the ashes, but not to take up where the old one left off. Now is the time for a new nation.

6. However Jesus came not to condemn but to redeem. We too do not condemn individuals, but we condemn evil and seek to heal both individuals and our nation. We call for repentance and conversion of heart. Let those who have committed atrocities admit it honestly. Admission of guilt is a virtue, not a weakness. We invite the prodigal son to return to the family, the lost sheep to the fold, the sinner to right behaviour.

7. We have been shocked by the events that have rocked our new nation since December 2013. We have witnessed things that should never have taken place on the soil of this nation, as brother fought against brother, leading to so much unnecessary death and displacement of individuals and communities, with many fleeing as refugees to neighbouring countries, and the most appalling destruction. We cannot remain silent in the face of what we have witnessed and heard. We speak on behalf of those who have spoken to us, people now displaced and destitute. We speak on behalf of the silent victims of our

two nations. Violence is the daily experience of so many of our peoples in South Sudan, Darfur, the Nuba Mountains, Abyei and Blue Nile.

Causes of the Conflict

8. *We must no longer be children, tossed to and fro and blown about by every wind of doctrine, by people's trickery, by their craftiness in deceitful scheming. But speaking the truth in love, we must grow up in every way into him who is the head, into Christ. (Ephesians 4:14-15)*

9. This crisis has been caused by many issues which need to be addressed:

a. We have witnessed the growing tensions within the governing party, the SPLM. The failure to deal with these through internal party mechanisms has played a significant role in the escalation of tension that preceded the violence that erupted on 15th December 2013. Democratic reform is urgently required within the SPLM. Internal party disputes should not be allowed to destabilise the nation.

b. We stress the need for better governance. Too often we see the tendency to personalise political power, to behave in ways counter to the best interests of our communities, a failure to appreciate that public office is a service to the people. Our institutions across the country need to be staffed by individuals chosen for their competency and professionalism.

c. Corruption and nepotism have contributed to the destabilisation of South Sudan. This has prevented basic services from reaching the people and is breeding resentment and disillusionment towards the institutions of our state.

d. Our history is an open wound that desperately needs healing. We must heal our society by allowing our communities to tell their stories openly and without fear. Negative narratives fester and poison our social relations. We retell them in our villages to our children. Let us end these vicious cycles by creating space where we can speak and work towards peaceful coexistence and reconciliation.

THE WAY FORWARD...

Truth and Reconciliation

10. The reconciliation we seek is a process that involves truth telling, knowing what happened when violence erupted between various communities, and why. Thereafter one can speak of accountability, restitution, forgiveness, and peaceful coexistence. There are no quick-fixes to the deep social divisions and trauma within our society. With time and by promoting processes that are holistic and people-centred, we believe that our painful history and our trauma can be healed and our nation reconciled. This is our expectation of the National Committee on Healing, Peace and Reconciliation. This Church-led committee must not fail in its important mission. However reconciliation is not only the work of specialised committees. Reconciliation must become the single most important priority at every level of national life. The National Budget must reflect this, as must the plans of all ministries, government bodies, UN agencies, NGOs (including international NGOs) and all institutions and individuals.

Inclusive Negotiations

11. We are critical of the exclusion of the Churches and other civic forces from the peace talks in Addis Ababa, not for the first time; they were excluded from the IGAD talks which led to the CPA in 2005, despite the leading role the Churches had played in advocacy and working for peace. In 2013, Churches were asked to lead the Committee for National Healing, Peace and Reconciliation, and to negotiate an end to the rebellion led by David

Yau Yau in Jonglei State; in 2012, a Church leader was asked to chair the Jonglei peace process; previously Church leaders were asked to negotiate with George Athor. Why are Church and civic leaders now excluded from the ongoing IGAD talks? Why is it that only those who took up arms are discussing the future of our country? What is the legitimacy of any agreement signed in Addis Ababa built on military groups determining our future? A handful of political leaders instigated a crisis in which their followers have devastated the country; how can they alone be entrusted with negotiating the future of the nation without input from the citizens?

12. *The message of peace is not about a negotiated settlement but rather the conviction that the unity brought by the Spirit can harmonize every diversity. It overcomes every conflict by creating a new and promising synthesis. Diversity is a beautiful thing when it can constantly enter into a process of reconciliation and seal a sort of cultural covenant resulting in a "reconciled diversity". (Evangelii Gaudium, 230)*

Governance and Democratic Institutions

13. *But those who want to be rich fall into temptation and are trapped by many senseless and harmful desires that plunge people into ruin and destruction. For the love of money is a root of all kinds of evil, and in their eagerness to be rich some have wandered away from the faith and pierced themselves with many pains. (1 Timothy 6:9-10)*

14. Our young nation has embraced democracy as our political system of governance, which offers those who wish to stand for elected office and represent their communities an opportunity to do so. We must openly challenge each other on the future of our country, but we must ensure that our disagreements are dealt with openly and in a civil manner, firmly rejecting all recourse to violence. Resolving our problems through violent means reveals the lack of maturity and depth in our democratic system. We cannot allow South Sudan to fail due to the actions of a few who are immune to the suffering of their own people, who personalise political power, turning their positions of public service into opportunities for personal enrichment and nepotism. Our state institutions must be strong enough to prevent this, and public leaders must be mature and ethical in their service of this nation.

15. The country needs accountability and transparency from its elected leaders and government officials. There must be no impunity for crimes committed by political leaders, officials, armed forces, police and others. Impunity for senior leaders gives legitimacy to unacceptable behaviour patterns within our society.

Responsible Reporting and Public Communication

16. We are critical of the conduct of both national and international media institutions. It is often stated that truth is the first victim of war. We still do not know what actually happened to trigger the recent violence, as no investigation has yet been conducted, but the media quickly lost sight of their duty to report responsibly and impartially. Reports based on information which may not have been accurate inflamed violence and revenge attacks and induced panic. Journalists and the whole of society must embrace their identity as peacemakers and reconcilers, ensuring that communication is truthful, and that negative stereotyping of communities does not happen. Responsible reporting should not create hatred and violence.

17. We call upon our national leaders and all in public office to communicate responsibly. In the interest of peace, stability and national unity we urge them to refrain from hate speech, incitement to violence, propaganda, abuse, misinformation, untrue and exaggerated statements, unfounded allegations, speculations and rumours.

Reform of the Organised Forces

18. The reform of our organised forces, especially our national army and police, is urgent. Our army has grown in size since the signing of the CPA and has become a significant cost to our nation, at the expense of investment in development priorities. It lacks cohesion. We are conscious of the need to address reconciliation within the armed forces themselves. There is no longer any place for personal militias. We believe our armed forces need urgent support and pastoral care. We also feel that our national army needs a new name, not associated with a single political party. A professional army should never be involved in politics.

19. We deplore the manner in which children have been conscripted and recruited into armed forces during the current conflict. Children have no place in the conflict. The manner in which our youth were manipulated has left much to be desired. We urge those who exploit the youth and incite them to illegal activities to desist.

20. We call upon all armed groups, whether government or opposition, whether formal or informal, to respect international norms for armed conflict. This includes respect for and protection of civilians, dignified treatment of prisoners of war, and refraining from extra-judicial killings. The Church and other agencies which assist the people have been targeted and looted; pastors from our sister churches have lost their lives and we fear for the safety of some of our own personnel. We insist on respect for institutions such as hospitals, churches and places where displaced civilians shelter

Education

21. Education is essential for the future of the nation, and for building peace and reconciliation. National schools can strengthen diversity. Centres for peace and development studies can help the growth of the nation. Education can help people understand the structures and dynamics of society. But there must be more than simply academic education; it should include formation in moral and ethical values. Many of our leaders are churchgoers, but their behaviour does not indicate a good moral life. We need to form consciences and professional ethics.

Violence in Sudan

22. As we focus on South Sudan, we remain painfully aware of the suffering of the peoples of the Nuba Mountains, Darfur and Blue Nile in Sudan, and the contested area of Abyei. Daily bombing causes great suffering and death to civilians. Confined in their own areas, they do not have access to food, medicines, vaccines and other humanitarian necessities. Women, children and the elderly shelter in caves. Many have been displaced. They too deserve justice and peace, the freedom to practice their own culture and religion, and full citizen rights in the land of their birth. The people of Abyei are yet to receive the official referendum which they were guaranteed in the CPA; we support their right to determine their own political future. South Sudanese and Christians in Sudan also deserve to have their basic human rights guaranteed, and we condemn attempts to harass and restrict the activities of the Church.

We Commit Ourselves

23. We commit ourselves to the rebuilding that is necessary within our new nation. The task ahead is daunting, but we stand in solidarity with those who need our support. We express our solidarity with our pastoral agents: local personnel, missionaries, and laity. They have chosen to stay with their people at great personal risk.

24. The Diocese of Malakal, covering the three states of Jonglei, Unity and Upper Nile, will receive our particular attention as we source more local personnel, missionaries and other resources to ensure that the immediate and long-term needs of this Diocese are supported. The humanitarian crisis in this Diocese is particularly acute and we appeal to all agencies, especially our own Caritas Internationalis family, to support these vulnerable communities

through all possible means, while not forgetting the needs in other parts of our two countries. The presence of the Church in the rural parts of Greater Upper Nile will help to bring stability and human development.

25. We offer ourselves, our time and our energy, and the resources of our Church to support the mediation process.

26. We reiterate our support and ownership of the Committee for National Healing, Peace and Reconciliation.

27. We commit ourselves to continuing our long-standing education programmes.

28. We offer our Catholic Radio Network and other media resources to support the process of peace and reconciliation.

The Building of a New Nation

29. *Jesus said, 'Everyone then who hears these words of mine and acts on them will be like a wise man who built his house on rock. The rain fell, the floods came, and the winds blew and beat on that house, but it did not fall, because it had been founded on rock. And everyone who hears these words of mine and does not act on them will be like a foolish man who built his house on sand. The rain fell, and the floods came, and the winds blew and beat against that house, and it fell—and great was its fall!' (Matthew 7:24-27)*

30. We are convinced that we stand at a decisive moment in the history of South Sudan. Fundamental choices must be made about how we deal with our past and present history, about how we govern ourselves as a nation, about how state institutions serve the poor. We must seize from the present crisis an opportunity to re-found our nation on democratic principles of dialogue, inclusion, and respect for diversity, God's gift to humanity. We encourage that which strengthens diversity and weakens barriers. We need to work to support the notion that we are one nation sharing one identity, rich in culture, blessed by diversity, which is to be celebrated. Mature and strong leaders can help us to see beyond ourselves to that which is beautiful in our societies. Insecure leaders will remind us of our differences, drive wedges between our communities, and ultimately destroy us. Where are our Mandelas and Nyereres? Where are those who will lead us in re-founding this newly independent nation? We proclaim our hope and expectation that the people of South Sudan can and will rise above the crisis.

31. Let our nations be built not on foundations of sand but on strong foundations of truth, justice, reconciliation, diversity and peace, on the foundations of the Gospel values enshrined in Catholic Social Teaching. Hear these words and be wise!

32. When the crisis erupted, our people turned spontaneously to prayer. We call on the nation and all people of good will to continue to accompany the peace and reconciliation process with prayer and fasting. Furthermore, we appeal to our leaders to join their people in this endeavour.

33. May God bless you.

34. Given this 30th day of January 2014 in Juba, South Sudan.

H E Cardinal Gabriel Zubeir Wako
Archbishop of Khartoum

H G Paulino Lukudu Loro
Archbishop of Juba

H L Erkolano Lodu Tombe
Bishop of Yei
Vice-President of SCBC

H L Rudolf Deng Majak
Bishop of Wau

H L Eduardo Hilboro Kussala
Bishop of Tombura Yambio

H L Michael Didi Adgum
Bishop of El Obeid

Mgr Roko Taban Mousa
Apostolic Administrator of Malakal

Mgr Thomas Oliha Attiyah
Apostolic Administrator of Torit

H L Santo Loku Pio
Auxiliary Bishop of Archdiocese of Juba

H L Macram Max Gassis
Bishop Emeritus of El Obeid

Fr John Mathiang
Coordinator of Rumbek