

POPULATION CONTROL IN CHINA: STATE-SPONSORED VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND CHILDREN

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**POPULATION CONTROL IN CHINA: STATE-
SPONSORED VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
AND CHILDREN**

THURSDAY, APRIL 30, 2015

CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE
COMMISSION ON CHINA,
Washington, DC.

The hearing was convened, pursuant to notice, at 2:04 p.m., in room 2175, Rayburn House Office Building, Representative Christopher Smith, Chairman, presiding.

Also present: Representatives Trent Franks, Randy Hultgren, and Robert Pittenger.

**OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER SMITH, A U.S.
REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW JERSEY; CHAIRMAN, CON-
GRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA**

Chairman SMITH. The Commission will come to order. I want to wish you all a good afternoon.

Today's hearing will examine the looming demographic, economic, and social problems associated with China's one-child policy and seek recommendations on how the international community can assist China to address that.

China's one-child policy is state-sponsored violence against women and children, including and especially the girl child, and constitutes massive crimes against humanity.

With us today is a distinguished panel, all of whom have made major contributions to combating these crimes against women and in defense of those who have been victimized, whether it be men, women, or children, as a result of this policy.

With us today is Chen Guangcheng, the Chinese legal advocate who was jailed for five years for trying to protect women facing forced abortions and sterilizations. In his testimony, Chen absolutely gets it right. He calls China's course of population planning policies "genocide." He calls for an international tribunal to investigate these crimes against humanity and calls on the administration to enforce existing U.S. law and bar Chinese officials from coming to the United States.

In 2000, I wrote the law. It's called the Admiral Nance-Meg Donovan Foreign Relations Act for fiscal years 2000 and 2001. The bill was signed into law on November 29, 1999. Section 801 of Title VII of that Act requires the Secretary of State not to issue any visa to, and the Attorney General not to admit to the United States, any foreign national whom the Secretary finds, based on credible evi-

dence, has been directly involved in the establishment of forced abortions or forced sterilizations.

To the best of my knowledge, under President Obama, almost no one—we can't find anyone who has been rendered inadmissible. Thus, it has been a gross failure of the Obama administration not to enforce existing law, particularly on those in China who so brutally violate women's rights.

The one-child policy will soon mark its 35th sad anniversary. That's 35 years of telling couples what their families must look like, 35 years of forced and coerced abortions and sterilizations, 35 years of children viewed by the state as excess baggage from the day that they were conceived.

The human rights violations associated with this policy are massive. We have only recently begun to fully understand the demographic consequences of what that could mean for China, for China's neighbors, and for the rest of the world.

Just over a year ago, China announced a slight change to the policy, allowing couples in which one parent is the only child to have two children. The announcement was followed by a tidal wave of international media coverage trumpeting that relaxation of China's one-child policy and speculating that the policy was on the way out. That has not happened. The policy change was only minimal and was grossly inadequate in light of the coercion the Chinese Government has employed for three decades against women and children.

Left unchanged is the Chinese Government's stranglehold on deciding who can have children, when they can have children, and how many children a family can have. Left unchanged are the coercive measures and the ruinous fines that can be taken if a woman is found to be carrying a child without permission. Let's not forget, one needs to get a birth-allowed certificate in order to carry a child, otherwise the child is illegal. Brothers and sisters, as we all know, are illegal throughout all of China.

Left unchanged is the large bureaucracy that enforced, and continues to enforce, the policy of population control. In the 1990s, I chaired a hearing with a woman who took the name of Mrs. Gao to protect her family back in China. She ran a program in the Fujian Province and she stood right there at the witness table and said by day I was a monster, by night I was a wife and mother of one child. She talked about how women, often in the ninth month of pregnancy, would be pleading with her in tears to allow them to continue and to have that child without injury or death. She said that is the reality.

She said she had the ability to incarcerate family members. Not just the woman, not just her husband, but other family members to increase the pressure, the coercion so that she would succumb to a so-called voluntary abortion.

The minimal changes also do nothing to address the three-decade decimation of the female population. Tens of millions of women and girls are missing from the population, a policy that can only be accurately described as gendercide. The extermination of the girl child in society simply because she happens to be a girl is outrageous and a crime against humanity.

I would also point out that Mira Visenstahl writes in her book, and very heavily documented, that in Asia there were about 160 million missing females. She points out that's roughly the number of all the women and girls living in the United States of America decimated from the Asia population, and China is leading the way, sadly.

China's birth limitation policy continues to increase gender imbalance, making China a regional magnet for sex and bride trafficking of women from neighboring countries, such as Burma, Cambodia, Vietnam, Laos, and North Korea, and beyond. This is unacceptable. It's horrific, it's tragic, and it's absolutely wrong. We are waiting for the course of population planning policies to end, but where is the United Nations? Where is the Obama administration? AWOL.

Yet, the Chinese Government continues to deny that there will be an end. Of course, ending the brutal policy would be the moral thing to do, and everyone is increasingly aware that ending this policy would also be in the Chinese Government's best interests.

As the economists noted just last week, by 2025 nearly 1 in 4 Chinese citizens will be over the age of 60. At the same time, China's working age population has shrunk in each of the past three years. These factors are likely to hurt not only the government balance sheets, but also economic growth in China. This should be of particular concern to the Chinese Communist Party, as economic growth is the primary source of their alleged legitimacy.

The government should also be concerned about the dramatically skewed gender ratio. It may be fashionable for the media to write stories about leftover women, but I know, and I'm quite sure the Chinese Government knows, that its real problem is the young men—one estimate was 40 million, nobody knows the exact number—who will be unable to find wives in the coming years.

The government should be concerned about this because they will have huge, huge dislocation and a lot of turmoil with its society that prides itself on harmoniousness.

We continue to see an increase in human trafficking. Again, the magnet is caused by the lack of women, who have been brutally killed pursuant to the one-child-per-couple policy.

Given its current realities, it's baffling that China would continue to implement its population control program. Absolutely baffling, and yet they do. This hearing is meant to shine additional light on it, get recommendations on what we ought to be doing to try to mitigate and hopefully end this egregious abuse of women and children.

I'd like to yield to Mr. Franks, Trent Franks, Chairman of the Constitution Subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee and also the Chairman of the Caucus on Religious Freedom, and a great leader on behalf of human rights.

**STATEMENT OF HON. TRENT FRANKS, A U.S.
REPRESENTATIVE FROM ARIZONA**

Representative FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I guess the quickest way for me to do this is to express my complete agreement with everything that Chairman Smith has said. I'm so grateful to all of you for being here. I have known every last one of you

in some context in the past. I admire your courage and your humanity so deeply. I know sometimes it seems like the battle is unending, but you know that God sees your efforts and your work.

And in the final analysis we all spend our time doing many different things, but when we are focused on trying to recognize the humanity of those in the shadows of life it is a worthwhile endeavor, almost no matter what our particular thrust really is.

So I just appreciate you for remembering that we're all very briefly on this planet and life is a miracle of the most profound magnitude, and you're using it to try to help others hold onto that miracle as long as possible and in the most joyous way they can.

I just have every conviction that the counsels of eternity will deem your efforts very worthwhile, so I want to just, again, express my gratitude to you. You know, as difficult as it all seems, I am convinced of two things: That someday the world is going to begin to understand the real matrix here, that apart from respect for innocent human life and the recognition of religious freedom and other foundational, core essences of who we are as human beings, that really life has no other real purpose of consequence. I think the world's beginning—they're going to understand that. I mean, if nothing else, the information age has a way of helping everyone get a close-up look.

I'm convinced that as time goes along we're going to come to a realization within ourselves collectively that this is a big deal, this thing called life, and what we do that honors the Maker of life and those that are our fellow heirs of life are really all that matters.

And then the other thing I would say to you that is one of the great encouragements to make always—when you see all the suffering and all the tragedy and you know that there are children this day for whom help will not come in time, those are hard, hard, harsh things: But if there's anything I am absolutely sure of, it is that the Lord of the universe hears the cries of every last one of these little children. He knows them by name and if time turns every star in heaven to ashes, that eternal moment of his deliverance will come to each of them someday. In the meantime, we do the best we can to be the good stewards of the moments we have to try to reach out to them.

So, thank you. I could name every one of you here, but—Reggie, I appreciate you. You're always in the middle of things. And Chai Ling, you're always—you know, we read about you all the time. And Chen, you're kind of a famous hero to all of us. Nicholas, I know you're sort of the brains of the outfit sometimes, and I appreciate what you do. But more than anything else, just realize that it's your heart that goes before you and you are doing a good thing.

I am honored to be here to see you and I hope that as time goes along we'll have more interaction. We're working really hard, as you know, here in the Congress to do some things. The Chairman is always in the middle of everything that we're doing. I'm glad to be able to be with you here. This man has been a hero of mine for I don't know how long, but we're about doing an important thing. Whether we succeed or fail, the effort is worth every moment we have. So, thank you, and God bless you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman SMITH. Chairman Franks, thank you very much. Thank you for your extraordinary leadership.

We are joined by Randy Hultgren, who is finally out of the Chair. He was presiding all day yesterday in the Chair on the floor of the U.S. House of Representatives. I yield to the gentleman.

**STATEMENT OF RANDY HULTGREN, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE
FROM ILLINOIS**

Representative HULTGREN. It's so good to be here. It's something that I'm very interested in and very passionate about, and so I'm here to learn as much as I can, to hear from you, but also to find out what we can do to make a difference. You absolutely are doing that already and we just want to come alongside and help and use whatever ability we have to be able to help. And even saving one life or one child or one young woman is all worth it, so that is my commitment.

It's such an honor to be with a couple of my heroes as well on this Commission, Chairman Smith and Congressman Franks is a great friend and someone I look up to and want to emulate in however much time my constituents give me to serve them in this capacity. So thank you for being here, thank you for your work.

With that, I'll yield back.

Chairman SMITH. Randy, thank you very much.

I'd like to now introduce our distinguished panel. Each and every one of you are experts and have done yeoman's work. We will end with Chen Guangcheng battling cleanup because this is a man who has suffered immensely for his beliefs, and certainly Ling has suffered as well. But beginning first with Nicholas Eberstadt, who is the Henry Wendt Scholar in Policy Economy at the American Enterprise Institute.

A political economist and demographer by training, he is a senior advisor to the National Bureau of Asian Research, and has served on the visiting committee at the Harvard School of Public Health, the Global Leadership Council at the World Economic Forum, and the President's Council on Bioethics. He has also served as a consultant to the World Bank, Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development, and the Bureau of the Census.

Without objection, yours, and all of everyone else's bios, full bios, will be made a part of the record.

Valerie Hudson is a Professor and George H.W. Bush Chair in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University. Her co-authored book, "Bare Branches, Security Implications of Asia's Surplus Male Population," received two national book awards and widespread media coverage for its unique insights into the possible consequences of Asia's gender imbalance.

Dr. Hudson has developed a nation-by-nation database on women, the WomenStats Project, to facilitate empirical research on the status of women globally. She is founding editorial board member of Foreign Policy Analysis and serves on the editorial boards of Politics and Gender, and International Studies Review.

Then we'll hear from Reggie Littlejohn, who is founder and president of Women's Rights Without Frontiers, a broad-based international coalition that opposes forced abortion and sexual slavery in China. Ms. Littlejohn is an acclaimed expert on China's one-

child policy, having testified six times before the U.S. Congress, three times before the European Parliament, and presented at the British, Irish, and Canadian Parliaments as well.

She has briefed officials at the White House, Department of State, United Nations, and the Vatican. Ms. Littlejohn also represented Chinese refugees in numerous political asylum cases.

We will then hear from Chai Ling, who is founder of All Girls Allowed, a nonprofit organization which seeks to expose the injustices of China's one-child policy and rescue girls—actually rescue them—and mothers in-country from gendercide.

A leader in the 1989 Tiananmen Square student movement and among the most wanted by the Chinese dictatorship at the time and two-time Nobel Peace Prize nominee, she is founder of Jenzabar, a company that provides higher education software and management solutions and a co-founder of the Jenzabar Foundation which supports the humanitarian efforts of student leaders.

Chai Ling also authored "A Heart for Freedom," a memoir detailing her journey from a fishing village in rural China to Tiananmen Square, where we all remember her and praise her for her courage, and then on to America.

Then finally, and batting cleanup for our witnesses, will be Chen Guangcheng, the legal advocate and activist. Blind since childbirth, Mr. Chen is from rural China where he advocated on behalf of people with disabilities and exposed and challenged abuses in population planning with officials, including forced abortions and sterilizations. He was imprisoned for his activism for four years, over four years, following two years of house arrest.

Mr. Chen escaped confinement in a daring and almost unbelievable escape, where in 2012 he made his way to the U.S. Embassy and then came to the United States. He is currently a distinguished fellow in human rights at the Witherspoon Institute Center on Religion and the Constitution; a distinguished visiting fellow at Catholic University Institute for Policy Research and Catholic Studies; and a senior distinguished advisor to the Lantos Foundation for Human Rights and Justice.

Mr. Eberstadt, if you could begin.

[The witnesses' biographies appear in the appendix.]

**STATEMENT OF NICHOLAS EBERSTADT, PH.D., HENRY WENDT
SCHOLAR IN POLITICAL ECONOMY, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE
INSTITUTE**

Mr. EBERSTADT. Chairman Smith, Members of Congress, distinguished co-panelists, and esteemed guests, it is a privilege to be invited to testify on the demographics of China's one-child-policy era, and if I might say it's a special honor to sit at the same table as Chen Guangcheng, who is one of modern China's towering human rights heroes.

[Showing of slides]

Mr. EBERSTADT. With the assistance of this Power Point, I'm going to try to make four quick points about what we know and what we don't know concerning the demographics of China's one-child policy.

First, what we know. The unnatural imbalance between the numbers of baby boys and the number of baby girls that has

emerged in China over the past 30 years is the consequence of a terrible collision between three huge social forces, between a ruthless son preference, declining fertility and sub-replacement fertility, which adds a new freighting of gender outcome to each additional birth, and the advent of relatively reliable and inexpensive gender determination technology in the context of unconditional abortion.

You can see from this graphic here, I believe, the strong correspondence between fertility levels and gender imbalance. The lower the fertility level, as estimated by the U.S. Census Bureau over the past generation in China, the higher, the more abnormal the distortion from what we would expect as a natural human balance between proportions of boys and proportions of girls.

The missing piece here, of course, is sonography, is ultrasound. This graphic shows the estimated proportion of China's counties with access to ultrasonography. We can see that by the late 1980s, over 90 percent of China's counties were reported to have access to sonography. By no coincidence, the 1990s Chinese census shows the enormous increase in sex ratios at birth.

Let me show you this one slide as well. It shows the sex ratios, the number of boys per 100 girls, by birth parity: first born, second born, third born, and so forth. You'll see that in the earlier Chinese censuses, the imbalance between baby boys and baby girls for first-born babies was relatively small. It was almost a biologically human ratio, whereas for second, third, and fourth births the ratio was absolutely impossible for any large human population. That's where sex-selective abortion comes in.

Yet in the most recent Chinese census, in the 2010 census, we see a sex ratio of birth for first-born children of about almost 114 boys reported for every 100 baby girls. In effect, sex-selective feticide in China appears to have been increasingly front-loaded with respect to birth parity. Fewer first-time parents than in the past are apparently willing nowadays to take their chances with biologically determined gender outcomes for their first-born child.

Second, most international observers of Chinese demographic trends believe that the imbalance between baby boys and baby girls has stopped increasing in recent years and may actually be declining. Just the dimensions of this pause and/or decline are still a matter of considerable debate and uncertainty: a necessary, inescapable uncertainty given the basic data from China with which we have to work.

The plain fact is that contemporary China does not have a vital registration system that provides accurate and comprehensive national data on annual births and deaths, and when one looks at contending alternative sources of data from China, the respective successive annual censuses or hospital birth records, or for children a little bit older, for children who are enrolling in school for the first time, we see tremendous discrepancies as this chart by the Census Bureau researcher Dr. Daniel M. Goodkind indicates.

For some given birth years we have discrepancies of 10 percentage points or more. That's not a trivial difference. This is also true when one looks at Chinese official census data for children born in particular birth years. Big discrepancies here as well.

Why these big discrepancies? Because parents are not reporting their children. Why are they not reporting their children? There is

a very strong incentive, under the one-child-policy era, under the strictures of the one-child policy, not to report one's child. This tends to be true of girls, of course, but it also tends to be true of boys. This is an inescapable uncertainty in estimating the precise dimensions of the imbalance today, much less its future trajectory.

Now, third, we have talked in the past about some of the consequences of the one-child policy, to the extent that it is demographically effective. We have talked about the sub-replacement fertility consequences of shrinking labor force and population aging. One of the other consequences, to the extent it is effective, is the prospective creation of an army of unmarriageable men.

In this work done by Chinese demographers, the projection is that men in their late thirties stand about a 25-percent chance of never getting married for those of the year 2030, and men in their late forties in 2030 stand about a 20-percent chance, this for a society where, until more or less yesterday, universal marriage was the norm and very widely the practice.

But other changes in Asia, I think, are throwing a wild card into this situation, making it even more volatile. Throughout the rest of east Asia, we have seen what some demographers have called a "flight from marriage" by women, a tendency for women to postpone marriage or avoid marriage altogether.

This typically has started out as an elite phenomenon in societies like Hong Kong and Taiwan, and, of course, also Japan and South Korea, in the big metropolises and within the most educated strata of women. But the elite fashion has ultimately turned out to be a mass norm in those societies.

You'll see in this chart that China has yet really to enter into this flight, even though other countries of China's same income level had already evidenced this flight quite strongly.

But what seems to be an incipient flight from marriage by women in China is now beginning. We can see that in this graphic, which shows the most recent Chinese census results. For the nation as a whole, this flight seems to have begun as of 2010 and, sure enough, it is most evident in Beijing today. That's the light blue bar there. And it is most evident within Beijing by the highest educated group of young women, and that's the green bar there.

Just how fast the flight from marriage by women is going to proceed we cannot tell, but to the extent that it does proceed as it has in the rest of the east Asian rim, this will intensify the marriage squeeze and only further increase China's coming and pending army of unmarriageable men.

If I could, I'd make one final point. While the human rights implications of China's one-child policy are well known and widely documented, the question of the program's actual demographic impact is rather less straightforward. We can note here that east Asian rim countries today exhibit some of the world's very lowest fertility levels and all of these in places that have never toyed with compulsory birth control.

Japan has reported snapshot TFR, Total Fertility Rates, of under 1.3 births per woman per lifetime in some years. South Korea's, at times, has dropped below 1.2. In Chinese cultural venues like Taiwan and Hong Kong, it has dropped in some years below 1.0, less than one birth per woman per lifetime.

So we may reasonably ask, has forcible population control accelerated modern China's fertility decline? Would fertility levels really be higher today without the program? Is it possible they'd be even lower? The simple truth of the matter is, we don't know. There are a number of methodological approaches we could take to pursuing that question.

In my view, they strongly merit pursuit, not least so that we may have some sense in advance of the magnitude of the demographic responses that will be elicited when the one-child program is finally scrapped once and for all. Thank you.

Chairman SMITH. Thank you very much, Dr. Eberstadt.

We're going now, by way of Skype, to Dr. Hudson, Valerie Hudson, who couldn't be with us in person but is doing it via Skype.

Dr. Hudson?

[The prepared statement of Mr. Eberstadt appears in the appendix.]

**STATEMENT OF VALERIE M. HUDSON, PH.D., PROFESSOR AND
GEORGE H.W. BUSH CHAIR, BUSH SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT
AND PUBLIC SERVICE, TEXAS A&M UNIVERSITY (VIA SKYPE)**

Ms. HUDSON. Thank you. Are you able to hear me?

Chairman SMITH. Yes.

Ms. HUDSON. Great. Thank you to the distinguished members of the Commission for their invitation, and also for their attention to this extremely important problem. Also thanks to the other experts assembled who are outstanding in their respective fields and whose work has inspired my own.

A final thank you to my co-author, who was kind enough to allow me to use a paper that we had written as the foundation for my remarks. Now, I want to warn you, that's a 43-page paper and I've been given approximately eight minutes to summarize that argument.

I was asked to speak specifically on the topic of this paper, which was, what's going on with China's neighbors, specifically South Korea and Vietnam, the changes in those two countries, and what implications that might have for China's own demographic issues.

Let me start out by saying that as China struggles to normalize its sex ratio, it's interesting to note that China is book-ended by two countries that have had vastly different birth-sex ratio trajectories: South Korea and Vietnam.

In South Korea, a very abnormal birth-sex ratio was normalized over the course of approximately one decade. In the latter, Vietnam, a normal sex ratio of birth became profoundly abnormal over the course of less than one decade and threatens to become even more abnormal than that of China. Are there lessons for China from the experiences of these mismatched bookends? If you will, a note about son preference.

As Nicholas Eberstadt has said, it's a ruthless type of force. Let me suggest that its foundations in the East Asian context are not dissimilar from those found in other regions. Its root is the organization of society along patrilineal lines. The vast majority of lineage-based groups traced descent through the patriline, practice patrilocal marriage, inherit land and property through the patriline.

Patrilineality permits groups of male relatives bound by blood ties to become politically powerful and band together in allegiances when conflicts arise. However, in patrilineality, the most vulnerable family members are the women, whose role it is to reproduce the patriline.

As sociologist Mark Weiner notes, “the anti-individualism of the rule of the clan burdens each and every member of a patrilineal society, but most of all it burdens women. The fate of women lays bare the basic values of this rule and as outsiders, citizens of liberal states often find their own values clarified when they confront the lives these societies offer women.” I think that was echoed in Representative Smith’s opening remarks.

So signs of patrilineality still enforced, despite the fact that we’re in the 21st century, include prevalence of patrilocal marriage, it includes inequitable family law and customs, discrimination against women, and lastly, it denies property rights for women. Property rights in law are not the same as property rights in practice, which are often a very different kettle of fish.

And, of course, we would suggest that those three factors may be present in societies where the sex ratio is not abnormal. Oftentimes what is needed is a catalyst for son preference to adopt its more ruthless face. Certainly one prime example of that catalyst in a patrilineally organized society is the enforcement of government limits on fertility.

The one-child policy, now law in China, and the two-child policy of Vietnam are cases in point. As Nick Eberstadt has pointed out, when fertility is forcibly lowered by the state, son preference will turn into enactment of son preference, which is a euphemism for culling girls from the birth population.

This is so because the typical family-level solution for not having a son is to continue to bear children until a son is forthcoming. If that solution is no longer an option for a family, some parents will select for a child of the male sex.

Another catalyst which we will be speaking of in a patrilineally organized society is the government’s decision whether to provide a meaningful old-age pension for all of its citizens. The old-age pension scheme in traditional patrilineal societies is sons. If the government decides to provide a substitute pension scheme, any perceived need to enact son preference will be profoundly undercut.

So what I’d like to do now is go to a summary of our more elaborate and articulated case studies of South Korea and Vietnam, which I cannot present to you in the time allotted to me.

Let’s look first at South Korea. What we found in the South Korean case were several critical factors—and let me list those—in South Korea’s ability to revert its sex ratio of birth from highly abnormal to normal.

What we found was: (1) an enforcement of a ban on physician-provided prenatal sex identification, despite the fact of abortion being easily available in South Korea; (2) South Korea undertook a unique and profoundly meaningful attack on patrilineality. They dismantled its core structures, such as the notion of male household head and *hoju*, birth registry, family registry, and so forth, including those that buttressed patrilocal marriage; (3) the South Korean Government provided some form of old-age insurance to the

bulk of the population, providing a substitute for the need to have a son to provide elder support.

Next, South Korea did not enforce any type of fertility control policies and it should be noted, as Nick Eberstadt has pointed out, that the fertility rate dropped even despite the fact that there were no such limitations on fertility.

Finally, urbanization and the decline of rural land as an important inheritance also changed the relative value of sons and daughters, as parents were then able to transfer goods and receive goods from both their daughters and sons on an equal basis.

Let's turn to Vietnam. Vietnam is very puzzling. Given that it shares the same foundation of strong son preference with South Korea, the first half of the Vietnamese puzzle is why it took so long for son preference to turn into son preference enactment.

After all, Vietnam also has a patriarchal system, staunch son preference, trends of economic and demographic modernization, strong family planning regulations, and easy access to abortion. Yet it was not until about 2002 that the sex ratio of birth of Vietnam began to be abnormal, really taking off like a rocket around 2005.

Another part of the puzzle is that Vietnam was a Communist country and gender equality was enshrined in law from virtually the very beginning, but of course laws on the books and practice on the ground are two different things.

Let's hit the highlights then of the Vietnamese case. Before I do, I'd like to note that just as in the South Korean case an increasingly abnormal birth sex ratio occurred in the context of steady economic development, and I want to return to that in my concluding remarks. All right.

So the factors involved in Vietnam's trajectory of increasingly abnormal sex ratio of birth, no real enforcement of a ban on prenatal sex identification in a context where abortion is easily available, the Vietnamese Government made no effective legal attack on patrilineality, no real attempt to dismantle its core structures, and there was continued importance of land inheritance by sons in this society.

The Vietnamese Government provided no real form of old-age insurance to the bulk of its population. Furthermore, it imposed a two-child policy, enforced by semi-coercive means. When that became law and punishments were affixed in 2005, that's when you see the sex ratio of birth really take off in Vietnam.

Lastly, unlike South Korea, it's a predominantly rural country. Sixty-eight percent of the population is classified as rural, and so land still continues to have importance. All right.

Concluding remarks. What can we learn from these case studies, as cursory as they have been? First, and this is extremely important, increasing wealth and increasing levels of education are irrelevant to the enactment of son preference.

Eberstadt himself has said, as we have seen sudden steep increases in birth sex ratios, it is by no means inconsistent with continuing improvements in levels of per capita income and female education. South Korea's greatest rise toward abnormality in its birth sex ratio coincided with its greatest rise in GNP per capita and average level of education in the society.

In similar fashion, Vietnam has also seen its birth sex ratios turn highly abnormal during the same time in which Vietnam became increasingly wealthy and increasingly educated. The same can be said of China and India. This finding is noteworthy.

The assumption that sex ratios will naturally normalize over time as a country progresses in its development is completely unwarranted, in my estimation. The case studies of South Korea and Vietnam show that specific attention must be paid to the roots of son preference in order to deter a rise in the sex ratio at birth.

I would also like to point out to the Commission that even though this is the year 2015, the list of countries with highly abnormal sex ratios is growing. It is not decreasing. In addition to Vietnam, we have countries such as Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Albania, and others not necessarily within Asia, but even outside the Asian region, where this is becoming a great problem. Thus, this is not just a puzzle of the past or even of the present. This is a puzzle of the past, present, and the future and I think it's right that you're looking at this.

Now, let me just give you our recommendations, we have a few, and then I'll wrap it up. Our first observation will be echoed by the remainder of the panel: catalyzing son preference enactment through coercive fertility limitation is catastrophic in terms of effects on the sex ratio. So Vietnam did not learn its lesson from China, and this was a great mistake on its part.

Our second observation is that it is important that physicians be the target of punishment for any identification of fetal sex or provision of sex-selective abortion. Even now in the United Kingdom, which had not had a son preference enactment problem since the Middle Ages, just within the last year felt the need to create legal penalties for doctors for these very reasons.

Our third conclusion is that it is insufficient to try to raise the status of daughters within the society by having large billboards that talk about how wonderful daughters are. In actuality, you have to reduce the value of sons. One of the most important ways that you do that is that you provide a system of old-age pensions so that sons are not the old-age solution for their parents.

Last, something that South Korea did that neither Vietnam nor China has done is actually enforce gender-equal laws in inheritance, property rights, you name it, on their broader populations, especially in the rural areas. So patrilineality has continued unabated in Vietnam and China, freighting, as Nicholas put it, the preference for sons.

In sum then, and I think that one last note is that it's also true that Vietnam is hemorrhaging women, not only at birth but also in the young adult cohort due to the massive export of brides to China, Taiwan, and South Korea because of those countries abnormal sex ratios. It is not just the sex ratio at birth that should concern policymakers in Ho Chi Min City.

In sum, I hope this examination of China's mismatched bookends of South Korea and Vietnam has been instructive in helping to clarify what is and what is not causally linked to the enactment of son preference. As the list of nations enacting son preference lamentably grows longer, these insights may be of increasing importance over time.

Thank you very much.

Chairman SMITH. Dr. Hudson, thank you so very much.

There is a vote on the floor so my colleagues and I will have to leave. It's at zero time left, actually. But I do have a question and we'll leave the record open for a moment, if you wouldn't mind answering it, and then reconvene as soon as we come back from the votes.

My question would be—you have done groundbreaking work in the area of what an increasingly male, increasingly gray population might have on a place like China in terms of violence and the possibility of war in order to project the chaos that is occurring in China. Thank you for your work and your comparison.

Trent Franks, who just left, is the author of a bill in the House that got a majority vote last Congress to ban sex-selection abortion in the United States. I met with the president of Azerbaijan in Baku and spent about half of my time with him, speaking to this disparity and this discrimination against the girl child inherent in sex-selection abortion, and urged him—pleaded with him—to defend the littlest girls that are being decimated in his country.

So thank you. The fact that you point out ominously that this is a growing trend and not a contracting phenomenon is a very, very tragic, but reversible, policy that we need policies globally. So maybe you want to speak a little more on that while the record is open, and then we will have a brief recess as soon as you're done because I know you have to get on as well. I do have to vote. But if you could talk about the military side as well.

Ms. HUDSON. Yes. I wanted to note that the work of myself and my co-author, Andrea Den Boer, has been focused on trying to point out that there were clear security implications of creating a vast number of unmarried males within a society.

I've often been tempted, in fact, to create a graphic—and maybe, Nick, you can lend me your graphic designer—and actually show the flow of women from various countries into China, into South Korea, Taiwan, other places that these nations are actually sucking in women from abroad even from nations such as Vietnam where there's abnormal sex ratios to begin with.

Yet, despite drawing in these women, as Nick points out, estimates are still that 20 to 25 percent of the young adult population, male population in China, will not be able to find brides. It is also true, as Nick pointed out, that women at higher levels of education are not satisfied with what Chinese marriage looks like. It does not look like an equitable companion-type of relationship, but it looks like the old patrilineal style of marriage where women are subordinated in marriage.

So despite the inflow of women, I think the sheer numbers of men who are unmarried in China, plus the growing rejection of patrilineal hierarchical style marriage by highly educated Chinese women means that I think China is in for a very rough ride in terms of instability over time.

I think we already see that. We see, again, as Nick pointed out, the data is sketchy, but from what data we do have we have been able to show that sex ratios, in fact, are correlating with rises in violent crime in areas of China, and we've also noted the re-emergence of what we could call male coalitions, smuggling rings, black

market purveyors of small arms, drugs, and prostitution, and so forth, that plagued historical China in the days, again, when there were very high sex ratios.

Will this internal instability spill over and lead to regional effects? Possibly. We think that that is certainly something that happened in the past and it's something that might be anticipated in the future. Surely the Chinese Government is going to have to become even more authoritarian in order to control spiraling levels of internal instability caused by this large army, as Nick put it, this large number of unmarried men.

For what stake in society have you given an unmarried man? In a patrilineal-based society, he has very little face, he will not have descendants for his family line. In terms of providing for his elderly parents, he may do that, but then there's no future. There's no future, no continuation of the family line over time. So this is a deeply distressing problem, I think, for the Chinese authorities.

We know that they have been spending a lot of money commissioning studies on these men and what their proclivities are, where they're located, where they congregate, and so forth. So we know the Chinese authorities are aware of this issue. We know, as Representative Smith said, that there has been a slight tweaking of the one-child policy. There's been rampant talk of going to a two-child policy.

Yet, demographers will tell you, the horse has left the barn. Those cohorts of young men have already been born and so the sex ratio of the young adult population of China is going to be abnormal for decades to come, even if the birth sex ratio was normalized tomorrow, which it will not be. So this is an abiding problem. I can't see anyone but myself, so I'm hoping that this is an appropriate place to stop speaking.

Mr. PROTIC. Thank you, Dr. Hudson. As the congressman said, we're in recess for a few minutes.

[Whereupon, at 2:54 p.m. the hearing was recessed.]

[The prepared statement of Ms. Hudson appears in the appendix.]

AFTER RECESS

[3:16 P.M.]

Chairman SMITH. The Commission will resume its sitting. Again, I apologize to our witnesses and all of our guests for that delay. We don't expect any other votes until about 4:45, 5:00, so we should be okay.

I'd like to now introduce Reggie Littlejohn, and the floor is yours.

STATEMENT OF REGGIE LITTLEJOHN, FOUNDER AND PRESIDENT, WOMEN'S RIGHTS WITHOUT FRONTIERS

Ms. LITTLEJOHN. Honorable members of the Commission and distinguished fellow panelists, ladies and gentlemen, I am grateful for this opportunity to testify here today as we commemorate the 25th anniversary of China's one-child policy. I am very honored especially to be able to share a table with blind activist Chen Guangcheng because, as you know, I've been advocating for him

since 2008 and you held, Congressman Smith, hearing after hearing after hearing to secure his release, and then to actually be able to testify with him is a great honor.

I would also like to acknowledge the presence today of another great Chinese human rights hero, Dr. Teng Biao, who is here with us today. Dr. Teng Biao, as you may know, was part of Chen Guangcheng's team in 2005 when he was doing his groundbreaking work, together with his wife Yuan Weijing, another human rights hero. They are the ones that produced the report that got Chen Guangcheng in jail, and Dr. Teng Biao has been heroic in defending him and himself spent jail time on behalf of Chen Guangcheng. So I'm greatly honored to be testifying today.

I have been asked to comment upon China's insistence on keeping the one-child policy, despite looming demographic concerns. China has not eased, has not relaxed, has not abandoned its one-child policy, despite reports to the contrary. China periodically tweaks its one-child policy. These minor modifications are routinely exaggerated.

For example, under the misleading headline, "China To Ease One-Child Policy," Xinhua News Agency reported that China would lift the ban on a second child if either parent was an only child, beginning on January 1, 2014. It was already the case that couples could have a second child if both parents were themselves only children. This minor adjustment did not ease the one-child policy, it merely tweaked it.

The minor modification of the policy that took place on January 1, 2014, number one, did not affect a large percentage of couples in China; number two, was not subject to a time table in which implemented; number three, retained the dreaded birth intervals between children. If a woman got pregnant before the interval lapsed, she would be subject to forced abortion. Number four, most importantly, makes no promise to end the coercive implementation of the one-child policy.

Noticeably absent from the Chinese Communist Party's announcement is any mention of human rights. Even though it will now allow some couples to have a second child, China has not promised to end forced abortion, forced sterilization, or coerced contraception. The coercive enforcement of China's one-child policy is its core. Instituting a two-child policy in certain limited circumstances will not end forced abortion or forced sterilization.

The problem with the one-child policy is not the number of children allowed, rather, it is the fact that the Chinese Government is telling people how many children they can have and enforcing that limit coercively through forced abortion and forced sterilization.

Even if all couples were allowed to have two children, there is no guarantee that the Chinese Communist Party will cease their appalling methods of enforcement. Regardless of the number of children allowed, women who get pregnant without permission will be dragged out of their homes, strapped to tables, and forcibly aborted.

Furthermore, instituting a two-child policy will not end gendercide. Indeed, areas in which two children are currently allowed are especially vulnerable to gendercide, and we have just heard from Dr.

Valerie Hudson about the fact that when Vietnam had a two-child policy the gender ratios zoomed up.

So I expect, over the next several years, that the Chinese Government will probably announce that they are instituting a two-child policy and that will be blared out by the media as the end of the one-child policy. What I'm saying is, it is not the end of the one-child policy. The core of the policy is the coercion, and they're not saying they're going to end that.

Furthermore, all the reasons the Chinese Government has given for this adjustment are economic or demographic: China's dwindling labor force, the country's growing elderly population, the severe gender imbalance. The adjustment is a tacit acknowledgement that the continuation of the one-child policy has led, and will continue to lead, to economic disaster.

The policy was originally instituted for economic reasons. It is ironic that through this very policy China has written its own economic death sentence. Even if China were to completely abandon the one-child policy and all population control now, demographers worry that it might be too little, too late to avert the demographic disaster already caused.

As one researcher stated, "Even if the family planning policy were terminated today it would be too late to solve our rapidly aging population, the drastic shrinkage of the labor force, and the gaping hole in social security funds that the country has already begun struggling with."

Despite the demographic pressure to end the policy, the Chinese Government, just this month, on the 10th of this month, denied that it has plans to implement a two-child policy. Continuing the one-child policy makes no demographic sense. China's population problem is not that it has too many people, it is that it has too few young people and too few women. Limiting births can no longer justify the policy.

In addition, the most recent modification of the one-child policy has failed to produce the expected number of births, as couples are self-limiting the size of their families. Why then does the Chinese Communist Party keep the policy? I will attempt to explain the unexplainable. In my opinion, the Chinese Communist Party will never abolish the one-child policy because the government is exploiting the one-child policy as social control masquerading as population control.

The one-child policy was formally instituted on September 25, 1980, in response to a population explosion under the Mao era where fertility rates rose to 5.9 children per woman. The one-child policy began as a means to control this population, however brutal and misguided.

The terror that forced abortion and involuntary sterilization had was a by-product of a population control policy. Now that keeping the policy makes no demographic sense, I believe that terror has become the purpose of the policy.

Forced abortion continues in China, terrifying both women and men. Some of these forced abortions have been so violent that the women themselves have died along with their full-term babies. Forced abortion is so terrifying that victims become shattered emo-

tionally, and sometimes succumb to mental illness. China has the highest female suicide rate of any country in the world.

Men also are terrorized. Some men have been killed or maimed for life. Others have lost control and murdered family planning officials. Some men have resorted to suicide in protest over the excessive fines imposed by the government. The spirit of the Cultural Revolution lives on in the family planning police, who have been able to steal, intimidate, torture, and kill with relative impunity.

The Chinese Communist government is a brutal totalitarian regime. It has many human rights abuses. The detention and torture of human rights lawyers, activists, and journalists, religious persecution, the execution of prisoners to harvest their organs for transplant, just to name a few. However egregious, each of these human rights violations touches only one sliver of society. The one-child policy is unique in that it touches everyone.

So the one-child policy is uniquely the way that the government in Beijing can take its arm and extend it and touch the womb of every single woman in China and declare life or death over that child, and that is a way of extending its reign of terror over the entire nation. That's the first reason I think that they're not going to abandon the policy.

The second reason is that the one-child policy is enormously profitable for the Chinese Communist Party. The one-child policy system of fees and fines is an important source of revenue for the Party. These fines are arbitrary and inconsistently applied throughout China and can be as much as ten times a person's annual salary.

Very few can afford to pay these terror fines, and in high-profile cases the fines may run into the millions of dollars. It has been estimated that the Chinese Communist Party has received as much as \$314 billion since 1980 in family planning fines.

The use of these fines is not subject to accountability so they can be used simply to line the pockets of the family planning officials or fund other government projects under the table. This system or lack thereof is a strong incentive for them to keep the policy.

The third reason I think that the Chinese Communist Party will never abandon the policy is that the one-child policy's infrastructure of coercion can be turned to crush dissent of any kind. There is growing dissent inside of China—now I quote from previous congressional testimony—“Internal Chinese law enforcement data on so-called mass incidents, a wide variety of protests ranging from sit-ins, to strikes, to marches and rallies, and even genuine riots, indicated that China has seen a sustained, rapid increase in those incidents, from 8,700 in 1993 to nearly 60,000 in 2003, to more than 120,000 in 2008.” Meanwhile, there are as many as 1 million family planning officials.

This army of family planning officials can be turned in any direction to crush dissent of any kind. By the way, if China's family planning officials were an army they would tie with North Korea as the sixth largest army in the world.

The last reason that I think that the Chinese Communist Party will not abandon the one-child policy is that they use the one-child policy to break relationships of trust. In addition to the family planning police, there are employed a system of paid informants so

that a woman who is pregnant can be informed on by her neighbors, her friends, her co-workers, people in the village who are simply hired to watch women's abdomens to see if someone might be pregnant and then see if she's carrying a birth permit.

Then in addition, if a woman flees because she's illegally pregnant, there are instances where the Chinese Communist Party will detain and torture her family. What this does, is it ruptures every kind of relationship of trust in society, which is very useful to the Chinese Communist Party because if you can't trust anyone you can't organize for democracy.

In conclusion, I believe that the Chinese Communist Party is maintaining its grip on power through the one-child policy by shedding the blood of innocent women and babies of China. China's one-child policy is the largest and most disastrous social experiment in the history of the world.

Through it, the Chinese Communist Party boasts that they have prevented 400 million lives, which is greater than the entire population of the United States and Canada combined. This is the hallmark of Communist regimes, the peacetime killing of their own citizens.

So in terms of policy recommendations, we respectfully request that the U.S. Government urge the Chinese Government to abolish the one-child policy and end all forms of coercive population control, and offer incentives for couples to have girls.

Women's Rights Without Frontiers has a "Save a Girl" program where we go and basically encourage women to keep their daughters and offer them a monthly stipend to keep their daughters, and empower them to keep their daughters. We have found that it takes very little to actually save the lives of baby girls in China.

Number three, offer pensions to couples who do not have a son, ensuring that parents of girls will not become impoverished in old age. Number four, abolish the *hukou* system so that all children will have access to healthcare and education.

In addition, we respectfully request that the U.S. Government establish principles of corporate responsibility to ensure that U.S. corporations do not allow coercive family planning in their factories in China and also de-fund the UNFPA [United Nations Population Fund] unless and until the UNFPA stops supporting and participating in the management of a program, a coercive abortion or involuntarily sterilization in China, in violation of the 1985 Kemp-Casten amendment. Thank you.

Chairman SMITH. Ms. Littlejohn, thank you very much for your testimony, your work, and for your recommendations, all of which will be taken very seriously by this Commission. So, thank you.

We are joined by Robert Pittenger, a gentleman from North Carolina, who has been an outspoken advocate of human rights and has spoken on Chinese human rights in particular in a very effective way. I'd like to yield to him, if he has any opening comments.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Littlejohn appears in the appendix.]

**STATEMENT OF ROBERT PITTENGER, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE
FROM NORTH CAROLINA**

Representative PITTENGER. Thank you so much, Chairman Smith, and for your dedication and leadership in the 30 years that I have been with you and known you. Thank you to each of you who have come today to give testimony to the realities that are so grievous to all of us in China.

I'd like to just understand that China's rapid rise on the global stage does not come without cost, including China's strong disregard for human rights and well-being of its people. This issue is close to my heart, as I have been deeply involved in efforts to protect the rights of the Chinese people, support their religious expression for over 30 years.

While population control policies are not unique to China, China's policies are particularly egregious and are some of the most heavily enforced in the world. These population control policies have fractured communities, exacerbated gender-based biases and violence, and caused irreversible damage to the stability of the population.

Enforcement of population control policies at the local level has led to reports of traumatic violations of individual rights, forced abortions and sterilizations, and increased human trafficking to counter over-population of males. China must repeal these horrific policies not only for the well-being of their people, but in order to protect the sustainability of their already aging population.

The United States must remain committed to human rights of all peoples and hold our counterparts around the world accountable for their violations. We must promote the repeal of population control in China and across the world.

I look forward to hearing more of your testimony, and I yield back.

Chairman SMITH. Mr. Pittenger, thank you very much for your leadership for these many years.

I'd like to now yield to Chai Ling.

STATEMENT OF CHAI LING, FOUNDER, ALL GIRLS ALLOWED

Ms. CHAI. Thank you, Chairman Smith, and thank you for your tireless effort to end the one-child policy for the past 35 years, for upholding human rights for all people in China and in the world. Thank you, Ranking Congressman, for your support and care for our country and our people.

The title of my testimony today is, "In Jesus' Name, I Declare the One-Child Policy Will End, and Will End Soon." I am honored to be invited to be a part of this distinguished panel, and I will focus on the following three subjects: The brutal nature of the one-child policy; how the one-child policy is being dismantled by the Lord one-by-one and step-by-step by His faithful workers; and how genocide can also be ended in such a way.

I know the brutal nature of the one-child policy. When I was first asked about that, it was June 1990, when Congressman Chris Smith asked me during my first U.S. congressional hearing, after I came out from Tiananmen Square I spent 10 months in hiding. Congressman Chris Smith asked me, "Does anybody know about

the one-child policy?" I thought, does not everybody—all know about one-child policy?

Congressman Smith said, "No, not everybody knew." The truth was one child per family. Those three words sound so benign and perfect. Only decades later I realized even I did not know the true meaning of it either and the true nature of this policy was, indeed, all the other children must die. How they must die can be explained by the following story.

This woman on the screen, her name is Zhang Wen Fang. She was nine months' pregnant with her second child. She was dragged into a forced abortion clinic. She fought so hard to save her baby's life, she was injected with deep anesthesia.

By the time she woke up not only had she lost her baby, she also lost her uterus and her entire health, her relationship—with the baby's father—and her job. So from a vibrant, healthy mother and young entrepreneur, she was turned into this homeless, jobless, and disabled petitioner for justice.

The next picture is a picture of a forcefully aborted baby who was dumped in a water bucket. Cases like Zhang Wen Fang and a baby like this were numerous because, even according to the Chinese Government's own admission, they have eliminated 400 million babies. That's 400 million of forced and coerced murders like this story. So it is, indeed, the largest crime against humanity on Earth and a pure evil.

It was at Congressman Chris Smith's hearing in November 2009 that my eyes were opened up to the nature of the one-child policy and I realized how, like many others, I had also been fooled all these years. But after I led the Tiananmen movement and paid a severe price for it, including continually living in exile as of today, I know from personal experience to try to end China's one-child policy not only needs commitment, endurance, experience, perseverance, courage, all these human attributes we can name, but it also needs something bigger, much bigger, to overcome this massive evil.

My finding was revolutionary to me, and I ask for forgiveness up front if you find my testimony uncomfortable in any way. I don't mean to offend anybody, but as for me, I could no longer live the life that I lived before by trying to pursue justice and freedom, seeking to do good only on my own back.

I did find the big thing, and that is God. So shortly after the hearing, Ms. Reggie Littlejohn led me to the Lord through Christ Jesus and I was able to be restored to life and to carry on the fight for freedom and justice.

In June 2010, I founded All Girls Allowed. In the past few years, we have fought against and tried to end the one-child policy in a very different way than what I did in 1989 at Tiananmen Square. It was an Abraham, Moses, David vs. Goliath kind of walk with the Lord.

We experienced these verses taught in Sunday School in our walk, in our daily walk with the Lord, verses like "With people, this is not possible. But with God, all things are possible." And "Do not overcome evil with evil, but overcome evil with good." "If you abide in me and my words abide in you, ask whatever you wish

and it will be done for you. My Father is glorified by this, that you bear much fruit and still prove to be my disciple.”

Our experience has shown that these verses are not only true, but possible in our fight to end the one-child policy. I understand other witnesses may say that the Chinese Government may never end the one-child policy, but you know what? They’re not in control. God is! And His faithful are! Under God’s mighty plan, that one-child policy will come to an end.

God is not a deity up there in the air with no interest in the suffering in China, so our work in the past has shown the good news that God has overcome all suffering. That is the true meaning for me, the cross: God has conquered all evil through the power of Jesus Christ’s death on the cross.

So with that, it means that not only can we confront the one-child policy, with God we can also overcome it and end it. The truth is, the one-child policy is ending step by step.

So this is what happened. In November 2011 in Rome, I had a powerful personal experience with the Lord. As I was crying out for the policy to come to an end I felt the words of Jesus in the Beatitudes, “Blessed are those who are hungry and thirst for righteousness, for they will be satisfied.” I felt Jesus come down, wept and said, “If nobody else on Earth would do it, I will—that is, end it.”

So in December 2011, I went to a conference, a mission conference in Los Angeles, and there a lady who had the gift of listening from God and declared God is starting the work of ending the one-child policy beginning in 2012.

So in June 2012, a disciple of an American missionary couple learned about the Choose Life message and called 500 Chinese pastor leaders to repent to God, to forgive others and ourselves for actions of forced and coerced abortions, just as the Lord promised, “If My people, who are called by My name, will humble themselves and pray and seek My face and turn from their wicked ways, then I will hear from Heaven and I will forgive their sins and will heal their land.”

So the next day, the very next day, June 13, 2012, the story of the young mother and the forcibly aborted baby picture—it’s going to be graphic, so I apologize for that—was released on the Internet and it caused 90 million people to bombard the Internet to protest against this brutal policy.

Within a month, on July 22, 2012, the outcry against the policy had caused China’s Family Planning Committee to declare absolutely stopping the late-stage forced abortions. They were silent on early-stage forced abortions. Within months, 23 provinces adopted that policy on their Web sites. Ever since then we have found very few cases, much fewer cases—we only found one case who had a forced abortion. When our workers called them, they immediately compensated the family.

By June 1, 2014, 800,000 Chinese believers had received the teaching of the “Choose Life” message. That means they learned that life starts from conception. In China in general, people thought abortion is just taking a piece of tissue out of the body. So when that message was taught to them, repentance and crying out went throughout the land.

So November 14, 2013, the Chinese announced they would ease the one-child policy to even further relax the condition of the two-children policy.

So in 2015, China already had 1 million babies registered for birth certificates—as second children registered birth certificate for a second child, and by January 13, 2015, more than 600,000 babies had been born as second children, and that's just as big as the entire city population of Boston.

As you can see, the pictures they promote in the stories are no longer a couple with a boy picture, the boy has been replaced by a baby girl now in this picture. They're all wearing pink. It's the same color here with our logo. We have seen this movement continuing to take place, this is the timeline of how the policy has been adopted province by province.

But April 5, 2015, Xinhua Net announced that China would promote a full two-children policy with no conditions. Recently, some Family Planning Committee leaders tried to refute the chatters, but we know the end is coming near.

So our recommendation is we urge the Chinese leader to make the decision to end the one-child policy once and for all and make it an all-children-allowed policy. We invite American leaders to join us to embrace this message and support this message on June 1 and to declare it on China's Children's Day.

Regarding gendercide, as we all know, the one-child policy is a massive evil, but they also have a lot of side consequences. It produced massive gendercide. One of every six baby girls are aborted or killed. A gender imbalance: 37 million extra men that will not find wives.

Sex trafficking. Sixty percent of worldwide trafficking, sex trafficking, is taking place in China. Children without *hukou*—13 million. Aging populations show that in 15 years China is going to have a population with 400 million people over 60 years old. A large percentage of women suffer forced or coerced abortions; this shows 86 percent of the women had at least one abortion.

Domestic violence. Thirty percent of families reported domestic violence. Sexual assaults against women and children are very high. The UN number is 74 percent. A high percentage of young couples under 35 are getting divorced, and 500 women commit suicide daily.

With these social issues, our work to expose, rescue, and heal in the name of Jesus by Simply Love Her has also proven fruitful in the past five years. Two thousand mothers and babies have been helped by our ministry. Many babies that would not have been born otherwise, especially baby girls, have been able to be saved.

More encouragingly, we also saw the Chinese Government recently, at least from the reports, saying that they are also giving financial incentives to families and couples to try to incentivize them to have baby girls.

But our experience is “just money alone is not enough.” The family needs to change the concept to know that men, women, girls and boys are all made in the image of God, and because of that, we shall cherish them equally, treat them equally. So our recommendation is to end the gendercide by adopting an all-girls-allowed policy.

So, thank you very much.

Chairman SMITH. Ling, thank you very much. Thank you for your witness. Very often people forget what drives so many of us in human rights work, and for me as well. It is my faith in Jesus Christ. So I want to thank you for that very strong witness as to the why of it, and we are people who believe that faith and works—faith without works is dead, but faith with works can accomplish a great deal. Even if we have a mustard-seed-like faith, it does take a great God to bring it to fruition. So, thank you for that.

I would like to now introduce a great human rights defender, a man who suffered four years—over four years—in prison for defending women, particularly in Linyi, who had been forcibly aborted, by taking up their cause. His epic escape, I think, is without parallel.

The whole country, the world, was riveted as you made your way, Mr. Chen, to the U.S. Embassy and when you were, sadly, given over to the Chinese Government, and then finally, after a great deal of attention brought to your case, released so you can live in freedom, you, your wife Weijing, and your children.

You have mentioned over and over again, and this Commission remains steadfast in speaking out on behalf of your nephew and your other family members who remain in China, and so know that there's a good, strong bipartisan commitment forever, however long it takes, to your family as well. Thank you for speaking out so boldly on behalf of human rights, and especially for those who are suffering the utter cruelty of the one-child-per-couple policy.

Chen Guangcheng.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Chai appears in the appendix.]

STATEMENT OF CHEN GUANGCHENG, DISTINGUISHED FELLOW IN HUMAN RIGHTS, SIMON CENTER ON RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION, WITHERSPOON INSTITUTE; DISTINGUISHED VISITING FELLOW, INSTITUTE FOR POLICY RESEARCH AND CATHOLIC STUDIES, CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY, VIA INTERPRETER JAMES CHENG

Mr. CHEN. Dear Mr. Chairman, dear Senators, Representatives, and Commission members, I am honored to be here today to testify before the Commission about the conditions and suffering of women in China.

Let me start with listing the birth control slogan from some of the following provinces to address the issue of violent birth control in China, which is a matter of life and death. But China's birth control policy is breaking down the traditional morality of the Chinese society.

In Hunan province, for example, they have a slogan that says, "All Villagers Must Be Sterilized Once a Single Villager Violates the Birth Quota." In Anhui province they say, "We'd Rather See 10 More Tombs Than a Single Baby Born Alive." In Jiangsu, they say, "We'd Rather See a River of Blood Than a Single Baby Born Alive." In my home province, Shandong, they said, "We'd Rather See a Broken Home Rather Than a Collapsed Country."

From these slogans you can definitely see a clear picture of the bloody and brutal violence resulting from China's birth control pol-

icy and practices. I remember back in the summer of 1982 that a village Party chief said, while at rest,

“During the birth control movement I went to see a friend who had just had an abortion in the hospital.

“After wandering to the backyard of the hospital, I saw an old man trying to remove a pile of dead babies in his two drums, and spades pressing down the bodies when it was almost full. I saw some of the babies with hair, noses, ears, and some just taking the shape of a person, and all sorts of them being carried away to somewhere for burial.”

As you know, birth control in China is almost like taboo, and nobody dares to touch the nerve. To achieve its goal of population control, the Chinese Government and the Communist Party has established a vast control and planning policy system to carry out this project. The Party has also signaled to those on the ground the jailing, beating, and eviction, and demolishing and other policies are not beyond the red line, even at the cost of life.

In my own village and the neighboring villages we often heard and saw groups of people, from a dozen to several dozens, and headed by the local Communist Party chief, acting like bandits and beating villagers and holding them without any legal procedures day and night. We could hear screaming and crying during those operations.

I volunteered to help the villagers with my legal knowledge in the hope of stopping and preventing such brutal actions from the government, and yet I found the law was useless in trying to stop these illegal and inhuman practices. The Party committee had ordered local law enforcement authorities like the police department, and prosecutors, and the judiciary department not to get involved in any of these cases involving violent birth control situations.

The propaganda officials ordered the media not to report any of these violations. So whenever these kinds of human rights violations occurred, the villagers could want to help, want to get help from the police, but they were told that this is a government action and beyond the scope of their work. The police refused to intervene.

When a complaint was made to the local prosecutor, it was turned down. Even when such a suit was filed in local court, it would be rejected with no further consideration. Therefore, the media was also not allowed to report so local folks could really not find a place to obtain justice. Once such a layman was driven to such desperation by lack of hope, he would resort to violence. Only when such violence happened, you would see the law enforcement flooding in as a tool of the human rights violation at the will of the Communist Party.

As you probably know, in China a married couple must seek a permit from the government before pregnancy. With such an official document in hand, the couple can then think of having a baby. If pregnant without such a permit, the woman would be summoned and forced to report to a local birth control service station.

If these Communist bandits failed to get the pregnant woman to submit to the abortion operation, then they would take away the family members, like their uncles and aunts, and siblings, and even their neighbors with force, and also in cruelty. They were coerced into fighting between and among each other and they were

forced to tell the whereabouts of the pregnant women. That kind of coerced fighting between them caused great strife among these relatives, even hatred.

What is worse, when they were detained illegally for a period of time they had to pay, like 50 to 100 yuan a day, which is what, about \$10 to \$20, in the name of the so-called legal training fee. But this is, as a matter of fact, ironically that they pay for what they suffered during time at the illegal detention center of the Chinese Government, local government.

Whenever a pregnant woman without a birth permit was forced into the birth control service station, she would be handed over a form, the so-called acknowledgement, purporting that such a kind of procedure like sterilization or forced abortion was done with her consent. If the pregnant woman refused to sign the form, against her own will, there would be several strong men to threaten her and say, "Whatever you do, we just put you down in the operation room and have the operation done."

I'm sorry, I must describe a kind of abortion procedure in China which is a little bit graphic. During the first three months of pregnancy, a device would be inserted into the vagina and the fetus would be cut into pieces inside the womb and then pumped out.

After six months of pregnancy, a poison is injected into the womb to kill the baby and then birth is induced to withdraw the baby from the body. Later in pregnancy, at six months or beyond, the birth is to be induced and the baby drowned in a water bucket, and sometimes it's brutal, as the doctor would break the neck of a baby and throw it into a trash bin.

During the six-month period of 2005, there were more than 130,000 forced abortions and sterilizations that took place in Linyi city alone, which is my hometown. More than 600,000 family members suffered during this period. This brutality and these crimes against women and their families has brought irrevocable physical, spiritual, and psychological harm. There were 130,000 forced abortions in a six-month period in 2005, which is the correct number.

Over the past 35 years, China has killed a total of 360 to 400 million young lives as a result of its inhuman and violent birth control policy and practices. This brutality still goes on today. Despite Chinese Government propaganda of loosening control on the second child bearing for some couples in certain conditions, but with no significant change.

Just a few days ago I got a case involving a man who was disabled due to the severe beating by the local government personnel just because his wife's sister had an extra or additional baby without a permit. This inhuman brutality of the birth control policy has resulted in society becoming indifferent to life and has diminished the dignity of human beings and has broken down the traditional morality of Chinese society on life-and-death matters, leading to social decay.

The birth sex ratio is distorted as a result of the planning birth control policy of the Chinese Government. As an old Chinese saying goes, a single piece of wood burns long enough, so it's hard to raise a single child in a family.

These so-called little emperors and little princesses have exhibited selfish character and weak and fragile psyches. Along with

these issues, China is becoming an old and aging society, which is almost like a hidden bomb, with more than a million families who have lost their only child.

A contemporary genocide is taking place in Communist China now. It is a horrific crime against humanity. I would make the following proposal. First, the U.S. Congress, the U.S. Government, and the administration, along with the international community, should take all steps necessary to stop this inhuman cruelty of the Communist Party of China.

It should call for an international tribunal to investigate the crimes committed by the Communist regime in China and make Communist government officials accountable for their crimes against humanity, particularly this kind of family planning leading to genocide. To be more specific, those tombs for burying those babies, because of the population and abortion, coerced abortions, can be found in today's China.

Second, the United States should ban these criminal Communist officials from China from entry into the United States, and their property in this country should be forfeited. These officials, including the former Security Chief of the Communist Party Zhou Yongkang, who has been arrested, actually, on charges of various crimes, and the second is Zhang Gaoli, who is the former governor of Shandong province and now is the first Vice Premier and Politburo member of the Communist Party.

Also, Party Chief Li Qun, who is not only a practitioner of violent birth control bureaucracy, but is also a leading evil-doer, persecuting my family there. These human rights violators who act against humanity must be made accountable.

I want to thank you very much for all your support, for your tireless work all these years. Thank you so much for your care.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Chen appears in the appendix.]

Chairman SMITH. Guangcheng, thank you very much for your leadership, for your very strong and powerful testimony.

In 1984, I offered the first amendment to de-fund any organization, including the UN Population Fund [UNFPA], because of their complicity in these crimes against women, these crimes against humanity. It passed. Right after that, that became Kemp-Kasten, which is current law. Yet, the administration refuses to de-fund the UNFPA, despite their complicity in these crimes against women.

You have made such a powerful call that this is genocide, and I do hope that people in this city and in capitals all over the world, and at the United Nations recognize this for what it is: it is genocide, the systematic destruction.

The way the Genocide Convention reads, it is in whole or in part, this is a very large part and gendercide, the killing of young girls, baby girls simply because they're female—and I know that Nicholas Eberstadt had done much work on that, as you all have in the past. Yet, there is very little being done today to combat this, especially at our government level.

Let me just say a couple of things and then I'll yield to my colleagues. I do believe there is breathtaking indifference and outright enabling. Has our Nobel Peace Prize-winning President, President Obama, defended women and children from China's one-child-per-couple policy? I haven't heard it. It was several of us who asked,

when he met with President Hu and then Xi Jinping, to raise this issue. There's been nothing, deafening silence. This testimony of all of you hopefully will be a pivot. It's about time our government engaged this human rights atrocity that's occurring.

Guangcheng, your call for an international tribunal. Where is the United Nations, their treaty bodies, whether it be the International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights or the Human Rights Council, why have they been so silent? Occasionally there's been a mere mention of this somewhere buried on page 54 of a universal periodic review, but nothing that is commensurate with the gravity of this genocidal act that is being committed. So I thank you for that call for the tribunal, for labeling this, the genocide, for what it is.

On the visa ban, we have a visa ban, and President Obama is not enforcing the law. It couldn't be more clear. I have the language of the law right here in front of me. It couldn't be more clear. Any complicity—denial of entry into the United States for foreign nationals engaged in establishment or enforcement of forced abortion or sterilization policy. It's been the law of the United States since the year 2000. It has not been enforced. It has to be enforced.

Yesterday, I chaired on the Global Magnitsky Act, which I am the prime sponsor of, so that we'll take the lessons learned from the Magnitsky Act and the good work it has done toward Putin's government and those who killed Sergei Magnitsky.

Well, we already have this law. Why is this not being implemented? We've got to ask that question. I hope our friends over at the press aisle will ask that question: Mr. President, why are you not enforcing this important law?

One question about the bribes. Reggie, you brought up that huge amount of money. Not bribes, the fines. I would suspect on top of that would be the bribes paid under the table at times to try to plead for the life of the child. Then there's the confiscation of property and valuables when they expand their efforts to go after the family members. As you pointed out, Guangcheng, the man that you just heard about that was beaten and is now disabled because of his sister-in-law who had a child that was not allowed by the government of China. Punishment, punishment, punishment. That's all we hear. And yet when the Chinese Government sends their representatives here to the United States, we treat them with kid gloves and do not raise these issues in any meaningful way. That, too, has to change.

Finally, your point, Guangcheng, about the slogans, and perhaps others might want to speak to this. Even if tomorrow there was no one-child-per-couple policy, they have so propagandized and done a political coercion, if you will, starting from the youngest levels of a child's life. Better 10 More Tombs Than a Single Baby Born, one of the signs you mentioned, Guangcheng. We'd Rather See a River of Blood Than a Single Baby Born. What prejudice against the life of a child who is so defenseless and so at risk that the government, the strong arm of a dictatorship, could come down so hard.

I remember Harry Wu wrote a book and the title was, "Better Ten Graves Than One Birth," very similar to what you just mentioned a moment ago. This is madness. The fact that the elites, especially, have refused—it's politically correct not to raise this issue.

I raise all the human rights issues, as do my colleagues here. We care about all the human rights issues: torture, the Internet censorship, and all the other issues. But here we're talking about an assault on women, children, the family, and even the relatives.

I'd like to yield to my colleagues for any comments they might have, and then if you could respond to any of these comments or points that you would like.

Mr. Franks?

Representative FRANKS. I don't think there's anything I can add to what Chris has already said. It reflects my perspective completely. We have a bill here in the Congress right now that we should be hopefully passing in the next month: Pain Capable, which will protect children late in gestation in utero.

Then we're going to be hopefully taking up another bill that will deal with sex-selection abortions in America. I can't express to you how important I believe your perspective and the information that we will have from China and the people at this table will be to that debate because it is one that the American people overwhelmingly are with us on.

It's just a matter of being able to overcome the pro-abortion perspective of saying, "Oh, no, this isn't really happening, this isn't really true." You know how it is, this is the way they do it. So I just can't tell you how important I think all of you are to that effort. That's really how I became acquainted with some of you when we were trying to do this before, but persistence will prevail, by the grace of God.

And again, I thank every one of you for what you're doing. I hope you don't grow weary in well-doing. You are doing a good thing. Sometimes those of us at this podium like this are three-fourths exhausted because we had an all-night mark-up, but we believe so strongly in what you're saying and that's why we're here.

I hope you know that somehow the truth has a way of getting through. Always throughout history when people were able to finally see the humanity of the victims and the inhumanity of what was being done to them, even the hardest heart was changed. So, be encouraged. It's going to happen. God bless you.

Chairman SMITH. Thank you, Chairman Franks.

Before yielding to Randy, as the author of both of those two bills, one deals with pain capable babies. We know beyond any reasonable doubt that at 20 weeks the child feels excruciating pain, and that applies to American babies who are killed, that applies to the Chinese babies who are suffering those later-term abortions, in that case under coercion.

On the sex-selection abortion, Chairman Franks was able to muster a majority of House Members to vote for his bill and that debate—you know, it's a little bit on the side here, but it's not because of sex-selection being a terrible consequence of the one-child-per-couple policy, one of the consequences. To hear people who claim to be in favor of women's rights defend the selection of a child in utero for extermination simply because she is a girl is the height of hypocrisy.

Randy?

Representative HULTGREN. Thank you again, Chairman. Thank you all for being here. Very, very powerful and so much for us to

think about, to pray about, to figure out how we can best impact and again work together to save lives, to turn this horrible, horrible tragedy around, unthinkable tragedy.

I do have a couple of questions, if I could open it up to any of you for response on this. Just from the title of Guangcheng's statement of how violent birth control in China is breaking down the traditional morality of Chinese society, I want to just hear your thoughts of a domino impact of gendercide, of forced abortion, and how something or somewhere someone must have thought this was a good idea, and yet how destructive it has been for morality, but also for the family, for the future, and now it almost feels like this desperation to try and react.

But it almost feels too late without, Chai Ling, as you said, a heart change. We had a group that had the opportunity to remember George Washington, and even some of the prayer that has happened by leaders of our nation in the past. We had a group of us that had an opportunity to pray last night. But just for me the thought that we do have strong arguments and changing minds needs to happen, but also changing hearts and how we do that.

So I'm rambling, but would love to hear from you, or want to hear from you, of some of the domino impacts, I guess, of breaking down of morality and how that has impacted, I guess, other parts of Chinese society and what we can do to turn that back around again. Is there hope to turn that back around again?

Ms. CHAI. Yes. I absolutely believe there's a hope. That hope is really to understand and to know God through Jesus Christ and also to understand what life is, when it begins. So what we found most exciting about this whole battle, is my life was changed when I saw a baby fetus model and an ultrasound picture. I never knew that. I myself had four abortions, three were coerced and one I did not know better.

So when we shared this little fetus model in China, in the church community, it had a profound impact and caused powerful change. People just crawled on the floor just weeping because they did not know the fetus is a life and is a growing baby. In their own hand, we have allowed this—forced and coerced abortions—to happen to the most precious thing and—the baby—is meant to be an inheritance from God.

People called it tissue, called it a burden, called it something that would harm us. So when that teaching of Choose Life was happening, first the 500 pastors and leaders repented and God blessed with ending forced—late-stage forced abortion.

When 800,000 people were educated, I believe God allowed it to come to a conditional two-children policy. This year, this summer, there's going to be 7 to 8 million people more that will be educated by the Choose Life message. There's a manufacturer working with us day and night trying to produce those baby fetus models. Even more powerful changes are coming.

Another key concept is, I think as Chen Guangcheng mentioned, the slogans saying we would rather to have broken down families but save the nation. When I came to America, one thing very key for me was families and nations are not exclusive of each other but in the Chinese culture it has been a thousand years of this kind

of demonic stronghold to say I can either have the family or I can have a nation, but I can't have both.

I recently, in prayer to process these things, realized, wow, this stronghold was so deep in my own life as well. So what dawned on me is when Jesus Christ went on the cross He said "I am doing my Father's will." He went up there to love his Father, but what he was also able to accomplish was the biggest thing to bring the Kingdom into the world.

So in the biblical sense, the family is the nation and the nation cannot survive with broken families. So that is a concept I am hoping, through these kind of hearings and testimony, I believe the leaders of China are watching and I hope they will understand, too.

Representative HULTGREN. Let me ask a question, Reggie, if I could to you. To me, gendercide is so concerning. I'm just wondering, is there any movement of other groups, especially women's groups, of recognizing the threat of gendercide and the damage that's being done there? Is there something that you're seeing there, things again that we can do to see how damaging this is to our world, but also specifically to women, and to men as well, just the inequality that's there of 35 million, or I forget the exact number, of men who will not be able to have a spouse. So I just wondered if you're seeing anything there on gendercide of what we can be doing, again, to get more people involved.

Ms. LITTLEJOHN. [Inaudible.]

Representative HULTGREN. I guess, both. I would say both, or anywhere, I guess, where you would see hope or see opportunity.

Ms. LITTLEJOHN. Yes. But the thing is that—

Representative HULTGREN. Can you turn on your microphone?

Ms. LITTLEJOHN. You might be aware—

Representative HULTGREN. Can you turn on your microphone? I'm sorry.

Ms. LITTLEJOHN. Oh, I'm sorry. You might be aware of the five women who have recently been detained in China for doing something as really simple as just objecting to sexual harassment on public transportation. The women of China, they can't even take up the most uncontroversial cause, a cause that is something that even the Chinese Communist Party wants. I mean, the Chinese Communist Party isn't in favor of sexual harassment on public transportation, and yet they jail these women.

The message, as I interpret it, is you cannot organize to do anything, we are the ones who are controlling everything. Even if you're trying to help us, we're going to slam you in jail because we don't want you to taking any initiative.

So I am not aware of groups within China on Chinese soil that are attempting to combat gendercide. The Chinese Government is cracking down ever more strongly on anyone who wants to assemble for any reason, including reasons that the Chinese Government might even agree with.

In India, there are some efforts to combat gendercide but they are really struggling. Actually, Women's Rights Without Frontiers wants to come to India. Congressman Chris Smith has hosted a showing of the "It's A Girl" film on Capitol Hill, a 63-minute documentary. The first half hour is on India, the second half-hour is on China.

So we have a successful campaign to save baby girls in China. We'd love to go to India, we'd love to show the film, we'd love to get on the news about that to combat the culture of gendercide there, because as it is right now, even in India, even though they don't have a totalitarian regime that is crushing any kind of women's movement, they have this intense shame.

People do not talk about this. Really, somebody is going to need to go over there and show the film, get on television, get on radio, speak to people and get a movement to help people in India who are really struggling right now to combat gendercide.

Representative HULTGREN. Well, thanks. Again, we want to help with that.

One last thing with the shame. I've got to think the medical community, hearing stories of doctors breaking necks of late-term babies, throwing them away, buckets of water to drown babies, there's got to be a shame level there with the medical community as well, who have been trained to save life and protect life, and yet clearly are destroying life so much here.

But I'm going on too long, so I'll yield back. Thank you so much for all of your work. Please keep it up.

Chairman SMITH. Thank you very much.

Mr. Pittenger?

Representative PITTENGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ms. Chai Ling, I certainly agree with you that changed lives, changed hearts is the ultimate need, that when Jesus Christ changed my life, that made everything else different. My work in the East has been related toward seeing people know Christ, so I do understand that.

I would say that in our country we have seen at least an awareness, an openness, or recognition that the majority of the American people understand the brutality of late-term abortion and they gravitate to that. What I heard today from your testimonies—and please forgive me that I had to be in two hearings today and I had to come in and out.

Sorry for that—but from what I heard when I've read, these are the most egregious, horrific crimes against humanity that you can hear. I think it is incumbent upon us as Members to share your story with our colleagues, to share it with our friends in the media, to build a better understanding of how horrific the entire one-child policy is and the brutal effect it has had on your entire society.

So that's our work. Your ability to help us in that mission to continue, you've touched each of us today, all of you have. I am deeply grateful for the work that you do to bring us to this point. We have much more work to do, but I know each of these individuals on this panel very well and you have our heart and commitment to continue in this fight. God bless you.

Ms. CHAI. Thank you.

Mr. CHENG. Mr. Chen would like to add.

Mr. CHEN. Let me add something. Before we knew that the Chinese women and other people have been fighting all the time against such kinds of brutal, violent birth control policies and practices, but with little effect. But in the past recent 10 years or so, with the Internet available to the ordinary people, we see a different picture now.

When I reported this kind of thing to the outside world and when they knew that I could offer some legal knowledge, they would come to me, even from 100 miles away. We find the Internet is a very, very powerful tool that the U.S. Government and the people around the world can take advantage of and to stand along with the Chinese people in fighting for this justice, to end this genocide. We want to see freedom of the Internet and the information flow into China and outside of China. So that will help everybody involved in the cause understand better how we could do a better job.

Ms. CHAI. I would like to add my recommendation to the American side. I know there are three additional bills that could really help to show a model to China on how they ought to change their culture of gendercide as well. One is the sex trafficking bill. I believe—I'm not sure if it's passed or in the process of being passed. Another one is the Girls Count Act. That bill would give children without *hukou* the opportunity to buy or purchase *hukou*. I highly encourage that bill to be passed.

The third one is a campus safety and accountability bill. We learned that U.S. campuses that have 20 percent of the women being date raped or raped, and in a recent documentary called "The Hunting Ground," it showed that colleges and universities have become a hunting ground for women to be sexually violated. In China, as Reggie just mentioned, those five ladies, just for advocating for no more sexual harassment in a public area, were being detained. So to pass the campus safety bill would set a better campus culture and would definitely give an example for Chinese universities and colleges on how they ought to act. I believe once we change the culture, we can save lives and we can save women and children.

Chairman SMITH. Thank you.

Before we conclude I just would like to ask Dr. Eberstadt, you know, Dr. Hudson spoke about, and you did as well, a ruthless son preference. I think there is an under-appreciation of how, when juxtaposed with—even though you say the empirical data is not fully there, if you're only allowed one and you have a son preference and it turns out the woman is carrying a daughter, the pressures will be very, very intense to ensure that she is not born and she is killed.

Would you want to speak to that ruthless son preference issue? Because again, our hope is that many of the recommendations you make, if there's anybody listening in China—and there certainly are people, I think, who care. You interface with demographers who get it. They're heading toward an implosion economically, and societally, in terms of the break-up of the family.

They cannot long sustain, even at the point of a barrel of a gun, the coherence of a nation when you have so decimated its foundation. It will implode. I don't think the leadership gets that yet, but if you could speak to that ruthless son preference issue.

Mr. EBERSTADT. Thank you, Congressman Smith. I have written elsewhere about what I've called the "global flight from the family," which is a truly worldwide phenomenon. It may also be regarded as a flight by the strong from the weak. It has, I think, grave implications for the future.

The global war against baby girls is something quite specific. I would observe that we know now, and Professor Hudson alluded to this, there's a way back from it. We've seen the existence proof that there's a way back from it from South Korea.

What we saw in South Korea, I think, is the importance of civil society and the importance of faith-based groups, and the importance of engaging in a struggle for conscience. It worked in South Korea, I think it can work elsewhere.

Chairman SMITH. Would anybody else like to add something, colleagues or witnesses, before we close?

Ms. CHAI. Can we suggest to end the hearing with a prayer?

Chairman SMITH. Before we do that, I do want to ask unanimous consent that Marco Rubio, who is the Cochair of our Commission, that his full opening statement be made a part of the record.

Without objection, that is so ordered.

Please, if you could close with a prayer.

[The prepared statement of Senator Rubio appears in the appendix.]

Ms. CHAI. Would that be okay? Yes. Dear Father, Lord Jesus, Holy Savior, we thank you for this wonderful opportunity to be together, to testify about the evil of the one-child policy and gendercide, and testify also about the triumph of Your victories. We thank you for Congressman Chris Smith's faithfulness and his team's hard work. We thank you for the other ranking congressmen's support on this issue, and all the distinguished witnesses, for their powerful testimonies.

So God, we know things that are not possible with man but are possible with you, and all things are possible. You gave us power to bind and loose things. We are here in unity to declare that we bind the one-child policy and we loose the All Children Allowed policy in China, we bind up gendercide, we loose the All Girls Allowed Policy in China, in India, and in the entire world. In Jesus' name we pray, Amen.

Chairman SMITH. Amen. The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:29 p.m. the hearing was adjourned.]

APPENDIX

PREPARED STATEMENTS

PREPARED STATEMENT OF NICHOLAS EBERSTADT

APRIL 30, 2015

Members of Congress, Distinguished Co-Panelists, Esteemed Guests:

It is a pleasure and a privilege to be invited here today to testify on China's demographic evolution in the era of the One Child Policy.

The general dimensions of what I have called "the global war against baby girls"¹ will, I am afraid, already be all too familiar to most of you, as will the general nature of that war as it has unfolded in China over the past three and a half decades.

My testimony this afternoon will therefore simply attempt to provide a few updates on contemporary China's biologically un-natural sex ratio at birth, and some of the prospective questions arising from this artificially induced gender imbalance. My testimony will rely upon the graphs and tables that accompany this written statement.

I wish to make four basic points in this statement:

First: modern China's un-naturally high sex ratio at birth (SRB) can be understood as a social collision between three powerful forces—ruthless and enduring son-preference; sub-replacement fertility, which perforce freights the gender of each birth with additional import for parents; and inexpensive, universally available prenatal gender determination technology in the context of an unconditional abortion policy.

Ms. Anne Morse of the Population Research Institute has used US Census Bureau estimates of China's fertility levels and gender imbalances to illustrate vividly the strong correspondence between lower fertility levels and higher SRBs in China over the past generation. [SEE FIGURE 1] Of course this gender imbalance is effectuated through mass sex-selective abortion, which presupposes widely available and reliable information on the gender of every fetus. When the One Child Policy commenced in the early 1980s, sonography or ultrasound machines were only found in a tiny minority of China's nearly 3000 counties—mostly of course in urban areas. But by 1988, over 90 percent of China's counties possessed ultrasound machines. [SEE FIGURE 2] Thus by the time of China's 1990 census, all-China second births, third births, and all higher order births were reporting sex ratios of 120 or more [SEE FIGURE 3]—in contrast to the "normal" ratio of 103–105 typical of large established human populations, so far as we can tell, all around the world today and all throughout history.

Its name notwithstanding, China's One Child Policy has never actually managed to enforce a one-child-only regimen over China as a whole: in recent years, by the estimates and projections of the US Census Bureau's International Data Base, China's total fertility rate has ranged between 1.5 and 1.6 births per woman per lifetime. In the 1990s and early 2000s, to judge by officially reported census figures, sex-selective abortion was not common for first pregnancies in China: instead, parents intervened massively across the country with female infanticide at higher-order parities. According to the 2010 census, however, the SRB for first births had risen sharply: to almost 114 boys for every 100 girls. This, even as SRBs for some higher-births appear to have been significantly declining. In effect, sex-selective feticide in China appears to have been increasingly "front-loaded" with respect to birth parity in recent years: fewer first-time parents than in the past are apparently willing nowadays (2010) to take their chances with biologically-determined gender outcomes for their firstborn child.

Please note that China's involuntary population control policy is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for biologically abnormal distortions of a modern society's sex ratio at birth. Un-naturally high SRBs today are witnessed in culturally Chinese settings like Hong Kong and Taiwan; in parts of India and Pakistan; and in West Asian countries such as Georgia and Armenia. None of those societies maintains a forcible birth control policy. To the extent that China's One Child Policy successfully coerces parents into having fewer children than they would otherwise desire, however, we would expect such pressures to result in higher SRBs than would otherwise occur. In 2007 Professor Zeng Yi, one of China's leading demographers, offered his judgment that approximately half of China's surfeit of baby

¹Nicholas Eberstadt, "The Global War Against Baby Girls", *The New Atlantis*, Fall 2011, available electronically at <http://www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/the-global-war-against-baby-girls>.

boys at that time was due to the One Child Policy.² He did not, however, explain how he derived that approximation. Exactly how much the One Child Policy contributes to China's SRB imbalance is a complex question to answer—and one that requires further scholarly investigation.

Second: there is broad agreement among researchers of China's population trends that China's overall sex ratio at birth is no longer rising, and may indeed have begun to decline in recent years—but there remains some disagreement in expert circles about the actual levels and trends here, and these differences are for the moment essentially irresolvable given the non-trivial uncertainties and discrepancies contained in China's official demographic data.

The two leading institutions that produce worldwide demographic estimates and projections at a national level are quite arguably the US Census Bureau, with its aforementioned continuously updated International Data Base, and the UN Population Division, with its biennially-revised "World Population Prospects" series. One can compare their estimates for China's sex ratio at birth for the One Child Policy Era. [SEE FIGURE 4] The Census Bureau and the UNPD present their data slightly differently: UNPD offers five year averages whereas Census gives year-by-year estimates or projections, and Census Bureau estimates only start with the year 1990 while UNPD series trace all the way back to 1950. (UNPD also includes Taiwan in its calculations for China, unlike Census Bureau IDB.) Nevertheless, it is apparent from Figure 4 that while UNPD and Census Bureau evaluations of levels in trends in SRB for China over the past generation are generally quite close, they are not identical. Their differences are most pronounced for the most recent years (2010–2015): by UNPD's projections, China's SRB for those years would have averaged 116, but Census' projections for that same period averaged about 112.

Some of this difference may be explained by the fact that the Census Bureau's projections are more recent than UNPD's and therefore utilize more up-to-date information.³ But it is also true that the official Chinese demographic data that independent analysts must contend with can afford no certainty concerning sex ratios for those born throughout the One Child Policy Era—least so for small children.

The plain fact is that contemporary China does not yet have a vital registration system that provides accurate and comprehensive national data on annual births and deaths. Further, as Dr. Daniel M. Goodkind of the US Census Bureau has pointed out, there are discrepancies in demographic data from different official Chinese sources: census counts versus hospital records versus primary school enrollment records (primary schooling in theory being universal these days for children 7 years of age). [SEE FIGURE 5] For example: where school enrollment data would have suggested a sex ratio at age 7 of about 110 for boys and girls born in 1993, China's 1995 "mini-census" placed their sex ratio at about 120. These are big differences.

But even if we limit our gaze to official censuses and "mini-censuses" (1% intercensal sample surveys of the Chinese population) we see major discrepancies. [SEE FIGURE 6] The 2005 "mini-census" tells us that the sex ratio for two-year-old children was 125, but the 2010 census says it was 119 for seven-year-old kids in 2010—even though the two year olds and seven year olds in question were all born in 1993. By the same token, the 2000 census places the sex ratio for children born in 1999 at nearly 123, while the 2010 census puts it at about 117. Clearly all these ratios are abnormally high—but such differences raise considerable questions about what the true underlying levels and trends in gender imbalance for China may be. Differential childhood mortality cannot account for such discrepancies.

Part of the trouble here seems to be a varying undercount from one census to the next for China's children and youth. [SEE FIGURES 7 THROUGH 9] For males and females born from the mid-1980s onward, China's successive censuses provide significantly different headcounts for any given birth year. The 2010 census, for example, offers a substantially higher headcount for population born in every year of the 1990s than does the 2000 census. Notably, it is not only girls who seem to have been undercounted in the 2000 census—at least in light of the 2010 census: boys also appear to have been undercounted. Such undercounts speak, among other things, to the incentives for parents to "conceal" non-quota births when reporting those births might risk strictures or other penalties, including financial penalties. We may suspect that such strategic under-reporting of births has continued in recent years, insofar as the One Child Policy itself has continued. But trends and differentials in sex-specific under-reporting today remain a major unknown—and how experts treat

²Zeng Yi, "Options for Fertility Policy Transition in China", *Population and Development Review*, Volume 33, Issue 2 (June 2007), pp. 215–246.

³These UNPD estimates and projections are from the "2012" revision (released June 2013) for the "World Population Prospects" series; the "2014" revisions are expected later this year.

this unknown necessarily have implications for calculated estimates and projections regarding current and future trends in gender imbalance in China.

Third: China's imbalanced sex ratios at birth over the past generation already portend a virtually unavoidable "marriage squeeze" for the generation to come; but that "squeeze" may be even more severe than previously anticipated owing to a new trend just now beginning to emerge on the Mainland: a "flight from marriage" by young women.

Today as in the past, China has embraced what might be called a "universal marriage norm"—and in recent decades, it has actually also achieved something close to universal marriage in practice. According to the 2000 China census, for example, just 3.8 % of men and a mere 0.2% of women in their early forties had never been married.⁴ But these were children of the pre-population control era. With rising SRBs and continuing sub-replacement fertility, any society with a "universal marriage norm" must perforce be consigned to the prospect of substantial numbers of "surplus grooms" or effectively unmarriageable young men.

Professor Zeng Yi and his colleagues are among the demographers who have projected the prospective dimensions of this marriage squeeze for China in the decades immediately ahead. [SEE FIGURE 10] In a study from 2008, their work suggested that about 25% of Chinese men in their late thirties, and over 20% of those in their early forties, would be never-married by the year 2030. The growing army of unmarriageable males envisioned in their projections, it is important to note, was still predicated on the assumption of near-universal marriage for Chinese women.

But that assumption is now being challenged by facts on the ground.

Throughout the rest of East Asia, what has been dubbed a "flight from marriage" by women (and also men) has been underway for more than two decades.⁵ In both Japan and South Korea—but also in such quintessentially Chinese settings as Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan—demographic data have been recording a pronounced and still-continuing tendency for women to postpone marriage to ever later ages—and, increasingly, to forgo marriage altogether. In all the societies so affected, the "flight from marriage" begins as an elite phenomenon, starting in large urban areas and in the strata with the highest educational attainment—then, gradually or not-so-gradually, that elite fashion becomes a mass norm. In Japan and Hong Kong, for example, about 23% of women in their late 30s were still single according to recent census counts (2010 and 2006 respectively), and about 17% of those in their early forties were likewise reportedly never-married. [SEE FIGURES 11 and 12]

As may be seen in Figures 11 and 12, Mainland China is a latecomer the East Asia's "female flight from marriage" party. Contemporary China's "female flight from marriage" has thus far been more hesitant than those of other postwar East Asian locales even after controlling for income: as may be seen, the proportions of still single women in their late thirties and early forties for China in 2010 were notably lower than for Singapore, Taiwan and Hong Kong when those societies had levels of GDP per capita comparable to China 2010. [SEE FIGURES 12 AND 13] But incipient signs of a "flight from marriage" by women are now evident in China, the country's impending "marriage squeeze" notwithstanding.

Figures 15 through 17 document the first hints of such trends. [SEE FIGURES 15 THROUGH 17] The tendency for Chinese women to postpone, or forgo, marriage is only just becoming visible at a national level: less than 2% of women in their late thirties were never married as of the 2010 census. But that fraction is decidedly higher than in previous decades. And just as in the rest of East Asia, the tendency for women to postpone marriage, or avoid it altogether, is emerging first in the China's major metropolitan center and in the most educated segments of Mainland society. Although the national average share of never married women ages 35–39 in China in the 2010 census was reported at 1.8%, it was 5.1% in Beijing—still low by current East Asian standards, but nevertheless roughly three times the national average. Within Beijing, furthermore, nearly 9% of women in their late thirties with some college or post-secondary education were never married as of 2010—as were roughly 18% of those women in their early thirties. This is precisely what an East Asian "flight from marriage" by women would look like in its early stages.

⁴ UN Population Division, "World Marriage Data 2012", available electronically at <http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/publications/dataset/marriage/wmd2012/Main-Frame.html>.

⁵ Cf. for example Richard Leete, "The Continuing Flight from Marriage and Parenthood Among the Overseas Chinese in East and Southeast Asia: Dimensions and Implications", *Population and Development Review*, Volume 20, Issue 4 (December 1994), pp. 811–829; and Gavin W. Jones, "The 'Flight from Marriage' in South-East and East Asia," *Asian Metacentre Research Paper Series*, No. 11 (National University Of Singapore, 2003) available electronically at <http://www.populationasia.org/Publications/ResearchPaper/AMCRP11.pdf>.

At this juncture we cannot tell how fast, or how far, the tendency to postpone marriage, or forgo it altogether, will progress in Mainland China. But such a trend is already definitely evident. And to the extent that this trend unfolds further, the magnitude of the “unmarriageable male” problem can be expected correspondingly to intensify over the coming generation.

Fourth: while the human rights implications of China’s One Child Policy are well known and widely documented, the question of the program’s actual demographic impact is rather less straightforward. Exactly how much has involuntary population control shaped (or warped) contemporary China’s population structure? There is no immediate, easy answer here because history does not allow re-runs: we do not know what China would look like today if Beijing had never enacted that terrible social experiment.

It may suffice here to note, however, that the East Asian rim today exhibits some of the world’s very lowest fertility levels—all in places that have never toyed with compulsory birth control. In recent years, Japan has reported “snapshot” (i.e., period) total fertility rates below 1.3 births per woman; South Korea’s at times has dropped below 1.2; and in some years Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan have all reported TFRs of less than one birth per woman. In this context, fertility levels for contemporary China—or even just for contemporary urban China—do not look extraordinarily low.

So we may reasonably ask: Has forcible population control accelerated modern China’s fertility decline? Would fertility levels really be higher today without the program? Is it possible they would have been even lower? The simple truth of the matter is: we cannot really address these immense issues with any great confidence as of yet. From a methodological perspective, estimating the net demographic impact of China’s police state population policy presents an exceedingly difficult analytical challenge. There are of course a number of approaches that could be pursued—but none is without its limitations. Such a project, however, in my view strongly merits active pursuit—not least so we may have some sense in advance of the magnitude of demographic responses that will be elicited when the One Child Policy is finally scrapped.


Accompanying Charts to Prepared Statement

Nicholas Eberstadt

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
Submitted Testimony for Hearing on
“Population Control in China: State Sponsored Violence Against
Women and Children,”
U.S. Congressional-Executive Commission on China
Rayburn House Office Building 2175
April 30, 2015

Figure 1




Source: Anne Morse, *Sex Selection in China and its Demographic Causes* (New York: Catholic Family & Human Rights Institute, June 3, 2013), available at: <http://c-fam.org/images/YoungScholars/Y15%201%20Sex%20selection%20and%20smaller%20families%20LW.pdf>

Figure 2
Percent of Counties with Ultrasound Machines in the Data




Source: Yuyu Chen, Hongbin Li, and Lingsheng Meng, "Prenatal Sex Selection and Missing Girls in China: Evidence from the Diffusion of Diagnostic Ultrasound" (DC: George Washington University, 2010), available at: http://www.gwu.edu/~iiep/assets/docs/gtwtwtgw/2010/lingsheng_meng_sex_ratio_china.pdf

Figure 3
 Reported sex ratio at birth by order from census counts: China, 1981-2010




Source: Isabelle Attané, *The Demographic Masculinization of China* (Switzerland: Springer, 2013).

Figure 4
 China's Sex Ratio At Birth, 1980-2015:
 United Nations Population Division vs. United States Census Bureau,
 (estimates and projections)



Source: Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision, <http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Excel-Data/population.htm>, Accessed April 27, 2015; US Census Bureau, International Database, "Fertility Rates," available at <http://www.census.gov/population/international/data/idb/informationGateway.php>, Accessed on April 27, 2015.


Figure 5
China sex ratios at birth implied by various sources:
1981-2005 (boys per 100 girls)



Sources: Births from censuses and intercensal surveys refer to those born in the year preceding each census/survey - National Bureau of Statistics 1988, 1997, 2007b; Population Census Office 1995, 1993, 2002; Back projections from 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2005 this counts incorporate sex differences in mortality and international migration; Hospital surveys - see Zeng et al., 1993; New school enrollments 7 years hence (scaled for slight underenrollment of females) - Zhang, 2005.


Source: Daniel Goodkind, "Child Underreporting, Fertility, and Sex Ratio Imbalance in China", *Demography* 48, no. 1 (2011): 291-316.

Figure 6
Sex ratios by birth year according to successive Chinese censuses: 1982-2010




Source: Department of Population Statistics, State Statistical Bureau, "1982 Population Census of China" (Beijing: China Statistics Press, 1985); Department of Population and Employment Statistics National Bureau of Statistics, "China Population Census: Tabulation of the 1990 Population Census of the People's Republic of China" (Beijing: China Statistics Press, 1992); 1995 data: Judith Banister, "Shortage of Girls in China Today: Causes, Consequences, International Comparisons, and Solutions," 2003. Department of Population and Employment Statistics National Bureau of Statistics, "China Population Census: Tabulation of the 2000 Population Census of the People's Republic of China" (Beijing: China Statistics Press, 2002); Department of Population and Employment Statistics National Bureau of Statistics, "China 2005 1% Population Survey Data Assembly," (Beijing: China Statistics Press, 2007); Department of Population and Employment Statistics National Bureau of Statistics, "China Population Census: Tabulation of the 2010 Population Census of the People's Republic of China" (Beijing: China Statistics Press, 2012).

Figure 7
 Population Count By Birth Year From Successive Chinese Censuses:
 Males plus Females, 1976-2010




Source: Department of Population Statistics, State Statistical Bureau, "1982 Population Census of China" (Beijing: China Statistics Press, 1985). Department of Population and Employment Statistics National Bureau of Statistics, "China Population Census: Tabulation of the 1990 Population Census of the People's Republic of China" (Beijing: China Statistics Press, 1992). Department of Population and Employment Statistics National Bureau of Statistics, "China Population Census: Tabulation of the 2000 Population Census of the People's Republic of China" (Beijing: China Statistics Press, 2002). Department of Population and Employment Statistics National Bureau of Statistics, "China Population Census: Tabulation of the 2010 Population Census of the People's Republic of China" (Beijing: China Statistics Press, 2012).

Figure 8
 Population Count By Birth Year From Successive Chinese Censuses:
 Females, 1976-2010




Source: Department of Population Statistics, State Statistical Bureau, "1982 Population Census of China" (Beijing: China Statistics Press, 1985); Department of Population and Employment Statistics National Bureau of Statistics, "China Population Census: Tabulation of the 1990 Population Census of the People's Republic of China" (Beijing: China Statistics Press, 1992); Department of Population and Employment Statistics National Bureau of Statistics, "China Population Census: Tabulation of the 2000 Population Census of the People's Republic of China" (Beijing: China Statistics Press, 2002); Department of Population and Employment Statistics National Bureau of Statistics, "China Population Census: Tabulation of the 2010 Population Census of the People's Republic of China" (Beijing: China Statistics Press, 2012).

Figure 9
 Population Count By Birth Year From Successive Chinese Censuses:
 Males, 1976-2010




Source: Department of Population Statistics, State Statistical Bureau, "1982 Population Census of China" (Beijing: China Statistics Press, 1985); Department of Population and Employment Statistics National Bureau of Statistics, "China Population Census: Tabulation of the 1990 Population Census of the People's Republic of China" (Beijing: China Statistics Press, 1992); Department of Population and Employment Statistics National Bureau of Statistics, "China Population Census: Tabulation of the 2000 Population Census of the People's Republic of China" (Beijing: China Statistics Press, 2002); Department of Population and Employment Statistics National Bureau of Statistics, "China Population Census: Tabulation of the 2010 Population Census of the People's Republic of China" (Beijing: China Statistics Press, 2012).

Figure 10
Proportion of single (never-married) males by age group:
China 2000-2030 (projected)




Source: Unpublished addenda from Zeng Yi, Wang Zhenglian, Jiang Leiwen and Gu Danan, "Future trend of family households and elderly living arrangement in China", *Genus* LXIV (1-2), pp. 9-36, kindly provided to the author.

Figure 10
 East Asia's "Female Flight From Marriage":
 Proportion of single (never-married) females (35-39)
 by county or territory,
 1970s-2010s




Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2013). World Marriage Data 2012, accessed April 24, 2015. Available at: <http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/WMD2012/MainFrame.html>. Taiwan data: Ching-Li Yang and Hung-jeng Tsai, *The Changes of Fertility and Nuptiality in Taiwan* (presented at "International Symposium of Social Policy in Asia" Tokyo, February 2007), available at <http://www.econ.hit-u.ac.jp/~koko/sympo-feb07/paper/Yang-Tsai-The%20Changes%20of%20Fertility%20and%20Nuptiality%20in%20Taiwan2.pdf>; and National Statistics, Republic of Taiwan, "Statistical Tables - Marital Status," accessed on April 24, 2015, available at <http://eng.stat.gov.tw/lp.asp?ctNode=1629&ctUnit=779&Base5D=7>.

Figure 12
 East Asia's "Female Flight From Marriage":
 Proportion of single (never-married) females (40-44)
 1970s-2010s




Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2013). World Marriage Data 2012, accessed April 24, 2015. Available at: <http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/WMD2012/MainFrame.html>. Taiwan data: Ching-Li Yang and Hung-Jeng Tsai, *The Changes of Fertility and Nuptiality in Taiwan* (presented at "International Symposium of Social Policy in Asia," Tokyo, February 2007), available at <http://www.econ.hit-u.ac.jp/~kokyo/sympo-feb07/paper/Yang-Tsai-The%20Changes%20of%20Fertility%20and%20Nuptiality%20in%20Taiwan2.pdf>; and National Statistics, Republic of Taiwan, "Statistical Tables - Marital Status," accessed on April 24, 2015, available at <http://eng.stat.gov.tw/lp.asp?ctNode=1629&ctUnit=779&BaseDSD=7>.

Figure 13
 Proportion single (never married) females (35-39) versus GDP per Capita:
 Selected East Asian Venues, 1970s-2010 (Maddison GDP estimates)




Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2013). World Marriage Data 2012, accessed April 24, 2015. Available at: <http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/WMD2012/MainFrame.html>. Taiwan data: Ching-Li Yang and Hung-leng Tsai, *The Changes of Fertility and Nuptiality in Taiwan* (presented at "International Symposium of Social Policy in Asia" Tokyo, February 2007), available at <http://www.econ.hit-u.ac.jp/~kyoko/sympo-feb07/paper/Yang-Tsai-The%20Changes%20of%20Fertility%20and%20Nuptiality%20in%20Taiwan.z.pdf>; and National Statistics, Republic of Taiwan, "Statistical Tables - Marital Status," accessed on April 24, 2015, available at <http://eng.stat.gov.tw/jp.asp?ctNode=1629&CUnit=779&BaseSD=7>. GDP data: The Maddison-Project, <http://www.ggd.net/maddison/maddison-project/home.htm>.

Figure 15
 Proportion of single (never-married) females by age group, Country-wide
 China 1982-2010




Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2013). World Marriage Data 2012, accessed January 28, 2014. Available at: <http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/WMD2012/MainFrame.html>

Figure 16
Proportion of single (never married) females
by age group and region, China 2010



Source: Department of Population and Employment Statistics National Bureau of Statistics, "China Population Census: Tabulation of the 2010 Population Census of the People's Republic of China" (Beijing: China Statistics Press, 2012).

Figure 17
 Proportion of never-married women by age and educational attainment:
 Beijing 2010



Source: Department of Population and Employment Statistics National Bureau of Statistics, "China Population Census: Tabulation of the 2010 Population Census of Beijing Municipality" (Beijing: China Statistics Press, 2012).

**China's Mismatched Bookends:
A Tale of Birth Sex Ratios in South Korea and Vietnam**

by

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
ABSTRACT: Due to its rising power in the international system as well as the sheer size of its population, the extremely abnormal birth sex ratios of China have been the focus of policymakers and scholars alike. As China struggles to normalize that ratio, many have asked if there are lessons to be learned from the experiences of other countries facing similar issues. Interestingly, China is “bookended” by two countries that have had vastly different birth sex ratio trajectories: South Korea and Vietnam. In the former, a very abnormal SRB was normalized over the course of approximately one decade. In the latter, a normal SRB became profoundly abnormal over the course less than one decade, and threatens to become even more skewed than that of China in the future. Are there lessons for China from the experiences of its “mismatched bookends” neighbors?

Introduction

While it is generally true that declining fertility, gender inequality, and the availability of sex selective technologies have led to rising M:F birth sex ratios throughout much of Asia since the 1980s, that generalization masks important variation across Asian nations. As seen in Figure 1 below, while the continuing increase in the sex ratio at birth (SRB) of China is a focus of attention by policymakers and scholars alike, there is more to observe in the East Asian region. Interestingly, China is “bookended” by two countries that have had vastly different birth sex ratio trajectories in recent years: South Korea and Vietnam. In the former, a very abnormal SRB was normalized over the course of approximately one decade. In the latter, a normal SRB became profoundly abnormal over the course less than one decade, and threatens to become even more skewed than that of China in the future if the sex ratio continues to rise at the current rate. Are there lessons for China—for any country facing abnormal SRBs—from the experiences of these “mismatched bookends” neighbors?

To investigate that question, we first discuss in general terms the drivers of gender inequality and offspring sex selection in East Asia. We then turn to a more in-depth examination of the evolution of SRBs in each nation, South Korea and Vietnam. We first take a holistic look at comparisons of national indicators for the two nations, and then delve deeper to examine differences in the intensity and timing of the identified drivers and in national reproductive policy in each using historical process-tracing. We then reflect on what can be learned from the experiences of these two nations, moving in apparently opposite directions over a fairly short period of time.

Figure 1: Comparing Sex Ratios at Birth for China, South Korea and Vietnam, 1981-2013



Sources: China 1980-2000 data from Lutz, Wolfgang, Sergei Scherbov, Gui Ying Cao, Qiang Ren, and Xiaoying Zheng, "China's Uncertain Demographic Present and Future," *Vienna Yearbook of Population Research* 5 (2007): 45; 2001-2005 data from Tao Tao, and Xianling Zhang, "Underreporting and Overreporting in China's Sixth National Population Census," *Population Research* 37, no. 1 (2013): 45; 2006-2011 data from National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2011 National Sample Survey on Population Changes, China's Total Population and Structural Changes in 2011, 20 January 2012; 2012 figure from National Bureau of Statistics of China, Statistical Communiqué of the People's Republic of China on the 2012 National Economic and Social Development, 22 February 2013 at http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/PressRelease/201302/t20130222_72261.html; 2013 figures from National Bureau of Statistics of China, 'China's Economy Showed Good Momentum of Steady Growth in the Year of 2013', 20 January 2014, at http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/PressRelease/201401/t20140120_502079.html.

Korea: KOSIS, Korea Statistical Information Service: Statistical Database, Live Births by Age Group of Mother, Sex and Birth Order, 1981-2013, at kosis.kr.

Vietnam: 1999-2013 data from General Statistics Office, *The 1/4/2013 Time-Point Population Change and Family Planning Survey: Major Findings*. Hanoi: Statistical Publishing House, 2013.

General Drivers of Offspring Sex Selection in the East Asian Context

To discuss drivers of offspring sex selection is to discuss both foundations and catalysts. The foundation of sex selection is son preference. However, son preference need not lead to the enactment of that preference in terms of sex-selective abortion or passive/active female infanticide. There are many nations in the world that place greater value on sons than daughters, but few nations where birth and early childhood sex ratios indicate that preference has moved to enactment. (Unfortunately, it appears that latter list is growing, not shrinking over time, an observation that deserves its own research agenda.) Rather, preference moves to enactment when certain catalytic pressures are applied. These may be of natural origins, such as famine, but in the twenty-first century are more likely to be

man-made; that is, policies and incentive structures imposed upon society by national governments.

The foundations of son preference in the East Asian context are not dissimilar from those found in other regions. Its root is the organization of society along patrilineal lines. The vast majority of lineage-based groups or clans trace descent through the patriline, practice patrilocality, and inherit land and property through the patriline.¹ Even in the rare matrilineal societies, power, land, and resources are still held by male kin, in the form of brothers from a particular mother. Patrilineality permits groups of male relatives bound by blood ties to become politically powerful and band together in allegiances when conflict arises, and hence scholars have noted the deep importance attached by the clan to biological replication.² Charrad observes, “The socially meaningful ties unifying the network thus bind men together and bypass women”.³ The early forms of private property were held not by individuals but by patrilines: kinship relations founded on agnatic lineage allow both property and labor, including the reproductive labor of women, to remain within the clan under male control.⁴

Arguably the most vulnerable family members in these societies are the women whose role is to reproduce the patriline, for the subordination of female interests, reproductive or otherwise, is how patrilineal clans are formed in the first place. As Weiner notes, “The anti-individualism of the rule of the clan burdens each and every member of a clan society, but most of all it burdens women. The fate of women lays bare the basic values of the rule of the clan, and as outsiders, citizens of liberal states often find their own values clarified when they confront the lives clans afford their female members.”⁵ And as Fukuyama notes, “In agnatic societies, women achieve legal personhood only by virtue of their marriage to and mothering of a male in the lineage”; that is, women only “exist” in these societies as they create the patriline because patrilines cannot exist without women creating them.⁶ Related to this is the common practice of excluding women from performing necessary religious rites on behalf of ancestors—for the ancestors to be so honored are all male.

Men—and not women—must therefore control assets, whether these be children or land or cattle, else the power of the clan will dissipate. For example, Fukuyama observes, “While widows and unmarried daughters may have certain

¹ Thomas Barfield, 2010, *Afghanistan: a Cultural and Political History*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 22; Dale Eickelman, 2002, *The Middle East and Central Asia: An Anthropological Approach*, Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 75; William Lancaster, 1997, *The Rwala Bedouin Today*. Prospect Heights, Illinois: Waveland Press, Inc, 36-42.

² Barfield, *Afghanistan: a Cultural and Political History*, 20.

³ Mounira M. Charrad, 2001, *States and Women's Rights: The Making of Postcolonial Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco* Berkeley: University of California Press, 53.

⁴ United Nations Development Program, 2005, *Arab Human Development Report 2004: Towards Freedom in the Arab World*, New York: United Nations Publications, 164.

⁵ Mark S. Weiner, 2013, *The Rule of the Clan: What an Ancient Form of Social Organization Reveals about the Future of Individual Freedom*, New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 64.

⁶ Francis Fukuyama, 2011, *Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution*, New York, NY: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 233.

inheritance rights, they are usually required to keep the lineage's property within the agnatic line."⁷ This agnatic control of resources is effected in a number of ways, of which we will mention but three here.

1. **Patrilocality of Marriage.** Patrilocality makes the formation of agnatic clans a fairly straightforward task, and thus is universally favored by patrilineal groups. Because of patrilocality, most males in a particular area are kin, which forms a natural foundation for male alliances in patrilineal clans. In such societies, where land and resources belonged exclusively to men, the complete economic dependence of females is effected, resulting in a profoundly subordinate status for women.
2. **Inequitable Family Law that Discriminates Against Females.** Patrilineal clans make family law in the image of their own reproductive interests, as shown by inequitable family laws favoring men across time and space.⁸ The purpose of such discrimination between male rights and female rights in marriage is clearly to effect the subordination of female interests, especially reproductive interests, to male reproductive interests. Thus we see that adultery is a greater crime for women than for men, divorce may be easy for men to obtain but difficult for women, child custody may default to the father's kin, and so forth. This discrimination is most clearly seen in customary law--even states with equitable family laws on the books might not enforce these laws because of patrilineal clan-based tradition or practices.⁹
3. **Women's Property Rights in Practice.** Keeping resources within the patriline requires inheritance and property rights favor men and major economic resources such as land will remain solely within male hands. Thus women's property rights in practice (and opposed to formal law) will be strongly indicative of whether patrilineal clans play an important role in societal governance. For example, Fukuyama notes, "the ability of women to own and bequeath property is an indicator of the deterioration of tribal organization and suggests that strict patrilineality [has] disappeared."¹⁰

Thus we can see that the main foundational driver of son preference is societal organization around patrilineal clans. The more important these patrilineal groups are in society, even in the presence of a strong state and gender equitable laws "on the books," the higher the intensity of son preference. However, as noted previously, preference need not move towards enactment; generally speaking, catalysts are necessary for this to occur. While these catalysts may be natural in origin (e.g., famine), more often they originate in the imposition of strong new incentive structures by the government on the society.

One prime example of such a catalyst in a patrilineally-organized society is the enforcement of governmental limits on fertility. The One Child Policy (now a

⁷ Fukuyama, *Origins of Political Order*, 233.

⁸ Barbara Smuts, 1992, "Male Aggression against Women: An Evolutionary Perspective," *Human Nature* 3:1-44, accessed at doi: 10.1007/BF02692265.

⁹ Valerie M. Hudson, Donna L. Bowen and Perpetua L. Nielsen, 2011, "What is the Relationship Between Inequity in Family Law and Violence Against Women? Approaching the Issue of Legal Enclaves," *Politics and Gender* 7(4): 453-492, accessed at doi: 10.1017/S1743923X11000328.

¹⁰ Fukuyama, *Origins of Political Order*, 233.

law) in China, and the Two Child Policy of Vietnam, are cases in point. When fertility is forcibly lowered by the state, son preference will turn into enactment. This is so because the typical family-level solution for not having a son is to continue to bear children until a son is forthcoming. If that solution is no longer an option, some parents will select for a child of male sex, especially at higher birth orders. In South Korea, although its two-child and later one-child policies were not enforced, these norms were quickly accepted in urban and then rural areas within this homogenous nation.

Another catalyst in a patrilineally-organized society is the government's decision concerning whether to provide meaningful old-age pensions for all its citizens. The old age pension scheme in such a society is sons. If the government decides to provide such a scheme, any perceived need to enact son preference will be profoundly undercut. Indeed, even the foundation of son preference itself may be affected.

With this conceptual background in mind, we now turn to a broad comparison of South Korea and Vietnam (with an eye on neighboring China, as well) before beginning our historical process-tracing case studies of these two nations.

South Korea and Vietnam: A Macro-level Comparison

Broad Socio-Economic Characteristics. Despite similarities along such dimensions as ethnic homogeneity (both countries are fairly homogeneous, as is China), Table 1 suggests there are more points of contrast than similarity between Vietnam and South Korea. South Korea is a far richer and more urbanized nation than Vietnam, and despite the fact that Vietnam is a communist country for which gender equality is an important principle, several of the indicators in Table 1, such as % females with at least some secondary education, the lower age of marriage and higher rate of adolescent births, show that Vietnam lags South Korea on important gender-related dimensions:

Table 1: Comparing Socio-Economic Indicators for Vietnam and South Korea

Indicator	Vietnam	South Korea
GNI per capita (male, 2011 PPP\$)	5,655	38,990
GNI per capita (female, 2011 PPP\$)	4,147	21,795
Female Labour force participation rate (% aged 15+)	72.8	49.9
% Old age pension recipient	34.5	77.6
% Share parliament seats held by women	24.4	15.7
% Females with some secondary education	59.4	77
Rural population (% of total population)	68.3	17.9
Maternal mortality rate (deaths per 100,000 live births)	59	16
Mean age at marriage (2010)	22.7	28.9
Total fertility rate (births per woman)	1.8	1.3
Adolescent birth rate (births per 1,000 women aged 15-19)	29	2.2
Female life expectancy	84.8	80.5

Sources: Data from Human Development Report 2014, at <http://hdr.undp.org/en/data>, with the exception of the figures for rural population (see World Development Indicators, last updated 12/19/2014), and the statistics for mean age of marriage (KNSO, Korea National Statistical Office, Women's Lives through Statistics in 2011, 27 June 2011, at www.kostat.go.kr; and GSO (General

Statistics Office, Vietnam), Population Change and Family Planning Survey, 1/4/2010: Major Findings. Hanoi: Statistical Publishing House, 2010.

Gender-Related Ordinal Scales. More importantly for our purposes are ordinal scales specifically designed to examine women's status in law and society, obtained from the WomanStats Database. For each of these scales, a lower number indicates a better situation for women. Here we again see that across these dimensions, Vietnam's overall profile is somewhat worse. In addition, on a measure of patrilocality (which in turn is an indicator of the importance of patrilineal groups in society), both China and Vietnam score higher (i.e., greater patrilocality) than South Korea.

Table 2: Gender-related ordinal scales for Vietnam, South Korea and China

Scale	Vietnam	South Korea	China
Level of Physical Violence Against Women	3	2	2
Degree of Inequity in Family Law	3	2	2
Age of First Marriage for Women Practice	1	0	0
Property Rights for Women in Practice	2	2	1
Prevalence of Patrilocality	2	1	2

Source: WomanStats Database, www.womanstats.org

General Overview of Women's Situation in Vietnam and South Korea

To better facilitate cross-country comparison, this review looks at the following broad categories: abortion, family practices (marriage, inheritance, and elder care), education, employment, participation in government, and government attitudes toward gender equality. On the surface – that is, in terms of legal rights – both countries offer similar protection women and affirmations of gender equality. However, a qualitative review of the data suggests that family practices -- inheritance and elder care specifically – deserve particular attention because these are points on which the two countries seem to diverge most markedly.

Abortion and Family Planning

Laws regarding abortion in both countries have remained relatively stable over the last fifteen years, and both experience high rates of abortion, with, for example, Vietnam's total abortion rate estimated to be 83 per 1000 women (or 59.1

abortions per 100 pregnancies), putting it in the top five countries in the world and the top in Asia.¹¹

Abortion in South Korea has been illegal since 1953,¹² but it also has one of the highest abortion rates in the world (rates were estimated in 2012 at 29.8 per 1000 women aged 15-44,¹³ but reported to be as high as 66 abortions per 100 births in 1990).¹⁴ The Maternal and Child Health Law in 1973 established some exemptions, such as disability, disease, rape, incest, and risk to the mother's health.¹⁵ As recently as 2001, medical associations have made periodic calls for the decriminalization of induced abortions, though to no avail.¹⁶ In practice, however, abortion rates remain high – so high that at first glance it would not seem that there is any legal restriction on abortion. Estimates suggest that only 4% of total abortions in 2005 were lawful, for example.¹⁷ Until very recently, enforcement of abortion laws in South Korea was lax, with only 2-7 cases prosecuted annually.¹⁸ In February 2010, South Korea introduced a 'Comprehensive Plan for the Prevention of Illegal Abortion,' a response to the low birth rate and an attempt to crack down on illegal abortions).¹⁹ A few harsh prosecutions have made examples out of offenders, and in response many obstetricians no longer offer abortions.²⁰ However, two things are of interest. First, although South Korea has stepped up enforcement as of 2010, there is no substantively new legislation on the books that changes the regulation of abortion. Second, the birth-sex ratio in South Korea had already normalized before the enforcement was enhanced.

Issues of Patrilineality

Marriage, inheritance, and elder care practices in both countries revolve around a common question: the identity of a woman and how it is affected by marriage. Legally speaking, both countries now offer the same answer, that is, a woman is a separate and equal individual with the same responsibilities and rights as a man. Culturally, however, there is some divergence. Whereas South Korea's

¹¹ Tuoitre News, 21 May 2014, "Vietnam Ranks First in Asia in Abortion, Among World's Top 5," *Tuoitrenews.vn.com*, at

<http://tuoitrenews.vn/society/19787/vietnam-ranks-first-in-asia-in-abortion>

¹² United Nations, 2002, "Addendum to the Second Periodic Report," *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights*, CCPR/C/VNM/2001/2/Add.1

¹³ Sophia Lee, 26 January 2013, "Aborting the Future," *WorldMag.com*, at

http://www.worldmag.com/2013/01/aborting_the_future; Jane Kang, 14 October 2013, "To Abort or Not to Abort: That is the Question in Korea," *Voices in Bioethics*, at

<http://voicesinbioethics.org/2013/10/14/abortion-south-korea/>

¹⁴ Doo-Sub Kim, "Le déficit de filles en Corée du Sud: évolution, niveaux et variations régionales," *Population*, 59, no. 6 (2004): 983-997.

¹⁵ CCPR/C/VNM/2001/2/Add.1

¹⁶ CEDAW, 23 July 2003, "Consideration of reports submitted under article 18 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women," *Fifth Periodic Report of States parties: Republic of Korea*, CEDAW/C/KOR/5

¹⁷ KWAU, Korean Women's Association United, 2011, *NGO Shadow Report: Republic of Korea*, at

http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cedaw/docs/ngos/KWAU_RepublicKorea49.pdf

¹⁸ *Ibid.* Furthermore, many prosecuted cases resulted in a suspended sentence or execution.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ *Ibid.*

cultural expectations are beginning to align with its legal framework, in Vietnam they remain firmly entrenched in traditional mores.

Marriage

Until recently, South Korean law legitimized a patrilineal system of family headship. Beginning in 2003, women were legally permitted to head households,²¹ and the number of female-headed households has increased slowly).²² In 2005, the unfavorable headship system was eliminated, meaning that women are no longer legally subordinate to the male family head).²³ Furthermore, the right to unilaterally dispose of property within marriage was eliminated),²⁴ and the equal right of both spouses to the marital home asserted. Also in 2005, the government enacted a Framework Act on Health Family, which stipulates that the government will promote an equitable family culture.²⁵ We will delve these issues in greater depth in our historical process-tracing on South Korea.

These changes marked the beginning of legal gains in other marital areas within South Korea that distinguish a married woman as a distinct, equal and autonomous individual. Law enforcement related to domestic violence has been enhanced, followed by a decrease in domestic violence related arrests.²⁶ In 2009, a court ruling found marital rape unconstitutional, establishing a precedent in the absence of explicit criminalization by prosecuting cases.²⁷ Although far from perfect, South Korea has continued to march toward the legal protection of women within marriage.

Prior to these legal changes, marriage meant a literal loss of identity for a woman and her assimilation into the husband's family.²⁸ Family ties tended to be maintained with the husband's family, but not the wife's. These changes encourage and reinforce social shifts that see a woman as an equal participant with equal ownership of her family, rather than a supporting actor for her husband's family. For example, by 1999, co-residence with extended family (i.e., the husband's family) had begun to decline and shift toward a nuclear family.²⁹ However, some social attitudes remain entrenched and lag behind legal frameworks and enforcement – such as persistent ideas about marital relations that do not allow for the possibility of marital rape.³⁰

²¹ U.S. Department of State, 2003, "Korea, Republic of," *2003 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices*, <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/>.

²² CEDAW, 5 March 2007, "Consideration of reports submitted under article 18 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women," *Sixth Periodic Report of States parties: Republic of Korea*, CEDAW/C/KOR/6.

²³ U.S. Department of State, 2007, "Korea, Republic of," *2007 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices*, at <http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2007/100525.htm>.

²⁴ CEDAW/C/KOR/6.

²⁵ CEDAW/C/KOR/6.

²⁶ CEDAW/C/KOR/6.

²⁷ Korea Times, 18 January 2009, "Marital Rape: Ruling Seen as Move to Protect Spousal Right to Sex," Opinion, at http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/opinion/2009/01/202_38045.html

²⁸ New Zealand Immigration Service, "Family Structures," Immigration Research Programme, 2000, <http://www.dol.govt.nz/research/migration/pdfs/FamilyStructures>

²⁹ New Zealand Immigration Service, "Family Structures."

³⁰ KWAU 2011.

On the legal side of things, Vietnam has made similar changes in laws governing marriage, thanks in no small part to the 2000 Marriage and Family Law.³¹ On paper, women are entitled to head households and have their names recorded jointly on family assets – in fact, joint titling is required and local administrations advise couples to register certificates in both names.³² In cases of divorce, their housework is regarded as income generating,³³ and marital property is to be divided into two halves (an improvement over South Korea, where women are entitled to portions of the marital estate varying from one-fifth to one-half). Although domestic violence was not previously specifically criminalized, Vietnam also introduced the Law on Domestic Violence Prevention and Control in 2007 for that purpose.

In practice, however, this picture of Vietnam may be misleading. Women are still perceived as assimilating into the husband's family after marriage, with few distinct or equal rights. We will be exploring that issue in greater detail in our process-tracing on the situation in a later section of this paper. Within the marriage, societal attitudes persist in stigmatizing or blaming victims of domestic violence.³⁴ Although spousal rape is criminalized,³⁵ there are no known cases of prosecution.³⁶ Although joint titling is required for all family assets,³⁷ in practice most land use rights certificates and local land administration books only have the husband's name recorded as head of household, and if women manage to secure land, they are typically given smaller plots.³⁸ Only 10-12% of agricultural land has a woman's name on the title, and these are mostly single heads of household.³⁹ The patrilineal social structure means that even if a woman is entitled to one half of the land or property, her access to it after a divorce may be unpredictable. Recent figures show that only a quarter of women involved in a divorce lodged a suit to have their rights enforced. In many cases, women themselves may voluntarily renounce their fair

³¹ CEDAW, 22 June 2005, "Consideration of reports submitted under article 18 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women," *Combined fifth and sixth periodic reports of States parties: Viet Nam*, CEDAW/C/VNM/5-

³² CEDAW, 2004, *Rural Women's Access to Land and Property in Selected Countries*, at <http://www.landcoalition.org/sites/default/files/legacy/legacypdf/cedawrpt.pdf?q=pdf/cedawrpt.pdf>.

³³ CEDAW, 20 October 2000, "Consideration of reports submitted under article 18 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women," *Combined third and fourth periodic reports of States parties: Viet Nam*, CEDAW/C/VNM/3-4

³⁴ Asian Development Bank, 2002, "Women in Viet Nam," *Regional and Sustainable Development Department*, at <http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/institutional-document/32605/women-vietnam.pdf>.

³⁵ U.S. Department of State, 2011, "Vietnam," *2011 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices*, at <http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2011/1535>.

³⁶ U.S. Department of State, 2007, "Vietnam," *2007 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices*, at <http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2007/100543.htm>.

³⁷ Anna Knox et al. 2007, "Connecting Rights to Reality: A Progressive Framework of Core Legal Protections for Women's Property Rights," *International Center for Research on Women*, at <http://www.icrw.org/publications/connecting-rights-reality>.

³⁸ CEDAW/C/VNM/5-6.

³⁹ CEDAW/C/VNM/3-4; Vietnam, 2001. Decree no. 70/2001/ND-CP of October 3, 2001 Detailing the Implementation of the Marriage and Family Law, <http://policy.mofcom.gov.cn/english/flaw!fetch.action?id=e73960ba-7975-4104-9036-ae203e5edbd3>

share because of societal pressure: 23% of urban women and 46% of rural women reported doing so.⁴⁰

Inheritance.

The subject of inheritance is another integral part of family practices, and plays a major role in the relative value of sons and daughters. As in the case of marriage practices, both countries have made recent legal changes on this subject, but social acceptance varies.

Sons and daughters now have equal inheritance rights in South Korea, but this was not always so. Until 2005, inheritance ran through the male line. Upon marriage, women joined their husband's family register, and all children born to the family belonged to the father's registry. A daughter was unable to receive inheritance from her family or transmit inheritance in her own right to her children. This legal basis for inheritance discrimination was dismantled by the Supreme Court in 2005.⁴¹

In Vietnam, women also enjoy legal parity with men in terms of inheritance. Again, however, the persistence of patrilocal customs severely limit women's ability to enforce inheritance rights. Not only do women tend to move away from their own families, they remain reluctant to fight the custom.⁴² Although sons and daughters are supposed to inherit equally, sons are much more likely to inherit than daughters unless a legal document specifies otherwise.⁴³ Agricultural lands are rarely, if ever, gifted to daughters.⁴⁴ When a man dies, it is more likely that his son's name, not his widow's, will be on the land certificate.⁴⁵

In the case of Vietnam, the issue is not that women cannot legally receive and pass on inheritance. Although there are no legal barriers to female inheritance, social attitudes continue to hold men in higher esteem and emphasize their role in continuing the family line.

Elder Care

A final aspect of the family practice puzzle is the responsibility for elder care within a family. If a son and his wife are expected to care for his parents, it is rational to seek security in old age by choosing to have sons. For this reason, conceptions of a woman's distinct identity after marriage (or lack thereof) and relative responsibilities to his family and her family could be an important determinant in son preference. So, too, is a country's perception of social safety nets.

In South Korea, evidence of shifting attitudes toward elder care can be found in the recent phenomenon of a ballooning elderly suicide rate.⁴⁶ Newspapers carry

⁴⁰ CEDAW, 2004.

⁴¹ Astrid Tuminez with Kerstin Duell and Haseena Abdul Majid, 2012, "Rising to the Top? A Report on Women's Leadership in Asia," *Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy*, at <http://sites.asiasociety.org/womenleaders/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/Rising-to-the-Top-Final-PDF.pdf>.

⁴² CEDAW/C/VNM/5-6.

⁴³ U.S. Department of State, 2011.

⁴⁴ CEDAW/C/VNM/3-4.

⁴⁵ CEDAW, 2004.

⁴⁶ Choe Sang-Hun, 28 November 2007, "South Koreans Rethink Preference for Sons," *New York Times*, at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/28/world/asia/28iht-sex.1.8509372.html?_r=1&.

harrowing tales of elderly South Koreans who drained savings to facilitate children's success, expecting that the children would in turn care for their parents – only for the parents to find themselves abandoned. In an article for *The New York Times*, Choe Sang-Hun describes a woman contemplating suicide who “was dismayed that her sons did not invite her to live with them, but she also dreaded becoming a burden.”⁴⁷ The percentage of South Korean children who believe they should care for their parents has dropped from 90 percent to 37 percent over the last 15 years.⁴⁸

The South Korean government has been left to play catch-up, attempting to implement social security for an abandoned generation of elders. Although strides have been made in this area, with subsidized healthcare,⁴⁹ pensions,⁵⁰ and cash allowances,⁵¹ it is still not enough. Some South Koreans are too old to have paid into the pension, or are among the 47% of the population not covered by the National Pension Service, and the South Korean government still “denies welfare to people whose children are deemed capable of supporting them.”⁵² Additional detail will be added in our process-tracing about South Korea in the next section of the paper.

Vietnam has not experienced such a dramatic shift in children's attitudes toward their elders. The majority of the elderly population, especially in the North, live with a son rather than a daughter.⁵³ In surveys, the Vietnamese population continues to cite continuance of patriline as very important.⁵⁴ Vietnam, like South Korea, has begun introducing social aid policies (first in 1995), but thus far the brunt of elderly care appears to fall on the younger generation, and especially the sons. In 2010, only 10% of the elderly (above age 60) in Vietnam received a pension, and only 20% of the labor force is currently registered in a state pension program.⁵⁵

Education

Education is another area in which differing preferences for males are more clearly expressed. On average, women in South Korea attain more education than their Vietnamese counterparts. As of 2010, only 24.7% of women in Vietnam had completed at least a secondary education, whereas in South Korea the corresponding number is 79%.⁵⁶ Women in Vietnam compose nearly two-thirds of

⁴⁷ Choe, “South Koreans Rethink.”

⁴⁸ Chico Harlan, 21 January 2014, “For South Korea's Seniors, A Return to Poverty as Confucian Filial Piety Weakens,” *The Washington Post*, at http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/for-south-koreas-seniors-a-return-to-poverty-as-confucian-filial-piety-weakens/2014/01/20/19769cf2-7b85-11e3-97d3-b9925ce2c57b_story.html

⁴⁹ CEDAW/C/KOR/6.

⁵⁰ CEDAW/C/KOR/5.

⁵¹ CEDAW, 2007, “Concluding comments: Republic of Korea,” *Thirty-ninth session*, CEDAW/C/KOR/CO/6.

⁵² Choe Sang-Hun, 16 February 2013, “As Families Change, Korea's Elderly Are Turning to Suicide,” *New York Times*, at <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/17/world/asia/in-korea-changes-in-society-and-family-dynamics-drive-rise-in-elderly-suicides.html?pagewanted=all>

⁵³ John Bryant, 2002, “Patriline, Patrilocality and Fertility Decline in Vietnam,” *Asia Pacific Population Journal* 17(2), p. 111-126.

⁵⁴ Bryant, “Patriline, Patrilocality.”

⁵⁵ Paulette Castel and Minna Hahn Tong, Vietnam - Developing a modern pension system: current challenges and options for future reform. Washington DC; World Bank, 2012.

⁵⁶ United Nations Human Development Program, 2010, *Gender Inequality Index*, at <http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/table-4-gender-inequality-index>

the country's illiterate population,⁵⁷ whereas illiteracy rates in South Korea are vanishingly small.

Both countries mandate free, compulsory education for both girls and boys. In 2000, South Korea specifically amended its Basic Education Act to promote gender equality.⁵⁸ Vietnam, although it makes education compulsory through 14 years of age for both sexes, does not have a similar law. Girls are expected to fall under the umbrella of the more general 1998 Law on Education, which reaffirms a constitutional right of all citizens to education.⁵⁹

One of the more immediate causes of inequitable female education in Vietnam appears to be poverty, especially in rural areas.⁶⁰ Although education is technically free, associated costs – including loss of labor within the family while a child is in school – means that families are often not able to educate all children.⁶¹ When choosing whether to send a son or daughter to school, families anticipate different rates of return on education for each – the persistent perception that girls will grow up and go on to “belong” to future husband's families reduces incentive for her family to allow her to go to school.⁶² Overall, surveys indicate that Vietnamese parents have educational aspirations for girls,⁶³ but when it comes to making difficult decisions on who gets to go to school, these choices are influenced by entrenched cultural attitudes that education is more important for boys than girls.⁶⁴ As a result, the female dropout rate in Vietnam is high.

On the whole, the South Korean government seems to have taken a more active interest in promoting gender parity in education. Women attain higher education at increasing rates – although fewer than one in ten women entered college in 1981, that number has risen to six in ten as of 2006. Since 2000, the government has continued to legislate to improve women's educational representation both as students and professors. A notable example includes the 2002 Act on Support for Women in Science and Technology, enacted in response to the clustering of female students in social sciences and education fields.⁶⁵ In 2003, the government introduced employment targets for female professors at national universities and provided a legal framework for affirmative action to employ women professors.⁶⁶

Overall, both countries have established a legal basis for the equal education of women. However, the governments have placed differing priorities on supporting these rights. In Vietnam, lax enforcement of compulsory education

⁵⁷ Asian Development Bank, 2002.

⁵⁸ CEDAW/C/KOR/5.

⁵⁹ United Nations, 2002, “Addendum to the Second Periodic Report,” *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights*, CCPR/C/VNM/2001/2/Add.1.

⁶⁰ Asian Development Bank, 2002.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ World Bank, 2012, *World Development Report 2012: Gender Equality and Development*. <http://go.worldbank.org/CQCTMSEI40>.

⁶⁴ World Values Survey, 1999-2004, Wave 4, OFFICIAL AGGREGATE v.20140429. World Values Survey Association (www.worldvaluessurvey.org). Aggregate File Producer: Asep/JDS, Madrid SPAIN

⁶⁵ CEDAW/C/KOR/6.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

allows educational disparities to persist. Vietnamese legislation shows little, if any, attention to this issue. In South Korea, however, policymakers devote continuous and vigorous attention to improving educational opportunities for women. The results are reflected in women's educational achievements, with predictable ripple effects in other areas of society.

Female Employment. In both countries, there are now no legal restrictions on the employment of women or the industries and hours they can work. Both countries have also enacted legislation tailored to the needs of working women, addressing maternity leave and family leave.⁶⁷ On paper, these rights seem like positive steps, but women still log many more hours of unpaid labor than men in both countries,⁶⁸ and still experience significant pay gaps in both countries. Knowledge and skills have a direct bearing on earning ability, of course – for example, women's capacity as agricultural workers is affected by their relative lack of certification and skills – but also by these pervasive stereotypes. For example, in Vietnam, the pay gap has been steadily decreasing since 1992,⁶⁹ but continues to exist in part because of women's lower levels of qualification as well as their inability to hold several positions simultaneously or log overtime because of family responsibilities.⁷⁰

The effects of patrilineal inheritance practices also continue to harm women in both countries, even though such practices are being rolled back in South Korea. For example, lack of landownership in both countries is an important factor in wage disparities for female agricultural workers. In Vietnam, women farmers earn only 73% of male farmers,⁷¹ although the wage gap overall is declining—according to the 2012 Labor Survey, men's monthly wages were 1.1 times that of women's, yielding a pay gap of 10.4%⁷². In South Korea, women are responsible for half of the country's agricultural production but they own only 26 percent of the country's farms.⁷³ Their average hourly wage is 68.8% that of men's.⁷⁴ Agricultural workers in both countries also often fall outside of the labor protections they might claim under urban employment.

One particularly notable divergence, however, is the two countries' differing retirement laws. In South Korea, the age of retirement for both men and women is 60.⁷⁵ In Vietnam, however, the age for men is 60, whereas women have mandatory

⁶⁷ CEDAW/C/VNM/3-4; CEDAW/C/KOR/6

⁶⁸ CEDAW/C/VNM/5-6; Asian Development Bank, 2002; Economist, 26 November 2011, "Female labour markets: The cashier and the carpenter," *Economist.com*, at <http://www.economist.com/node/21539932>

⁶⁹ CEDAW/C/VNM/3-4

⁷⁰ Asian Development Bank, 2002

⁷¹ CEDAW/C/VNM/5-6

⁷² GSO (General Statistics Office, Vietnam), Report on Labour Force Survey, 2012. Hanoi: Statistical Publishing House, 2013.

⁷³ CEDAW, Consideration of reports submitted by States parties under article 18 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Seventh periodic reports of States parties, Republic of Korea, 9 November 2010, CEDAW/C/KOR/7, ¶132.

⁷⁴ CEDAW, CEDAW/C/KOR/7, ¶90.

⁷⁵ CEDAW/C/KOR/6.

retirement at 55.⁷⁶ Ostensibly, this was done to give women more time to rest and fulfill their traditional obligations as caretakers. This impacts pension, of course – women’s pension is only 67% of their salary while a man’s pension is 71.43%.⁷⁷ But it also places women at a severe disadvantage for advancing within a career and women’s ability to independently secure an economic future. Moreover, it reinforces the notion that, for women, a career is always a secondary role.

Participation in Government. In terms of governance, both countries show a track record of improvement. The percentage of parliament seats held by women in South Korea has steadily increased, from 5.86% in 2000 to 15.7% in 2014.⁷⁸ South Korea has taken steps to improve this number by introducing a 50% quota in 2004 for women’s participation on political parties’ proportional representation lists⁷⁹ – an improvement over the 2000 quota of 30%.⁸⁰ In Vietnam, women’s parliamentary representation has held relatively steady between 24-26%.⁸¹

At the same time, Vietnam lacks a ministry of cabinet level specifically set aside for women’s issues, whereas South Korea has had a Ministry of Gender Equality and Family since 1998. South Korea has also established a Women’s Policy Coordination committee under the Prime Minister’s office to effectively promote gender equality policies.⁸² This difference could account for South Korea’s somewhat better record of government attention to gender issues.

In sum, then, while laws on the book in Vietnam and South Korea both appear to support gender equality, in practice there is a noticeable divergence between the two countries. We turn now to a more focused and in-depth process-tracing of change over time in the SRBs of the two nations.

The Tale of South Korea

“One son is worth 10 daughters.” (traditional saying)

“One daughter raised well is worth 10 sons.” (Korean government media campaign, 1978)

By 1990, South Korea’s SRB had climbed from a normal ratio just ten years earlier to an astonishing 116.5.⁸³ By 2007, it was back down to 106.2, well within the normal range. A 2010 survey reflects the startling change in preference for sons. 38% of expectant Korean mothers wanted a daughter, compared to 31 percent who

⁷⁶ CEDAW/C/VNM/3-4.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ United Nations, 2000, *Women Watch*, <http://www.un.org/womenwatch/>; Save the Children, 2014, *State of the World’s Mothers 2014*, at http://www.savethechildren.org/atf/cf/%7B9def2ebe-10ae-432c-9bd0-df91d2eba74a%7D/SOWM_2014.PDF.

⁷⁹ CEDAW/C/KOR/6

⁸⁰ CEDAW/C/KOR/5

⁸¹ World Bank, 2000, “Proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments,” *Indicators*, at <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SG.GEN.PARL.ZS>; Government of Vietnam, <http://www.chinhphu.vn/portal/page/portal/English>.

⁸² CEDAW/C/KOR/6.

⁸³ Source: KOSIS, Korea Statistical Database: Live Births by Age Group of Mother, Sex and Birth Order, 1981-2013, kosis.kr.

wanted a son.⁸⁴ One South Korean woman with three sons summed up the change in this manner: “When I tell people I have three sons and no daughter, they say they are sorry for my misfortune . . . Within a generation, I have turned from the luckiest woman possible to a pitiful mother.”⁸⁵ And indeed, the change arguably came within *less* than a generation. South Korea enjoys the distinction of being the only nation that has successfully normalized extremely skewed sex ratios at birth. Policymakers and scholars look to South Korea for clues concerning how to cope with abnormal sex ratios in other countries. Chung Woo-jin, a professor at Yonsei University in Seoul, is quoted as saying, “China and India are closely studying South Korea as a trendsetter in Asia. They are curious whether the same social and economic changes can occur in their countries as fast as they did in South Korea’s relatively small and densely populated society.”⁸⁶ The tale of South Korea’s SRBs is thus well worth telling in detail.

Many observers attribute the demise of South Korean son preference to economic development. But South Korea was getting rich while its SRB was getting worse: from 1970 to 2000, GDP per capita in South Korea increased exponentially from USD 299 to USD 22588.⁸⁷ In 1980, the SRB was 107, rising to 109.4 in 1985, peaking at 116.5 in 1990, dropping to 110.2 in 2000, and then declining to a normal ratio (106.2) by 2007.⁸⁸ It is only in the first years of the twenty-first century that South Korea’s SRB began to revert. The case of South Korea shows us that son preference clearly does not decline with a rise in per capita income—even a sustained and significant rise over three decades as seen in South Korea (or in China, or in India). To understand the reversion, we must move beyond wealth as an explanatory variable.

Son preference and sex selection in Korea has a long history. In his 1936 study of birth sex ratios throughout different parts of the globe, Russell found that the sex ratio of the 5.3 million registered births in Korea between 1921 and 1929 was 113.1.⁸⁹ This abnormally high sex ratio was likely due to under-registration of female births, but it may also reflect neglect of daughters in a culture that highly favoured sons. A desire for at least two sons meant that most Koreans had large families, but the introduction of a nation-wide fertility policy meant that son preference would become more obvious as family sizes dwindled. In 1961, concerned that the high fertility rate would impede development, the Korean government adopted a National Family Planning Program that promoted small families (ideally three children), offering economic incentives to women to use contraceptives to prevent unwanted pregnancies. In the 1970s, the Korea Institute

⁸⁴ William E. Hudson, 2012, *Global Issues: Selections from CQ Researcher*, CQ Press.

⁸⁵ Sang-Hun, “South Koreans Rethink Preference for Sons.”

⁸⁶ Ibid. . See also The Hindu, 24 December 2013. “Flawed Preference.” *Opinion/Editorial*. At <http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/editorial/flawed-preference/article5494314.ece>.

⁸⁷ United Nations Statistics Division “Per Capita GDP at Current Prices.” *Data*. At <https://data.un.org/Data.aspx?d=SNAAMA&f=grID%3A101%3BcurrID%3AUSD%3BpcFlag%3A1>.

⁸⁸ Ho Sik Min, 2007, “Son Preference and Fertility in China, South Korea, and the United States,” Ph.D. Dissertation Texas A&M University, at <http://repository.tamu.edu/bitstream/handle/1969.1/ETD-TAMU-1379/MIN-DISSERTATION.pdf?sequence=1>

⁸⁹ W.T. Russell, “Statistical Study of the Sex Ratio at Birth,” *Journal of Hygiene* 36, no. 3 (1936), p. 389.

of Health and Social Affairs, along with the Planned Parenthood Federation of Korea, promoted a two-child norm and by 1983 the fertility rate had dropped from 6.0 (1960s) to the below replacement level of 2.06.⁹⁰ In promoting two children as the ideal family size in 1970, the state attempted to reinforce the idea that sons and daughters were both desirable, as reflected in the slogan “Daughter or Son, Stop at Two and Raise Well”.⁹¹ Despite government attempts to equate the value of sons with daughters, having a son was seen as so vital that 50% of women (68% of rural women) surveyed in 1971 indicated that failure to have a son was a sufficient reason for a husband to have a child with another woman.⁹²

At first glance, the promotion of the two-child norm in South Korea did not seem to affect the overall birth sex ratio. The 1974 Korean National Fertility survey, which included data on over 18,000 live births, recorded an SRB of 106.5, but when disaggregated by family size, this normal sex ratio reveals a surprising relationship between the overall number of children and the sex ratio of offspring: the sex ratio for families with three or less children was 126.4 compared to a sex ratio of 99.3 for families with four or more children.⁹³ As Park demonstrates in his analysis of the survey, the sex distribution and number of offspring depends greatly on the sex of the first and second born children—if the first two children are girls, families will continue to have more children, whereas if the first two children are boys, families are more likely to stop having children, thus smaller sized families are skewed in favor of male births overall.⁹⁴ Fertility surveys suggested that in the 1970s, the ideal composition of offspring was two sons and one daughter.⁹⁵ There is also evidence of daughter discrimination resulting in higher than expected mortality rates for female infants and children the 1960s and 1970s: mortality statistics from 1960-1979 demonstrate that female children died at a higher rate than males, with almost twice as many females dying as male children aged 1-4 in the period from 1978-1979.⁹⁶

The first slightly above normal national birth sex ratio recorded in South Korean censuses occurred in 1975, when a birth sex ratio of 108.1 was reported, which was much higher than the 106.5 reported in the 1970 census.⁹⁷ Annual birth statistics reveal near normal birth sex ratios until 1984, when the sex ratio reached 108.7 and continued to climb each year thereafter. Family planning programs throughout the 1980s and early 1990s promoted even smaller families using the slogan “Even two children for a family is too many for over-crowded Korea,” and it

⁹⁰ Sam-Sik Lee, “Low fertility and policy responses in Korea,” *The Japanese Journal of Population* 7, no. 1 (2009), p. 57.

⁹¹ Jae-Mo Yang, “Family Planning Program in Korea,” *Yonsei Medical Journal* 18, no. 1 (1977): 64-74, p. 68.

⁹² Yang, “Family Planning Program in Korea,” p. 72.

⁹³ Chai Bin Park, “Preference for Sons, Family Size, and Sex Ratio: An Empirical Study in Korea,” *Demography* 20, no. 3 (1983): 336.

⁹⁴ Park, “Preference for Sons,” pp. 338-340.

⁹⁵ Park, “Preference for Sons,” p. 340.


⁹⁶ The ratio of male/female deaths was 0.53 during that period. See Daniel Goodkind, “On Substituting Sex Preference Strategies in East Asia: Does Prenatal Sex Selection Reduce Postnatal Discrimination?” *Population and Development Review* 22, no. 1 (1996), p. 117.

⁹⁷ Park, “Preference for Sons,” p. 350. The age 0 sex ratio in 1966 was slightly high at 107.5, but the birth sex ratios for 1955 and 1960 were below 106.

is during this period that the sex ratio rose to its peak of 116.5 in 1990.⁹⁸ The ratio of male to female infant and child deaths was at, or near, normal levels by 1990, suggesting that parents were substituting prenatal sex determination for previous practices of daughter discrimination that resulted in higher mortality for female infants and children.

As suggested above, Korea's national birth sex ratio hides variation according to birth order. As Figure 2 demonstrates, parents do manipulate the sex of higher parity births in order to achieve their desired family composition.

Figure 2: Sex Ratio at Birth by Birth Order, 1981-2013, South Korea




Source: KOSIS, Korea Statistical Database: Live Births by Age Group of Mother, Sex and Birth Order, 1981-2013, kosis.kr.

A closer look at the sex ratios for the first two births demonstrates that there are also considerable differences between the sex ratios at first and second birth orders, as shown in Figure 3.

⁹⁸ Korea: KOSIS, Korea Statistical Database: Live Births by Age Group of Mother, Sex and Birth Order, 1981-2013.

Figure 3: Sex Ratio at Birth for Total, First and Second Births, 1981-2013, Korea



Source: KOSIS, Korea Statistical Database: Live Births by Age Group of Mother, Sex and Birth Order, 1981-2013, kosis.kr.

With the exception of the births in 1990, the sex ratio for first births was always within or near the normal range, suggesting that parents do not attempt to control the sex of offspring with first births. Second and higher order births, however, are skewed towards sons. First and second births have had normal sex ratios since 2006, but the sex ratio of third and higher order births was still skewed in 2012. The small number of higher order births, however, means that the overall birth sex ratio is not affected.

These national birth sex ratios hide further variations as well. The overall birth sex ratio in Korea is now 105.3 (2013 figure), and national birth sex ratios have been within the expected 104-107 range since 2007. Does this figure mask high birth sex ratios within parts of the country? An examination of the juvenile population from the 2010 census affirms that the sex ratio for the population aged 0-4 is within a normal range for all major cities and all provinces. The higher sex ratio from 2000-2005 manifests itself in the higher than expected sex ratio of 108.0 for the nation and in some cities and provinces: South Eastern provinces of North and South Gyeongsang, with the nearby cities of Ulsan and Daegu, all have 5-9 sex ratios between 110 and 111.9.⁹⁹ The gender bias in juvenile sex ratios is less pronounced than it was twenty years ago, when the birth sex ratio peaked at 116.5

⁹⁹ Korea National Statistics Office, Summary of Census Population (By administrative district/sex/age), 2010, at kosis.kr.

and the average sex ratio for children aged 0-4 was 111.2. The sex ratios of some provinces remained at normal levels as demonstrated by the juvenile sex ratios found in Table 3.

Table 3: 0-4 Sex Ratio by Administrative Region, South Korea, 1990

Administrative division	1990 Age 0-4 Sex ratio
Whole country	111.2
Seoul	110.2
Busan	111.6
Daegu	125.2
Incheon	107.4
Gwangju	108.0
Daejeon	115.4
Gyeonggi-do	108.0
Gangwon-do	107.5
Chungcheongbuk-do	111.1
Chungcheongnam-do	109.2
Jeollabuk-do (North Jeolla)	106.6
Jeollanam-do (South Jeolla)	107.5
Gyeongsangbuk-do (North Gyeongsang)	121.7
Gyeongsangnam-do (South Gyeongsang)	115.2
Jeju-do	111.0

Source: KNSO, Summary of Census Population (By administrative district/sex/age), 1990, at kosis.kr.

In 1990, the South Western provinces of North and South Jeolla had 0-4 sex ratios of 106.6 and 107.5, but the neighbouring provinces of North and South Gyeongsang had 0-4 sex ratios of 121.7 and 115.2.¹⁰⁰ Chun and Das Gupta explain that this region in the Southeast is known for its conservative and patriarchal attitudes and has long exhibited stronger son preference than other parts of Korea.¹⁰¹ The higher sex ratios cannot be explained by a difference in access to ultrasound machines and prenatal sex determination, rather, according to Chun and Das Gupta, the explanation seems to lie in the strength of traditional values associated with Confucianism.¹⁰²

Although few Koreans would refer to themselves as Confucianists (only .22% of the population identified themselves as followers of Confucianism in the 2005 Census),¹⁰³ Confucian beliefs are strongest in areas dominated by Buddhists, rather than strongholds of the Protestant and Catholic Churches. According to the 2005 Population Census, 53% of Koreans define themselves as having a religion, and of

¹⁰⁰ Korea National Statistics Office, Summary of Census Population (By administrative district/sex/age), 1990, at kosis.kr.

¹⁰¹ Heeran Chun, and Monica Das Gupta, "Gender Discrimination in Sex Selective Abortions and its Transition in South Korea," *Women's Studies International Forum*, 32, no. 2 (2009): 89-97.

¹⁰² Chun and Das Gupta, "Gender Discrimination," p. 91.

¹⁰³ Korea National Statistics Office, Population by Sex, Age and Religion, 2005, at kosis.kr.

these 55% are Christian (Protestant and Catholic) and 43% are Buddhist.¹⁰⁴ There are some regional variations for the three dominant religions, and given the closer association between Buddhism and Confucianism (with its emphasis on patrilineal emphasis on filial piety and ancestor worship), it is not surprising to observe that Buddhism is most dominant in the southeastern provinces of North and South Gyeongsang (an area that includes the cities of Daegu and Busan) where the birth and juvenile sex ratios are the highest in the nation.

Table 4: Juvenile Sex Ratios and Religion by Region, Korea, 1995

	%Buddhist	%Protestant	%Catholic	1990 0-4 SR
Whole country	23.2	19.7	6.6	111.2
Seoul	18.4	26.2	8.7	110.2
Busan	38.2	11.1	4.7	111.6
Daegu	33.2	11.6	6.8	125.2
Incheon	14.6	25.8	9.0	107.4
Gwangju	15.3	21.7	9.1	108.0
Daejeon	23.2	21.1	6.6	115.4
Gyeonggi-do	18.5	23.7	7.7	108.0
Gangwon-do	23.2	16.2	5.1	107.5
Chungcheongbuk-do	23.5	15.2	6.2	111.1
Chungcheongnam-do	19.9	19.1	4.7	109.2
Jeollabuk-do	12.2	26.4	6.0	106.6
Jeollanam-do	13.6	20.4	4.3	107.5
Gyeongsangbuk-do	31.0	12.3	3.9	121.7
Gyeongsangnam-do	36.3	9.1	3.6	115.2
Jeju-do	33.6	8.4	6.2	111.0

Source: (Religions): Korea National Statistics Office, Population by Sex, Age and Religion, 1995, at kosis.kr; 0-4 SR from Korea National Statistics Office, Population by Sex, Age and Religion, 1995, at kosis.kr.

In their regression analyses of the effect of religion and socioeconomic factors on the sex ratio at birth in Korea in 1994 and 2000, Kim and Song found that at a regional level, religion, and not socioeconomic conditions, had a significant effect on the sex ratio at birth. The presence of religion, measured as the number of Protestant churches and Buddhist temples, had an effect on the sex ratio for second and higher order births: the presence of Protestant churches had a negative effect on the sex ratio for second and higher order births whereas the presence of Buddhist temples had a positive effect.¹⁰⁵ Kim and Song suggest that whereas Protestantism is strongly opposed to abortion and ancestor worship, Buddhism has a more ambiguous outlook on abortion and strongly supports ancestor worship,

¹⁰⁴ 23% of the total population is Buddhist, 18% is Protestant, and 11% is Catholic, according to the Census. Korea National Statistics Office, Population by Sex, Age and Religion, 2005, at kosis.kr.

¹⁰⁵ Kim, Doo-Sub, and Yoo-Jean Song, "Does religion matter? A study of regional variations in sex ratio at birth in Korea." In Isabelle Attané and Christophe Z. Guilmoto, eds., *Watering the Neighbour's Garden: The Growing Demographic Female Deficit in Asia*, Paris, 2007, pp. 183-203.

thus making it more likely that Buddhist families would exhibit strong son preference and perhaps be willing to use technology to achieve male offspring.

Are there other factors which might also explain the regional differences observed in these south eastern provinces in Korea? An examination of regional levels of women's economic participation and education yields mixed results. The highest level of women with no education and the highest level of elementary school education only are both found in South Jeolla province (Jeollanam-do), where the sex ratios were not above normal ranges even in 1990, when the rest of the nation exhibited very high sex ratios.¹⁰⁶ North Jeolla is the only province with a lower than average economic participation rate for women, and the sex ratios here were also not above normal range. The South Korean case makes plain that neither women's education nor employment seems to have a significant effect on the sex ratio.¹⁰⁷

Whatever the ultimate cause of son preference, the rise in birth sex ratios can be attributed to the widespread practice of induced abortion. While abortion is illegal in South Korea except in limited cases, we have already noted that the abortion rate is quite high and there appears to be no enforcement of the ban. However, in sketching the timeline of important developments, one is the South Korean government's early prohibition of prenatal sex identification, which was banned in 1987 (the birth sex ratio had reached 112.3 in 1986) and effected in 1988.¹⁰⁸ While lax on abortion law, the government did attempt to enforce the 1988 ban: in 1991, the licenses of eight physicians were suspended for performing sex identification with subsequent abortion.¹⁰⁹ The government strengthened the law in 1994, applying further pressure on the medical community to ban the use of ultrasound machines or other technologies used to determine the sex of a fetus. Medical professionals risked fines, imprisonment, and even loss of their medical license for performing prenatal sex determination.¹¹⁰

Kim explains that prenatal screening technologies became widely available in urban and rural areas in South Korea in the mid-1980s; despite the penalties for violating the law against sex determination and sex selective abortions, South

¹⁰⁶ The 0-4 sex ratio in 1990 for North Jeolla was 106.6, which is within the normal range. KNSO, Korea National Statistical Office, Population by Sex, Age, Marital Status and Educational Attainment (15 years old and over), 2010, <http://kostat.co.kr>.

¹⁰⁷ The type of women's employment could have an effect (i.e. manual labor vs. professional employment), but this information was not available by region. KNSO, Economically active population by gender, age group and educational attainment, 2010, at http://kosis.kr/statHtml/statHtml.do?orgId=101&tblId=DT_1ES2B03&language=en&conn_path=I3.

¹⁰⁸ In-Soo Nam, 1 July 2013, "South Korean Women Get Even, At Least in Number," *Wall Street Journal*, at <http://blogs.wsj.com/korearealtime/2013/07/01/south-korean-females-get-even-at-least-in-number/>. It should be noted that in 2009, the ban was eased so that after 32 weeks, prenatal sex identification is permitted.

¹⁰⁹ Kate Gilles and Charlotte Feldman-Jacobs, 2012, "When Technology and Tradition Collide: From Gender Bias to Sex Selection," *Population Reference Bureau Policy Brief*, at <http://www.prb.org/pdf12/gender-bias-sex-selection.pdf>, Box 2.

¹¹⁰ Bela Ganatra, "Maintaining access to safe abortion and reducing sex ratio imbalances in Asia," *Reproductive Health Matters* 16, no. 31 (2008): 90-98.

Koreans continue to select for sons.¹¹¹ The 1991 National Fertility and Family Health Survey found that women had a very permissive attitude towards induced abortion and reported that 32% of women approved of aborting a fetus because of its sex.¹¹² Given that the sex ratio at birth remained at high levels until 2006-2007, it would seem that the fetal sex identification ban did not have a significant effect on the behavior of expectant mothers, though we cannot say if it had an effect on the willingness of physicians to identify fetal sex. (Fetal sex identification was widely available outside of physician's formal offices.)

But something even more momentous happened after the ban on physician fetal sex identification was put in place. In 1989 (and effected beginning in 1991), the first wave of revision to Korean family law began, stemming from lawsuits invoking the Korean Constitution's provision that "Marriage and family life shall be entered into and sustained on the basis of individual dignity and equality of the sexes, and the State shall do everything in its power to achieve that goal."¹¹³ Before this change, as we noted in the introductory section, South Korea's family law revolved around its traditional patrilineal clans (*hoju*) and their interests. Women were not considered full members with equal rights in their birth clan (and they are removed from their birth family's clan register upon marriage), and they were not considered members of their husband's clan at all. Furthermore, the husband could determine unilaterally where the married couple would live, ensuring patrilocality could be practiced. In a sense, then, women were "homeless." As is typical in patrilineal societies, resources were kept fairly strictly within the male line. In 1977, women were granted their first rights of inheritance, but they were still fairly unequal in nature. Daughters only received 25% of the inheritance that their brothers received, fathers had complete child custody rights in divorce, and division of assets after divorce was highly unequal favoring men. The revisions that came in 1991 were therefore stunning: the law asserted that a married couple's domicile had to be decided jointly; it provided that the wife's name would be entered into her husband's family register (*hojeok*; and his could be entered into her family's if he so chose); there would no longer be an automatic paternal right to child custody; and the inheritance shares of daughters and sons would be equal.

While the 1991 revisions struck at the taproot of patrilineality, it is also true that Korean scholars have determined that it took several years for people, especially in rural areas, to become aware that the law had changed. A study in 1994 found continued ignorance, even among women.¹¹⁴ But the changes kept

¹¹¹ In 1990, for example, there were an estimated 422,000 abortions, which means that 40% of all pregnancies that year were terminated by abortion. See Doo-Sub Kim, 2004, "Le déficit de filles en Corée du Sud : évolution, niveaux et variations régionales," *Population*, 59, no. 6: 983-997.

¹¹² Choe, Minja Kim, and Kyung Ae Park. "Fertility decline in South Korea: Forty years of policy-behavior dialogue," *Korea Journal of Population Studies* 29, no. 2 (2006): 1-26.

¹¹³ Article 36(1); See also Mi-Kyung Cho, "Recent Reform of Korean Family Law," Conference Paper, Ajou University, Korea, at <http://www.law2.byu.edu/isfl/saltlakeconference/papers/isflpdfs/CHO.pdf>.

¹¹⁴ Rosa Kim, 1994, "The Legacy of Institutionalized Gender Inequality in South Korea: The Family Law," *Boston College Third World Law Journal* 14(1), at <http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1269&context=twlj>.

coming. In 1998, Korean courts for the first time ruled that a child could acquire Korean nationality through its maternal line. Previously, only the paternal line could bestow citizenship rights.¹¹⁵

The coup de grace against patrilineality, however, occurred with another revision of the family law code in 2005 (effected in 2008). The Constitutional Court in Korea declared that the *hoju* system itself was unconstitutional because it violated the constitutional right to gender equality. In its place would be a new system of family registration, instead of the *hojeok*. Every family member would now have his or her own individual record book. In addition, children could use the mother's surname if both parents agreed, and take the surname of a stepfather even without agreement of the biological father. Children of unmarried mothers would be permitted to have their mother's surname. Stepchildren and adopted children would now have full legal and inheritance rights.

As patrilineality was significantly undermined, so, too, was patrilocality. And as patrilocality is undermined, the expectation that one's son(s) will provide old-age support withers, as well. As Korean scholar Sung Yong Lee explains "Since sons and daughters inherit equally [now], parents cannot expect their sons and not their daughters to support them. But since they [still] do not expect their daughters to support them, they now do not expect either their sons or daughters to support them."¹¹⁶ Several key changes have been taking place simultaneously within Korea— attitudes regarding the responsibility for caring for the elderly have been changing rapidly as the role of sons in caring for his parents is replaced by the state and by the elderly themselves, and the tradition of the multi-generation household has given way to the nuclear household. In 1980, 80% of the elderly lived with one of their children, but this has decreased significantly over the years.¹¹⁷ In 1990, 49.6% of those aged 65 and over were living in households with more than three generations, dropping to 30.8% in 2000.¹¹⁸ In rural areas, where multi-generational households were once common, a 2012 survey recorded that only 20.9% lived with their offspring.¹¹⁹ The decline in the multigenerational household has been offset by investment in child care centres, making it possible for women to work after childbirth, even in the absence of grandparents to look after the grandchildren. In 1991, the government promulgated the Child Care Act, aimed at increasing the provision of early childhood education and care, making it easier for women to continue working after childbirth. As a result of increased financial support for early

¹¹⁵ Pil-what Chang and Eun-shil Kim, 2005, *Women's Experiences and Feminist Practices in South Korea*, Ewha Womans University Press.

¹¹⁶ Sung Yong Lee, 2013, "How did Son-Preference Disappear in Korea? Based on the Perspective of the Value of Children," *Paper presented at The Sociology of Population Side Meeting Program*, Busan, South Korea.

¹¹⁷ Erin Hye-Won Kim, and Philip J. Cook, "The continuing importance of children in relieving elder poverty: evidence from Korea," *Ageing and Society* 31, no. 06 (2011): 953-976.

¹¹⁸ Statistics Korea, *2005 Statistics on the Aged*, 21 October 2005, at www.kostat.go.kr.

¹¹⁹ Statistics Korea, *2012 Statistics on the Aged*, 27 September 2012, at www.kostat.go.kr.

childhood education, the number of childcare centres increased from 1919 in 1990 to 29,823 in 2007.¹²⁰

Urbanisation has also contributed to rapidly changing attitudes towards caring for elderly parents, both from the perspective of the children and from the parents. As Chung and Das Gupta note, the fact that Korea is now predominantly urban (80%) has changed traditional patrilineal and patrilocal practices. Daughters no longer marry exogamously and are just as likely as sons to live near their parents and contribute to their economic support, thus weakening the pattern of eldest sons caring for their parents and reducing the gap between the value of daughters and sons.¹²¹ Urban assets are also transferred more easily to both sons and daughters than rural land, which further affects the valuation of daughters. Urban life also makes it possible for the elderly to work longer and save for their retirement through pensions. In 2006, 67% of those aged 65 and over believed that it was the responsibility of family members to take care of the elderly, but that figure had dropped to 38% in 2010—the majority of elderly parents are now working to higher ages and have plans in place to ensure their economic well being after retirement.¹²² According to a 2014 nationwide Social Survey, 50.2% of elderly parents are now supporting themselves and only 10.1% are supported by the eldest son (in comparison with 46.3% self-support and 22.7% eldest son support in 2002).¹²³ A further change concerns the growth of the care for the elderly as a new economic initiative within the public and private sector. The Korean government has been investing in long-term care facilities for the elderly since 2003. At that time, there were only 230 nursing homes (16,455 beds), but by 2008 the number of nursing homes had quadrupled.¹²⁴ Within a generation, the mode of family life has drastically changed within South Korea.

This undermining of parental expectation that sons would support them could not have taken place without the concomitant decision of the South Korean government to provide old-age insurance. Whether they have done so meaningfully is another question, however, as we previously noted, and is a source of continuing tensions within South Korean society. The law denies public pension funds to people whose children are considered capable of supporting them. In 2013, only 37.6% of the elderly population received a state pension.¹²⁵ Increasing poverty and suicide rates among the elderly have become a grave concern.¹²⁶

¹²⁰ Ito Peng, "The good, the bad and the confusing: the political economy of social care expansion in South Korea," *Development and Change* 42, no. 4 (2011): 912.

¹²¹ Chung, Woojin, and Monica Das Gupta. "The decline of son preference in South Korea: The roles of development and public policy," *Population and Development Review* 33, no. 4 (2007): 757-783.

¹²² Statistics Korea, *2011 Statistics on the Aged*, 29 September 2011, at www.kostat.go.kr.

¹²³ Statistics Korea, Summary Results of *2014 Social Survey*, 27 November 2014; 2002 statistics are recorded in the 2008 *Social Survey (Health and Family)*, 9 December 2008, at www.kostat.go.kr.

¹²⁴ Jin Wook Kim and Young Jun Choi, "Farewell to old legacies? The introduction of long-term care insurance in South Korea," *Ageing and Society* 33, no. 05 (2013), p. 878.

¹²⁵ South Korea, *Statistics on the Aged 2014*, 29 September 2014, at www.kostat.go.kr.

¹²⁶ Sang-Hun, "As Families Change."

The pension system of South Korea deserves further explication.¹²⁷ In 1960, civil servants gained a pension system, and in 1963 military pensions were separated out from these. In 1975, primary school teachers gained a pension, as well. It was not until 1988 that a national pension scheme was put into place, in principle covering the majority of the labor force. At first it covered only companies with at least 10 employees, then in 1992 was extended to those with only 5 employees. However, in 1994, an individual pension was introduced, allowing rural residents to be included individually in 1995, and then in 1999, urban workers were folded in, as well. There were further extensions in 2005, but the major change came in 2007, when a “national basic livelihood security scheme” for those in poverty and a “Basic Old Age Pension” for the elderly were created. The Basic Old Age Pension is, however, means-tested—not only one’s own means, but the means of one’s children factor into the provision of this pension, as we have seen. The IMF notes that while pensions cover over 82% of the 65-and-older population in 2011, the poverty rate of the elderly in 2008 was 45.1%, highest among all the OECD countries. The percent of income support received by the elderly as transfers was 54.8% in 1990, dropping to 44.7% in 2008.

Another interesting factor in the South Korean case is what has not changed in terms of gendered expectations. More specifically, Korean scholar Sung Yong Lee notes that the marriage cost for a groom’s family is still three times that incurred by the bride’s family, since the groom’s is supposed to procure housing for the new couple. This is clearly a legacy of patrilocality, but the custom is no longer supported by the rest of the patrilineal social structure that made such a large investment rational. Indeed, Sung Yong Lee argues that the normalization of South Korea’s sex ratios did not come about because the value of daughters has increased in that nation. Rather, he argues that it is explicitly the value of *sons* that has decreased so dramatically in the course of a very few years. Not only is it the case that one can no longer expect a son to provide for a parent in their old age, but at the same time, parents are currently still required by custom to expend much more money to assure a son’s place in life.¹²⁸

In sum, we see several critical factors at work in the South Korean case:

- enforcement of a ban on physician-provided prenatal sex identification, despite abortion being easily available
- an effective legal attack on patrilineality, dismantling its core structures, including those buttressing patrilocality
- the provision of some form of old-age insurance to the bulk of the population, providing a substitute for the need to have a son to provide elder support
- the absence of fertility control policies, even though TFR dropped significantly during the same time period
- urbanization and the decline of rural land as inheritance has also changed the relative values of sons and daughters as parents are able to transfer goods to and receive goods from both sexes on an equal basis. Without a greater male

¹²⁷ The material in this paragraph draws upon Seong Sook Kim, 2013, “Pension Reform Options in Korea,” *IMF.org*, https://www.imf.org/external/np/seminars/eng/2013/oapfad/pdf/kim_ppr.pdf

¹²⁸ Sung Yong Lee, “How did Son-Preference Disappear in Korea?” 2013.

right to inheritance, parents no longer expect sons and not daughters to support them in old age.

The case of South Korea is an important one, for as Goodkind stated in 1999, "South Korea is well noted for having the strongest son preference in the world." If it is possible for South Korea to revert to normal SRBs, it may be possible in other countries, as well. We will take up that discussion in the concluding section of the paper.

The Tale of Vietnam

"With one son you have a descendant, with 10 daughters you have nothing."
(Traditional Vietnamese saying)¹²⁹

Vietnam's tale is quite different from that of South Korea. Given that it shares the same foundation of strong son preference (particularly in the north) with South Korea, the first half of the Vietnamese puzzle is why it took so long for son preference to turn into enactment. As Guilmoto *et al* note, Vietnam had a patriarchal system, staunch son preference, trends of demographic and economic modernization, strong family planning regulations and easy access to abortion, all in the context of a fairly homogeneous society.¹³⁰ And yet it was not until 2002 that the SRBs of Vietnam began to become abnormal—precisely the time period when South Korea's SRBs were strongly reverting to normal. The second puzzle of Vietnam is that the velocity with which the SRBs of Vietnam have become abnormal is arguably greater than any other country has yet experienced. There is scant literature addressing either of these two Vietnamese sex ratio puzzles. Some historical process-tracing will be helpful in understanding Vietnam's unusual trajectory.

When the socialist state of Vietnam was established in 1954, the government introduced laws to transform gender relations through a new legal, economic, and political system.¹³¹ Indeed, some suggest, "Vietnam is something of a regional leader when it comes to gender equality."¹³² Despite positive changes to marriage practices (e.g., banning polygamy and encouraging later marriages), improved health and education for women, and enhanced employment opportunities for women, nevertheless gender disparities remained and the desire for sons continued strong in this predominantly rural state. (Interestingly, during the late 1980s and early 1990s, there was actually a dearth of young men of marriageable age due to the

¹²⁹ Thanh Nien News, 6 August 2010, "The Boy Boom," *TN.News*, at <http://www.thanhniennews.com/society/the-boy-boom-15416.html>.

¹³⁰ Guilmoto, Christophe Z., Xuyên Hoàng, and Toan Ngo Van, "Recent increase in sex ratio at birth in Viet Nam," *PLoS One* 4, no. 2 (2009): e4624.

¹³¹ Danièle Bélanger, "Son preference in a rural village in North Vietnam." *Studies in Family Planning* 33, no. 4 (2002): 322.

¹³² Helen Clark, 2012, "Vietnam: Sex Selection Skews Sex Ratio," *IPS*, at <http://www.ips.org/mdg3/vietnam-sex-selection-skews-sex-ratio/>.

legacy of the Vietnam War and outmigration, with 86 marriage-age men per 100 marriage-age women recorded in 1989, and 93:100 in 1999.¹³³)

In addition, the Vietnamese government's policies of renovation (*doi moi*) in the mid-1980s to transform the state planned economy into a market economy also had detrimental effects on women through job losses and through the reinforcement of the relationship between land and kinship through the transfer of land to families following de-collectivization.¹³⁴ It is worth remembering from Table 1 that 68.3% of Vietnam's population is classified as rural.

Vietnam became a party to the UN women's rights convention (CEDAW) in 1980 and has made some progress towards reducing discrimination against women. For example, the census of 2009 reports higher levels of enrollment for girls versus boys at the secondary and tertiary levels.¹³⁵ Nonetheless, as the state comments in its 2013 report to the CEDAW Committee, "the concept of 'discrimination against women' in specific areas of social life has not been inclusively applied in specific areas of social life and not been fully applied in the making and enforcement of law to ensure the implementation of this concept in reality."¹³⁶

Despite efforts to improve gender equality in the state, son preference remains strong throughout most of the country, especially in the north where the original Kinh migrants first settled.¹³⁷ The need to have a son is linked to the

¹³³ Nobuko Mizoguchi, 2010, "The Consequences of the Vietnam War on the Vietnamese Population," Ph.D Dissertation University of California Berkely, at <https://escholarship.org/uc/item/0sh7j7s9#page-3>

¹³⁴ Bélanger, "Son preference in a rural village," p. 323.

¹³⁵ Daniele Belanger, Thi Ngoc Lan Nguyen, and Thi Thuy Oanh Nguyen, 2012, "Closing the Gender Gap in Vietnam: An Analysis Based on the Vietnam Censuses," *Observatoire démographique et statistique de l'espace francophone*, at https://www.odsef.fss.ulaval.ca/sites/odsef.fss.ulaval.ca/files/odsef_english_version.pdf

¹³⁶ CEDAW, Consideration of reports submitted by States parties under article 18 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Seventh and Eighth Periodic Report of State Parties Due in 2011: Viet Nam, CEDAW/C/VNM/7-8, 13 December 2014, ¶ 23.

¹³⁷ The Kinh comprise about 89% of the nation's population (see See United Nations Population Fund, 2009, *Factsheet on Ethnic Groups in Viet Nam: Evidence from the 2009 Census*, at http://un.org.vn/en/publications/doc_details/329-factsheet-on-ethnic-groups-in-viet-nam-evidence-from-the-2009-census.html). Of them, Guilmoto notes, The Kinh originated from the northern plains and delta regions, and they progressively expanded southward from the eleventh to the eighteenth century, absorbing local populations of Chamic and Khmer origins. Uxorilocal residence (in which a married couple lives with or near the wife's parents), on the other hand, is a common feature in the south and constitutes one of the typical traits of its bilateral system. The Mekong River Delta has the largest proportions of families with coresiding married children. But of greater interest here is the share of daughters among coresiding married children: their proportion varies across regions from 12 percent to 41 percent and is twice as large in the south as in the north . . . we do not know whether the relatively woman-friendly attitudes and policies found in parts of Vietnam will be able to withstand the gradual socioeconomic homogenization of Vietnam's population. The fact that prenatal sex selection can also be detected in the largest metropolitan areas such as Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City suggests that rapid social transformations and the growing employment opportunities for women have not yet substantially eroded traditional gender arrangements." In a related publication, Guilmoto attempts to operationalize degree of patrilineality across the regions of Vietnam by examining % of those heads of households aged 40 and above living with married children and also more specifically with married daughters. This exercise, which the author admits may have reliability problems, yielded mixed results. (Christophe Z. Guilmoto, "Sex

patrilineal kinship system that is prevalent in Vietnam, as in other parts of Asia. Eldest sons inherit the family land and the family home, and are responsible for performing rites on behalf of their dead ancestors, a practice denied to women. One commentator notes, "In nearly every Vietnamese house there is a shrine dedicated to the family line, but it is the job of sons, not daughters, to worship there. When a woman marries it is assumed she will worship her husband's family because according to custom the spirits of her own ancestors cannot enter the house at the same time as those of her husband."¹³⁸ Sons are also assigned greater economic value due to patrilocal practices of the eldest son continuing to live in the natal home and caring for parents in old age. As Nguyen Dan Anh of the Vietnam Academy of Social Sciences expressed it, "If you don't have a son, you are considered finished. You don't have happiness or luck in your life."¹³⁹

In her work in rural north Vietnam, Danièle Bélanger found that one of the primary reasons for valuing sons more than daughters concerned the effect that having a son had on the family's status and legitimacy within the community.¹⁴⁰ Women who marry a first son are under the greatest pressure to have male offspring to continue the family line, but all women experience at least some pressure to have a son from their extended family as well as from others within the community. In the villages where Bélanger conducted her research, bearing a son was viewed as insurance against polygamy, divorce, and even domestic violence.¹⁴¹ Because all homes have ancestral altars at which rituals on behalf of dead ancestors are regularly performed, sons are seen as essential. In the absence of a son, the responsibility of performing these rituals (and with it the family home and land) will usually be transferred to a nephew or similar male member of the family, but not to a daughter.¹⁴² Bélanger concludes that "son's religious value is unquestionable, and daughters cannot compete with their brothers on this front. Girls hold no intrinsic honor or symbolic value."¹⁴³ In a survey of Vietnamese men in 2012, 70.7% of respondents expressed that a reason to have a boy was for "lineage;" another 51% said old age support; and 49% said "ancestor worship." At the same time, 75% of respondents said there would be a dearth of marriageable girls due to sex-selective abortion in their country.¹⁴⁴

Although women comprise a significant proportion of the labor force in Vietnam, particularly in areas of agriculture and manufacturing (52% of those employed in both of these areas are women) as well as in health and education

selection, son preference, and kinship structures in Viet Nam," Centre Population & Développement, February 2012, at www.ceped.org/wp)

<http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1728-4457.2012.00471.x/abstract>

¹³⁸ Marianne Brown, 14 February 2012, "Vietnam's Parents Want a Dragon Son," *The Guardian*, at <http://www.theguardian.com/society/2012/feb/14/vietnam-gender-birth-ratio-inequality>

¹³⁹ Clark, "Sex Selection Skews Sex Ratio"

¹⁴⁰ Bélanger, "Son preference in a rural village," pp. 326-327.

¹⁴¹ Bélanger, "Son preference in a rural village," p. 327.

¹⁴² Bélanger, "Son preference in a rural village," pp. 328-329.

¹⁴³ Bélanger, "Son preference in a rural village," p. 329.

¹⁴⁴ United Nations Population Fund, 2012, *Study on Gender, Masculinity and Son Preference in Nepal and Vietnam*, at http://un.org.vn/en/publications/doc_details/333-study-on-gender-masculinity-and-son-preference-in-nepal-and-vietnam.html.

(61% and 70% respectively), their income does not usually benefit the natal family.¹⁴⁵ In her study, Bélanger found that daughters often made significant financial contributions to their parents or siblings, but these were not openly acknowledged and often had to be made through brothers or in secret.¹⁴⁶

Although women can legally inherit land, and the 2003 revision to the Land Law stated that land is to be shared by both the husband and wife, both of whose names should be on the land title, in practice as of 2008, only 10.9% of agricultural land, included both names, and the rates of joint titling for residential land in rural and urban areas were 18.2% and 29.8% respectively.¹⁴⁷ Furthermore, in a 2012 survey performed under UN auspices, only 37% of men surveyed professed knowledge of women's legal right to equal inheritance.¹⁴⁸ Indeed, anthropologist Tine Gammeltoft has opined, "As regards gender inequality, a lot could be done too – but again, the political will is not there. For instance, it is a huge problem that only sons inherit their parents' property and daughters get very little – if this was changed, the gender landscape in Vietnam would change dramatically."¹⁴⁹

Vietnam lacks a Civil Registration System to record births, thus birth sex ratios must be derived from census data or other population surveys. According to the 2014 Inter-Censal Population and Housing Survey, Vietnam has a population of 90.5 million, 33% of which live in urban areas, a total fertility rate of 2.09 and the SRB was 112 (113 for rural areas and 111 for urban areas).¹⁵⁰

Concerned with a high fertility rate (6.3), a large rural population (85% of the 30.2 million), and low levels of development, population control measures were introduced in the northern regions of Vietnam in 1961 through the Ministry of Health.¹⁵¹ Couples were encouraged to limit the number of births to 2-3, and family planning clinics providing IUDs were established throughout the River Delta region, with the result that the birth rate dropped to 5.25 by 1975.¹⁵² Efforts to reduce population growth were renewed following the end of the war and unification of North and South Vietnam. From 1976-1988, the Communist Party's Congresses produced targets for reduced population growth that were unsuccessful, resulting in a decision in October 1988 by the Council of Ministers to introduce a two-child norm

¹⁴⁵ Employment figures are from the 2008 labour survey. See, GSO (General Statistics Office, Vietnam), *The 1/4/2008 Population Change, Labour Force and Family Planning Survey*. Hanoi: Statistical Publishing House, 2008.

¹⁴⁶ Bélanger, "Son preference in a rural village," p. 330.

¹⁴⁷ CEDAW, Viet Nam, CEDAW/C/VNM/7-8, ¶ 232.

¹⁴⁸ UNFPA, *Study on Gender, Masculinity, and Son Preference*, 2012

¹⁴⁹ Thao Vi and An Dien, 23 September 2014, "Vietnam Still Plagued by Sex-Selective Abortions," *Thanh Nien News*, at <http://www.geneticsandsociety.org/article.php?id=8087>

¹⁵⁰ Vien Nhu, 'Population Exceeds 90 million', VGP News, The Socialist Republic of Vietnam Online Newspaper of the Government, 17 December 2014, <http://news.chinhphu.vn/Home/Population-exceeds-90-million/201412/23329.vgp>; General Statistics Office of Vietnam, Department for Population and Labour Statistics, "Press Release: The First Ever Inter-Censal Population and Housing Survey 1/4/2014 Announcement of Key Findings," at http://gso.gov.vn/default_en.aspx?tabid=768&ItemID=14175.

¹⁵¹ Ministry of Health, The General Office for Population and Family Planning, *Population and Family Planning Work in Vietnam: 50 Years of History and Development (1961-2011)*, Ha Noi 2011.

¹⁵² MOH, *Population and Family Planning*, 18.

throughout most of the country. A two-child limit was to be imposed on all party members, civil servants and those serving in the military, and covered all those living in urban areas as well as the specific geographic regions of the Red River Delta, the Mekong Delta, the lowlands of the central coastal provinces and the midlands.¹⁵³ Families of ethnic minorities were permitted to have three children, but there were costs for other families who exceeded the two-child norm in the form of higher rents, the imposition of social support funds, and a prohibition on migrating to urban areas and industrial zones.

In 1993, the government introduced a resolution on family planning work that condemned party officials for failing to reduce population growth and introduced further measures to reduce fertility to 1-2 children per family, indicating that there would be repercussions in the form of 'administrative measures' for party members and state employees who failed to implement the new policy.¹⁵⁴ There was no recognition of the effect of the imposition of this new policy on the gender balance within families, nor were measures put in place to prevent sex selection at that time. Fines and job penalties were not evenly applied throughout the country, although researchers suggest that they were more likely to be imposed on violators of the policy who were party members, cadres, teachers, or those who lived in the population-dense region of the Red River Delta.¹⁵⁵

Recognizing that the imposition of a two child limit had resulted in a rising birth sex ratio, the National Assembly issued Population Ordinance in January 2003 which indicated that families could "actively and voluntarily decide on the number of children, the time to have babies and the duration between child births."¹⁵⁶ This was the first population policy instituted by the National Assembly, which, along with the Communist Party and the Government of Ministers, shapes and adopts policies within the state, and this defence of reproductive rights was in sharp contrast with the 1988 one-to-two child policy.¹⁵⁷ To resolve the controversy, the Communist Party adopted Resolution 47 in 2005, which reinforced the need for the state to control population growth and called for a return to the two-child norm—the National Assembly revised the Population Ordinance accordingly in 2008 (with

¹⁵³ The Decision further outlined the minimum age for childbearing (22 for women, 24 for men for party members, otherwise 19 and 21 for other women and men respectively), and provided details regarding the spacing of children according to the age of the mother. See Vietnam Council of Ministers Decision 162, October 1988, translated by Joint Publications Research Service on East and Southeast Asia (JPRS), 1989, JPRS-SEA-89-007, 8 February. Reprinted as "Vietnam's new fertility policy," in *Population and Development Review* 15, no. 1 (1989): 169-172.

¹⁵⁴ Resolution of 1993 on Policy Concerning the Population and Family Planning Work. (Hanoi Voice of Vietnam Network, 18 February 1993, as translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Document No. FBIS-EAS-93-035, 24 February 1993, pp. 64-65). At <http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/population/policies/VIETNAM2.htm>.

¹⁵⁵ Daniel M. Goodkind, "Vietnam's one-or-two-child policy in action," *Population and Development Review* 21, no. 1 (1995): 85-111; Danièle Bélanger, "Indispensable sons: Negotiating reproductive desires in rural Vietnam," *Gender, Place and Culture* 13, no. 3 (2006): 251-265; Danièle Bélanger, "Son preference in a rural village in North Vietnam." *Studies in Family Planning* 33, no. 4 (2002): 321-334.

¹⁵⁶ Vietnam Standing Committee of National Assembly, *Population Ordinance*, No. 06/2003/PL-UBTVQH11, 9 January 2003.

¹⁵⁷ Bang Nguyen Pham, Peter S. Hill, Wayne Hall and Chalapati Rao, "The Evolution of Population Policy in Viet Nam," *Asia-Pacific Population Journal* 27, no. 2 (2012): 41-56.

effect from January 2009).¹⁵⁸ The revised Ordinance stated that couples and individuals were obligated to participate in the family planning campaigns of the state in terms of the timing and spacing of births, with a limit of “one or two children, except in special cases prescribed by the Government.”¹⁵⁹ As noted by the press, “A degree of coercion is used to enforce the two-child policy. Communist Party members who have more than two face automatic expulsion and parents are often asked to pay the health and education costs of a third child. More serious sanctions include having land confiscated.”¹⁶⁰

The 2003 Ordinance also declared that sex selection was illegal, and the consequences of determining the sex of a fetus or aborting fetuses on the basis of their sex (as well as violating the principles of the population policy more generally), were later outlined in the 2006 Decree No. 114/2006/ND-CP.¹⁶¹ In 2006, penalties were increased to include fines and license revocations.¹⁶² However, it is clear that enforcement is lax. The Vietnamese press has reported that, “Deputy Minister Tien said that the measures to reduce the gender ratio imbalance have been ineffective. Those measures include a ban of medical workers from disclosing the sex of the fetus, and a ban on sex-selective abortion. So far, the authorities have penalized only two private clinics in Hung Yen and Kien Giang provinces for providing sex diagnostic ultrasound services. The nationwide campaign consists of a series of workshops, policy dialogues and parades in Hanoi, Hai Duong and Bac Ninh provinces. There will also be a social media campaign calling on the government and all stakeholders to join hands to end gender-biased sex selection.”¹⁶³ Some news sources also report that the government may offer economic incentives to families of girls, offering health insurance and favored status in school admissions and hiring, but this has not appeared to have any impact on SRBs.¹⁶⁴

Vietnam is currently drafting a new population law to submit to the National Assembly in 2015, which will replace the Population Ordinance. The new law will hopefully loosen the state’s control over the number of births, as the low fertility coupled with strong son preference (in addition to significant outmigration of Vietnamese females as foreign brides) will have long-term effects on the country’s

¹⁵⁸ Pham *et al.*, “The Evolution of Population Policy in Viet Nam,” p. 47.

¹⁵⁹ Vietnam, Standing Committee of the National Assembly, Ordinance to Amend Article 10 of the Ordinance population, No.: 08/2008/UBTVQH12, 27 December 2008 (in Vietnamese). Available at <http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/population/policies/poppolicy.htm>.

¹⁶⁰ Owen Bennett-Jones, 8 November 2000, “Vietnam’s Two-Child Policy,” *BBC News*, at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/1011799.stm>.

¹⁶¹ Viet Nam Commission for Population Family and Children, Guideline for Administrative Publishment and Fines on Violation of Population and Children Policies, Decree No. 114/2006/ND-CP (in Vietnamese), October 2006, Hanoi: VCPFC, available at <https://www.ilo.int/dyn/natlex/docs/ELECTRONIC/94641/111108/F456322143/VNM94641%20Vnm.pdf>.

¹⁶² Pham, Hall, Hill, and Rao, “Analysis of Sociopolitical and Health Practices,” 2008.

¹⁶³ Le Ha, 24 September 2014, “Male-Female Ratio Imbalance May Reach Over Four Million,” *VietnamNet*, at <http://english.vietnamnet.vn/fms/society/112597/male-female-ratio-imbalance-may-reach-over-four-million.html>.

¹⁶⁴ Lien Hoang, 19 March 2013, “Vietnam Mulls Cash Handouts to Families with Daughters,” *Voice of America*, at <http://www.voanews.com/content/vietnam-cash-handouts-families-daughters-girls/1624857.html>.

demographic profile. As Bang Nguyen Pham argues, the existing population policy “has now dramatically impacted on Vietnam’s population profile, with distortions in the SRB extending into early childhood, and progressive population ageing. This policy no longer serves the needs of contemporary Vietnam. Relaxing Vietnam’s policy on birth control is one direct adjustment that the new Law can take to slow down the rapid pace of TFR decline, and thereby, slow down the ageing of the population.”¹⁶⁵

At the same time, there is little government capacity to offer old age insurance. Vietnam’s pension policy is relatively new, having been instituted in 1995 for those in the formal economy. Yet despite the fact that contributions are meant to be compulsory, not all employees and employers comply so that only 63% of those expected to be making contributions were doing so in 2006.¹⁶⁶ Much of the population is excluded from the social insurance system—those in rural areas, agricultural production, or in the informal sector are not covered.¹⁶⁷ A further Social Insurance Law enacted in 2006 attempted to increase coverage through further voluntary contributions and the provision of an old age benefit, but in order to receive old age benefit, the retiree must have worked for a minimum of 20 years (15 years if hazardous) and contributed social insurance premium for at least 20 years. The World Bank has concluded that Vietnam’s current policies are not sustainable in the long run, particularly due to the early retirement age (55 for women, 60 for men) and the rising life expectancies.¹⁶⁸ As Vietnam’s population ages (currently the elderly comprise 10% of the population), the need for a pension will intensify if families are to weaken the patrilineal ties that reduce the value of women relative to men.

While there have been some fluctuations in the recorded birth sex ratio during the past fifteen years (likely due to the small percentage of births recorded in annual censuses which are susceptible to large errors), there is little doubt that the overall trend is that of a rising birth sex ratio. Danièle Bélanger *et al* first raised the question as to whether birth sex ratios were rising in Vietnam in a 2003 publication: her team analysed censuses, hospital records, and smaller surveys to examine birth sex ratios, finding that while there was evidence of son preference and sex selection for higher birth orders, amongst some groups (farmers, for example) and in some regions (higher sex ratios for some hospital births in the north), there was no evidence that the sex ratio at birth was increasing throughout the nation as a whole.¹⁶⁹ Scholars argue that population surveys did not provide confirmation of an

¹⁶⁵ Bang Nguyen Pham, “The demographic transition and implications for the new Law on Population in Vietnam.” *Asian Population Studies* 10, no. 3 (2014): 237-240.

¹⁶⁶ Tran Van Son, Experiences of Social Pension in Viet Na (2001 – 2009), Ministry of Finance, Vietnam, 2009, at <http://www.oecd.org/finance/private-pensions/46260880.pdf>


¹⁶⁷ Nguyen Thi Hang Ngan and Zhang Jianhua, 20 October 2014, “Interview: Gender Equality has Improved Much in Vietnam: Expert,” *Shanghai Daily*, at http://shanghaidaily.com/article/article_xinhua.aspx?id=247725.

¹⁶⁸ Castel, Paulette and Minna Hahn Tong, *Vietnam - Developing a modern pension system: current challenges and options for future reform*. Washington DC, World Bank, 2012.

¹⁶⁹ Danièle Bélanger, Khuat Thi Hai Oanh, Liu Jianye, Thuy Le Thanh, and Pham Viet Thanh, “Are sex ratios at birth increasing in Vietnam?,” *Population* 58, no. 2 (2003): 231-250.

overall rising birth sex ratio until 2006 and the publication of the findings from the Population Change Survey, which recorded a nationwide birth sex ratio of 110.¹⁷⁰ Guilмото, Hoàng, and Van, explain that the 1999 census and other demographic surveys, such as the Demographic and Health Surveys of 1997 and 2002 did not “provide any further strong evidence of active sex selection.”¹⁷¹ The small birth sizes in these surveys means that any recorded sex ratios are subject to wide error, but the large imbalance in male and female infants should have raised concern within the state that sex selection may have been occurring. The 2002 Demographic and Health Survey recorded birth sex ratios of 109.4 in 2002 and 111.2 in 2000 (with a low rate of 102.8 for 2001),¹⁷² and annual population surveys in 2002 and 2004 indicated very high sex ratios for the 0-4 population of 111.9 and 114.6 respectively. While these are subject to error given the small samples used to estimate the size of the total population, the high ratios (shown in Figure 4) should have caused some concern among the country’s demographers prior to 2006.¹⁷³

Figure 4: Sex Ratio at Birth in Vietnam, 1999-2014



Sources: 1999-2013 from General Statistics Office, *The 1/4/2013 Time-Point Population Change and Family Planning Survey: Major Findings*. Hanoi: Statistical Publishing House, 2013; 2014 data from General Statistics Office, Department for Population and Labour Statistics, “Press Release: The First Ever Inter-Censal Population and Housing Survey 1/4/2014 Announcement of Key Findings.”

¹⁷⁰ Pham, Bang Nguyen, Wayne Hall, Peter S. Hill, and Chalapati Rao, “Analysis of socio-political and health practices influencing sex ratio at birth in Viet Nam,” *Reproductive Health Matters* 16, no. 32 (2008): 176-184.

¹⁷¹ Guilмото, Christophe Z., Xuyên Hoàng, and Toan Ngo Van, “Recent increase in sex ratio at birth in Viet Nam,” *PLoS One* 4, no. 2 (2009): e4624, p. 1.

¹⁷² GSO (General Statistics Office, Vietnam), *Vietnam Demographic and Health Survey 2002*, Vietnam Committee for Population, Family and Children, Hanoi, and ORC Macro, Calverton, MD., 2003, Table C.3 Births by calendar years, p. 144.

¹⁷³ These sex ratios are derived from Table 1.3, which reports proportion of the population by age group according to the 2002 and 2004 surveys in GSO (General Statistics Office, Vietnam), *Result of the Vietnam Household Living Standards Survey 2006*, Hanoi: Statistical Publishing House, 2007.

Further disaggregation of the birth sex ratios reveals that even in years when the overall sex ratio appeared to be within the expected range of 105-106 males per 100 female births, some regions within the state were experiencing abnormally high birth sex ratios. As Table 5 demonstrates, even in 2005, when the overall sex ratio at birth was 105.6, the Red River Delta and Central Highlands areas had ratios of 109.3 and 108.5 respectively.

Table 5: Birth Sex Ratios by Region, Vietnam, 2005-2013

Region/Year	2005	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Vietnam (Total)	105.6	111.6	112.1	110.5	111.2	111.9	112.3	113.8
Red River Delta	109.3	110.8	119.0	115.3	116.2	122.4	120.9	124.6
Northern Midlands and Mountain Areas	101.8	109.1	114.2	108.5	109.9	110.4	108.2	112.4
North Central and Central Coastal Areas	104.7	112.4	108.2	109.7	114.3	103.3	112.1	112.3
Central Highlands	108.5	117.3	116.7	105.6	108.2	104.3	98.4	114.1
South East	106.8	117.5	116.8	109.9	105.9	108.8	111.9	114.2
Mekong River Delta	103.8	107.9	102.8	109.9	108.3	114.9	111.5	103.8

Source: General Statistics Office, Vietnam, Statistical Data: Population and Employment: Sex Ratio at Birth by Region, at www.gso.gov.vn. The GSO has not provided birth sex ratios for 2006 by region.

At present, the birth sex ratio is at higher than normal rates in all regions with the exception of the Mekong River Delta region, and the Red River Delta region has significantly higher birth sex ratios than other regions. These differences cannot be explained in terms of degree of son preference expressed in surveys, nor in population size or density, but it is interesting to note that the levels of education in this region are lower than in others—only 12.2% of those above age 5 have completed upper secondary school in this region according to the 2014 Inter-censal survey.¹⁷⁴ Noting the high SRB in the Red River Delta region, the 2010 population survey stated the following: “access to medical services and modern equipment is relatively easy, and the people in this region also have higher levels of education and higher living standards, so they are able and willing to pay for early foetal sex determination services.”¹⁷⁵

While it seems certain that sex selection is occurring in Vietnam, the extent of the problem is difficult to measure in precise terms, particularly at the regional level, due to counting errors. Asian birth sex ratio data is often wrought with over or under counting errors, particularly if revealing births can lead to the imposition of fines or other penalties. In China, for example, birth sex ratio data obtained through censuses and surveys are subject to problems of under- or over-reporting due to the size of its population, the difficulty of counting the significant migrant population, and parents’ attempts to hide the birth of offspring in order to avoid the fines and punishments associated with out of plan births. Although there are punishments associated with having more than two births in Vietnam, there is no evidence that parents misreport the number of children born in surveys and censuses. However,

¹⁷⁴ GSO (General Statistics Office, Vietnam), Department for Population and Labour Statistics, “Press Release: The First Ever Inter-Censal Population and Housing Survey 1/4/2014 Announcement of Key Findings,” 17 December 2014, at http://gso.gov.vn/default_en.aspx?tabid=768&ItemID=14175.

¹⁷⁵ GSO (General Statistics Office, Vietnam), Population Change and Family Planning Survey, 1/4/2010: Major Findings. Hanoi: Statistical Publishing House, 2010.

the birth sex ratios recorded in annual population change surveys are based on a 2 percent sample of the population, which may not accurately reflect the overall sex ratio for the state. In their analysis of different sources of birth sex ratio data (the annual population surveys, birth records from public health facilities, and births recorded in the vital registration system), Pham *et al* found varying degrees of bias and inconsistency among all three sets of data.¹⁷⁶ The evidence does still support the presence of a skewed sex ratio for the state as a whole as well as in the Red River Delta region.

Surveys seeking information about prenatal sex determination support the argument that sex selection is widespread in Vietnam. According to the 2013 Population Change and Family Planning Survey, 83% of women who gave birth between 2007 and 2013 knew the sex of the fetus prior to birth.¹⁷⁷ The percent of rural women having knowledge of the sex of their fetus had increased from 66.5% in 2007 to 82% in 2013, whereas the percentage of urban women dropped slightly from 88.1% to 85.1% during this period. The figures are lower for women who have no formal education (36.8%) compared with those who have completed upper secondary school or above (86.8%). 99.2% of those having knowledge of the sex of the fetus obtained that information through ultrasound technology.¹⁷⁸ Ultrasound technology is widely available throughout urban and rural areas, and the costs of having a scan are sufficiently low (equivalent to US\$2.50-3.50) that most women can afford to have several scans throughout their pregnancies.¹⁷⁹ There appears to have been a ten-fold increase in ultrasound availability between 1998 and 2007.¹⁸⁰

The 2013 Population Survey provides further information about regional patterns of son preference in Vietnam. When women who had given birth in the previous two years were asked about the desired sex of their fetus, 57.3% had no preference, 31.2% desired a son, and 11.5% desired a daughter; women in the Red River Delta region expressed the highest degree of son preference with 40.5% desiring a son, and the Southeast region had the lowest figure of 20.9%.¹⁸¹

Whereas in Korea, birth sex ratios are generally close to normal levels for first births and rise significantly with second and higher order births, in Vietnam birth sex ratios are higher for first births than second births. Analysis of the 15% sample survey conducted during the 2009 census reveals that the birth sex ratio for births between 2008 and 2009 was 110.2 for first births, 109.0 for second, and 115.5 for third or higher order births (which comprise just 16% of all births).¹⁸² The

¹⁷⁶ Bang Nguyen Pham, Chalapati Rao, Timothy Adair, Peter S. Hill, and Wayne Hall, "Assessing the quality of data for analysing the sex ratio at birth in Viet Nam," *Asian Population Studies* 6, no. 3 (2010): 263-287.

¹⁷⁷ GSO (General Statistics Office, Vietnam), *The 1/4/2013 Time-Point Population Change and Family Planning Survey: Major Findings*. Hanoi: Statistical Publishing House, 2013, Table 5.9.

¹⁷⁸ GSO, *The 1/4/2013 Time-Point Population*, Table 5.11, p. 49.

¹⁷⁹ Pham, et al, "Analysis of socio-political and health practices," p. 180.

¹⁸⁰ New Scientist, 15 May 2009, "Sex Selection Brings Vietnamese Boy Boom," *NewScientist.com* no. 2708, at <http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg20227083.100-sex-selection-brings-vietnamese-boy-boom.html>.

¹⁸¹ GSO, *The 1/4/2013 Time-Point Population*, Table 5.12, p. 49.

¹⁸² GSO (General Statistics Office, Vietnam), *Sex Ratio at Birth in Viet Nam: New Evidence on Patterns, Trends and Differential*, Vietnam Population and Housing Census 2009, 2011, Hanoi, p. 23.

sex ratio for third births is significantly higher (131.9) in the absence of a son than for those families who have at least one son (107.0), suggesting that families seeking to have at least one son will resort to sex selective technologies to ensure a male offspring.¹⁸³ The 2011 Population Change and Family Planning Survey further disaggregated national ratios by urban and rural areas, the results of which are found in Table 6.

Table 6: Vietnam Sex ratio at birth by urban/rural residence and birth order, 2011

	Total	First birth order	Second birth order	Third and higher birth order
National total	111.9	109.7	111.9	119.7
Urban	114.2	115.6	110.2	120.8
Rural	111.1	107.4	112.6	119.4

Source: GSO (General Statistics Office, Vietnam), *The 1/4/2011 Population Change and Family Planning Survey: Major Findings*. Hanoi: Statistical Publishing House, 2011, p. 56.

According to the 2011 survey, sex selection in rural areas was more likely occurring for second and higher order births, whereas sex selection was likely occurring for births of all orders in urban areas, with particular emphasis on first and third births. The state's response to the high sex ratios for third order births is to prevent more than two births per family. Population surveys since 2006 have placed great emphasis on learning the characteristics of women who give birth to more than two children, analysing their level of education, rural/urban residence, socio-economic region, and the sex of previous children, with the expected results that women who give birth to three or more children are typically rural (17% of rural women aged 15-49 in 2010 had three or more births compared with 9.5% of urban women), and are less educated (for example, 45% of those having three or more births in 2010 had no formal education).¹⁸⁴ There is no strong regional pattern to third order births (five of the six regions have percentages between 11 and 18), with the exception of the Central Highlands region, where 29% of women aged 15-49 had a third or higher order birth in 2010.¹⁸⁵ This could be due to the higher numbers of ethnic groups in the Central Highlands—the 2010 survey states “The Central Highlands is also a region with a high concentration of ethnic minority people, approach of contraceptives and communication means on family planning is a bit limited.”¹⁸⁶

The Vietnamese government is attempting to tackle the high sex ratio by reducing the number of higher order births because these have the highest sex ratio. The published findings from the 2011 population survey state that “in order to reduce the imbalanced trend in the sex ratio at birth it is necessary to have the suitable advocacy policy in urban residences especially toward the women who have many children.”¹⁸⁷ The number of third order births has been declining for the

¹⁸³ GSO, *Sex Ratio at Birth in Viet Nam*, p. 25.

¹⁸⁴ GSO (General Statistics Office, Vietnam), *Population Change and Family Planning Survey, 1/4/2010: Major Findings*. Hanoi: Statistical Publishing House, 2010, pp. 49-51.

¹⁸⁵ See Table 5.7, GSO, *Population Change and Family Planning Survey, 1/4/2010*, p. 51.

¹⁸⁶ GSO, *Population Change and Family Planning Survey*, p. 51.

¹⁸⁷ GSO (General Statistics Office, Vietnam), *The 1/4/2011 Population Change and Family Planning Survey: Major Findings*. Hanoi: Statistical Publishing House, 2011.

past decade, but this decline has corresponded with a rise in the birth sex ratio in the same time period. If women cannot simply have more children to achieve their desired number of sons, they will use technology to realise their ideal family composition and the overall sex ratio is unlikely to decline from its current high levels with this approach. Information on sex selection is widely available, despite the Government's attempts to control access to that information by destroying books on sex selection and shutting down internet sites advertising sex selection services.¹⁸⁸ Indeed, some account for Vietnam's late rise in SRB as resulting not from a lack of will to enact son preference, but rather from the country's delayed access to ultrasound machines, with Guilмото noting, "The widespread use of ultrasound began in the early 2000s with the import of new equipment such as 3-D scans."¹⁸⁹

Despite strong son preference, there is no evidence of differential treatment of male and female infants—the infant mortality rate in 2013 was 17.4 for males and 13.2 for females, yielding the expected ratio of a higher proportion of male infant deaths. Figures for childhood mortality are also significantly higher for males than females, with a male under-five mortality rate of 29.9 and a female rate of 15.8.¹⁹⁰ Education enrolment rates for both boys and girls have improved since 2006, with girls achieving higher rates of enrolment in primary, lower secondary, and upper secondary schools by 2012.¹⁹¹ Investment in daughters' education is a positive sign that the government's gender equality initiatives are working.

Again, as in the South Korean case, an increasingly abnormal SRB trend occurred in a context of steady economic development. Per capita GDP has risen fast in Vietnam: it was less than USD94 in 1989, and moved above USD1302 in 2010.¹⁹² Now considered middle income, Vietnam's agriculture accounted for only 20% of GDP in 2010.¹⁹³

In sum, utilizing the list of factors we identified in the South Korean case, we see a marked divergence with Vietnam:

- no real enforcement of a ban on prenatal sex identification, in a context where abortion is easily available
- no effective legal attack on patrilineality, no real attempt to dismantle its core structures, including those buttressing patrilocality; continued importance of sons to inherit land and perform ancestor worship

¹⁸⁸ Patralekha Chatterjee, "Sex ratio imbalance worsens in Vietnam," *The Lancet* 374, no. 9699 (2009): 1410.

¹⁸⁹ Guilмото, "Son Preference," 2012.

¹⁹⁰ Figures for 2013 are representative of those throughout the 2000s, with male infants and children under 5 dying at higher rates than females. General Statistics Office, *The 1/4/2013 Time-Point Population*, p. xiv.

¹⁹¹ According to the 2012 education survey, enrolment rates for boys and girls are as follows: 92.2 and 92.7 in primary, 79.8 and 83.0 for lower secondary, and 55.2 and 63.9 for upper secondary.

¹⁹² United Nations Statistics Division, Per capita GDP at current prices - US dollars, Viet Nam, at <https://data.un.org/Data.aspx?d=SNAAMA&f=grID%3A101%3BcurrID%3AUSD%3BpcFlag%3A1>.

¹⁹³ World Bank, 2010, "Agriculture, value added (% of GDP)," *Indicator*, <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.AGR.TOTL.ZS/countries>.

- no provision of some form of old-age insurance to the bulk of the population, which might provide a substitute for the need to have a son to provide elder support
- the presence of fertility control policies, enforced by semi-coercive means.
- the role of land in economic life remains very important in a country where the population is still predominantly rural, with 68% classified as rural, and the value of women remains tied to their role as mothers of sons in rural communities

Implications of the Experiences of South Korea and Vietnam

“I think that we can learn lessons from South Korea.” (Ho Xuan, head of Bac Ninh Province’s Population and Family Planning Department, Vietnam, 2012)¹⁹⁴

It is our contention that both demographers and policymakers can learn from the “mismatched bookends” of South Korea and Vietnam.

First, as many have begun to note, increasing wealth and increasing levels of education are orthogonal to the enactment of son preference. As Nicholas Eberstadt avers, “As we have seen, sudden steep increases in SRBs are by no means inconsistent with continuing improvements in levels of per capita income and female education—or, for that matter, with legal strictures against sex-selective abortion.”¹⁹⁵ South Korea’s greatest rise in SRBs coincided with its greatest rise in GNP per capita and its population’s level of education. In similar fashion, though not experiencing quite an ascent on the world stage, Vietnam has also seen its SRBs turn highly abnormal in a time of increasing wealth and education. The same can also be said of China and India: as *The Economist* notes, “Though son preference is often seen as “backwards”—a product of poverty and insularity—sex-selective abortion is actually independent of wealth and income. It is highest, for example, in some of the richest, most open parts of China and India, such as Guangdong province in southern China and Haryana state in north India.”¹⁹⁶

This finding is noteworthy from a policy perspective. The assumption that sex ratios will normalize over time as a country progresses in its development is unwarranted. The case studies of South Korea and Vietnam show that specific attention must be paid to the roots of son preference as well as to enactment catalysts for a rise in sex ratios in son-preferring countries to be deterred. The fact that so many nations of the world are, in fact, son-preferring cultures suggests that finding the most important keys to this puzzle is a task that is not limited to Asia in its utility. As noted earlier, the list of countries in which SRBs are abnormal is not

¹⁹⁴ Viet Nam News, 12 November 2012, “Avoiding the Looming Marriage Squeeze,” *VietNamNews.vn* <http://vietnamnews.vn/opinion/232618/avoiding-the-looming-marriage-squeeze.html>.

¹⁹⁵ Nicole Eberstadt, 2011, “The Global War Against Baby Girls,” *The New Atlantis: A Journal of Technology and Society* (Fall), at <http://www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/the-global-war-against-baby-girls>.

¹⁹⁶ *The Economist*, 19 September 2011, “Growth is not Enough,” *Economist.com* <http://www.economist.com/blogs/newsbook/2011/09/gender-inequality>.

decreasing in length; rather, lamentably, that list is growing, and its members are not confined to Asia. As Eberstadt puts it, “Two of the key factors associated with unnatural upsurges in nationwide SRBs—low or sub-replacement fertility levels and easy access to inexpensive prenatal gender-determination technology—will likely be present in an increasing number of low-income societies in the years and decades immediately ahead.”¹⁹⁷

This is thus not a puzzle of the past, or even of the present. This is a puzzle of the past, present, *and* future. What do South Korea and Vietnam teach us? As Ho Xuan expressed in the epigraph, can South Korea teach Vietnam—and by extension, China and other nations—how to normalize its SRBs?

Our first observation is intuitive: catalyzing son preference enactment is not wise. Countries worried about SRB abnormality should not coerce fertility limitation. There is ample evidence that fertility will fall naturally even without birth limitation policies. Allowing it to fall without intervention precludes the types of spikes in SRBs that we saw in South Korea and Vietnam. In this case, Vietnam can probably learn from China, which is slowly but surely moving in the direction of lifting its one child policy. Of course, the damage done to sex ratios during the decades in which the one child policy was brutally enforced cannot be undone, and China will experience repercussions from that earlier policy decision. We hope the Vietnamese will be quicker to see the folly of such a policy course than the Chinese have been.

Our second observation is also fairly intuitive: making fetal sex identification and sex-selective abortion illegal *for physicians*, and actually punishing doctors for infractions, while ineffective in reducing SRBs in a context where such identification methods are freely available outside doctors’ offices, is nevertheless an important legal step for two reasons. First, it makes clear to the entire society that the state will not tolerate son preference. This is a legal norm with great societal import. Second, by putting the onus on doctors and holding only doctors accountable, the medical community becomes a dampening force on the persistence of son preference enactment within the society. Over time, that dampening force can be crucial in the velocity of progress. Nations such as the United Kingdom, which had not had a son preference enactment problem since the Middle Ages, have in the early 21st century felt the need to create such legal penalties for medical personnel for these very reasons.

As co-authors, we have come to a third conclusion from our examination of these “mismatched bookends,” one that is perhaps less intuitive than the previous two. With others cited in this paper, we conclude it is insufficient to “raise the status of daughters” in order to normalize SRBs. Raising the status of daughters admits and highlights that daughters are in truth not as valuable as sons, and implies that extraordinary means must be employed to artificially lift them higher. It is an acquiescence, not a resistance, to son preference.

Rather, we feel that what the South Korean case teaches us is that the only effective means of attenuating son preference is to *lower the value of sons*. And here the government—and only the government—holds the levers that can work.

¹⁹⁷ Eberstadt, “The Global War Against Baby Girls,” 2011.

To understand this point, it is useful to first step back and consider the problem of individual security more broadly. Ultimately, there are currently *only two alternative answers* to the problem of individual security—state government and patrilineality. Where state government is weak or oppressive, the only structure capable of providing effective individual security is the kin group, almost always defined agnatically.

We have noted that the vast majority of human societies even today are son-prefering, despite the fact that relatively few societies enact that preference to cull girls. We have also noted that the vast majority of lineage-based groups trace descent through the patriline, practice patrilocality, and inherit land and property through the patriline. Patricia Crone explains this commonality across space and time in human history exists because “tribes and states are not sequential stages but *alternative answers to the problem of security*” (emphasis ours).¹⁹⁸ Rather than leave the individual defenseless against the power of the state, clans were “authority structures capable of countering other authority structures,”¹⁹⁹ available to many, even most, within the society simply by fact of birth.

Arguably the most vulnerable family members in patrilineal groups, however, are the women whose role is to reproduce the patriline, for the subordination of female interests, reproductive or otherwise, is how patrilineal clans are formed in the first place. Schatz is right when he states, “If we can identify the mechanisms of identity reproduction, we gain exceptional purchase on both identity persistence and identity construction . . . Whether clan divisions persist or not hinges on identifiable mechanisms of identity reproduction.”²⁰⁰ Female subordination specifically in marriage plays that role for agnatic clans.

Goody explains that the supremacy of the agnatic lineage was maintained because “the conjugal pair was incorporated into the larger unit, male authority was supported by the kin group and a woman’s independent role in the household was minimal.”²⁰¹ As Weiner notes, “The anti-individualism of the rule of the clan burdens each and every member of a clan society, but most of all it burdens women. The fate of women lays bare the basic values of the rule of the clan, and as outsiders, citizens of liberal states often find their own values clarified when they confront the lives clans afford their female members”²⁰²

It is critical to understand that patrilineal clans *cannot exist* without the subordination of female interests to the goals of the male members of the clan. As Fukuyama notes, “In agnatic societies, women achieve legal personhood only by

¹⁹⁸ Patricia Crone, “The Tribe and the State,” in *States in History*, ed. John A. Hall, Oxford, Oxfordshire: Basil Blackwell, quoted in Paul Dresch, 1990, “Imams and Tribes: The Writing and Acting of History in Upper Yemen,” in *Tribes and States Formation in the Middle East*, ed. Philip S. Khoury and Joseph Kostiner, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 252-287.

¹⁹⁹ Lois Beck, 1990, “Tribes and the State in Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century Iran,” in *Tribes and States Formation in the Middle East*, ed. Philip S. Khoury and Joseph Kostiner, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 192.

²⁰⁰ Edward Schatz, 2004, *Modern Clan Politics*, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 13

²⁰¹ Jack Goody, 1983, *The Development of the Family and Marriage in Europe*, London and New York: Cambridge University Press, 30.

²⁰² Weiner, 2013, *The Rule of the Clan*, 64.

virtue of their marriage to and mothering of a male in the lineage”; that is, women only “exist” in these societies as they create the patriline because patrilineages cannot exist without women creating them.²⁰³

The fierceness and the sensitivity with which the subordinate status of women in patrilineal societies is guarded by the men of these societies testifies to Fukuyama’s proposition. Charrad observes, “Women represent a potential source of rupture in the web uniting the men of the patrilineage.”²⁰⁴ Men—and not women—must therefore control assets, whether these be children or land or cattle, else the power of the clan will dissipate.

These observations set the stage for understanding how South Korea was so effective in normalizing its sex ratio, despite the fact that scholars opine South Korea had one of the highest levels of son preference of any human society. The South Korean government, especially its courts, attacked patrilineality at its roots, stripping males of privilege in inheritance, control of assets and children, and even in ability to create lineage. Indeed, the South Korean government might be viewed as following in the footsteps of the Catholic Church in Middle Ages. Many scholars attribute the drastic decline of agnatic kin group power in Western Europe during this time period to Christianity’s ban on polygyny, the rising age of marriage of females from onset of puberty to ages 22-24 beginning in northwest Europe in the 13th century, and the Catholic Church’s insistence on inheritance rights for widows and the denial of such rights to other agnatic kin, including illegitimate offspring of the widow’s deceased husband.²⁰⁵ This is an historical tale suggesting that interference in the reproduction of agnatic kin exclusivity by improving the situation of women in marriage has great potential to subvert patrilineality. Those with the least power under the system of agnatic kin groups—women—may ironically possess the key to the system’s entire dismantlement.

What the South Korean government accomplished, then, was not in the first place elevation of the status of daughters. What South Korea accomplished was an effective attack on the value of *sons*. By eliminating all male privilege in inheritance, in lineage formation, and in control of assets—and enforcing this elimination in a nation increasingly urban and therefore not as dependent on land—the value of sons decreased dramatically. Furthermore, one of the sole remaining legacies of patrilocal custom—the patrilineal custom that the groom’s family is responsible for finding housing for a new couple—actually worked to decrease the value of sons to an even greater extent. Now it is sons and not daughters that are the children upon whom parents lose their money. And because daughters and sons inherit equally, sons can no longer be expected to provide for parents in old age to a greater degree than daughters. The South Korean government’s provision of old age insurance, even though still somewhat unreliable, is the final nail in the coffin of individual reliance on patrilineal groups for individual security.

²⁰³ Fukuyama, *Origins of Political Order*, 233.

²⁰⁴ Charrad, *States and Women’s Rights*, 55.

²⁰⁵ See, for example, Fukuyama and Goody. See also Mary Hartman, 2004, *The Household and the Making of History: A Subversive View of the Western Past*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Can either Vietnam or China emulate what South Korea has done? In both cases, the key contextual variable—degree of dependence on land as an asset, related to degree of urbanization—may work against both countries. Land is the asset most stubbornly held in the patriline, no matter what laws on the books might say. And if land matters, then the patriline continues to matter, to the detriment of daughters.

Pending change in that contextual, which will surely come eventually, what might China and Vietnam do to help revert its SRBs? The South Korean case suggests some answers. Coercive fertility limitation policies should be removed. Old age insurance must be broadly provided, and it should provide a meaningful level of reliable support. Laws punishing the collusion of physicians with fetal sex identification and sex-selective laws must be publicly enforced. Finally, the laws that China and Vietnam have on the books instituting equality in marriage and asset control in marriage/inheritance must be aggressively enforced. It is clear that enforcement is currently severely lacking in both nations.

Both China and Vietnam might well consider an additional step taken by South Korea—equalizing women's rights in lineage formation by allowing women and men the right to choose their surname upon marriage and the right to equally choose the surname of their children. And of course one last consideration for Vietnam is its hemorrhaging of the female sex not only at birth, but in the young adult cohort due to the export of brides to China, Taiwan, and South Korea. It is not just the sex ratio at birth that should concern policymakers in Ho Chi Minh City.

In sum, this examination of China's mismatched bookends has been instructive in helping to clarify what is and what is not causally linked to the enactment of son preference. As the list of nations enacting son preference lamentably grows longer, these insights may be of increasing import over time.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REGGIE LITTLEJOHN

APRIL 30, 2015

Honorable members of the Commission, Representative Chris Smith, Senator Marco Rubio, distinguished fellow panelists, ladies and gentlemen, I am grateful for this opportunity to testify here today, as we commemorate the 35th anniversary of China's brutal One Child Policy.

I have been asked to comment upon "China's insistence on keeping the One-Child Policy, despite looming demographic concerns."

China has not "eased," "relaxed" or "abandoned" the One-Child Policy, Despite Reports

China periodically tweaks its One Child Policy. These minor modifications are routinely exaggerated. For example, under the misleading headline, "China to Ease One-Child Policy," Xinhua News Agency reported that China would lift the ban on a second child, if either parent is an only child, beginning on January 1, 2014. It was already the case that couples could have a second child if both parents were themselves only children. This minor adjustment did not "ease" the One Child Policy. It merely tweaked it.

Indeed, in apparent response to quell overly optimistic speculation that this small change represents a major reform, Xinhua ran another report soon after the original announcement: "Birth Policy Changes Are No Big Deal." In this second article Xinhua states that Wang Pei'an, deputy director of the National Health and Family Planning Commission (NHFP), told Xinhua that "the number of couples covered by the new policy is not very large across the country."¹

The minor modification of the policy that took place on January 1, 2014: 1) did not affect a large percentage of couples in China; 2) was not subject to a timetable in which to implement it; 3) retained the dreaded "birth intervals" between children (if a woman gets pregnant before the interval has lapsed, she risks forced abortion); and 4) makes no promise to end the coercive enforcement of the Policy.

Noticeably absent from the Chinese Communist party's announcement is any mention of human rights. Even though it will now allow some couples to have a second child, China has not promised to end forced abortion, forced sterilization, or forced contraception. The coercive enforcement of China's one-child policy is its core. Instituting a two-child policy in certain, limited circumstances will not end forced abortion or forced sterilization.

The problem with the one-child policy is not the number of children "allowed." Rather, it is the fact that the CCP is telling women how many children they can have and then enforcing that limit through forced abortion and forced sterilization. Even if all couples were allowed two children, there is no guarantee that the CCP will cease their appalling methods of enforcement. Regardless of the number of children allowed, women who get pregnant without permission will still be dragged out of their homes, strapped down to tables, and forced to abort babies that they want.

Further, instituting a two-child policy will not end gendercide. Indeed, areas in which two children currently are allowed are especially vulnerable to gendercide. According to the 2009 British Medical Journal study of data from the 2005 national census, in nine provinces, for "second order births" where the first child is a girl, 160 boys were born for every 100 girls. In two provinces, Jiangsu and Anhui, for the second child, there were 190 boys for every hundred girls born. This study stated, "sex selective abortion accounts for almost all the excess males."

To say that China has "relaxed" or "eased" its One Child Policy under these circumstances is entirely unwarranted.² Because of this gendercide, there are an estimated 37 million Chinese men who will never marry because their future wives were terminated before they were born. This gender imbalance is a powerful, driving force behind trafficking in women and sexual slavery, not only in China, but in neighboring nations as well.

Furthermore, all the reasons the Chinese government has given for this adjustment are economic or demographic: China's dwindling labor force, the country's

¹"Birth policy changes are no big deal." http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/indepth/2013-11/16/c_132893477.htm. 11/16/13.

²"China's One-Child Policy 'Reform' Won't End Abuses: US Group." <http://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/policy07232014161119.html>. 7/23/14; "China Hasn't 'Eased' Its One-Child Policy." <http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/364200/chinahasnt-eased-its-one-child-policy-reggie-littlejohn>. 11/18/13; "China Not Easing One Child Policy, Says Campaigner." <http://www.zenit.org/en/articles/china-not-easing-one-child-policy-says-campaigner>. 11/22/13; "Little Change in Practice for China's One Child Family Policy." <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/nov/24/little-change-in-practice-for-chinas-one-childfam/?page=all>. 11/24/13.

growing elderly population, and the severe gender imbalance. The adjustment is a tacit acknowledgement that continuation of the one-child policy will lead to economic and demographic disaster. The policy was originally instituted for economic reasons. It is ironic that through this very policy, China has written its own economic, demographic death sentence.

Even if China were to completely abandon the One Child Policy and all population control now, demographers worry that it might be too little, too late to avert the demographic disaster it has caused. As one researcher stated, “Even if the family-planning policy were terminated today, it would be too late to solve our rapidly ageing population, the drastic shrinkage of the labour force and the gaping hole in social-security funds that the country has already begun struggling with.”³

Despite the demographic pressure to end the policy, the Chinese government recently denied that it has plans to implement a two-child policy in the near future.⁴

Continuing the One Child Policy makes no demographic sense. China’s population problem is not that it has too many people, but too few young people and too few women. Limiting births can no longer justify the policy.

The One Child Policy will turn 35 on September 25, 2015. The fertility rate has fallen to approximately 1.5 children per woman, far below the replacement level of 2.1. These birth rates are dangerously low.

In addition, the most recent modification of the One Child Policy has failed to produce the expected number of births, as couples are self-limiting the size of their families.⁵ Why, then, does the Chinese Communist Party keep the One Child Policy?

1) In my opinion, the Chinese Communist Party will *never* abolish the One-Child Policy, because the government is exploiting the One Child Policy as social control, masquerading as population control.

The One Child Policy was formally instituted on September 25, 1980 in response to the population explosion under the Mao era, when the average fertility was 5.9 children per woman. The One Child Policy began as a means to control the population, however brutal and misguided. The terror of forced abortion and involuntary sterilization was a by-product of the Policy.

Now that keeping the Policy makes no demographic sense, I believe that terror is the purpose of the Policy. Forced abortion continues in China, terrifying both women and men.⁶ Some of these forced abortions have been so violent that the women themselves sometimes die along with their full term babies.⁷ Forced abortion is so terrifying that victims at times succumb to mental illness and China has the highest female suicide rate in the world.⁸

Men also are terrorized. Some have been killed or maimed for life.⁹ Others have lost control and murdered family planning officials.¹⁰ Some men have resorted to suicide in protest over the excessive fines imposed by the government.¹¹ The spirit

³“Critic of One Child Policy in from Cold.” <http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1224885/critic-one-child-policy-cold> 4/28/13; “Easing One Child Policy May Be Too Late.” <http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/easing-one-child-policy-may-be-too-late>. 1/7/14.

⁴“China denies full implementation of ‘two-child policy.’” http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2015-04/10/content_20407560.htm. 4/10/15.

⁵“Why China’s New Family Planning Policy Hasn’t Worked.” <http://thediplomat.com/2015/04/why-chinas-new-family-planning-policy-hasnt-worked/>. 4/20/15.

⁶“China Couple Speak of ‘Forced Abortion.’” <http://news.sky.com/story/1150016/china-couple-speak-of-forced-abortion> 10/4/13; “Four Uyghur Women Forced to Abort Their Babies in Xinjiang.” <http://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/abortion12302013050902.html>; “Xinjiang authorities try to force six women to abort for violating one-child policy.” <http://www.asianews.it/news-en/Xinjiang-authorities-try-to-force-six-women-to-abort-for-violating-one-child-policy-29925.html>. 12/30/13

⁷“China Couple Speak of ‘Forced Abortion.’” <http://news.sky.com/story/1150016/china-couple-speak-of-forced-abortion> 10/4/13; “Four Uyghur Women Forced to Abort Their Babies in Xinjiang.” <http://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/abortion12302013050902.html>; “Xinjiang authorities try to force six women to abort for violating one-child policy.” <http://www.asianews.it/news-en/Xinjiang-authorities-try-to-force-six-women-to-abort-for-violating-one-child-policy-29925.html>. 12/30/13.

⁸“Forced abortion at 7 Months – The Horror of China’s One Child Policy Sparks Further Outrage.” <http://www.christianpost.com/news/forced-abortion-at-7-months-the-horror-of-chinas-one-child-policy-sparks-further-outrage101764/> 8/7/13; “Chinese couple seeks damages for forced abortion.” http://www.worldmag.com/2014/01/chinese_couple_seeks_damages_for_forced_abortion 1/10/14.

⁹“China: Family Planning Official Stabs Man to Death,” <http://www.womensrightswithoutfrontiers.org/blog/?p=147>. 4/5/11.

¹⁰“Crazed Chinese father-of-four stabs two government officials to death over one child policy.” <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2376771/Chinese-father-kills-1-child-policy-officials-registering-4th-child.html> 7/24/13.

¹¹“Chinese father of four commits suicide over one-child policy fines so his children can go to school.” <http://www.lifesitenews.com/news/chinese-father-of-four-commits-suicide-over-one>

of the Cultural Revolution lives on in the family planning police, who have been able to steal, intimidate, torture and kill with relative impunity.

The Chinese Communist Party is a brutal, totalitarian regime. It has many human rights abuses: the detention and torture of human rights lawyers, activists and journalists; religious persecution, the execution of prisoners to harvest their organs for transplant. However egregious, each of these abuses touches only a sliver of Chinese society. The One Child Policy is unique in that it touches everyone.

2) The One Child Policy Is Enormously Profitable for the Chinese Communist Party.

The One Child Policy's system of fees and fines is an important source of revenue for the Chinese Communist Party. These fines are arbitrary and inconsistently applied throughout China, but may be as much as ten times a person's annual salary. Very few can afford to pay these "terror fines." In high profile cases, the fines may run in the millions of dollars.¹²

It has been estimated that the Chinese Communist Party has received as much as \$314 billion in family planning fines since 1980.¹³ The use of these fines is not subject to accountability, so they may be used simply to line the pockets of the family planning officials or to fund other government projects under the table. This system (or lack thereof) provides a strong incentive to keep the Policy in place.¹⁴

3) The One Child Policy's Infrastructure of Coercion Can Be Turned to Crush Dissent of Any Kind

There is growing unrest inside China. "[I]nternal Chinese law enforcement data on so-called "mass incidents"—a wide variety of protests ranging from sit-ins to strikes, marches and rallies, and even genuine riots—indicated that China has seen a sustained, rapid increase in those incidents from 8,700 in 1993 to nearly 60,000 in 2003, to more than 120,000 in 2008.¹⁵ Meanwhile, there are as many as 1 million Family Planning Officials.¹⁶ This army of Family Planning Officials can be turned in any direction to crush dissent of any sort. Does the Chinese Communist Party regard this army as necessary to maintain control in a tinder-box situation?

4) The One Child Policy Breaks Bonds of Trust, Discouraging Dissent

In addition to official Family Planning Police, the One Child Policy employs a system of paid informants—"womb police." Anyone can inform on an illegally pregnant woman—her neighbors, friends, co-workers, people in the village who watch women's abdomens to see who might be pregnant. On May 15, 2012, I testified before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health and Human Rights, together with Mei Shunping, a victim of five forced abortions. She described the way her factory enforced the One Child Policy. "If one worker violated the rules, all would be punished. Workers monitored each other." The women became informed on one another. Predictably, friendships were destroyed.¹⁷

child-policy-fines-so-his-c. 5/26/14; "Farmer drinks poison after being fined for violations of family planning policy." <http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/830847.shtml> 12/8/13

¹²Zhang Yimou's children spark one-child policy debate." <http://en.people.cn/90782/8236414.html>. 8/8/13.

¹³"The Brutal Truth: A shocking case of forced abortion fuels resentment against China's one-child policy." <http://www.economist.com/node/21557369>. 6/23/12.

¹⁴"Huge Fines for Violators of One-Child Policy, but Little Accounting." <http://sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/12/12/hugefines-for-violators-of-one-child-policy-but-little-accounting/>. 12/12/13; "Population Control Is Called Big Revenue Source in China." <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/27/world/asia/chinese-provinces-collected-billions-in-family-planning-fines-lawyer-says.html>. 6/26/13; "China has collected \$3.1 billion from one-child policy violators so far this year." <http://qz.com/154079/china-has-collected3-1-billion-from-one-child-policy-violators-so-far-this-year/>. 12/5/13; "Chinese Family Planning Officials Misappropriated \$260 Million in Fines." <http://www.theepochtimes.com/n3/293660-chinese-family-planning-officials-misappropriated-260-million-infines/>. 9/20/13.

¹⁵"China's Social Unrest Problem—Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission." Murray Scott Tanner, Ph.D. <http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Tanner-Written%20Testimony.pdf>. 5/15/14; see also, "Rising Protests in China." <http://www.theatlantic.com/photo/2012/02/rising-protests-in-china/100247/>. 2/17/12.

¹⁶"Family Planning: Enforcing with a smile." <http://www.economist.com/news/china/21638131-enforcers-chinas-one-child-policy-are-trying-new-gentler-approach-enforcing-smile>. 1/10/15. If China's Family Planning Officials were an army, they would tie with North Korea as the sixth largest army in the world. "World's Largest Armies." <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/armies.htm>.

¹⁷"Testimony of Mei Shunping, Victim of Five Forced Abortions in China." <http://archives.republicans.foreignaffairs.house.gov/112/HHRG-112-FA16-WState-ShunpingM-20120515.pdf>. 5/15/12.

In addition, if an illegally pregnant woman runs away to escape a forced abortion, members of her extended family may be detained and tortured.¹⁸ This puts enormous pressure on the woman to give herself up for an abortion. The system of paid informants and the persecution of family members and neighbors rupture the natural bonds of love and trust in Chinese society. People feel that there is no one they can trust.

Could the Chinese Communist Party be exploiting this rupture in relationship to divide and conquer? If people cannot trust anyone, they cannot organize for democracy.

Conclusion

In my opinion, the Chinese Communist Party will not relinquish coercive population control because 1) it enables them to exert social control through terror; 2) it is a lucrative profit center; 3) it provides an infrastructure of coercion that can be used to crush dissent of any sort; and 4) it ruptures relationships of trust, so that people cannot organize for change. I believe that the Chinese Communist Party is maintaining its grip on power by shedding the blood of the innocent women and babies of China.

China's One Child Policy is the largest and most disastrous social experiment in the history of the world. Through it, the Chinese Communist Party boasts that it has "prevented" 400 million births. This is the hallmark of Communist regimes—the peacetime killing of their own citizens. Now China faces demographic disaster. Ironically, the Chinese Communist Party instituted the One Child Policy for economic reasons, but through it, it has written its own economic death sentence.

Policy Recommendations:

We respectfully request that the U.S. government urge the Chinese government to:

- Abolish the One Child Policy and all forms of coercive population control;
- Offer incentives for couples to have girls;¹⁹
- Offer pensions to couples who do not have a son, ensuring that parents of girls will not become impoverished in their old age; and
- Abolish the *hukou* system, so that all children will have access to healthcare and education.

In addition, we respectfully request that the U.S. government:

- Establish principles of Corporate Social Responsibility, to ensure that U.S. corporations do not allow coercive population control measures to be taken against their employees; and
- Defund UNFPA, unless and until UNFPA stops supporting or participating in the management of a program of coercive abortion or involuntary sterilization in China, in violation of the 1985 Kemp-Kasten Amendment.

¹⁸Testimony of "Wujian," Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission, 11/10/09.<http://www.womensrightswithoutfrontiers.org/index.php?nav=cases&nav2=wujian#anchor>

¹⁹We have found in our "Save a Girl" campaign that the encouragement of modest monetary support is enough to make the difference between life and death to a baby girl. "Twin Girls Saved from Abortion in China, Husband's Family Only Wanted Boys." <http://www.lifenews.com/2014/05/30/twin-girls-saved-from-abortion-in-china-husband-family-told-wife-they-only-wanted-boys/> 5/30/14.

Chai Ling

Founder & President

All Girls Allowed – In Jesus' Name, Simply Love Her

Mission of All Girls Allowed: To restore life, value and dignity to girls and mothers; to reveal the injustice of the One Child Policy;

Author: A Heart for Freedom

Thursday, April 30th, 2015

Testimony to
The Congressional Executive Commission on China
Chairman Congressman Chris Smith
Cochairman Senator Marco Rubio

**The time is now to end the One Child Policy: In Jesus' name
I pray, God's Will be Done on Earth**

To the Honorable Chairman Chris Smith, thank you Chairman Smith. Thank you for your tireless effort to end the One Child Policy for the past 35 years! For upholding the human rights of all people in China, and in the world!

To the Co-Chairman Senator Rubio, thank you for your great work to fight for the women and the children as well, by sponsoring legislation that will protect the least of these: such as the Girls Count Act, the Anti-Human trafficking bill, and the campus safety bill. Your great work honors women and children and honors the Lord by making our world a better place for women and children!

I am encouraged by the legislative agenda addressing domestic and global problems especially for vulnerable women and Children. The recent passage of the Anti- Human Trafficking bill shows that a bi-partisan collation can be forged if Members will keep unrelated political agendas to the side. It warms my heart to see our wonderful friend and the greatest champion of Human Rights in the House Chairman Smith teamed up here with the courageous Chairman Senator Rubio to define an American Foreign policy based on our unique American Values expressed in the Judeo-Christian faith that have been the bedrock of American leadership in the world and should define a second American Century in this 21st century, as Chairman Rubio has so eloquently called for.

Thank you for inviting me to testify here with a panel of distinguished witnesses. My testimony will address the following three subjects:

- The Brutal nature of the One Child Policy;
- How the One Child Policy is being slowly dismantled by the hard and dangerous work of people faithful to the Lord's call;
- How gendercide can now also be ended too

I. The Brutal nature of the One Child Policy :

The first time I was asked about whether I knew anything about China's One Child Policy was at a Congressional hearing in June 1990, when I escaped to America after spending 10 months in hiding from being the "Most wanted in China". Congressman Smith asked me that question at. I answered with a surprise, "Doesn't everybody know all about China's One Child Policy?" Congressman Smith said, "No, not everyone knew". The truth was, "one child per family" three words sounded so benign and perfect. Only decade later I realized that I did not know the true meaning of it either. The true nature of this policy was that "all other children must die".

This woman was 9 months pregnant with her 2nd child and she was dragged into a forced clinic. She fought so hard for her baby's life and the doctor injected drugs into her and she fell into a deep sleep. By the time she woke up, not only did she realize her baby was gone, soon she found that she also lost her uterus, and her health. So she could never have another baby. In addition to that, she lost her job. She lost her love relationship with the baby's father. Her life was forever changed, from a vibrant, healthy and successful women entrepreneur into a homeless, jobless, and disabled petitioner for justice.



Cases like this above woman who suffered forced abortions are numerous. According to China's own admission, the One Child Policy had eliminated 400 million lives in the past 35 years. Even to me who did not know God, this was the largest human rights violation on earth and pure evil!

II. How the One Child Policy is being dismantled by the Lord and by His faithful works in the field step by step?

It was at Chairman Smith's hearing in Nov. 2009 that my eyes were opened to the true brutal nature of the One Child Policy, and realized how we were being

fooled to believe otherwise all these years. After leading the 1989 Tiananmen movement, and paying a severe price for it, including still living in exile as of today, I knew from personal experience ending China's One Child Policy not only need commitment, endurance, perseverance, courage, and all the human attributes you can name, but it needed something bigger, much bigger, to overcome this massive evil. My findings were revolutionary to me. I ask for your forgiveness upfront if you find my testimony uncomfortable in anyway. But as for me, I could no longer live the life I lived before by trying to pursue justice and freedom seeking to do good only on my own back. That almost brought me to death. Let alone the futility to find freedom and justice.

That bigger thing is God. Shortly after that hearing, many brave souls including Reggie here today led me to know God through giving my life to Christ Jesus. **And I was restored back to life able to carry on the fight for Freedom and Justice.**

Few months later, in June 2010, I felt called to found All Girls Allowed---in Jesus' name simply love her to help end the One Child Policy, and to end Gendercide to restore the God given life, value, and dignity to girls and mothers. The last 5 years have been for me a blessed Abrahamic, Moses, and David vs. Goliath's kind of walk with the Lord. We experienced firsthand verses taught at Sunday school in our daily walk with the Lord. Verses like:

- “With people, this is not possible, with God, All things are possible. (Matthew 19:26);
- “Don't overcome evil with evil, but overcome evil with good” (Romans 12:21),
- “7”If you abide in Me, and My words abide in you, ask whatever you wish, and it will be done for you. 8”My Father is glorified by this, that you bear much fruit, and so prove to be My disciples.” (John 15:7)

Our experience shows that these verses are not only true, but possible in our fight to end the one child policy. This is how we work and how my team interprets the events of our time. That God is not a deity up in the air with no interest in worldly suffering or our affairs, but a living God, who intimately and passionately cares about our suffering. This faith motivates me and my team to be the arms that hold the mothers and children who would be killed by this policy and offer them love and peace. Dozens of faithful workers do this in China every day, binding up the broken hearted. And not only God cares, God suffers with us; but Good News-God has overcome all suffering and that is to me the meaning of the Cross, God is ending all sorrows through the power of Jesus' death on the cross and Jesus'

presence on the earth today. That is the testimony of me and my team that we show our faith by our work to end this One Child Policy. And because Jesus lives, so we can all live and overcome our suffering too. So what does this mean to the One Child Policy? It means not only we can confront it, it means with God, we can also overcome it, we can end it, and the truth is: the One Child Policy is ending! Step by step.

This was what happened:

- In Nov 2011, At Rome, I had a powerful personal experience with the Lord, and I was led to the verses in the Sermon on the Mount, the Beatitude: "Blessed are those who hunger and thirst for righteousness, for they will be satisfied." I felt as if the Lord Jesus himself was weeping for the Chinese women and babies' sufferings under the One Child Policy and He promised if no one on earth will do something about it, He will;
- In Dec 2011, an American woman who has a gift of hearing from God declared at a large mission conference in LA, that God indeed will end the One Child Policy beginning in 2012;



- In June 12th 2012, a disciple of an American missionary couple learned about the choose life message, and called 500 Chinese pastors and leaders to repentance to God and to men of our actions. The Lord promised: “¹⁴ if my people, who are called by my name, will humble themselves and pray and seek my face and turn from their wicked ways, then I will hear from heaven, and I will forgive their sin and will heal their land.” 2 Chronicle 7:14



- On June 13th, 2012, the story of the young mother's forced aborted baby picture was released into Internet, and it caused a media storm and international outrage. Estimated 90+ million people protested on the Internet against this brutal policy:



(In June 2nd 2012, a young mother Feng Jianmei was dragged into forced abortion clinic. They injected poison into her baby's head inside her womb. On June 4th, the dead baby came out of her body. She was devastated.)

- In July 22nd 2012, the outcry against the brutal policy led to the swift announcement by the central government's family planning committee leader to stop all late stage forced abortions absolutely. Within months, over 23 providences adopted this policy. The cases of forced abortions have substantially reduced. (we only found one case since then. After our case workers called the family, the local government quickly made compensation to this family----a 180 degree change)



- In Nov 14th, 2013, China announced to ease its One Child Policy to a conditional Two Children Policy: "couples will be allowed to have two children if one of the parents was an only child."



http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-11/15/c_132891920.htm

- In 2015, China will have more than 1 million babies born as a 2nd child. As of Jan 13th, 2015, reports shown that more than 600,000 new 2nd child babies have been born which would not have otherwise been born, as big as the entire population of the city of Boston. Notice in this picture the couple is having a baby girl, the opposite from showing a baby boy in the past. And they are wearing pink. Almost the same pink we use as All Girls Allowed.




<http://www.bellanaija.com/2015/02/10/china-expects-1-million-additional-births-in-2015-as-1-million-couples-apply-to-have-2nd-child/>

Our reports from China revealed more and more places are implementing a non-conditional two children policy.

- April 2015, chatters from Chinese twitters recently have been talking about the pending news that China will end the One Child Policy officially in May and go for a Two Children Policy. Some of the family planning committee leaders tried to refute the chatters. But we know, the end is near.

Timeline of the Selective Two-Child Policy



<http://www.allgirlsallowed.org/blog/posts/chinas-two-child-policy-updates-and-looking-ahead>

Recommendations: We urge the Chinese leaders to make the decision to end the One Child Policy once for all, and make it an All Children Allowed policy, especially an All Girls Allowed policy. We invite the American leader to join us in

sending this message! Children are inheritance from the Lord! God will lead His people to freedom!

III. How gendercide can also be ended too

If One Child Policy was the main source of evil, and then it produces many other evil effects such as:

- **Gendercide:** 1 out of 6 baby girls in China were aborted or killed;
- **Gender Imbalance:** 37 million extra men will not find wives, it leads to social instability, militarization and massive sex trafficking;
- **Sex Trafficking:** today China counts for 60% worldwide sex trafficking;
- **“Children without residency status—children without Huko”:** According to China’s 2010 census, China has *13 million undocumented children*. The majority were “over-quota” children born in violation of China’s one-child policy, and who were accordingly denied legal identification or “household registration” known as *huko*. Without *huko*, a person cannot attend school, receive healthcare or government support, travel by train or plane, or get married.
 - **Aging Population:** Chinese government says China will have more than 400 million over the age of 60 in 15 years, the largest grey population country. Healthcare and social services will all be burdened by the aging, and the world’s second largest economy will struggle to maintain its growth.
- **Large percentage of women suffered forced or coerced abortions; 86%**
- **Domestic violence:** 30% families reported experiencing domestic violence. Actual numbers will be higher;
- **Sexual assaults against women and children are high;**
- **High percentages of young couples under 35 are getting divorced;**
- **500 women committee suicide daily.**

With all these social issues, our work to expose, rescue and heal in the name of Jesus to simply love her have proven fruitful as in the past 5 years, thousands mothers and babies were helped by our ministry. Your Hearings draw attention to this fruitful work and should continue.

Thank you Chairman Smith and Co Chairman Rubio for the opportunity to testify today. I would like to encourage Senator Rubio to push for passage of the Campus Safety and Accountability Act to end the violence against women and men in our country. And as I will make clear in my testimony today, the Girls Count Act hits at the heart of the problem for girls in China so again I thank Senator Rubio and Chairman Smith for sponsoring this Act and for being Champions for the rights of Women and girls.

As noted in my reference to the Girls Count Act, the core problem with China's coercive population control measures and one child policy is the requirement for a birth permit or Huko. This hate filled policy prevents couples and mothers from being free to plan their own family. Even worse it places 13 million baby girls on the black list in China where they have no birth registration and hence no access to healthcare, education, a passport or other rights given to citizens of China. These are Chinese girls born in China to Chinese parents but denied their right of existence due to the evil Huko and let us joined together not just calling for an end to the One Child Policy but for an end to the policy of requiring birth permits. Let us call for an All Girls, All Children Allowed Policy.

Recommendation: In Jesus' name simply love her.


If the Chinese government indeed is giving financial incentives to couples to have girls, that is a good policy move, as long as it does not encourage the couple to kill baby boys.

<http://www.theepochtimes.com/n3/1329559-the-backlash-of-chinas-birth-policy/>

Let me end my testimony on hope: Gendercide can also be ended in the name of Jesus by the renewing of our mind, one baby girl a time, because she was created also in the image of God!



IN JESUS' NAME, SIMPLY LOVE HER
All Girls Allowed



PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHEN GUANGCHENG

A MATTER OF LIFE AND DEATH: HOW VIOLENT BIRTH CONTROL IN CHINA IS
BREAKING DOWN THE TRADITIONAL MORALITY OF CHINESE SOCIETY

APRIL 30, 2015

To address the issue of violent birth control in China, let me start by listing birth control slogans from some of the following provinces:

In Yunnan: All villagers will be sterilized once a single villager violates the birth quota.

In Sichuan: Anyone avoiding sterilization must be put in custody; anyone avoiding sterilization must be punished by bulldozing their house; anyone avoiding abortion shall surrender their cattle and house.

In Anhui: We'd rather see ten more tombs than a single baby born alive.

In Jiangsu: We'd rather see a river of blood than a single baby born alive.

In Guangxi: An IUD must be secured after the first birth; sterilization must follow the second; the third and fourth must be killed.

In Shandong: We'd rather see a broken home than a collapsed country. First birth is OK, the second must be followed by sterilization, or law enforcement steps in.

From the above slogans, you can definitely get a clear picture of the bloody and brutal violence resulting from China's birth control policies and practices.

Back in the summer of 1982, a village Party chief said while at rest, "During the birth control movement, I went to see a friend who had just had an abortion in a hospital. After wandering to the backyard, I saw an old man trying to remove dead babies in his two buckets, and spades pressing down bodies. I saw some of the babies with hair, or a nose, or ears, some just taking the shape of a person . . . all sorts of them being carried away to somewhere for burial."

Birth control in China is taboo, as nobody dares to touch a nerve. To achieve its goal of population control, the Communist Party has established a vast system to carry out its policy. The Party has also signaled to those on the front line that jailing, beating, eviction, demolition and other such policies are not beyond the red line, even at the cost of life. In my village and neighboring villages, we could often hear and see groups of people, from a dozen to several dozen and headed by their local party chiefs, acting like bandits, beating villagers, and holding them in defiance of legal procedures, day and night. We could hear screaming and crying during these operations.

I volunteered to help the villagers with my legal knowledge in the hope of stopping and preventing such brutal actions. Yet, I found out the law was useless in trying to stop these violent birth control practices. The Party committee had ordered local law enforcement authorities such as the police, the prosecutors, and the judiciary NOT to get involved in such cases.

Whenever this kind of human rights violation occurred, villagers would call the police for help, but they were told that this was a governmental action, and beyond their scope of work, and so the police refused to intervene. When a complaint was made to a local **prosecutor**, it would be turned down; even when such a suit was filed in a local court, it would be rejected with no further consideration. Therefore, the local folks could not find a place to obtain justice. Once a layman was driven to such desperation by lack of hope, he would resort to violence. And only when such violence happened would you see law enforcement flooding in, tools of human rights violation at the will of the Party.

In China, a married couple must first seek a permit from the local birth control committee before pregnancy. With such an official document in hand, the couple can then think of having a baby. If pregnant without such a permit, the woman would be summoned and forced to report to a local birth control service station, where a Communist party official would force her to sign a form of acknowledgement prior to a forced abortion, purporting that such a procedure (including sterilization) was done with her consent. Of course, NONE of these women are willing to lose their own babies, but rather are coerced to place their fingerprint on the form against their will.

If these Communist bandits failed to get the pregnant woman to submit to a nighttime operation, then they would take away family members, relatives such as uncles and aunts, siblings, and even other neighbors within a diameter of 50 meter of the target, usually including 10–20 households, by force, often with cruelty. These relatives would be coerced into fighting before being taken away for illegal detention. Those who suffered would have to pay 50–100 yuan per day, which is about \$10–\$20, in the name of legal **training fee**. As a matter of fact, they have to pay

for their suffering. This illegal detention and torture has caused great strife, even hatred, among relatives.

Regarding forced abortion in China, during the first three months of pregnancy, a device shall be inserted into the vagina and the fetus cut into pieces inside womb, then pumped outside. Up to the sixth month of pregnancy, a poison shall be injected into womb to kill the baby and birth induced to withdraw the baby from out of the body. Late in pregnancy, at six months or beyond, birth is to be induced and the baby drowned in a water bucket. Sometimes, a doctor would break the neck of a baby and throw it into a trash bin.

During a six-month period of 2005, more than 130,000 forced abortions and/or sterilizations took place in Linyi city ALONE; more than 600,000 family members suffered during this period. This brutality and these crimes against women and their families have wrought irrevocable physical, spiritual and psychological harm. Many families have lost hope and ended up broken.

Over the past 35 years, China has killed a total of 360 to 400 million young lives as a result of its inhumane and violent birth control policies. This brutality still goes on despite China's propaganda of loosening control on the second child bearing for some couples on certain conditions. Just a few days ago, I got a case involving a man who was disabled due to a severe beating by local government personnel just because his sister-in-law had had an additional baby without a permit.

This inhumane brutality has resulted in society becoming indifferent to life and has diminished the dignity of the human being, thus breaking down the traditional morality of Chinese society on life-and-death matters and leading to social decay. The ratio of the sexes to one another is distorted - as an old Chinese saying goes, **a single piece of wood burns hardly long, so is hard to raise a single child in a family.** These so-called little emperors and little princesses exhibit a selfish character and a weak and fragile psyche. Along with these social issues, China has become an aging society, with more than a million families who have lost their ONLY child. . .

A contemporary genocide is taking place in Communist China now; it is a horrific crime against humanity. I would make the follow proposal:

(1) The United States Congress, along with the international community, should take all steps necessary to stop the inhumane cruelty of the Communist Party; it should call for an international tribunal to investigate crimes committed by the Communist regime in China, and make Communist officials accountable for their crimes against humanity, particularly this kind of genocide.

(2) The United States should ban those criminal Communist officials from entry into the U.S., and their property in this country should be forfeit. These officials include former security chief Zhou Yongkang (who has been arrested on charges of various crimes); Zhang Gaoli (former governor of Shandong Province, now first Vice Premier and Politburo member); and Linyi City Party Chief Li Qun, who is not only a practitioner of violent birth control, but also the leading evildoer persecuting my family. These human rights violators who act against humanity must be made accountable.

Thank you very much for your attention to the worsening human rights situation in China.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER SMITH, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW JERSEY; CHAIRMAN, CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA

APRIL 30, 2015

Today's hearing will examine the looming demographic, economic, and social problems associated with China's 'One-Child Policy' and seek recommendations on how the international community can assist China to address them.

China's one child policy is state sponsored violence against women and children, including and especially the girl child, and constitutes massive crimes against humanity.

With us today is Chen Guangcheng, the Chinese legal advocate who was jailed for five years for trying to protect women facing forced abortions and sterilizations.

In his testimony, Chen gets it right. He calls China's coercive population planning policies "genocide." He calls for an international tribunal to investigate these crimes against humanity and calls on the Administration to enforce existing US law and bar Chinese officials from the U.S.

In 1999, I wrote a law—The Admiral James W. Nance and Meg Donovan Foreign Relations Act for fiscal years 2000–2001. That bill was signed into law on November 29, 1999.

Section 801 of Title VII of that Act requires the Secretary of State not to issue any visa to, and the Attorney General not to admit to the U.S. any foreign national whom the Secretary finds, based on credible evidence, to have been directly involved in the establishment of forced abortions or forced sterilizations.

To the best of my knowledge under President Obama, almost one has been rendered inadmissible. It has been a gross failure of the Obama Administration not to enforce existing law, particularly on those in China who so brutally violate women's rights.

The "One Child Policy" will soon mark its 35th anniversary. That's 35 years of telling couples what their families must look like; 35 years of forced and coerced abortions and sterilizations, 35x years of children viewed by the state as "excess baggage" from the day they were conceived.

The human rights violations associated with this policy are massive. We have only recently begun to fully understand the demographic consequences and what that could mean for China, for China's neighbors, and for the world.

Just over a year ago China announced a slight change to the policy—allowing couples in which one parent is an only child to have two children.

The announcement was followed by a tidal wave of international media coverage trumpeting this "relaxation of China's one-child policy" and speculating that the policy was on its way out.

The policy change was really only minimal and was grossly inadequate in light of the coercion the Chinese government has employed for three decades against women and children. Left unchanged was the Chinese government's strangle-hold on deciding who can have children, when they can have children and how many children a family can have.

Left unchanged are the coercive measures and fines that can be taken if a woman is found to be carrying a child without permission. Left unchanged is the large bureaucracy that enforced and continues to enforce the policy of population control.

The minimal change also does nothing to address the three decade decimation of female population. Approximately 40 million women and girls are missing from the population—a policy that can only be accurately described as gendercide. The extermination of the girl child in society simply because she happens to be a girl.

China's birth limitation policy continues to increase the gender imbalance—making China a regional magnet for sex and bride trafficking of women from neighboring countries such as Burma, Cambodia, Vietnam, Laos and North Korea.

This is unacceptable, it is horrific, it is tragic, and it is wrong. We are waiting for the coercive population planning polices to end. Yet, the Chinese government continues to deny there will be an end.

Of course, ending this brutal policy would be the moral thing to do. And everyone is increasingly aware that ending this policy would also be in the Chinese government's interest.

As the Economist noted just last week, by 2025, nearly 1 in 4 Chinese citizens will be over the age of 60. At the same time, China's working-age population has shrunk in each of the past three years. These factors are likely to hurt not only government balance sheets but also economic growth in China. This should be of particular concern to the Chinese Communist Party, as economic growth is the primary source of their legitimacy.

The government should also be concerned about the dramatically skewed gender ratio. It may be fashionable for the media to write stories about "leftover women," but I know—and I'm quite sure the Chinese government knows—that its real problem is the 30 million young men who will be unable to find wives in the coming years.

The government should be concerned—as should China's neighbors and the international community—of the consequences of 30 million men, unable to find companionship, unable to start families, coming of age precisely at the time that China's economy is creating fewer jobs to employ them.

We continue to see increased human trafficking for forced marriages. NGOs working in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Burma have all reported an increase in trafficking of women and girls into China in recent years. Even if China ends the one-child policy tomorrow, given the current demographics, this problem of a shortage of women in China will only get worse in the coming decade.

Given this current realities, it is frankly baffling that China would continue to implement its brutal policy of population control. This is a policy that is hated by the Chinese people, recognized as a drain on China's social and economic development, destructive of traditional family relationships, and criticized globally.

China's women and girls have borne the brunt of the one-child policy over the past three and a half decades. All of China's society will feel the effects of this misguided and inhuman policy for decades to come.

I urge the government to do what is right, not only of its people, but what is clearly in its own interest, and end this policy now.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. MARCO RUBIO, A U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA;
COCHAIRMAN, CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA

APRIL 30, 2015

I'd like to begin by thanking Chairman Smith for his unwavering leadership on this issue.

Nearly 35 years ago, the communist regime in China enacted its "One-Child Policy," one of the most disastrous and immoral social policies in human history. It was the communist regime's ill-conceived "solution" to help curb population growth and boost economic development.

The One-Child Policy banned most Chinese couples from having more than one child. When couples conceived a second child, the Chinese government forced them to eliminate him or her, by any means necessary—including forced abortions. However, because of cultural norms that place a premium on boys, the policy's victims also included first-conceived children simply because they happened to be girls. In addition, Chinese women who gave birth to baby girls were indirectly victims of this policy because many ended up being shunned by their husbands, families, and society.

For over three decades, China's One-Child Policy, combined with the preference for sons, has condemned an unknown number of Chinese girls—who the policy helped deem unwanted or "surplus"—to abortion, infanticide, and abandonment. The result is a radically skewed sex ratio, and—by the Chinese government's own estimates—30 million more men than women by 2020. No one knows for sure what such a large surplus of males will mean for Chinese society, but many experts have predicted, among other consequences, an increase in human trafficking for the purposes of prostitution and forced marriages. Many of China's neighbors can attest to this reality.

China's One-Child Policy demands the attention of American policymakers not only because it is a grotesque violation of basic human rights, but also because there will be a growing number of involuntary bachelors and the likely impact this group may have on internal social unrest and broader regional stability.

The One-Child Policy has also contributed to a large number of unregistered children in China. The Economist has done an excellent job of documenting in several reports in recent years, noting that today there are about 13 million Chinese who lack household registration certificates, many of them because they were born in violation of the One-Child Policy. While it is technically illegal to withhold registration from "out-of-plan" children, in practice, many local family planning officials refuse to register these children as a way to force parents to pay large fines. In other cases, parents who know they will be unable to pay family planning fines do not even try to have their so-called "illegal" children registered. Not having this certificate means they can't go to school, get a job, get married or receive state benefits. They have no access to China's already flawed legal system. They can't even escape this misery by buying plane or train tickets so they can relocate. Over time, failing to register children at birth leaves them vulnerable to human trafficking and exploitation.

Just over a year ago, the Chinese government relaxed this disastrous policy. However, innocent Chinese parents are still forced to endure abortions and sterilizations in the parts of the country that are still subject to it. The shift in policy was not an admission that the government had perpetrated a horrific human rights abuse against its own people. Rather, it was based on the recognition that China now faces serious demographic decline in the coming decades if the status quo remains intact.

I am actively trying to address both the problem of unregistered children and China's sex-ratio imbalance through legislation I've introduced called the Girls Count Act.

The Girls Count Act would direct current U.S. foreign assistance to support the rights of women and girls in developing countries by working to establish birth registries in their countries. While China already has a birth registration system, the Girls Count Act includes provisions to coordinate with the private sector and civil society organizations to advocate for the registration of all children. Of course, the best way to ensure that all Chinese children are registered is to remove the fines and other punishments for "out-of-plan" children; however, until this happens, encouraging local NGOs to work with parents to register their children and, if nec-

essary, to take legal action against local governments who refuse to register children, would be a positive step.

In addition to the focus on registration, the Girls Count Act would support programs to help increase property rights, social security, home ownership, land tenure security, and inheritance rights for all citizens, and women in particular. Women in China often face difficulty protecting their property rights. In urban settings women may face pressure to keep their names off the deed of their home in order to allow their husbands to save face, while in rural areas women lose their land rights when they marry outside of their home villages. Yet as one of our witnesses today, Professor Hudson, will discuss, supporting property rights for women is crucial for raising the status of women and girls within the family and society as a whole. By working to raise the status of women, we can get at one root cause of the gender imbalances in China and elsewhere—the preference for sons. This Act is but one way we can address the societal consequences of China’s disastrous One-Child Policy.

Perhaps most regrettably, time and again this Administration has failed to prioritize human rights in its dealings with the Chinese government—at times going so far as to convey both indirectly, and directly, that these issues can be pushed to the sidelines in our bilateral relations. The Obama Administration has contributed millions of U.S. taxpayer dollars to the United Nations Population Fund, an agency which has been complicit in China’s One-Child policy. It is time for American foreign policy to reflect American values. The U.S. must continue to advocate for the complete elimination of the One-Child policy and the rights of all Chinese citizens, including the unborn, to live up to their God-given potential.

SUBMISSION FOR THE RECORD

 POPULATION CONTROL IN CHINA:
 STATE-SPONSORED VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND CHILDREN

APRIL 30, 2015

*Witness Biographies***Nicholas Eberstadt, Ph.D., Henry Wendt Scholar in Political Economy, American Enterprise Institute**

Nicholas Eberstadt is the Henry Wendt Scholar in Political Economy at the American Enterprise Institute. A political economist and demographer by training, he is a senior advisor to the National Bureau of Asian Research, and has served on the visiting committee at the Harvard School of Public Health, the Global Leadership Council at the World Economic Forum and the President's Council on Bioethics. He has also served as a consultant to the World Bank, Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development, and the Bureau of the Census. With numerous publications on demographics in East Asia, Dr. Eberstadt received his Ph.D., M.P.A., and A.B. from Harvard University, and his M.Sc. from the London School of Economics.

Valerie M. Hudson, Ph.D., Professor and George H.W. Bush Chair, Bush School of Government and Public Service, Texas A&M University

Valerie Hudson is Professor and George H.W. Bush Chair in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University. Her co-authored book, *Bare Branches: Security Implications of Asia's Surplus Male Population*, received two national book awards and widespread media coverage for its unique insights into the possible consequences of Asia's gender imbalance. Dr. Hudson has developed a nation-by-nation database on women, The WomenStats Project, to facilitate empirical research on the status of women globally. She is founding editorial board member of *Foreign Policy Analysis*, and serves on the editorial boards of *Politics and Gender*, and *International Studies Review*. Dr. Hudson received her Ph.D. in political science at the Ohio State University.

Reggie Littlejohn, Founder and President, Women's Rights Without Frontiers

Reggie Littlejohn is Founder and President of Women's Rights Without Frontiers, a broad-based international coalition that opposes forced abortion and sexual slavery in China. Ms. Littlejohn is an acclaimed expert on China's One-Child Policy, having testified six times before the U.S. Congress, three times before the European Parliament, and presented at the British, Irish, and Canadian Parliaments. She has briefed officials at the White House, Department of State, United Nations, and the Vatican. Her "Save a Girl" campaign has saved more than 150 baby girls from sex-selective abortion or grinding poverty in China. A graduate of Yale Law School, Ms. Littlejohn was named one of the "Top Ten" people of 2013 by *Inside the Vatican* magazine. She and her husband are raising as their own the two daughters of jailed pro-democracy dissident Zhang Lin.

Chai Ling, Founder, All Girls Allowed

Chai Ling is Founder of All Girls Allowed ("In Jesus' Name, Simply Love Her"), a nonprofit organization which seeks to expose the injustices of China's one-child policy and rescue girls and mothers from gendercide. A leader in the 1989 Tiananmen Square student movement and Nobel Peace Prize nominee, Ms. Chai escaped from China and received her MPA from Princeton and MBA from Harvard. She is the founder of Jenzabar, a company that provides higher education software management solutions, and co-founder of the Jenzabar Foundation, which supports the humanitarian efforts of student leaders. Ms. Chai is also author of *A Heart for Freedom*, a memoir detailing her journey from a fishing village in rural China to Tiananmen Square and then America.

Chen Guangcheng, Distinguished Fellow in Human Rights, Simon Center on Religion and the Constitution, Witherspoon Institute; Distinguished Visiting Fellow, Institute for Policy Research and Catholic Studies, Catholic University

Chen Guangcheng is a Chinese legal advocate and activist. Mr. Chen is from rural China, where he advocated on behalf of people with disabilities, and exposed and

challenged abuses of population planning officials, including forced abortions and sterilizations. Mr. Chen was imprisoned for his activism for four years. Following two years of house arrest, Mr. Chen escaped confinement in 2012 and came to the U.S. with his family. His now famous escape from China is detailed in a recently published memoir, *The Barefoot Lawyer: A Blind Man's Fight for Justice and Freedom in China*. In addition to his positions at the Witherspoon Institute and Catholic University, Mr. Chen is also a Senior Distinguished Advisor to the Lantos Foundation for Human Rights and Justice.

