

# CRISES IN SUDAN AND NORTHERN UGANDA

---

---

**HEARING**  
BEFORE THE  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA  
AND THE  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS  
AND HUMAN RIGHTS  
OF THE  
COMMITTEE ON  
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS  
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS  
SECOND SESSION

—————  
JULY 29, 1998  
—————

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations



U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

51-687 CC

WASHINGTON : 1998

---

For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office  
Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC 20402  
ISBN 0-16-057710-1

H461-23

## COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, *New York, Chairman*

WILLIAM GOODLING, *Pennsylvania*

JAMES A. LEACH, *Iowa*

HENRY J. HYDE, *Illinois*

DOUG BEREUTER, *Nebraska*

CHRISTOPHER SMITH, *New Jersey*

DAN BURTON, *Indiana*

ELTON GALLEGLEY, *California*

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, *Florida*

CASS BALLENGER, *North Carolina*

DANA ROHRBACHER, *California*

DONALD A. MANZULLO, *Illinois*

EDWARD R. ROYCE, *California*

PETER T. KING, *New York*

JAY KIM, *California*

STEVEN J. CHABOT, *Ohio*

MARSHALL "MARK" SANFORD, *South Carolina*

MATT SALMON, *Arizona*

AMO HOUGHTON, *New York*

TOM CAMPBELL, *California*

JON FOX, *Pennsylvania*

JOHN McHUGH, *New York*

LINDSEY GRAHAM, *South Carolina*

ROY BLUNT, *Missouri*

KEVIN BRADY, *Texas*

RICHARD BURR, *North Carolina*

LEE HAMILTON, *Indiana*

SAM GEJDENSON, *Connecticut*

TOM LANTOS, *California*

HOWARD BERMAN, *California*

GARY ACKERMAN, *New York*

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, *American Samoa*

MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, *California*

DONALD M. PAYNE, *New Jersey*

ROBERT ANDREWS, *New Jersey*

ROBERT MENENDEZ, *New Jersey*

SHERROD BROWN, *Ohio*

CYNTHIA A. MCKINNEY, *Georgia*

ALCEE L. HASTINGS, *Florida*

PAT DANNER, *Missouri*

EARL HILLIARD, *Alabama*

BRAD SHERMAN, *California*

ROBERT WEXLER, *Florida*

STEVE ROTHMAN, *New Jersey*

BOB CLEMENT, *Tennessee*

BILL LUTHER, *Minnesota*

JIM DAVIS, *Florida*

LOIS CAPPS, *California*

RICHARD J. GARON, *Chief of Staff*

MICHAEL H. VAN DUSEN, *Democratic Chief of Staff*

**SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA**

**EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman**

**AMO HOUGHTON, New York**

**ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey**

**STEVEN J. CHABOT, Ohio**

**DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey**

**MARSHALL "MARK" SANFORD, South  
Carolina**

**ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida**

**TOM CAMPBELL, California**

**JIM DAVIS, Florida**

**TOM SHEEHY, Staff Director**

**GREG SIMPKINS, Professional Staff Member**

**JODI CHRISTIANSEN, Democratic Professional Staff Member**

**SHANNON GAWRONSKI, Staff Associate**

---

**SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS**

**CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, Chairman**

**WILLIAM F. GOODLING, Pennsylvania**

**TOM LANTOS, California**

**HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois**

**CYNTHIA A. MCKINNEY, Georgia**

**DAN BURTON, Indiana**

**GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York**

**CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina**

**ENI P.H. FALEOMAVEGA, American  
Samoa**

**PETER T. KING, New York**

**DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey**

**MATT SALMON, Arizona**

**EARL F. HILLIARD, Alabama**

**LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina**

**ROBERT WEXLER, Florida**

**ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida**

**GROVER JOSEPH REES, Subcommittee Staff Director and Chief Counsel**

**ROBERT R. KING, Democratic Professional Staff Member**

**DOUGLAS C. ANDERSON, Counsel**

**CATHERINE DUBOIS, Staff Associate**



# CONTENTS

## WITNESSES

	Page
Ms. Susan Rice, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, U.S. Department of State .....	12
Ms. Carol Bellamy, Executive Director, UNICEF .....	29
Ms. Catherine Bertini, Executive Director, World Food Programme .....	33
Ms. Jemera Rone, Counsel, Human Rights Watch .....	36
Mr. Daniel Eiffe, Liaison Officer, Norwegian Peoples Aid .....	39
Sister Mary Rose Atuu, Little Sisters of Mary Immaculate of Gulu, Northern Uganda .....	43

## APPENDIX

### Prepared statements:

Hon. Christopher H. Smith, a Representative in Congress from New Jersey and Chairman, Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights .....	55
Hon. Cynthia McKinney, a Representative in Congress from Georgia .....	57
Hon. Donald M. Payne, a Representative in Congress from New Jersey ....	59
Hon. Robert Menendez, a Representative in Congress from New Jersey ....	61
Hon. Tony P. Hall, a Representative in Congress from Ohio .....	67
Ms. Susan Rice .....	74
Ms. Carol Bellamy .....	80
Ms. Catherine Bertini .....	85
Ms. Jemera Rone .....	99
Mr. Daniel Eiffe .....	116
Sister Mary Rose Atuu .....	124
Mr. Roger Winter, Director, U.S. Committee for Refugees . .....	130

### Additional material submitted for the record:

June 16, 1998 letter from the Little Sisters of Mary Immaculate of Gulu on Northern Uganda .....	145
July 29, 1998 letter to William Cohen from Hon. Donald M. Payne .....	153

### Material submitted by Ms. Bertini:

"Recent Deaths in the Line of Duty of WFP Staff Members" .....	154
Budget Revision for EMOP No. 5826.01 "Emerging Food Assistance to War and Drought Affected Populations" in the Sudan .....	155

# CRISES IN SUDAN AND NORTHERN UGANDA

---

WEDNESDAY, JULY 29, 1998

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, AND SUBCOMMITTEE ON  
INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS,  
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,  
*Washington, DC.*

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:39 p.m., in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ed Royce [chairman of the Subcommittee on Africa] and Hon. Chris Smith, [chairman of the Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights] presiding.

Mr. ROYCE. [presiding] This joint hearing of the Subcommittee on Africa and the Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights will come to order.

The humanitarian crisis in the neighboring countries of Sudan and Uganda are demanding world attention. Tragically, once again we are witnessing starvation by the tens of thousands in Sudan, and northern Uganda is experiencing equally horrific events. These crises are related and the Sudanese and Ugandan Governments are each providing support for rebel forces. Today's hearing aims to better understand these situations and better understand U.S. policy options.

Northern Uganda has been plagued by rebel insurgency for the past 12 years, but the frequency of attacks has increased over the last couple of years leaving thousands of displaced Ugandans living in makeshift camps. The perpetrator of this violence, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), has become notorious for looting homes and abducting and enslaving thousands of Ugandan children. The U.N. Children's Fund estimates that up to 10,000 youngsters have been victims of its gruesome atrocities. This violence mars Uganda's considerable progress.

Today, Sudanese by the thousands are dying from hunger in southern Sudan as a result of civil war and drought. The estimate of people in need of emergency food is 2.6 million. Thousands of Sudanese have left their homes in search of food and between 40 and 50 people are dying every day in the southern town of Wau alone. Humanitarian-inspired ceasefires, while desirable, are no long-term answer to this suffering. The political barriers to ending this suffering can seem daunting, but while providing aid and saving lives in the short-term, the United States may have a chance to encourage long-term developments.

In May, the Sudanese Government offered to hold a referendum in the south, supposedly allowing for the option of self-determina-

tion to southern Sudanese. It may make sense for the United States and others to look seriously at this proposal. As a good friend of Uganda, the United States may have a diplomatic role to play in its conflict. The United States is the largest funder of Operational Lifeline Sudan, the U.N.-sponsored program which coordinates the delivery of relief assistance to war-affected civilians.

Since 1989 when OLS was founded, the United States has contributed more than \$700 million helping to save countless lives. Yet many Members of Congress have grave concerns about how Operation Lifeline has functioned and what type of diplomatic support it has received from our government. We look forward to hearing from Assistant Secretary of State, Susan Rice and others on these issues. Our witnesses today will give us a current picture of the situation in southern Sudan and northern Uganda, as well as recommendations for effective U.S. policy in dealing with these humanitarian crises.

We are pleased to share today's hearing with the Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights, and I will now turn to the panel's Chair, Mr. Chris Smith of New Jersey.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Chairman Royce, and I do thank you for scheduling this very important hearing, and doing it jointly, on the humanitarian and human rights crises in northern Uganda and Sudan.

A few weeks ago, I received a visit from Sister Mary Rose Atuu, who shared her personal observations of a campaign of terror waged by the so-called Lord's Resistance Army, with the backing of the Government of Sudan. The systematic torture, rape, and murder of children, who are then forced to become murderers themselves, are atrocities on the order of those committed by Hitler and Stalin. Yet the modern world simply watches while the rape and the torture and the murder continues. I hope our Administration witnesses today tell us exactly what our government believes would be necessary to put an end to these depredations of the LRA, and what we are doing to see to it that these steps are taken.

The crisis in Uganda is inextricable from the plight of southern Sudan, whose people have been the victims of a vicious internal war inflicted by the radical military government in Khartoum, and who are now dying by the thousands as a result of the famine caused in large part by that war. The lesson of Sudan is also the lesson of the Soviet Union in its heyday; of Ethiopia in the 1980's; and of North Korea today. The primary cause of famine is not natural forces. The primary cause of famine is bad government. There is more than enough food in the world, and the governments and other institutions in the free and civilized world are more than willing to deliver it.

When these institutions fail, it is usually because they are impeded by the governments that caused the famine in the first place. This does not mean that we should stop trying. It is not the fault of the children of Sudan or of North Korea, that they were born in countries with evil governments. I hope to hear from our witnesses today exactly what needs to be done to end the starvation and the malnutrition, and I can assure you I pledge my support to make these things happen. We must bear in mind however, that the long-term solution to the problem of hunger must include an end

to the oppression, corruption, and disregard for human life that are at the root cause of hunger.

I agree with several of our witnesses today that the people of southern Sudan need more than humanitarian assistance; they also need peace. I have joined with my very distinguished colleagues, Tony Hall and Frank Wolf, in calling on the President to appoint a special envoy in an effort to turn the temporary and limited ceasefire into a lasting peace. But the people of Sudan have already learned that no peace will really last until it is peace with honor and justice. It would be tragically wrong to impose a peace that merely takes away from the people of southern Sudan what they have gained in the battlefield, allowing the Khartoum Government to consolidate its power and bide its time before engaging in yet another round of brutal repression. Peace in Sudan means self-determination for all of the people of Sudan. The people of the south must have free and fair elections under international supervision between independence and integration into a new Sudan that is both free and democratic.

We're very honored today to have our distinguished colleague, Tony Hall, who has been the leader in the Congress, whether it be on the House or the Senate side, the leader in trying to eradicate and on the short-term to mitigate the suffering imposed by world hunger. Tony has been a leader on Sudan, he and along with Frank Wolf have been there many times and again we benefit from the good work that he does. I'm very glad he's here and I thank him for joining us on this panel.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith appears in the appendix.]

Mr. ROYCE. At this time I will ask our colleague, Tony Hall, who has recently returned from Sudan, who in the past has taken many trips to Sudan in his efforts to combat world hunger, for his observations.

Mr. HALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and both of you, I appreciate your great effort today and your—certainly your most important witnesses that you're having here today to shed a lot of light really on what's going on. I have a rather long statement that I'd like to have it as part of the record, I'm not going to read it. I'm just going to talk a little bit about the trip that I took at the end of May.

I was in Sudan at the end of May and I must say that I'd been to Sudan before, this is my third trip, and it's getting much worse. I've visited a lot of disaster areas in the world and I would say that of course, the worst that many of us have seen was in Ethiopia in 1984. In the area that I was in this time, the province of Bahr-el-Ghazal which is in the south west part of Sudan, it's just about as bad as anything I've seen since Ethiopia in 1984. I just saw hundreds and hundreds of people just starving, many children beyond malnutrition and extreme, extreme starvation, and the last time I have seen that—I saw a little bit of it in North Korea—but the last time I saw it in a wholesale way was in Ethiopia in 1984.

And what is eerie about it is that, outside of some of the feeding stations, especially in this province in southwest Sudan, you see lots of mothers that have walked miles to get to this particular feeding camp and this particular feeding camp was being handled by World Vision. And they were all just very thin, their children



were beyond malnutrition, they were in the extreme part of starvation and obviously, in my opinion, what I was seeing is at least half of them would not make it. It was one of the eerie things about it and when you see hundreds of people waiting outside to get into the feeding center, when you see people like this and nobody is making a noise or children are not walking around, they're not playing, they're not laughing, they're not crying, they're just suffering—they're hardly making a noise; you know you're in bad shape, and that was the situation town after town, village after village, that we had seen.

We saw a lot of atrocities that were committed by horsemen apparently coming out of the north. One of the groups that we travelled with is a private voluntary organization called MPA, and it's a Norwegian people's aid and they showed us a battle that had occurred 10 days before where hundreds of people were butchered, people that were in villages, in markets, and what we were seeing 10 days later were the after effects of vultures and just picking the bones absolutely bare and it was an amazing sight and something I haven't seen again since Ethiopia.

This is a man-made disaster. Sudan has the ability, according to all of our experts, of being able to not only feed themselves, but they tell me they can feed all of Africa if they could ever have some peace, which they haven't had since they gained their independence; it's about 42, 45 years ago. Only a few years have they had peace. They have an abundance of water with the Nile running right short—there's a lot of water below the surface. In many parts of the land they have a lot of minerals, a lot of resources. They just discovered oil. It's the biggest country geographically in Africa. It's bordered by nine countries around it. There's no other country like that in Africa.

You're going to hear a lot of talk probably today about a good portion of the population. It's almost half and half of Muslim, southern part is Christian, and the tribal problems are just—it's one problem after another. But it has the ability to feed, not only feed itself, but to feed all of Africa, if left alone.

Our policy, in my opinion, of our government isolating Khartoum, is not working and I don't think it has worked for some time. I think the fact that we don't have an ambassador or a full complement of people in Khartoum is wrong. I think that we should talk to these people, no matter how much we detest the atrocities that are occurring over there, but to not have people in Khartoum on a regular basis, to not have people in our embassy, to not have discussions going on, I mean how are we ever going to be part of any peace process or any political settlement; we're not there to talk.

So I believe that our policy of isolating Khartoum is not working. I also went to Khartoum, I talked to Mr. Bashir and Mr. Tarabi and talked to other leaders within Khartoum and I think that maybe I might have been the first official of any kind in 5 years to talk to them, and I think it's silly. I think we ought to be having discussion.

We need more humanitarian help; there's no question about that. The United States is generous. We've always been generous. We're

a very generous government. We're a very generous people. We can do more; we can lead more in this particular area.

A lot of our friends can do much better jobs, especially our European neighbors. There's just no sense in the fact that they've kind of taken their hands off. Japan is sitting on maybe 6 million metric tons of food. We have written them and asked them to think about giving food to Sudan. I mean a lot of their food is rotting, and so we need a lot of help.

Frank Wolf and I have, and Chris Smith, we've called upon the President to appoint a high-level envoy to help with these. We have looked at the situation. By no stretch of the imagination are we experts, but in listening to people, in listening to friends and just traveling to the country a number of times, we've come to the conclusion that, you know if we're going to send our top people to Bosnia and we came out with the Dayton Peace Accords which occurred in my district, Dayton, Ohio, we're going to send Mr. Mitchell, who I think went to Ireland 100 times, and Mr. Holbrooke again to Cyprus, James Baker to parts of northern Africa to settle some of the major disputes that have been going on the past couple of years, why wouldn't we consider doing this in Sudan? They've lost 2 million people over the past 12 years. There's another 2.5 million people that are facing starvation and death and there's a good chance that thousands of these are going to die because the situation, I'm told, is getting worse even since I've been there.

And so I really believe that we need some kind of national envoy really and am hopeful we'll move toward that. I continue to hear more and more. I don't know if this is coming from the Administration or it's coming from Members of Congress that the possibility of a humanitarian envoy could be appointed from our government. I hope that's not the middle ground that the government is pushing, but I think that might be what is coming, and I think it's a nice gesture but that's all it is.

We've got a lot of humanitarian experts in Sudan, most of them, or a good portion of them, are here in the room. A lot of them are still in Sudan, are working on Alokichoggio, and OLS is—you know, they have a lot of people that have been there for years so we have a lot of humanitarian envoys. So a humanitarian ambassador, humanitarian envoy is a good gesture, but it's not going to do the job.

Sudan needs peace, there's no question about it, to end this war, and I think the only way to get peace is to have a political solution. In the whole, I would say the OLS operation, Lifeline Sudan has done a good job. If we didn't have them there, we'd have to figure out a way to invent them because they've been there a number of years, they work awfully hard. They've been timid sometimes. Somebody once told me, my friend Dan, he says that's a nice word, "timid." They've lacked the guts in the past few months when almost all of the food shipments into this province that I'm talking about, which are going to rebel-held areas at the SPLA, every flight has to be approved by Khartoum. And as a result of that, what's happened is all the food flights stopped. That's why you're seeing tens of thousands of people not only die, but that's why a lot of food has not gotten into that province.

And the United Nations thought the OLS has been very timid, as when Khartoum says, we're not going to allow you in, they have hardly raised their voice. I don't have any understanding toward that—when you go out to Sudan and you're in Kenya you hear a lot of criticism from both sides about the OLS relative to this lack of guts of raising their voice concerning this most important problem.

Food is now going into the province, and you'll hear from experts as to how much and what's needed, but these are just a few of my thoughts. I thank both of you for your interest and for all that you're doing, certainly for holding this hearing. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hall appears in the appendix.]

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Hall. We will now hear from the Ranking Member of this Committee, Mr. Robert Menendez from New Jersey.

Mr. MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I listened with great interest to my colleague who clearly is one of the most clariant voices in the Congress on behalf of those who hunger throughout the world, and I appreciate him being here today. His insights are always, I think, enormously important to those of us who deal with foreign policy issues. Tony Hall deals with these issues from a different perspective and his perspective is one that I appreciate and thank the Chair for having him today here and Tony for sharing it with us.

Once again, the Sudanese people find themselves confronted with famine and death, and once again the culprit is Sudan's 15-year-long civil war. Ten years ago, 250,000 Sudanese perished in the famine of the last 1980's and today OLS has mounted its largest relief operation ever to manage the more than 2.6 million people facing starvation, and the estimated 250,000 people who are near death. And while a ceasefire is in place and may be an opportunity, it is temporary and, sadly, Sudan's civil war appears no closer to ending today than it did in the 1980's. An estimated 1.5 million people have died in Sudan's civil war. In addition to the internal turmoil, the war has extracted an enormous cost on Sudan's neighbors. The civil war in Sudan still is the root cause of instability in East Africa. The government in Khartoum is responsible for funding and supporting regional insurgent groups and international terrorist organizations. Uganda has been disproportionately affected by the war in Sudan. Khartoum continues to support the LRA which has abducted some 10,000 children, some as young as 8 years old, in Northern Uganda which it uses to support its efforts to overthrow the Government of Uganda and to fight for the Sudanese Government in southern Sudan.

Today we're charged with looking at the humanitarian crisis in the region, but, clearly, we cannot look at the humanitarian crisis without acknowledging the civil war as the cause of the famine. The government in Khartoum uses food as a military weapon, attempting to starve fighters in the south, as it did earlier this year when it barred all relief flights to the south in February and March, in response to the military losses in the region. In addition, the war in the south has kept farmers from harvesting their crops. The reality is that the Sudanese people will cycle in and out of

famines until there is peace and stability which allows for sustainable farming throughout the country.

I know that Sudan and even the provision of humanitarian relief are subjects of divisive political debates. I think we can clearly state that no one—no one—supports the National Islamic Front (NIF), and everyone seeks peace and reconciliation for a people who have suffered for far too long. I think that maybe some of the observations that Mr. Hall made need to be taken to heart here as to how to conclude the problem of Sudan. I'm looking forward to listening to the Assistant Secretary because I'd like to hear why we had such a late response to the famine. Why we didn't have the ability to forecast? It seems to me that it's rather obvious that we should have been able to forecast what has been now a cyclical process, and that we should have known about the famine and prepared for a response to it.

I can only agree with the conclusion reached by reporter Bruce Neil in his recent article for *Time* magazine where he says and I quote: "But peace is a commodity that the Sudanese people need the most. Their starvation is all the worse because it is so unnecessary. Southern Sudan offers some of the most productive land in Africa and the people who live there are hardworking farmers and herdsmen, taskmasters at raising cattle, coping with scanty rainfalls and husbanding seeds. If the battles would only end, they could make it on their own. Instead, tens of thousands of them are likely to die in this famine and the next one which is sure to come."

Now, clearly, part of the work here today must be to consider not only how we address this crisis, but what we can and should do to forestall the next. And as I said, I'd like to hear why we didn't act in a much more propitious and quick manner. The status quo can only yield another famine, and I look forward to hearing the Assistant Secretary's response.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Menendez.

Let me ask our colleague, Cynthia McKinney of Georgia, do you have a statement you would like to submit at this time?

Ms. MCKINNEY. I do have a statement which focuses on the Ugandan side of this issue. I will submit it for the record and hear from our Assistant Secretary who has come.

[The prepared statement of Ms. McKinney appears in the appendix.]

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you. And let me turn now to the vice chairman of this Committee, Mr. Houghton of New York, to ask if he has a statement at this time.

Mr. HOUGHTON. No, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you. Mr. Don Payne of New Jersey.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me thank you and Chairman Smith for calling this very important hearing on the crisis of Sudan and northern Uganda.

Many people that I come across know that there is a severe problem in Sudan—it's been there for many years—but cannot comprehend its depth. To me the one predictable thing about Sudan is its unpredictability. An entire generation of southern Sudanese are dying in one way or another in the world's most neglected civil war. More than 1.5 million southern Sudanese have died over the past decade as a result of war, famine, disease, and just neglect of the

world. The urgency of the humanitarian crisis in Sudan cannot be overstated.

For the life of me, I cannot understand how this has happened yet again. An estimated 2.6 million people are currently at risk of starvation. Relief operations are seriously threatened because of the government's policy of starvation as a weapon. The NIF Government is primarily responsible for the escalation of the current humanitarian tragedy. Moreover, citizens continue to suffer needlessly, in part because of the indifference of the international community. OLS, created to prevent humanitarian crisis in Sudan, is also partly responsible. OLS has become hostage to NIF's constant manipulation. The indiscriminate aerial bombardment of refugee camps and massive ground onslaught by government forces appear targeted in deep populating southern Sudan and to crest Sudan's People Liberation Army, the SPLA.

My first visit to southern Sudan was in 1993, with many subsequent trips since, and I must honestly conclude that almost 8 years of oppression and dictatorship have intensified opposition to the NIF-led government. I've never seen the people in the SPLA more determined. I was in Yei last December with my good friend, Congressman Campbell, and I saw the devastation and the desperate conditions of the people who live there.

Mr. Chairman, I am sure everyone has seen the horrible photos in *Time* magazine, especially in the Bahr-el-Ghazal region, which depicts a mother that cannot provide milk for her starving child, and men that are too frail and too weak to walk, that often means a Dinka herdsman, whose master's raising cattle as a way of life, not being able to provide for his family. This brutal Islamic regime in Khartoum cannot compare in its viciousness to what is happening to the Christians and the animists in the south.

Let me conclude by saying that I must commend Assistant Secretary Susan Rice and our Administration's effective Sudan policy. It is precisely this policy that has brought both parties to the negotiating table. If we change course by opening the embassy without any tangible evidence of reform, the IGAD talks which are scheduled for next month have a potential to be circumvented. Most important, the government in Khartoum will interpret this move as a sign of approval for their brutal policy at a time when we should be clear about our objectives in Sudan. Moved by the situation, I have introduced H. Con. Res. 309 with Chairman Gilman, Chairman Smith, and Ranking Member Menendez, that seeks to halt the forced abduction and recruitment of children soldiers by the abusive government in collaboration with the LRA. It encourages the President to appoint an envoy for the region.

I would also like to submit this letter to the Pentagon for the record which asks for the use of the numerous C-130 planes we have just sitting around in reserve. The planes that are in the region, one is broken, the other two are having problems. The record should be set straight. The NIF government remains an obstacle to peace and a threat to the regional stability. It is cruel and inhumane to use food as a tool of war on the most vulnerable. The United States should not be used by Khartoum as a pawn for their sinister game. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back the balance of my time.

[The letter appears in the appendix.]

[The prepared statement of Mr. Payne appears in the appendix.]

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you Mr. Payne. Under very difficult circumstances, Mr. Payne and Mr. Frank Wolf have been to Sudan, and I'm going to ask Mr. Frank Wolf, who's helped focus this Congress' attention on this issue, if he wants to make an opening statement.

Mr. WOLF. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'll be very brief. I appreciate your holding the hearings. I appreciate Mr. Smith's efforts, and also Mr. Payne and Mr. Hall's latest trip, which I think has helped bring a lot of attention to the issue. I also want to thank Secretary Rice, who has been a good voice on this issue. My comfort level has increased tremendously by the fact that you're down where you are because I think we share a lot of the same views on Sudan.

I did want to say there are two other things: First, more U.S. aid, particularly with regard to the capacity-building that's necessary; and second, I understand—Mr. Hall said it, and I would like to reiterate—I think we really need a special envoy of the caliber of a former Senator, Sam Nunn or former Senator Paul Simon or Jim Baker—I'm not sure who would take the job—but somebody of that caliber. I know it was tried at one other time and the individual got sick and it was kind of a different type of a situation. But now that all the publicity is coming back on this issue (and I think the Administration is taking a good position on the issue) I think here's an opportunity.

I think if we don't seize all the publicity which has come and probably will come—it usually comes in 2- or 3-month waves and then begins to dissipate again—we may miss another opportunity. And I would think if, Madam Secretary, if we had somebody who would report through you, someone like Paul Simon or Sam Nunn—because when I watched the envoy when Senator Mitchell was the envoy to Northern Ireland, I read in the paper he went back to Ireland about 100 times. Obviously, it's easier to get to Ireland than it is to Sudan, but if you had somebody who became the reservoir of knowledge that had the confidence of the Administration and the confidence of Congress, that knew both sides, couldn't be fooled by either side, I think this would be the opportunity whereby at the end of this year we could bring about truly a real lasting peace.

It's just not a humanitarian solution we need; we also need a political solution, and I would urge you to take that under consideration because I think you've got so much else to do; if this person could funnel through you, I think they could make a difference. Senator Mitchell has been nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize and many more people have died in Sudan, both in the north and the south but particularly in the south, than died in Ireland. And obviously, he did an outstanding job there but, to take that same knowledge and intuition that he had and the ability, with a good relationship to the President and the Administration and Secretary of State, and also the respect he's had here in Congress, he was able to bring that together. The poor southern Sudanese living in the village of Torit or Kapoeta, or wherever they may be, could benefit from someone similar to Senator Mitchell and his expertise.

There's a special envoy, Holbrooke, for Cyprus. Compared to Cyprus, this is a much more significant issue of humanitarian interest.

And, last, we know that there are terrorist groups in downtown Khartoum. We have the opportunity to deal with that issue, to deal with all the other issues on the table. I think a political person could really make the difference in bringing this to a conclusion.

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the hearings and thank you for the time.

Mr. ROYCE.

Thank you, Mr. Wolf. Now, we will have opening statements from Congresswoman McKinney of Georgia and Congressman Sherman from California. Congresswoman McKinney.

Ms. MCKINNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to welcome Assistant Secretary Susan Rice, along with the other witnesses. I look forward to their testimony.

Twelve years ago Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni marched a 20,000-strong rebel army to Uganda's capital, Kampala, and liberated the Ugandan people from the reign of two of the most oppressive dictatorships the world has ever seen. During their successive regimes, Amin and Obote murdered over one million people. While the United States and the western powers did nothing, Museveni took action. Since then, the story of Uganda is nothing short of phenomenal.

President Museveni immediately formed a human rights commission to investigate the atrocities committed under the former dictators. Today the commission is chaired by a judge and overseen by members of the High Court. The mandate of the organization is to serve as a watchdog by monitoring government activities and to educate the public about respect for human rights.

After the establishment of the human rights commission, President Museveni began assembling judges, lawyers, and other scholars for the purpose of drafting Uganda's constitution. His administration actively solicited the involvement of men and women at the grassroots level. Several thousand Ugandans submitted memorandums offering suggestions. An important component of the constitution is a provision institutionalizing the human rights commission.

Perhaps most astonishing has been Uganda's economic growth under President Museveni. Real GDP growth has averaged 6.7 percent over the last 10 years; inflation has been reduced from 250 percent to 6 percent. The country has liberal current and capital accounts, so there is no restriction on foreign exchange.

To ease the concerns of foreign investors, Uganda now offers insurance to investors through the multilateral Insurance Guarantee Agency of the World Bank. Under Amin, Ugandans of south Asian heritage were stripped of their properties and forced to leave the country. President Museveni has allowed them to return and has given back their businesses and land.

To encourage American tourists and investors, citizens of the United States no longer need visas to travel to Uganda.

Understanding that an exclusionary government breeds its own opposition, President Museveni held elections and has an administration that reflects the diversity of Ugandan society. In 1987, a re-

porter asked him how he could afford to have such a large and diverse government. His answer was a simple one: It's cheaper than war.

Mr. Chairman, this is what President Museveni has built in just 12 years. But even more important than what he has done for Uganda, President Museveni is perhaps the first of a new breed of leader on the continent. He has proven that African leaders no longer need to follow the orders of their colonial masters to achieve success. Independence and security, Museveni has shown, are not mutually exclusive.

Unfortunately, all of this is threatened by an entity as evil as the world has ever seen. Northern Uganda is plagued by a rebel insurgency known as the LRA, led by Joseph Kony. The LRA is notorious for looting homes, abducting and enslaving thousands of Ugandan children. Boys as young as 11 years old are forced to serve as soldiers and to participate in extreme acts of violence. Girls of the same age are made into sexual slaves. Nearly all of the children who escape from the LRA are found to be HIV-positive. The U.N. Children's Fund estimates that up to 10,000 youngsters have been victims of rebel atrocities. Backed by an oppressive and terrorist regime in Sudan, the LRA is a direct affront to the new Africa.

It is time, I believe now, Mr. Chairman, for Congress and the Clinton Administration to embrace President Museveni and Uganda as a partner for peace and stability on the African continent. We must make a decision: Will the United States continue its centuries-old neglect of Africa? Will it support only the Mobutu Seseseiko's and Jonas Savimbi's of Africa? Or has President Clinton's trip truly marked a new beginning and relations between the countries of sub-Saharan Africa? Will we support those who are doing the right thing? The current crisis in northern Uganda poses this question. I, along with countless others who care about the future of Africa, await this answer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Ms. McKinney appears in the appendix.]

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Congresswoman McKinney. Congressman Sherman.

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My colleague, Ms. McKinney, has done an outstanding job of talking about Uganda, and I've just got an opening statement that focuses exclusively on Sudan.

This is the least known of the rogue regimes. Americans hear about North Korea; they hear about Iraq and Iran, and yet here is a regime that seems to combine aggression and oppression of its own people along with a near genocidal war, the south, and strong elements of the practice of slavery, one that most Americans think is only a product of the last century. And it's a government that hosts some of the vilest terrorists in the world, provides them sanctuary, and I believe provides them with aid as well.

We ought to have the strongest possible sanctions against the government in Khartoum, and yet we hear reports that American oil companies are looking to build pipelines and that American oil companies seem to have found some exceptions to policies enacted by this Congress, are doing business and making investments in Sudan. I think it's critical that we urge American oil companies to



cease making investments in Sudan, not to look for ways to do so, because I think the U.S. Government has got to feel free, should it become necessary to provide military aid to the opponents of the Khartoum Government, whether those opponents be in the north or the south or the east, and it may come to that.

This is a truly vile regime, and if it's necessary for us to go beyond sanctions to some degree of assistance to the regime's opponents, military assistance even, we should do that and we shouldn't have oil companies here saying, oh, but we have investments. Instead, it's for the oil companies to recognize that there are much better places in the world for them to invest. Thank you.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Sherman. We've been joined by Mr. Campbell from California and Mr. Chabot from Ohio.

Our first witness is Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Susan Rice. Dr. Rice previously served as Special Assistant to the President and is Senior Director for African Affairs at the National Security Council. A former Rhodes scholar, Dr. Rice earned her degrees at Stanford and Oxford University. She visited Uganda with Secretary of State Madeleine Albright last December, and again with President Clinton, my colleague Don Payne and myself in March. Secretary Rice.

#### **STATEMENT OF SUSAN RICE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS AT THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL**

Ms. RICE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, distinguished Members. I thank you for this opportunity to testify before your two distinguished subcommittees on two pressing human rights issues of serious concern to the U.S. Government. These are the humanitarian crises in southern Sudan and the heinous activities of the LRA in Uganda and southern Sudan. Although these crises are occurring in two different countries and differ substantially in scope and character, they share one thing in common: Both result in large part from the callous and repressive policies of the Government of Sudan.

Before turning to the humanitarian situations in southern Sudan and northern Uganda, I'd like to review with you the key elements of our Sudan policy and the events that have shaped that policy. Traditionally, throughout Sudan's 42 years of independence, the United States has sought good relations with Africa's largest state. However, when the NIF seized power in 1989 by overthrowing the democratically elected head of state, our relations deteriorated sharply. Today Sudan is the only state in sub-Saharan Africa that poses a direct threat to U.S. National Security interests.

During the past 9 years we have been at odds with the Government of Sudan over four fundamental issues: First, we condemn and strenuously oppose the Sudanese Government's active sponsorship of international terrorism. The government has allowed international terrorists such as Saudi financier Osama Bin Laden and terrorist groups such as Hamas, safe haven in Sudan. It has established training camps for extremist militants and was also involved in the assassination attempt on Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak.

Second, the NIF Regime continues to destabilize neighboring states through its assistance to a range of organizations, including

the LRA in Uganda, the Eritrean Islamic Jihad, and the Oromo Liberation Front in Ethiopia, that have consistently targeted civilians.

Third, the Government of Sudan systematically violates the human rights of its own citizens. Torture, religious persecution, slavery, and forced imposition of Shariya law on Sudanese citizens throughout the country are pervasive and well-documented.

Fourth, the Government of Sudan continues to prosecute a vicious war strategy in the south that is the direct cause of much of the starvation that is now killing so many in southern Sudan. Quite simply, the policies and practices of the NIF government directly put at risk the lives of hundreds of thousands of innocent civilians both at home and abroad. As a result, our policy is to isolate the Government of Sudan and pressure it to change fundamentally its behavior.

At the same time, we seek to contain the threat that it poses to the U.S. interest to neighboring African states and to the people of Sudan. Toward this end, we are working on two levels: First we're undertaking specific bilateral measures and then we are urging the United Nations and other concerned countries to act in concert to compel the Government of Sudan to change its behavior.

On a bilateral basis, the United States designated Sudan as a state sponsor of terrorism in August 1993, and imposed comprehensive economic sanctions on Sudan in November 1997. We believe these sanctions are now effectively denying Sudan access to American financial institutions and markets.

On a multilateral basis, we supported the 1996 U.N. Security Council resolution that imposed diplomatic sanctions on Sudan. In addition, we introduced resolutions at meetings of the U.N. Human Rights Commission condemning Sudan's flagrant violations of human rights. We have also worked with other countries to restrict arms sales to Sudan and to try to impose an air flight ban on Sudanese aircraft.

Through our Front-Line States Initiative, the United States has provided non-lethal military assistance to several countries bordering Sudan, so that they can defend themselves against NIF-sponsored aggression. We recognize, however, that security and democracy will come to Sudan only when the warring parties opt for resolution to the 15-year civil war on the basis of a just and durable peace, a peace that is based on respect for the human rights of all Sudanese.

Thus, the United States is actively supporting, both financially and diplomatically, the ongoing peace process sponsored by the intergovernmental authority on development known as IGAD. The United States strongly supports IGAD. We have assisted its revitalization efforts and provided direct assistance to the Sudan peace process. Our reasons for doing this are two.

First, the IGAD peace process represents a genuine effort by the countries of the region to address its own problems. We want to support and encourage this trend.

Second, and unlike any other negotiation effort over the last many years, IGAD has successfully defined a framework for the resolution of this conflict which tackles the central questions of religion and the state.

The Government of Sudan would like a proliferation of peace processes in order to delay, confuse, and undermine the IGAD process. We think we should not allow those efforts to succeed. We remain hopeful that additional progress will be made when the next round of IGAD peace talks resumes in August, and the Administration plans to send a senior U.S. diplomat to support those talks.

To promote viable democratic systems in post-war Sudan, we also have encouraged the various Sudanese opposition groups to strengthen their cooperation to halt their own human rights abuses, especially by the SPLA and by Springer factions, and to develop democratic institutions in areas under their control. Secretary Albright met last December with the leaders of the National Democratic Alliance, the umbrella opposition organization, to encourage them to work together effectively to promote the rights and freedom of the Sudanese people.

USAID is providing \$4 million in development assistance in areas administered by the Sudanese opposition in an effort to enhance the establishment of transparent and democratic systems that can over time ensure that Sudanese citizens control their own destiny. This is a new initiative.

Unfortunately, the humanitarian situation throughout southern Sudan remains dire, despite massive U.S. assistance, due to 3 years of drought, a dozen-plus years of internal strife, and the decision by the Government of Sudan to ban relief flights for the most severely affected areas in February and March. An estimated 2.6 million people are facing malnutrition or possibly starvation. Through direct pressure galvanized by the United States, the international community finally managed to persuade the Government of Sudan to grant access to relief flights on April 1st. Without the direction intervention of the United States, I don't believe that the flight ban would ever have been lifted by the Government of Sudan, at least not in the near-term.

The U.N. umbrella organization for NGO operations in Sudan, OLS provides the bulk of this relief to the most effective areas. Largely due to swift U.S. support, OLS should be able to provide the 15,000 metric tons of food per month needed by the most desperate people in the south, beginning in August. OLS is using American assistance to lease additional heavy-lift aircraft and will soon have 13 such aircraft, including C-130's, operating out of Lokichoggio and Kenya and three newly opened regional bases. The current food delivery program will be the largest of its kind in history, surpassing the Berlin airlift.

Members of Congress have urged that the United States also provide assistance to civilians living in areas that the OLS cannot reach. Let me assure you that we're already doing that. We feel that support for OLS is critical because it can deliver to needy civilians and also because the operation was agreed to through negotiations by both sides in the conflict. But that said, we recognize that OLS faces serious constraints, and so continue to provide assistance to non-governmental organizations working in non-OLS areas.

Since 1989, the United States has provided more than \$700 million in humanitarian assistance to Sudan. This year alone we have already pledged more than \$78 million. That \$78 million includes

60,000 metric tons of food, plus transportation costs, emergency health care, and tools and seeds for farming. More is likely to be provided this fiscal year. Already the United States accounts for over one-third of the total relief being provided by the international community. We've also decided to allocate up to 100,000 additional metric tons of wheat being purchased from U.S. farmers pursued in these relief efforts.

Today, as we speak, Roy Williams, who is the director of the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance at USAID, is in Sudan assessing the magnitude of the current problem, and the international effort being mounted to bring it under control. Upon his return, we will pursue appropriate next steps to expend our efforts and capacities.

The situation in Uganda is stark evidence that Sudan's disregard for human rights extends well beyond its own borders. The Sudanese-sponsored LRA murders, tortures, rapes, kidnaps, and forcibly conscripts the civilian population of northern Uganda. Its favorite targets for kidnapping are children. Kidnapped girls are forced to become sex slaves to LRA commanders while the boys are forced to fight. All can be subject to vicious corporal punishment and murder on the whim of the commander. Those who escape or are freed carry with them tragic psychological scars.

Although the LRA and its commander, Joseph Kony, have their origins in Uganda's own history of domestic conflict, it is Sudanese support for the LRA that is giving it the resources and the sanctuary necessary to terrorize the populations of the Gulu and Kitgum districts in northern Uganda. Sudan provides the LRA with safe havens deep within its own territory and supplies it with military equipment, food and other materials. After Sudan's support to the LRA increased significantly in 1994, the atrocities suffered by the people of northern Uganda rose exponentially and that suffering continues today.

During the first half of 1998, the number of incidents and the geographic spread of LRA depredations increased. Secretary Albright and I and others visited Gulu during her December 1997 trip to Africa. We were all deeply moved by the experience of meeting the child victims of the LRA atrocities. It left us ever more committed to helping Uganda address this ongoing conflict.

The United States is engaged on many levels to promote a resolution to the conflict in northern Uganda and to meet the immediate needs of the population there. The northern Uganda initiative announced by the First Lady in Kampala last March, if funded by Congress, will be a \$10 million, 3-year program designed to target relief and promote development in those areas most affected by the war in the north. The program will focus on food security, trauma counseling for children, employment generation, and reconstruction of the infrastructure, particularly roads, necessary to generate economic activity.

And although, of course, security is a prerequisite for sustainable growth and development in northern Uganda, it is our belief that progress can be made even before the conflict there has ended. Improved economic prospects, moreover, may generate additional support among the local population for the Government of Uganda's efforts to defeat the LRA insurgency.

In addition to our relief and development work, we are promoting other avenues of conflict prevention and resolution. We are delivering non-lethal defensive military assistance to the Government of Uganda to help improve the effectiveness of its military response to Sudanese-sponsored aggression, in particular, that of the LRA.

The Ugandan People's Defense Force has improved dramatically in the last 10 years. Still, it has not been as effective as it could be in combatting the LRA and protecting civilian populations. Our IMET programs and efforts by other like-minded donors are designed in part to address this problem, but ultimately the Government of Uganda needs to enhance its own efforts in this regard. We recognize the very difficult challenges associated with fighting an insurgency that operates in a large and remote area and resorts to such brutal tactics. But this is all the more reason for the Government of Uganda to make sure its own military has every advantage possible.

The UPDF Ugandan Forces, as well as government-sponsored local defense forces, must guard against human rights abuses. We believe the Government of Uganda is working to implement a military campaign that respects the human rights of non-combatants and deals as humanely as possible with the insurgency, many of them forcibly conscripted by the LRA. But the Ugandan Government must do more and better in this regard.

At the same time it is critical that we understand the sharp difference between the LRA and the Government of Uganda's defense forces' behavior. Abusive tactics are an abhorration for the Ugandan forces. For the LRA, they are standard operating procedure.

At the same time we are concerned that the government's military response may not be enough. To date, it has not succeeded in eliminating the LRA. Thus, we have encouraged the Government of Uganda to pursue a parallel political track to resolve the conflict. It's, frankly, difficult to imagine a negotiated settlement with a group like the LRA, and nonetheless, it is in the interest of arresting the serious cost of this conflict that we believe the Government of Uganda should consider seriously this option. To some degree at least, it seems that communication has begun to be established. But perhaps more important for long-term stability in the region, we encourage the Government of Uganda to enhance its dialog with community leaders in northern Uganda.

The human costs of the LRA insurgency in northern Uganda are immense because it requires the government to sustain high military spending and because it keeps a large part of the country outside of the productive economy. The war in the north is also detracting from what has been one of Africa's strongest economic success stories in recent years. Sudan's regional aggression, in short, is costing Uganda and many others a great deal, and we must continue to work to contain it.

Mr. Chairman, Members, I believe that humanitarian crises in northern Uganda and southern Sudan threaten the substantial strides that Africa has taken over the past decade toward stability, free market economies, and democracy. Today many Africans can dare hope that their children and their children's children will study and work in peace and security and freely and regularly elect just and accountable leaders. We look forward to working with both

subcommittees to help all Africans enjoy the same opportunity as the continent approaches the 21st century. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Rice appears in the appendix.]

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Secretary Rice. Let me begin the questioning by just asking about the situation where Iran, China, France, Qatar are all believed to be supplying arms or giving technical assistance to Sudan. Why is the United Nations not actively doing anything to deter these nations from such activities, if I may ask that? And why haven't these nations' involvement been made more than a public issue, do you think, internationally?

Ms. RICE. Mr. Chairman, I think we share the frustration implicit in your question when it pertains to the international community's response to the behavior of the Government of Sudan. The United States has been a leader of efforts in the U.N. Security Council to obtain tougher sanctions on Sudan, and frankly, thus far, there hasn't been an appetite for tougher sanctions. There are a variety of reasons for that, including the perspectives of some of the permanent members of the Security Council who perhaps have economic or political interests in Sudan that may override the international community and securities stake in Sudan.

We are quite concerned by this. The U.S. Government has actively sought to ferret out instances of armed shipments to Sudan through a variety of means, and where we have discovered them and where there are laws that enable us to potentially impose penalties on countries that export arms to countries that are on the list of state sponsors of terrorism. We have engaged very aggressively and, in fact, succeeded in deterring a number of armed shipments from landing in Sudan.

Mr. ROYCE. I know that, as I'd mentioned, China, Iran, France, Qatar are believed to be making those shipments. Could you shed light on which countries we were able to actually intercede and block arms shipments from?

Ms. RICE. Mr. Chairman, that will get us into some intelligence questions that we would have to take up in a closed session.

Mr. ROYCE. I understand. Let me ask you another question then. The Government of Sudan has expressed a willingness to offer autonomy for the southern part of the country. Is this a serious offer on the part of the NIF? Given the fact that the Front has fought to apply Muslim law to all of the country, to the country it begs the question, but what's your observation on that?

Ms. RICE. Well, I think it's important to note that the breakthrough that occurred at the last round of the IGAD talks was significant. It was the first time that the government had stated in any fashion its willingness to allow a referendum on the future of southern Sudan, but it is not without problems and it does raise doubts about the sincerity of that statement, for a variety of reasons.

In the first instance, there is great disagreement between the government and the opposition organizations as to how to define the area that would be subject to the referendum.

In the second instance, there are many who think that this was an effort to divide the opposition, to split the new alliance that has emerged over the last 3 years between northern opposition ele-

ments and southern opposition elements. And so I think it needs to be watched very carefully with those considerations in mind.

Mr. ROYCE. Let me ask you a question about what we know about the LRA, Joseph Kony, the originator of that movement, and have the bizarre acts of the LRA disqualified it as a legitimate political organization that should be engaged in peace talks? I mean, does that rule out engaging them in peace talks in northern Uganda?

Ms. RICE. Well, the LRA is one of the most bizarre and heinous military organizations anywhere. It doesn't have a clear political agenda. If we were to ask Joseph Kony what his ambitions were, I'm not sure that we would get an answer that makes sense in our terms. They seem to have only one guiding principle and that is tormenting people in the most vicious ways they can dream of. And so it is obviously very difficult in that circumstance to encourage a responsible government like the Government of Uganda to engage in a dialog with the LRA. Having said that, as I said in my testimony, we do think the situation is grave, that military means are not likely alone to suffice and that the Government of Uganda ought to consider a whole range of options including negotiations.

Mr. ROYCE. One last question on that point: How disciplined has the Ugandan Army been in its battle with these rebel movements? Does the Ugandan military need technical or other assistance to succeed in its fight against the LRA?

Ms. RICE. The Ugandan Army has had some success, but it also lacks skill; it lacks capacity in some regard. It has improved over the last several years but, Mr. Chairman, I think it's fair to say that there are some significant weaknesses. We have sought to help the government address those weaknesses to the extent we can through our modest military assistance programs. But internal discipline, routing out corruption, and other steps will also be essential for the Ugandan Army to succeed.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Secretary Rice.

I will now go to Mr. Smith for questioning. Thank you.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me just ask Ambassador Rice, what resources do you think it would take for the Ugandan Army to defeat Joseph Kony's army? We have some very riveting testimony that Sister Mary Rose Atuu is going to be giving and she tells the story of where some 44 girls were abducted from Sacred Heart Senior Secondary School in Gulu, and how when one sought to escape after being abducted, she was killed right in front of all the other students with bayonets.

But the main point of her testimony is to say, not just that this is a brutal outfit, but that the Ugandan Army did little to stop these perpetrators of these crimes; in other words, they just basically looked the other way. There may be instances where they, indeed, have stepped up and tried to save other students or other innocent people in northern Uganda, but, as she points out here, this is more the exception rather than the rule.

Now that we've advised the Ugandans to speak to Joseph Kony's army, with whom will they speak? Where will they find these people? Are there a number of people that have been identified as leaders, in addition to Kony, that would be the object of the negotiation? And again, what would it take militarily? Are we advising

Ugandans as to how they might prosecute a war against these people?

Ms. RICE. Well, as I said in my testimony, I think the problems are both military and political. There is clearly more than can be done to strengthen and professionalize the Ugandan military, and we, with modest resources, are doing some of that, but, obviously, there is much that remains to be done, and in fact what needs to be done can be assisted in part by the United States and others on the outside but there also needs to be improved discipline and improved tactics and efforts to ensure that corruption is addressed in the Ugandan Army. So there is—

Mr. SMITH. Do we have a program, a JCET program or some other program, in place now to train?

Ms. RICE. We have IMET programs. We provide very modest amounts of defensive non-lethal military assistance, primarily radios and personal equipment, tents, load-bearing equipment, and we do have on occasion, as we do in many parts of Africa, the occasional JCET exercise, which, as you know, is primarily an exercise for American forces overseas.

Mr. SMITH. Are we training them in guerrilla warfare and trying to apprehend guerrillas?

Ms. RICE. I'm not familiar with the details of our JCET program but, no, I do not—

Mr. SMITH. Could you provide that for the record? It's very important.

Ms. RICE. We can, indeed.

[The information below was supplied following the hearing.]

There are two programs by which U.S. military train Ugandans: the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program (\$900,000 in FY 98) and the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), \$1.96 million for initial training in FY 97, and proposed, but as yet unscheduled, follow-on training. The IMET program indeed has been designed to enhance Uganda's regional stability and efforts against the LRA by helping Uganda develop a professional, apolitical and more technically proficient military force. According to the Defense Department, under the FY 97 and 98 IMET, Ugandan military have attended courses at the Army Command General Staff College on professional military tactics, civilian-military relationships, defense research management, and the law of war.

Uganda completed initial ACRI training in September, 1997. ACRI is the U.S. initiative to help Africans create a regional peacekeeping response capability. In the initial training, 60 U.S. Army Special Forces personnel trained Ugandans over a 2-month period in logistics, brigade and battalion staff operations, liaison with non-governmental organizations and human rights. Through the ACRI program, the United States also provided Uganda with communications gear, mine detectors, night vision equipment, boots, uniforms and load-bearing equipment in support of the training.

Other training we have completed with Uganda over the last several years has included DoD-funded Joint Combined Exchange Training Programs (JCETs). The primary purpose of JCETs is to train and maintain the proficiency of our own Special Operations Forces. Benefits may also accrue to the host country. In the case of Uganda, since FY 95, there have been six JCETs. Four have focused on traditional light infantry training such as patrolling, mission planning, squad through company level tactics, and weapons skills. This last fiscal year, we conducted two JCETs. The first included a democracy seminar, command and control mechanisms, law of warfare, military discipline and justice, and civil-military relations. The second was part of the East African Cooperative peacekeeping exercise Natural Fire with Kenya and Tanzania. Natural Fire focused on peacekeeping operations, combined airborne operations, small unit tactics, and refugee control.

Mr. SMITH. I find it dismaying that I recently returned from Indonesia, where we were actually training the Kopassos who have



a terrible human rights record and are known by the human rights community to be the perpetrators of torture. I would hope that if the goal is to mitigate the damage being done by this rogue outfit, that we would at least be training responsible officers as to how to engage in such tactics, especially in light of the kind of humanitarian crisis that we're facing in northern Uganda and the testimony we will receive shortly.

Let me ask you another question because I know that we're under some time limits today. The ceasefire, how well is that progressing and is it an opening for enhanced humanitarian aid? And second, let me ask you about IGAD. I'll never forget when I was in Northern Ireland almost a year ago now in August, I met with all the players, all of the terrorists groups from the IRA, and all of them thought that a political settlement, while it would be nice, wasn't really in the cards. And yet they also showed some tendency toward it. Senator Mitchell imposed a deadline that most thought would be unable to be achieved and yet he stuck to it; Blair's Government stuck to it; Mo Mowlam stuck to it, and in the end, having that deadline made those negotiations work.

Is there any deadline contemplated with IGAD or is it just an open-ended series of negotiations? Is anybody looking at a time-frame when certain things might happen?

Ms. RICE. To answer your first question about the ceasefire, to our knowledge—and it's of course difficult to verify throughout such a large area without our own monitors on the ground—the ceasefire as declared by the Government of Sudan and by the SPLA appears to last a while, to have been holding. But I think it's important to note that there are more than those two sides to this conflict. There are many factions and bandits and rebel groups that have not committed themselves to the ceasefire, and they, unfortunately, yet prove to be a real problem as we try to take advantage of this window of opportunity.

With respect to IGAD, the United States itself has not imposed any deadline on this regional process. This is a process that's led by the states in the region, chaired by Kenya. We participate in something called the IGAD Partners Forum with other Western donors, where we provide assistance, both diplomatic and financial, to this IGAD peace process. I take your point about urgency—we all share it. Unfortunately, for many years the government in Khartoum has not exhibited a willingness to deal seriously with the fundamental issues that are at the root cause of this conflict. They are not yet prepared to acknowledge the full human rights to the people of the south, to allow them to worship freely and without persecution, and to protect them from slavery and to allow them to determine their own political future. Those are the fundamental differences. We have a very different relationship with the Government in Khartoum than we have with the Government of Ireland and the Government in Great Britain, and so our ability to impose a deadline in this context is quite different.

Mr. SMITH. Clearly, but the hatred among the opposing factions is certainly parallel, and while it's to a greater degree and there are more of them in Sudan, there are obviously more victims. My thought about a deadline was internally. I'm not saying we impose a deadline, but internally is something percolating up that, you

know, this is some kind of timeframe or is it open-ended? We know that peace processes can go on forever and sometimes they're used as an excuse to defer criticism, when meanwhile people are being killed and starvation runs wild.

You mentioned—and I'll yield back with this—a senior diplomat that would be going in August. Who is that senior diplomat?

Ms. RICE. We have not named that person publicly, and so I would prefer not to get ahead of myself, if you would allow me that. Thank you.

Mr. SMITH. OK, is the special envoy something that's being seriously considered right now?

Ms. RICE. Yes, we're very much aware of the proposal that is being made by a number of Members of Congress for a special envoy for political affairs. As you may know, there has been a separate proposal made by another group of Members that that envoy be limited to a humanitarian role, arguing that there is a potential for a political envoy, which has in fact been tried in the past, to fall into the trap that we all wish to avoid, which is to give the Sudanese Government some alternative to taking the IGAD peace process seriously. Both those proposals are under active consideration and I hope we will reach a decision on that soon.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you. Mr. Menendez.

Mr. MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Rice, you know I have a great deal of respect for you and your work, but let me ask you, how did we get to a point that the famine in Sudan reached this crisis stage without USAID and the State Department realizing the full gravity of the situation? In other words, I read some of these articles. You know, it seems to me that we have gone for the past two decades with a famine every several years, like clockwork. In fact we can almost foresee what are the difficulties that we will encounter in terms of the necessity for people to be fed.

And there's a quote here in one of these articles that says, "even the U.S. Government, pledged to prevent such needlessly reoccurring famines, has 'screwed up royally,' admits a senior Clinton Administration official. We are all to blame for this massive failure."

I just don't understand, and I'm not looking for fault as much as I'm looking to understand process as to how we function in a way that avoids this. I heard your answers to the questions being raised about the propitious opportunity of the ceasefire raising itself to some long-term negotiations that can reach a positive conclusion. How did we get to this stage? What was the failure in our reaction? Because certainly even from your own statement, although you cast it in a positive light, it seems that we responded late in this process and did not foresee what we should have been able to foresee?

Ms. RICE. It's a fair and important question, and I think it needs to be looked at a little bit in the context of the chronology of what's transpired in Sudan over the last several months.

Going back to last September and October, we in the international community began to receive reports that indicated that there may be food shortages in southern Sudan, but never indicated a famine on the scale that we have begun to see now. And those shortages were predictable and regular shortages in the Su-

danese context, a product of drought which is now in its third year, as well as the ongoing civil war.

A couple of things in the beginning part of this year took the international community and the U.S. Government by surprise. The first was that a warlord who had been aligned with the Government of Sudan, Kerubino Bol, switched sides and aligned himself with the opposition elements, and this started a major battle in and around the area of Wau in Bahr-el-Ghazal. Kerubino and his militia undertook a scorched earth policy, just burning indiscriminately villages, crops and people's homes which exacerbated the already very serious conditions under way. The next thing that happened was that the Government of Sudan refused to allow OLS to deliver food to the most affected areas.

Mr. MENENDEZ. That's not unusual.

Ms. RICE. It's not unusual but it came at a very critical time and it persisted for 2 months, and it exacerbated the situation. Moreover, the government and militias that it supported from the north were encouraged to engage in scorched earth policies and raids into parts of southern Sudan that further decimated areas that had long suffered.

The plain fact is that we in the United States and the international community as a whole did not respond quickly or flexibly enough to this whole range of events. I think we've learned some important lessons and we're developing some alternative mechanisms.

Roy Williams, who is out in southern Sudan as we speak, is there to look at what precisely the United States and other donors can do in the future to have more flexible and responsive mechanisms. In addition, the United States has for some time supported relief efforts in southern Sudan, but is doing much more as a result of this recent crisis. We will place a greater share of our resources into non-OLS NGO's, lessening dependence on the Government of Sudan.

Mr. MENENDEZ. I hate to interrupt you, but since my time is almost finished, I've got the gist of what your answer is, but we did make mistakes. I hope we learn from our mistakes and don't repeat them. I don't want to go into a lengthy list of things, but I think that despite the flight bans we did not push and create public pressure to try to overcome those flight bans in a manner in which I think that we could have.

But let me ask you this question: I heard your answers to some of the questions that were posed by Mr. Smith. Am I to understand, since peace is the ultimate solution here to the famine question—let me ask you: Am I to understand your comments basically to say you don't have a reasonable expectation that a ceasefire produces any viable options at the time for negotiations that can lead to a reasonable chance of achieving some long-term agreement? Is that basically what I understood your answer to be?

Ms. RICE. No, let me be clear. We've seen, first of all, the immediate 3-month ceasefire as providing a potentially valuable window of opportunity to enable the international community to maximize the relief to those most in need. When it comes to the longer-term resolution of this crisis, the IGAD process has made some progress in recent months. We think that the ultimate resolution of the con-

flict will come when and if the Government of Sudan realizes that it has to make some compromises on fundamental issues related to the rights and livelihoods of the people of southern Sudan and the IGAD process has pushed the parties further in that direction.

And while I think it would be naive to believe that the IGAD process will lead to early results, it has made more progress than any other peace initiative, including American-sponsored peace initiatives, over the last 15 years. At this stage we think it is in the international community's best interest to try to lend greater support to that.

If I might just correct the record, Congressman, on one point, the United States was out in front from the very beginning in pushing on the Government of Sudan and on the international community to push the Government of Sudan to lift the strike ban, and I think, in a story where we deserve some credit and some blame, that's one place where I think we deserve a bit of credit.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you. Mr. Houghton.

Mr. HOUGHTON. Yes, thanks very much, Mr. Chairman,

Madam Secretary, great to see you. I'll give you a puff ball question, none of the mega-stuff.

You've said that there is a current food program that really exceeds even that of the Berlin airlift in Sudan. I wonder whether in the light of the various events that have taken place there, whether you are thinking of rescinding some of the sanctions on just growing crops, you know, foodstuffs, seeds, and things like that, and I'm not sure whether that's been done or not. If you don't have an answer to that, maybe you can just send me a report.

Ms. RICE. I want to be sure I understood you. Did you say, "extending the sanctions?"

Mr. HOUGHTON. No, lifting the sanctions which you are currently in effect, things like seeds and fertilizers and crop-enhancing products, and things like that.

Ms. RICE. Well, to the extent—

Mr. HOUGHTON. The point is to try to kick in the farming rather than giving the food.

Ms. RICE. Our aid that I described, that \$78 million this year very much includes seeds and tools and other farming implements, and our sanctions don't prohibit the conveyance of any kind of humanitarian assistance.

Mr. HOUGHTON. So there are no sanctions on products like that?

Ms. RICE. Not on humanitarian assistance, and we would define it in this instance to include that; in fact, we are providing it—so, no.

Mr. HOUGHTON. All right good, wonderful; that's answered the question. Thank you very much.

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Hall.

Mr. HALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just have one question.

Throughout this war, the SPLA and the Government of Sudan have respectively made predictions of decisive victories that each side was going to have, when in fact it really hasn't materialized at all. And in your view and to the best of your knowledge, what is the likelihood of any significant shift in the balance of power or in the military balance of power in the near future?

Ms. RICE. Sir, I'm not a military expert or strategist, but I can reflect back to you what some of those individuals advise us, and that is that in the very short term I don't expect, based on that information, a dramatic shift in the balance of power on the ground. Over the longer term, the situation, frankly, depends a great deal on the ability of the opposition to coalesce and to coordinate its activities and on the ability of the states that have supported the opposition and the neighboring states to coordinate their activities, and that ability remains uncertain.

Mr. HOUGHTON. Well, I'm trying to make the case for seeking a political solution here because we've kind of been in the same situation now for a number of years, and it seems like for 12 years we—every year we face the same problem. It's one side or the other; it's this year the SPLA has maybe gained a little bit of territory and last year maybe it was the other way around, but it just keeps going back and forth. And the same situation keeps occurring and people keep dying. Ninety-nine percent of the people of Sudan, both north and south, they want peace, but the government officials and the non-government officials, both in the south and the north, are not allowing this to happen.

The point that I'm trying to make is that 12 years from now—I won't be here in Congress hopefully—but 12 years from now we could be having the same kind of meeting and I think our policy is just not working, that we need a new policy. And that's why Frank and I have come up with this idea of some kind of national envoy to try to bring peace to the area, to try to bring the sides together.

I just don't feel that the IGAD process is going to work the way it is. I don't think anybody expects peace to come out of that situation. There are even leaders in the area that don't think a lot about the IGAD process, and I just feel it's not going to work.

Ms. RICE. Let me be very plain and assure you that we all would strongly prefer a political solution to the conflict in Sudan, and that's why the United States has for many, many years, both directly and indirectly, sought to promote a political solution. The political solution is going to have to be based on some fundamental principles. In fact, they are principles which both the government and the opposition have agreed to, but when it comes down to the crunch, the Government of Sudan is unwilling to acknowledge that the people of the south deserve the right to determine their own political destiny, and deserve the right to worship freely and without oppression and to have their human rights respected.

And so I'm not sure what kind of political solution we seek that is not faithful to those basic tenants. We surely would encourage in every possible way a political solution that respects those fundamental principles, but without that, I don't know what we gain over the long-term.

Mr. HOUGHTON. Well, I would say that the situation in Bosnia and Ireland were just as difficult, maybe even more difficult, and we've talked to a lot of scoundrels in that situation and nobody thought that peace could ever come about in any of those situations, and in fact they did.

Ms. RICE. Well, talking is one thing and I'm glad you raised that again, sir, because I think it's important for the record that we be

clear. We have not stopped talking to the Government of Sudan; we have not closed our embassy in Khartoum. We have an almost continuous presence of diplomats, but they rotate in and out and their number has been drawn down because of a serious security threat that was perceived against our diplomats going back a couple of years ago. We have had, until just a few months ago, an ambassador accredited to Sudan. We now have a chargé; we intend to have another Ambassador just as soon as we can get one nominated and confirmed. In the past, our ambassador whether operating from Khartoum or Nairobi always and consistently maintained a dialog with President Bashir, with Torabi and others in the NIF Regime.

And Administration officials have gone through Khartoum on a fairly regular basis. I, myself, accompanied Secretary Albright, when, as she was our ambassador to the United Nations, she went to Khartoum and delivered a very clear message there.

So we have not been out of contact and we don't intend to be, but we're also, I think, trying to remain very clear-minded about what the fundamental issues are and the need for the Government of Sudan to fundamentally change its behavior.

Mr. HALL. Essentially, what we have in Khartoum is basically post-country nationals that are taking care of the buildings that we own and we have approximately two people from Nairobi, Chardze and an administrator, that go to Khartoum about every other week, and I wouldn't say that that was high-level delegation relative to discussing any types of things that you and I are interested in.

Ms. RICE. The numbers are not large, I agree with that. As I said, that has been for security reasons, but the level of representation has been high. The reason we now have only a chargé rather than an ambassador has nothing to do with the political situation; it has to do with the fact that our previous ambassador was appointed Ambassador to Haiti, and in the meantime, we have been waiting on the agreement of the Government of Sudan for us to accredit a new ambassador, so we can nominate that person and have him confirmed as expeditiously as possible by the Senate.

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Chabot.

Mr. CHABOT. I thank the Chairman.

I had the opportunity to be in Uganda last August, and we met with President Museveni and he seemed to be particularly frustrated with this, their ability to resist this LRA, and the army itself seemed very murky, their origins and their goals, to myself and the other members. I was wondering if you could perhaps expound a little more on how they rose up and what their goals are. They remind me a bit in their brutality of the terrorists groups in Algeria where they just go in and kill indiscriminately, and as you mentioned, the kidnapping of children and then using them in such a brutal manner. It's almost unbelievable the things that we heard there, and I'm just wondering, can you give us a little more on where, what their goals are, what they actually intend to accomplish, if there's an answer to that?

Ms. RICE. Well, as I tried to say earlier, unfortunately, they don't have a clear-cut political agenda that they or anybody else can articulate or understand. This is a sort of bizarre rump organization that emerged from the remnants of Idi Amin's army. They seem to

hold up little more than the 10 Commandments as their alleged guiding principles, but in practice their behavior has anything but to do with the 10 Commandments. They have no political manifesto; they seem to have no clear-cut ambition to govern the country. They simply terrorize people, and it's for that reason that they're so very difficult to come to grips with and to do deal with politically or militarily.

Mr. CHABOT. Do we have any idea how many followers they have, either military-type personnel or hangers-on? Are we talking 20,000 or more than that, or less?

Ms. RICE. I can't give you precise numbers. I can certainly get back to you with that, but the actual fighting forces are relatively small and I think measured in the low thousands. But the fact is that they regularly kidnap young people and press them into service, and so it's hard to quantify exactly the numbers on their side.

[The information from Ms. Rice was supplied following the hearing.]

Estimates of LRA fighters vary widely, partly because the LRA has abducted so many civilians. The LRA captors force abductees to fight alongside the LRA, making it difficult to distinguish which of the "fighters" are abductees and which are LRA. The hit-and-run guerrilla LRA fighting tactics and the terrain over which they operate also complicate the ability to accurately enumerate the LRA forces. Although imprecise, we estimate there are some 5,000 LRA fighters.

Mr. CHABOT. OK, but you do think they're acting, is it fair to say that they are acting in concert to some extent with some elements of Sudan's Government or are they completely independent?

Ms. RICE. Yes, they're absolutely acting in concert with the Government of Sudan. They're being directly supported by the Government of Sudan (GOS). The GOS is providing the LRA safe haven military resources, food and other support. So, it is yet another example of GOS efforts to destabilize neighboring states and abuse the human rights of its own and other people's citizens.

Mr. CHABOT. OK, thank you.

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Payne.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. I'll be brief, which is not normally the way I am, but I know you've been here for a long time, and I was caught in having an amendment introduced at a committee across the hall and you have to be there when your amendment's there. They tried to pull it while I came over here, so I had to go back. So I really will read your full text, and would simply like to say that, once again, we appreciate the work that you've been doing.

As I indicated earlier, I think that it's difficult to compare this to Northern Ireland, Bosnia, and all the rest. I do think that there has been a Government in Sudan which has been a pariah government for many years. It's been where terrorists have been harbored; it's been a place that has destabilized the entire horn. It's been a government that has reaped havoc and despair and death on its people, and at the point where the government is finally weakened, I think that it would be wrong for us, in my opinion—there are people that are talking to the IGAD group, led by President Moi, have constant discussions with SPLA and the Government of Khartoum. I think that for us to open up embassies, to

send diplomats there to talk to this government—I dislike seeing armed conflict.

It appears, though, about this time, for the first time in many, many years, there could possibly be an end to the conflict by a victory in the SPLA, and I think that at this time to change our diplomatic position, to give a false impression to the Government of Khartoum, would be wrong.

And, like I said, I have some questions, but I'll present them to you in writing. Thank you.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Payne. I think we have one last question.

Mr. SMITH. Just one additional question. I thank you, Chairman.

Mr. ROYCE. Chairman Smith, proceed.

Mr. SMITH. Ambassador, the U.S. Committee for Refugees makes a very good point about the need for using surplus cargo planes, C-130's. According to press accounts and according to an Air Force study in 1996, there are approximately 50 that are surplus. Has the Administration looked into ways that some or several of those planes might be loaned to the Operation Lifeline or in some other way utilized in this effort to mitigate this disaster?

Ms. RICE. Sir, we're aware of those suggestions and proposals. One of the things that Roy Williams from OFDA will explore in his discussions with the government in Khartoum is whether the government is prepared to grant permission for military aircraft, as opposed to civilian aircraft, to participate in this relief operation. That would be the prerequisite for the use of any military aircraft, our own or anybody else's.

Mr. SMITH. But if it's still civilian and military is precluded, could an arrangement be made to loan some of those C-130's so that the refugee and the humanitarian organizations, the NGO's, the OLS can use them?

Ms. RICE. Loan U.S. Government aircraft to who?

Mr. SMITH. Aircraft, yes. To the United Nations, to the whole operation in Sudan, those who are trying to help. I mean, that obviously requires pilots, but World Food Program and others can, I'm sure, find pilots to fly them.

Ms. RICE. The issue as I understand it, is that the Government of Sudan consistently has said that it would not allow aircraft, whether donated, leased, or otherwise provided by government militaries, to participate in this relief operation. So one of the constraints that OLS has faced is that it has to hire commercially available aircraft on the open market to participate in this operation. And I think I've been told that only some 30 such aircraft are available worldwide. And so it's a political issue. If you would like more detail on this, my colleague from the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance is behind me and able to go into more detail.

Mr. SMITH. For the sake of the record, I would ask. I'll talk to him after the hearing to get that. Just one final question, is there sufficient airlift now or is there a deficit?

Ms. RICE. Depends on your definition of "sufficient." Right now—

Mr. SMITH. Does it measure up to the humanitarian commodities that are available and the need? Are there sufficient aircraft that could be deployed right now if the government permits it?



Ms. RICE. My understanding is right now there are 10 heavy lift aircraft available. We expect over the next several days that that number will go up to 13. With that number, it is our understanding that by August those aircraft will be able to deliver the 15,000 metric tons of food that are estimated to be required to meet the needs of the population that is most desperate. Having said that, there is a problem. The problem is you can fly in the quantity required, but that does not necessarily guarantee that all those on the ground who need it once it is air dropped actually get it. So there's a two-pronged challenge here: the quantities we hope and think, if the estimates that we're getting from OLS and others in the international community are accurate, can be provided and can even be dropped. It's a question then of distribution on the ground. But again, we can provide further detail, if that would be helpful.

Mr. SMITH. That would be helpful, if you would. Please introduce her.

Ms. RICE. Valerie Newsome Guarneri from the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance.

Ms. GUARNIERI. You'll get further detail from the World Food Program when they speak, but, basically, there are these 10 aircraft, heavy-lift aircraft, that are operating right now, are coming fairly close to the target. In July there is an estimate of about 10,800 metric tons of food will be able to move to the target areas. There is a need to get up to this 15,000-metric-ton level and there is a need for these additional aircraft to be onboard in order to reach that target. And as the Assistant Secretary pointed out, it does seem that those aircraft will be onboard shortly and will then be able to reach the target.

The issue of distribution is one that's critical. There is a team that is under the direction of OLS that is doing an assessment beginning this weekend, to look at how the food is targeted once it reaches the ground. We're trying to ensure that all food aid reaches the most vulnerable groups and at this point where we're not sure that that is actually happening.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you. Well, that concludes our first panel and I want to thank Secretary Rice for testifying here today. We will now go to our second panel and we'll take a few minutes interim before our second panel. Let me mention that Subcommittee Chairman Chris Smith of the International Operations for Human Rights will be chairing the second panel. Thank you.

Mr. SMITH. [presiding] Let me introduce our next panel of witnesses: Carol Bellamy has been the executive director of the U.N. Children's Fund since May 1995. In her career before joining UNICEF, Ms. Bellamy had served as the director of the U.S. Peace Corps, the president of the New York City Council, and a member of the New York State Senate.

Catherine Bertini has been the executive director of the U.N. World Food Programme for the past 6 years. Prior to joining WFP, Ms. Bertini served as the Assistant Secretary of Agriculture for Food and Consumer Services as well as the Acting Assistant Secretary of the Family Support Administration at the Department of Health and Human Services.

Jemera Rone is counsel to Human Rights Watch for the past 5 years. Her research has focused on Sudan. Previously she opened the first Human Rights Watch field office in El Salvador where she remained for 5 years. She has investigated rules-of-war abuses in numerous countries including Afghanistan, Angola, Uganda, Croatia, and Serbia.

Dan Eiffe is liaison officer for the Norwegian Peoples Aid. Mr. Eiffe lived in southern Sudan for several years where he helped provide humanitarian relief to thousands of internally displaced people. In his current position he serves as liaison in Nairobi between the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), the media, and NGO's.

And finally, Sister Marie Rose Atuu is a nun of the Little Sisters of Mary Immaculate of Gulu. As a teacher of the Sacred Heart Senior Secondary School in Gulu, northern Uganda, Sister Atuu personally witnessed the atrocities committed against the children of that region by the so-called Lord's Resistance Army.

Ms. Bellamy, if you could begin and thank you for testifying today.

**STATEMENT OF CAROL BELLAMY, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,  
UNITED NATIONAL CHILDREN'S FUND**

Ms. BELLAMY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Smith, Chairman Royce. Let me begin by thanking you very much for inviting UNICEF to appear before these committees to comment on the emergency in Sudan and also the situation in northern Uganda. I'm particularly pleased to be here with my colleague, Catherine Bertini, from the World Food Programme with whom we work very closely, and indeed Jemera Rone with whom I practiced law many, many years ago. I hate to think about how long ago it was. I also very much appreciate the leadership of Representatives Tony Hall and Frank Wolf, both of whom I know have devoted considerable attention to Sudan for more than a decade.

And so, as has already been reflected today, southern Sudan is facing its most severe humanitarian crisis since the 1989 famine that killed an estimated quarter million people. Today it is estimated that some 1.2 million people in the south alone are in need of urgent assistance, and that's primarily in the Bahr-el-Ghazal region. UNICEF is, as has been commented on, the lead agency in southern Sudan coordinating the humanitarian relief effort known as Operation Lifeline Sudan or OLS as it is called.

I won't go into detail because it's already been reflected, other than to mention that OLS is a coalition of U.N. agencies, UNICEF and the World Food Programme, along with 38 non-governmental organizations. It was set up about 10 years ago in 1989 to ensure unified international response to people in need on all sides of the conflict in Sudan. Among some of the NGO partners working at OLS are World Vision International, CARE, Save the Children, Doctors Without Borders, Catholic Relief Services, just to name a few.

OLS operates both in the northern part of the country controlled by the Sudanese Government as well as those parts of southern Sudan which are under the control of Southern People's Liberation Movement, SPLM. OLS is the largest humanitarian relief operation

now underway anywhere in the world, and you'll hear from World Food Programme, they're engaged now in their largest food drop ever. And over the last decade, OLS I believe can be credited with saving tens of thousands of lives. Indeed, the fact that thus far there have been no major outbreaks of cholera, measles, or polio in Sudan in recent years is, I believe, a tribute to the work of all the partners in OLS, particularly those working to deliver vaccinations.

Despite its obvious contributions to reducing suffering, however, OLS continues to be subject to a number of constraints and difficulties, as has been reflected in the comments already today. Sudan is the largest country in Africa; it's three-and-a-half times the size of Texas. It has been embroiled in a protracted civil war since 1983. In addition to the main warring parties, the government and the SPLM, there are several other military groups with a political agenda as well as access to arms and ammunition. No small part of the challenge facing the OLS has been the difficulty of running a huge humanitarian effort that depends on maintaining a working relationship with all the participating factions, and I would emphasize that—with all the participating factions—in this civil war.

More than a million Sudanese have died as a direct result of the 15-year conflict and some 2 million people have been displaced, and that's one of the challenges we face today. A longstanding drought the last 3 years particularly has been difficult, has made the present situation increasingly desperate. Without exaggeration, the social, economic, and political infrastructure in southern Sudan has been devastated.

As a result of the current temporary ceasefire declared on the 15th of July by the government in Khartoum and by the SPLM, OLS began expanding the number of its food distribution centers in the Bahr-el-Ghazal area, and we expect to almost double the number of centers to reach about 48. We, ourselves, are assuming responsibility for 10 of these centers.

We continue to monitor malnutrition among children. A recent UNICEF survey indicates that malnutrition among children under 5 in this area is now standing over 50 percent.

The current ceasefire was welcomed by international aid agencies as an opportunity to save thousands of lives through a broadening and expansion of the relief effort. Following the recent visit to Sudan by Martin Griffiths, Deputy to the United Nations, Under Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs, to assess issues related to an accelerated relief operation, I visited Sudan last week. The purpose of my visit was to meet with the leaders of both the government and the SPLM and to see firsthand the magnitude of the crisis. I also wanted my visit to raise international awareness of conditions in Sudan that have been, until recently, ignored once again.

In the government-held town of Wau, where thousands of people have arrived in search of food, I visited a health center and a reception point where people who have barely survived for months on a staple of leaves and wild fruit were waiting to be admitted into the relief program. I must say, the number of newly dug graves—and one can tell about how many are children by virtue of the size of those graves—was quite shocking.

The following day I visited the SPLM-controlled village of Panthou. I saw relief workers ministering supplementary and therapeutic food to young children. Again, as I would follow on Congressman Hall's comments, the suffering I witnessed in these famine-stricken areas was horrific.

In Khartoum I met with the President, with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the State Minister for Social Planning and Assistant President, Riek Machar who, as you are aware, had been allied with the rebel forces, but now is part of the government. A couple of days later in Nairobi I met with representatives of the SPLM.

To all parties, I stressed the temporal and the geographic limitations of the ceasefire. The present ceasefire applies only to the Bahr-el-Ghazal region and its duration is only 3 months. I also stressed that OLS will do everything possible to respond adequately to the needs of the Sudanese people, but it is important to be realistic.

In agreeing to a ceasefire, the government and the SPLM need to take responsibility for ensuring not only that there isn't fighting between them, but that the non-regulated parties on both sides of the conflict observe the agreement. Also the corridors, the rail, the barge, the road corridors, which have been designated under the ceasefire agreement to allow OLS to bring in food and essential supplies, must remain open and safe. They must provide passage for relief workers.

Unfortunately, as the rainy season has now set in, roads are often not passable. The water corridors for barges are all too often in need of dredging and the rail lines are often not operational due to past military disruption. The challenge is enormous.

Clearly, though, as has been said again today, the humanitarian effort is no substitute for a political settlement that guarantees the rights of all Sudanese to live in peace, and I would strongly urge the recognition of the fact that even if it is only a small opportunity, this ceasefire presents an opportunity to try and pursue a peace agenda.

OLS is now over 10 years old. It is a complicated operation both in logistical and political terms. It is also expensive due to the constraints that I have noted. At times over the past decade and as a consequence of the lack of political will to resolve the long-running conflict that has created the humanitarian emergency, the donor community has experienced fatigue in terms of continued financial support to OLS. For example, in 1997, the donor community contributed only 40 percent of the total requirements published in the United Nations, the combined consolidated appeal by the U.N. agencies.

In 1998, despite a slow start, I am pleased to report that UNICEF and its OLS partners have received a significantly higher level of support from the international community, including the public, and that the overall level of funding for both northern and southern Sudan combined is now 62 percent of the consolidated appeal for Sudan.

It is also gratifying to note that the U.S. Government is the largest donor to UNICEF's operations in Sudan, contributing over \$5 million of almost \$25 million received to date. The governments of

Sweden, Norway and Canada, to name a few, also have made major contributions.

No doubt, this level of support from both governments and the public—because we receive support from the public as well—is due in large part to the tragic footage we've all seen in recent months on television and in newspapers. It is a humanitarian response to acute suffering on a massive scale. However, it also signals that governments and individuals continue to care about the people of Sudan and can be rallied to assist in finding a lasting peace.

As I have noted, we must act quickly as this tenuous ceasefire is now in effect, but it could end at any time. I can't stress strongly enough that donor governments should seize the moment to promote a political solution.

Mr. Chairman, you've also asked about the crisis in northern Uganda which involves among the world's most disturbing and flagrant abuses of the rights of children: their abduction, their torture, rape, and murder at the hands of a rebel faction. I know, particularly, Congressman Payne is deeply concerned about this issue. The rebel faction in question based in northern Uganda, and ironically called the Lord's Resistance Army, is comprised in large part of abducted children, sometimes as young as 11 years old. They've been tortured; they've been indoctrinated with brutal initiation rights to engage and kill Ugandan Government soldiers.

We estimate that somewhere between 6,000 and 10,000 children have been kidnapped and removed from their communities, schools, and homes in Gulu, Kitgum, and other districts in northern Uganda. In one case, 139 girls were abducted from a school run by nuns. Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have also reported these horrifying allegations and you're going to hear from them later. These children have graphically described the brutality they've suffered as foot soldiers, sexual slaves and porters to LRA members.

We at UNICEF support a rehabilitation center in Uganda operated by World Vision that has provided both physical and psychological health assistance to children who manage to escape the LRA. In recent months we have worked with the U.N. refugee agency (UNHCR) to secure the repatriation to Uganda of approximately a dozen children who had found refuge in Juba in southern Sudan that had come to the attention of our local staff. While approximately one-half of all such abducted children eventually manage to find their way home, as you might expect, there are irreversible scars both physical and psychological.

Mr. Chairman, the international community must speak loudly and clearly and with one voice on this matter and demand the immediate release of all children held by the LRA. Your firm resolve on this issue will make a critically important difference.

Finally, thank you very much for giving us this opportunity to speak both on Sudan and on northern Uganda.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Bellamy appears in the appendix.]

Mr. SMITH. Ms. Bellamy, thank you very much for your excellent testimony and for the outstanding work that UNICEF does, not just in Sudan, but all around the world, but particularly for today,

thank you for what you've done. And we'll have some questions, but let me ask Ms. Bertini if she would now proceed.

**STATEMENT OF CATHERINE A. BERTINI, EXECUTIVE  
DIRECTOR, WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME**

Ms. BERTINI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for this opportunity to participate in the briefing and talk about Sudan. In particular, I would like to summarize my remarks that have been submitted to the Committee and also we are submitting a description of our work in Uganda as well.

I, too, am pleased to be here with my colleague, Carol Bellamy; as you can see, we do much work together. And I'd also like to introduce to you, Mr. Tun Myai, who is the World Food Programme Director of Resources and External Relations who joins me and has been also our director of transport, was in Mr. Griffith's recent mission to Sudan, and also can provide additional information to the Committee or to staff members afterward.

Mr. Chairman, also before I begin, I want to give my condolences to you and all Members for the loss of two Members of your House family. The tragic murder last week, my condolences for their deaths but also, unfortunately, they are two examples of all too many people who are striving to protect all of us, and in the case of our work in Sudan to feed hungry people but who are faced with people who find it important for some strange reason to end their lives.

Just recently in Sudan, three staff members, two of the World Food Programme and one of Red Crescent, were killed. They were driving in World Food Programme-marked vehicles. They were attacked by gunmen, shot, and killed.

And just last week in Burundi we had another death of a staff member shot and killed in Burundi, in fact I'm just come to join you for today because I'm going to return to Rome to attend the latter person's funeral, Mr. Ricciardi.

I start with this because I think it's important to highlight not only the tragedies of their deaths, and I would ask, Mr. Chairman, also if we could send the names of these WFP-murdered staff members to be included in the record. Thank you.

Mr. SMITH. Without objection if you could put some background about them into the record. Again, our condolences to you.

Ms. BERTINI. Thank you.

[The report appears in the appendix.]

Mr. SMITH. You know, to kill humanitarian workers is obscene, to the highest degree. So our condolences to your organizations and to all of you who put your lives on the line.

Ms. BERTINI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. We will. And I raised this issue initially because it is a critically important issue for all of us; it affects our ability to operate throughout the world.

People continue to persevere. The Secretary General in fact has said that he is announcing a complete review of U.N. Security. In fact, there have been more civilians than soldiers killed on U.N. missions around the world this year.

This, of course, these deaths are a tragedy, but there is also the tragedy of the deaths of thousands of people in Sudan who just do

not have enough food. As has been discussed, there is the combined issue of war and of drought which is affecting this, the people in the country, complicated by inaccessibility and by limited or no infrastructure. This year, 1998, is probably one of about the three worst years in the last 15 years since the fighting has been going on, and as Ms. Bellamy mentioned, OLS was created in an attempt to help feed people and provide other emergency assistance.

Just to give you some understanding of the difference between last year and this year or years that aren't crisis years and this year, last year for 1997 we sent about 32,000 tons of food to southern Sudan. This year we're talking about, for the south, over 10,000 tons per month during this time between now and October. As it was pointed out to you, there was a report, in fact, by the WFP and the FAO in September which said that this problem was going to be worse this year; the harvest was not good; the drought is going to be even more difficult next year, and the intensified fighting particularly is adding to this problem. The flights were then banned, as was mentioned, in February and March.

But I should add, though, that when I think Congressman Menendez was asking something about this, I looked up in my notes—that OLS had warned of this crisis and a worsening crisis four times during February to the international community, and saying there is a great need for assistance.

Also, what happens in these cases always when we have slow-downs or other problems, vis-a-vis the government in terms of getting proper approvals, our people, the OLS people are immediately in talking to the government, trying to make them understand the need for us to continue to fly as well as talking to the SPLA because, in fact, this is a tri-partite agreement, and done that way on purpose to provide safety and security for these aircraft as well as the individuals who are going in to provide this very needed service.

The ban, however, was, as the Assistant Secretary said, very, very damaging. It was damaging for many reasons. First and foremost, because people weren't receiving food; second, because our workers were not there; they were not able not only to bring the food, but to assess the grave worsening conditions of many of the people.

Third, because as the drought worsened, so did the people's ability to cope as they moved more of their animals for instance and consume more of their animals.

And then donors, of course, were not interested in making big commitments at that time if they knew we were having serious problems getting food in. We did, however, try to expand at that time some of our other delivery methods and we were able to send, for instance, truck convoys in February, the first trucks that had arrived in some time, so that we could provide some assistance via road. I'll come back to that point in a minute.

The continued negotiations, of course, over the months of February and March did result in new access, and so by mid-April there were three planes operating there, many more in May and June and now in July. We, of course, raised our need estimates only slightly in terms of the numbers of people who were affected, but raised the need level very much for the amount of food that

was necessary because the people were in much more grave conditions and because they have less and less to fall back on from their own harvest.

The ceasefire now is extremely important and I want to emphasize Ms. Bellamy's remarks about that. It provides a terrific opportunity for additional action, and I will return to that topic.

To give you some idea about what is moving into the country now in terms of some of the questions that have been asked, we have, first of all, trucks and of course in any emergency situation, we would prefer to use trucks as the vehicle that is least expensive and usually most reliable. There are only six kilometers of paved roads in all of southern Sudan. That's about the distance between here and Arlington. So the trucks have to go on extremely difficult terrain; also, bridges that are needed are often bombed out during the warring process. So we're hoping that when we rebuild them now during the ceasefire, we will be able to have access throughout as a result of this. Trucks right now can get in about 1,000 tons per month. We are hopeful that we would be able to increase that amount if we are able to put some significant money—and we've asked the United States for some assistance here—into infrastructure rehabilitation. Also, we've asked for funds for a truck fleet, so that we can have a fleet of about 40 trucks who we can rely on to be able to come in and out of Sudan.

One other problem with the trucks is, when it rains a lot, then the trucks cannot pass on these muddy unpaved, difficult roads. However, when it rains a lot, a second way that we can use to get food into the country is by barge because, when it rains enough, then the barge on the Nile is useful. There is a barge right now on the Nile and it has 2,100 tons; that's the normal amount for any barge. We are negotiating to try to have two additional barges to be able to use to send food by river during the high-water times.

The air is, as was mentioned, the primary way of providing food now. We have actually 12 airplanes flying today. One more will be beginning tomorrow, and these planes now we have negotiated are not only flying out of Lokichoggio, which Congressman Hall mentioned, Lokichoggio—he's seen that operation there; it's a big operation, a very good humanitarian air base operation—but we've also negotiated that the flying will not only be out of Lokichoggio in Kenya, but also out of Nairobi, and the flights begin from Nairobi out of El Obeid in Sudan and out of Khartoum. Flights have begun from all four of those bases now, which will greatly enhance our ability to be able to get food into the country.

There will be, therefore, a total of 14 planes ultimately flying, and 3 of those planes will be the smaller buffalo planes and 11 will be the large planes, either the Hercules, or otherwise known as C-130's or Illusions. These are also planes that are doing air drops, as was mentioned.

You know, airlifting is the way when we move food in and airlift it and then land it at an airport and then offload it and distribute it. Air dropping can be only used when you can't even come to the air strips and this is an air-drop operation. It is the largest, as Ms. Bellamy mentioned, largest in the world, largest anyone has ever undertaken. Large means it costs a lot of money. This costs \$1 million a day and it is a very significant operation and program.



Food, more food is certainly welcome. We welcome very much Assistant Secretary's announcement that there would be 100,000 more tons directed to Sudan from the U.S. Government. Additional requests we have made are for corn soya, a blend for fortified dried skim milk for high protein biscuits, so that people who are in very severe nutritional state can have food that will be even more helpful to them, and we're hoping that donors would even fly that directly to our bases and that then we can fly that food in.

We also applaud the Administration's statement that there will be much more food purchased from U.S. farmers in order to distribute in this country and elsewhere.

I want to also underline the earlier comments about the need for a political solution made by Mr. Hall, Mr. Wolf, Ms. Bellamy. So much is necessary in order to help people live. What we need over the short-term, however, is, first of all, an extension to the ceasefire, so that we can continue to expand our operations in a major way to reach thousands of people.

Second, we need a promise fulfilled from the government, and we've been working with them, in order to have access to all areas of the country, and also to have an investigation on the murders that I mentioned to you.

And third, we're also working with the SPLA, OLS is, on this issue on the tax on food. You know, a man with a gun is always well fed, and it is something that humanitarian workers have to deal with all the time, but our purpose is not to feed the men with guns; our purpose is to feed the vulnerable people who desperately need food. And, of course, what the people of Sudan need most of all is peace and a political commitment we believe can win this war, but a humanitarian commitment can only keep people alive. And that is, in fact, what we have—a very, very strong humanitarian commitment.

We need a very, very strong commitment for peace. One million dollars a day is providing a very expensive bandaid for this problem. Wouldn't it be nice if we could invest generously in a cure for the problem? After all, a hungry Sudanese mother, too weak to nurse her dying baby, doesn't care why the food isn't there, doesn't care who's at fault. She just wants it all to end. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Bertini appears in the appendix.]

Mr. SMITH. Ms. Bertini, thank you for your excellent testimony and for the good work that the World Food Programme does each and every day, not just in Sudan but elsewhere.

I would like to ask Ms. Rone if she could make her presentation.

#### STATEMENT OF JEMERA RONE, SUDAN RESEARCHER, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH

Ms. RONE. Thank you. I'm Jemera Rone. I represent Human Rights Watch, and I've been to southern Sudan and the Nuba Mountains in central Sudan twice in the last year. I would have gone to government-controlled territory, but the Sudan Government doesn't see fit to give me a visa.

On the famine particularly, we've been very concerned because the way the war is being waged is in complete violation of human rights, and these human rights violations are what has caused the famine, with a little help from a 2-year drought. But for the contin-

ual marauding in the famine-stricken areas of Bahr-el-Ghazal by government militia, both the horseback militia that have already been mentioned and the warlords of Kerubino, the people in Bahr-el-Ghazal would not have been stretched to the limit that they were, so that they became very vulnerable when the drought struck.

These are some of the immediate causes of the famine, and the fact is that up until the ceasefire on July 15th, this raiding went on and continued, so that people who had endured battering by the militias during the past few years were continually battered and displaced up until recently.

When I was in Bahr-el-Ghazal, I got a glimpse of how that affects the civilian population. They were lined up around a feeding center, and one woman was telling me that she has five children abducted by the raiders into slavery and she has four children left. But what was really hard for her now was not the abductions, although she would like to have her children back; what was really hard was the hunger and that was the most immediate and pressing problem.

A few minutes later, as I was interviewing an elder, all of a sudden everybody got up and ran. I didn't know what was going on, and they were pulling me by my elbows saying, "Come on, come on;" I was saying, "Where's my water bottle? Where's my camera?" And it turned out it was nothing, but somebody heard something and they thought they were about to be raided and their responses were so quick to that. It really showed me how much fear that they live in and how on the edge they are, how really hard it is for people who are under this kind of pressure to settle down to farm, to do the necessary scrounging for food, if it's there.

So the ceasefire, if it's enforced, will greatly improve things in that manner, but we still have human rights problems going on. We regard human rights abuses as including looting, taking food by force from the civilian population. We've had a lot of reports of this. The government has many ways in which they do this, forcibly taking of food from the civilian population. Unfortunately, the rebel SPLA also has a track record and a history of looting; sometimes it's not by force, sometimes it's called taxation, but, frankly, as Ms. Bertini pointed out, the ones with the guns do always eat first and you don't really see any hungry soldiers.

I know that there is an undertaking now obtained under the OLS that's specifically looking into how they can combat and remedy this, and we very strongly support this. It's very important for the donor governments also to support efforts that are made to prevent looting and diversion of food.

One thing that can be done is to add more food monitors. There may be other ways to protect the people on the ground, to protect their right to this food, because if it is delivered to them and they can't keep it, then it's not going to do them very much good.

One of the worrying things we have seen in the past few weeks has been the influx of people from the famine area into some of the government garrison towns. Wau has received—the numbers vary of course, all these numbers are very iffy—between 47,000 or 56,000 or 65,000 Dinka from the famine area. For those people to go into Wau is like going into the lion's den because they all left

Wau en masse in January after fighting there because they were very afraid of government retaliation.

We also have reports that there was government retaliation against the few Dinka that remained in the town after the fighting. So for those outside to go back in means that they really are not getting enough food in the areas where they are. Part of that I've heard is due to SPLA taking food from them and part is also due to the fact that the famine has snowballed so fast that it's very difficult to control. Even with all the good effort and the good work of World Food Programme and OLS and UNICEF, they still are running uphill, to mixing metaphors, trying to do the best they can but the numbers of hungry people are just astounding.

It's not only in Bahr-el-Ghazal, of course. I want to draw the Committee's attention to one particular area where the Sudan Government has consistently refused all access and that is to the rebel-held areas of the Nuba Mountains. There may be 300,000 maybe 500,000 people who live there in SPLA-controlled areas. The Government of Sudan has never ever agreed to have any international assistance or humanitarian assistance or anything go into that area. They have totally blockaded it. They've also cut it off from all commerce, so the Nubas can't even get a few things like salt and sugar and used clothes from the traders that they used to deal with. The government is very good at agreeing and then reneging and wiggling out of its promises and they've done this here. Recently, they told Kofi Annan on May 20, this year, that, yes, they would permit the United Nations to conduct a food assessment mission into this area. And one thing led to another, and they argued over the composition of the team and where it would leave from, and that was all agreed to, and then they found another excuse not to permit the mission. So it's off indefinitely.

In this area, donor governments can help quite a lot by pressuring and keeping up the pressure on various agencies that work on this, and also not letting it drop through the cracks. The Nuba Mountains is an area that has tens of thousands of people at risk and there's a drought there too. And they have been raided and looted and burned by the government as part of its strategy, and this situation could cascade into something much worse unless there is access.

There had been a question about the Sudan Government's support for the LRA. We've actually gone to a lot of work by talking to the children who've been abducted, and to also some of the older persons who were taken, conscripted by the LRA and escaped, and we found there is clear evidence that the abductees were in Sudan; they were with the Sudan Government soldiers. The Sudan Government garrison was never too far from the LRA camps. The Arabs, as they called them, came and gave them food and weapons, and there was an enormous amount of collaboration.

In addition, many of these LRA abductees said that they participated in operations with the Sudan Government against the SPLA in southern Sudan. So in that way the two conflicts are really complicating each other, making things a lot worse for the civilians living in both areas.

The stories of the children who've been abducted by the LRA are truly appalling, and this particular rebel group is probably going

to win the prize for the worst and most abusive rebel group in the world, and that's not a very easy attainment since there are so many that are abusive.

There are things that the Sudan Government has asked for; I think we should be very careful with some things they're asking for. One thing I think has probably been discarded by wiser people and at World Food Programme, is use of the train to carry relief into Wau. This train is the only train line going into the south and it's been used for years solely for military purposes. They could have carried relief on it before, but they didn't. And this train is a very evil instrument in the war in Sudan; it transports troops; it also transports the tribal raiders and it takes their horses on the train and they stop and maraud along the way and abduct children and burn and loot cattle, and then they put the cattle in the train and take them on to market. To think that the government has asked that the sanctions be lifted insofar as it would permit them to buy the spare parts needed for this train in the USA—to think that we might permit that is just appalling to me. There should be another way to deliver food.

I think it would be wonderful to have a train that was solely dedicated to relief and had U.N. food monitors on it to assure that the SPLA did not attack it or mine the tracks or anything like that, and to make sure that the food was actually going where it was intended.

I think I'll stop now, but thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Rone appears in the appendix.]

Mr. SMITH. Ms. Rone, thank you very much and, without objection, your full statement and everyone's full statement will be made a part of the record.

Mr. Eiffe.

#### **STATEMENT OF DANIEL EIFFE, LIAISON OFFICER, NORWEGIAN PEOPLE'S AID**

Mr. EIFFE. Yes, thank you very much. My name is Daniel Eiffe. I'm the liaison officer of an international organization called Norwegian People's Aid. I spent the last 22 years in Africa as a Catholic priest, for 10 years in South Africa during the worst years of apartheid, and for the past 11 years I've been in southern Sudan.

I have a unique experience in southern Sudan, having lived actually in the field for 10 years. I've seen what's to be seen in Sudan; I've seen terrible, terrible things in Sudan. I've been there for massacres, for the famines of 1988 when 300,000 people died. I know the politics and I know the SPLM/SPLA Liberation Movement inside out and upside down. I know the individuals involved; I know the government, and I've seen it all. I've been an analyst as well, not just an emotion or humanitarian analyst, but a political analyst—the Catholic church has invested in me in extensive studies on the politics of Africa and I've got very strong views about southern Sudan.

This is a genuine struggle of the people of southern Sudan for liberation, for the human dignity. My organization is a non-neutral organization, Norwegian People's Aid; it is unique. We operate independently of the U.N. OLS; we operate in defiance of the Government of Sudan. We are a value-based organization which works

not just for relief, although we are the largest humanitarian NGO in southern Sudan--the values of democracy, human dignity, freedom and justice, these are our values. We work in solidarity, and these values are totally denied from the people of southern Sudan. It is hell.

I saw apartheid for 10 years as a priest and was detained even in South Africa. South Africa in its worst years is a tea party in comparison with the suffering of the people of southern Sudan. What is this all about? What is going on here? There is one line in this whole war: When you talk about Uganda's LRA, or the West Nile Bank Front which is the Ugandan rebel movement on the other side of the Nile, the West Bank, when you talk about food as a weapon of war, when you talk about Arab raiders, or when you talk about the United Nations being manipulated and denied access with food, there are all the weapons of the Sudan Government. It was the weapon of genocide, of ethnic cleansing on the southern Sudanese people. The bottom line for this Government of Sudan as it came to power: It wants the land of southern Sudan; it wants the land, but not the people; it wants the resources. Everything amounts to that.

I know what the LRA has been doing in northern Uganda. I worked in the border areas of Uganda and Sudan for 4 years. You could forget about doing anything with the Ugandan Army because the LRA bases are inside Sudan in Torit and in Juba.

This week the SPLA encountered Joseph Kony (leader of the LRA) and nearly captured him. The LRA operate from Sudan. It is impossible for the Ugandan Army to be expected to go in to another country's territory and chase these rebels. Until we solve the Sudan problem, you cannot solve the Ugandan problem because that's where the LRA bases are. These rebels are financed; they're supported. Last year the SPLA captured over 1,000 of them in March. I talked with them; they're acting together with the Sudan Government. I talked to them in the cells; how people treated them is in my statement. They're working together with the Sudan Government; they're one of the same. The Sudan Government uses them in the south and in the north it uses the Muncken raiders. I was there too, just before Jemera came in.

Mr. Kofi Annan, the U.N. Secretary General, praised the Government of Sudan for the good gesture of allowing relief into Sudan after having denied it for 2 months. At the same time that the food was on the ground, the government-based raiders came in on horseback, something you would think from the Middle Ages, thousands of men on horseback and massacred people.

I myself tried to help out some of those victims, those children who were shot, women who were abducted as sex slaves and young people; they kill the men. Story after story I could account for you. It is the same. It makes us break down. Your reaction is one of anger.

There were a number of World Food Programme people nearly killed there. There was World Food Programme food in a village beside Turalay, and the Sudan Government-based raiders took nine bodies of the people and killed them on top of the food to contaminate the food. These killers were what the government calls "Popular Defense Forces". They're not very popular, I can tell you, but

that's what they do. It is genocide, and they use food, they use peace talks, they use ceasefires as a weapon in this war.

In 1994, ex-President James Carter was in Nairobi when the Government of Sudan declared a ceasefire on a Friday in June. At that very moment I was inside Sudan living in Nimule with four Sudan Government planes bombing the hell out of us and artillery coming down on us. I had to run for my bunker to the radio to tell the press, "There's no ceasefire here." This Sudan Government is a government of deception and it uses every thing possible to do this. Even the current ceasefire, it's a joke. It's taking place in the middle of a swamp. Right now we have to pull our land cruisers out of the swamps because we as relief workers can't operate in that area. The only defense the people in the northern area of counties of Abyei and Twig Counties have is the rains, because the horses and the armored cars cannot move in the rains, and that's why the Sudan Government gave us a 3-month ceasefire. What happens after the 3 months?

Again, the oil is only 75 miles away, the rich oil of Bientul from where those massacres took place. And the raiders told the people that, you can forget about your land, you can forget about your children; they belong to us; your women come and serve us and your men we will kill. That's what the women told us who were abducted.

The problem in Sudan is not just the dead; it is those who are alive today, the 4 million, 5 million who are living outside their homes, and they're the living dead. The humiliation, the slavery, the dignity has been taken totally away from them. They are naked. They don't have clothes; they don't have food; they don't have medical services, and they don't know where to go.

As Jim Malone says, they're fleeing back into a government garrison town, and that is a desperate act because, once they're in there, they're trapped again in the town of Wau, where they will not be able to cultivate again and they use food. They will tell the World Food Programme: We need food in Wau because having a military garrison without a constituency is not very good for the visitors who go there. If a Congressman goes there and he sees a military garrison but no civilians, he's not convinced. So they use food in the towns to bring the people in. When the plane hit those towns at the end of January, 100,000 people fled out of those towns.

We need to heap up the pressure on the Government of Sudan. It is working. They're coming to the peace table. But there is one thing that's missing today in all the analysis I've heard as people are talking about this as a north-south conflict. People are forgetting that there are major democratic forces in the north, opposition parties who are already armed now and control areas on the Eritrean and Ethiopian border. It is not just the north and south. The National Democratic Alliance is an extremely important alliance here. These are the major opposition parties. It is not just about the SPLA and the Northern Government. The Northern Government represents and has never won more than 15 percent of the vote. They took power in 1989 in the military coup with 300 men in Khartoum, and since then, it has amassed the army and prohib-

ited the former parties, opposition parties within the government who are now in exile in Asmara.

Who are the SPLM/SPLA? Who are they? I was very happy to hear what Congressman Payne said today. He knows who they are. They have become a people's movement. They are there to defend people of Sudan. With the lack of development and the primitive nature of southern Sudan, it would only be, I think, God himself who would try and start a liberation movement and not John Gorang, because the nature of society itself creates inherent problems in Sudan. And that's why a lot of the alleged misdeeds are due to individuals; it is not or has not been the policy of the SPLM/SPLA.

When we have food diversion as an international organization right now, senior rebel commanders are not in detention in jail because of food that has been diverted. USAID is a major donor to Norwegian People's Aid; for that, we are very, very grateful.

The people of Sudan have a right to defend themselves. They have the right to defend their dignity. Even in this country, you fought for your democracy and for your freedom. We had to do the same in Ireland, and the southern Sudanese have the right to fight for the same thing, especially when the rest of the world is looking on and doing nothing about it.

This war didn't start in 1983; it started before independence in 1955. It was only the 50 years the British ruled that kept both forces apart. I can't understand, in light of the actions of the Sudan Government, what's wrong with supporting a movement like the SPLA that fights for a very just cause and try to reform it. And we're very grateful that the USAID has just now given a \$4-million grant for good governance in the south.

This rebel movement is becoming a government, is working on a judiciary, a police force. But every year \$200 or \$300 million is provided by donors for relief—beans, maize, and oil and medicines—but not a single dollar to date has been given for good governance, for helping these people to establish some form of administration in the limited areas. That's the solution for southern Sudan, not relief. I've often said, you keep your relief; we need a solution, and the solution is to develop democratic structures with good governance—a political solution.

You must keep the pressure on the NIF Government. It is a government that's bent under destruction.

I want to make one remark about the humanitarian situation concerning the people in southern Sudan. I don't think it's too arrogant to say I speak for the people in Sudan because I've been with them for all those years in those situations, sharing with them the suffering, and really they are very, very fed up. They are very fed up with relief operations that are sanctioned by that same government that's bent on their destruction, and that is the U.N. operation (Operation Lifeline Sudan). You need to support alternatives.

My own organization and six or seven other organizations are ready to operate in defiance of the Sudan Government, to fly in that food, to get those aircraft, and we have done it. We operate in areas where the United Nations has never operated before. We go into those areas, we were the first into those areas where those attacks I described earlier took place. We had to flee in the middle

of the night, but we didn't leave the area. We stayed in the area, and right now we have international agencies operating there such as Goal of Ireland, Norwegian Naglu Aid and others—international organizations who operate independently.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for giving me the opportunity to speak to you today.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Eiffe appears in the appendix.]

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Eiffe, and I certainly respect your passion and the good work you do in getting the food to people who otherwise wouldn't get it. And I think we all agree, though, that a political solution is what is needed. Increasingly, we're hearing from aid workers around the world, most recently in Kosovo, that we don't want more, on the short-term, yes, more food, but we have to have a political settlement. Otherwise, it's a mere perpetuation of the cycles of violence that are occurring. So thank you for your insights on that.

Sister Atuu.

#### **STATEMENT OF SISTER MARY ROSE ATUU, LITTLE SISTERS OF MARY IMMACULATE OF GULU, NORTHERN UGANDA**

Sister ATUU. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Please allow me to express my most sincere sympathy for the events that took place last Friday, and the tragic losses that you and the Capital community have suffered. My prayers are with the two brave police officers who were slain and their families.

I'm very grateful for your kind invitation. My purpose for being here is of utmost importance and I thank God and you for this opportunity. I'm here to testify before this Committee for the crisis in northern Uganda.

Since 1986, thousands of children and civilians have been abducted, killed, and enslaved in northern Uganda by the rebels who call themselves LRA. The government has been unable to stop the LRA due to its army corruption and unwillingness to provide an alternative solution to the fighting. I'm here today to bear witness to this atrocity and ask that the United States take a more active role in bringing peace to northern Uganda.

The LRA is led by Joseph Kony, whose only stated objective is to overthrow the government who took over the Ugandan Government in 1986. At first Kony tried to abduct adults, but he soon found that the children are more easy to brainwash, to believe that killing and dying for the rebels is honorable. During the first 2 weeks of abduction, children are given guns and are forced to kill anyone who disagrees with their ideas, including their parents, siblings, neighbors, and friends.

Furthermore, these children are used as combat shield in front lines to fight the rebels and the government soldiers. If any of the children try to escape, they will catch them and the rebels put them in the middle and they try to prevent them from escaping by real torture, and they give example to the other children by mutilating their ears, noses, hands, legs, and even lips.

I am sure some of you saw the "60 Minutes" show which was done on the 22nd of March, and that is just a part of the horror which is taking place in northern Uganda. Girls are sexually abused and enslaved by their abductors and forced to servitude.



Refusing to cooperate results in brutal beating, torture, and death. In total, I could say that the rebels have actually destroyed the mind and the conscience of the future generation of northern Uganda to believe that killing is honorable.

I want to tell you my personal witness of abduction of 44 girls from the school where I was teaching, Sacred Heart Senior Secondary School. In the early morning of July 19, 1992, a group of rebels, they came into the dormitory, and I was living near the convent, was just next to the dormitory. We soon heard the sounds of the door and the rebels scream, "Open, open." Then immediately they started joking again and they broke into one of the doors, and they tried to go to the second door, and because we had an iron bolt, they were not successful.

At dawn we came out to see whether the rebels had gone, but, to our own disappointment and sorrow, we found that 44 of our girls were abducted. Immediately we reported it to the nearby military government and they were only half a mile away. When we found the six policemen who were there and they were hired actually to guard the school, they told us that they had not heard the voices or the sounds and none of them were actually punished. They made all excuses.

In the following months, groups of our girls escaped from the rebels and returned to us, badly beaten with sore feet, and they were immediately taken to the hospital, St. Mary's, where actually Secretary of State Madeleine Albright visited. They described to us the experiences and explained how two of our girls were killed.

Jane was the first to be killed. She tried to escape. The rebels knew that she was trying to escape. Immediately they brought her in the middle of the girls, and other children they came in because, when they go, when they're abducted, they gather together in a certain place; then you can see many, many, many children. Then immediately they told them, "We want you to see this. If you try to escape we'll do the same thing we are going to do to Jane." Jane actually pleaded for her life. She said, "Just forgive me. I will do all what you want me to do, provided you spare my life." Immediately they pierced her body 16 times with a bayonet and they left her body there, just to display as a reminder for the other children, so that they may not try to escape again.

Then a few days later we heard that one of our girls was killed. Immediately we summoned the military, but they say that we could not go because security was tight. And many times when you try to follow the children, the government soldiers will begin to suspect you. They said, why do you go? If you manage to go and get the children, they know that you are a friend of the rebels, so people are just torn in between the rebels and the government.

And I could remember one of our priests was put in prison immediately after going to rebels, staying there for 3 days, and when he brought the children back, he was put in prison. He is now in Rome because he could not stay in Uganda.

The LRA actually remains mobile, with our girls and the other children carrying supplies they have looted. Then the second girl, Alice, was killed because she was not able to walk, and if you don't run due to the fact that sometimes our military government with helicopters will be coming, they just run with these kids in the long

grass, forests, all kind of things, and some of them are not able to resist after the long journey. So Alice could not run, and immediately this man just shot her because she couldn't run.

We know of Jane and Alice today only because we were assistants. There are many other children that have been taken, and are going to be taken, and nobody knows whether they are still alive or dead, and tragically, many more children will be abducted in the future unless this unspeakable situation is actually taken care of. I'm here today as a voice of the children who are being killed, who are still suffering, and who are the victims to come, just to plead for their salvation, for their saving.

The people of northern Uganda are torn between the rebels who burn their houses, abduct, mutilate, and kill them, and the government which does not protect them. Nearly half a million people are forced to live in a camp called "protected villages" in crowded inhumane conditions. The villages are actually frequent targets to rebels' attack and abduction because they are built around the military, which means the military are in the middle and the people are like a shield to them. So when the rebel comes, of course, I don't know, probably that is what military means.

Although the United States is already supporting Uganda economically, it has not yet effectively addressed this violation of human rights. U.S. donations are indirectly funding a corrupt military which cares more about its reputation because it wants to receive the rebels, but not to protect people. The innocent people and the children are dying and the problem of the southern Sudan is overwhelming. It started a long time ago.

I've seen this is—in Uganda this is the second or third reflux of refugees coming to Uganda, and it is a very serious issue. The one of southern Uganda also is a very, very tough issue. Therefore, I am asking the United States to put different envoys, so that they are actually being tackled differently, and as has been mentioned, the LRA or the LRA, actually they are being held by the Sudanese Government. When they realize that there is connection between the SPLA and Ugandan Government, then their eyes open and they say: We have to take advantage. And many now, those who are helping the rebels, are the fundamentalists, the Torabi group. The government also is there.

It is very important that we tell the truth because the truth will set us free, and many people we don't want to tell the truth. And who died? Children. And who are they? Innocent children. They are innocent; they do not know, and because of our sinful things, children are dying because we don't tell the truth and we don't go to the base of what is very important. I beg you to help to stop this war being waged against innocent children.

We ask that pressure be put on the Government of Uganda and on the rebels so that this senseless war can be stopped through peaceful settlement. People need peace; ordinary people need peace, they need nothing. That is, in northern Uganda, it is the cradle of all kinds of fruits and that's why it's called the Pile of Africa because everything comes from there.

And our army now they go and people work and all what they have done, the crops and what, immediately they come to your home; you have to put them in the lorries or in the truck and they

take to Kampala. They take advantage of all these kinds of atrocities.

In closing, I thank you in advance for helping me to get this message across, and especially in the United States, whom I know they are very, very, very concerned about the human rights and the children, and I pray God that he bless all of our efforts for doing his work on Earth. God bless you. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Sister Atuu appears in the appendix.]

Mr. SMITH. Sister Atuu, thank you very much for your very eloquent statement, and I'd like to ask you a few questions, and I will submit several more, because of the lateness of the hour, and also because your testimony has been so comprehensive. You've answered many of those questions that I think many of us have in advance.

Ms. Rone, you talked about the promises that Kofi Annan had gotten for a needs assessment, and we all know that there is no access, or almost no access, to the Nuba Mountains.

Ms. Bellamy, in your conversations—if you're at liberty to disclose some of those conversations with the leaders in Khartoum—did they show any propensity to honor their commitment to the Secretary General of the United Nations, to allow for that needs assessment, and is there any chance that there will be access for the humanitarian community to those areas?

Ms. BELLAMY. Well, in fact, the Minister of Foreign Affairs did acknowledge his commitment to the Secretary General about this and said that he expected it would happen at least before the fall. The minister intends to be at the U.N. General Assembly in September and he wouldn't be able to face the Secretary General if he fails to meet this commitment—I did raise the question of access. It was a very clear, straightforward discussion.

That being said, it is thought that the Minister of Foreign Affairs is not able to make this happen yet, even though he has made this commitment. It's my understanding—not my understanding—I actually know, that when Mr. Griffiths was there the week before, he raised this issue again on behalf of the Secretary General. The discussion then became attached to the tragedy that occurred with the killing of the two World Food and one Sudanese Red Crescent individual. In essence, they're looking for there to be some fingerpointing to the rebels, but it's inconclusive at this point, as I understand it. I don't know the specifics on that.

So I urge that at least this assessment go forward. They have repeated their verbal commitment. It was made again, but what we have seen, no indication yet that this is happening.

Mr. SMITH. You pointed out in your testimony that 62 percent of the U.N. consolidated appeal for Sudan has been met. 38 percent of that remains unmet. How many lives are being lost because of that lack of response?

Ms. BELLAMY. I have to be honest; I don't think we have the slightest idea about that. I think we realize that lives are being lost, and even if we had 100 percent, the fact is that people are in such terrible condition right now. We've all seen them; we know lives are being lost. But, I might on that, actually ask my colleague, Ms. Bertini, I don't mean to put you on the spot, but if you

want to speak to just some of these? Because it comes to the issue again of how quickly we can respond in some of these cases.

As I said, we are trying to expand the feeding centers because in some instances people aren't even in condition to eat the food. They have to go through the supplementary feeding in the first place. But there is still a shortfall, and that shortfall will go to whether we are going to be able to just get in the food that we think we need to get in at this point.

Mr. SMITH. Ms. Bertini.

Ms. BERTINI. Thank you. We've just expanded our food assessment, and therefore, our food request, and so we are now even more underfunded because of the increased request. So it's actually we're 60 percent short, which is about \$90 million for the food and related costs.

Mr. SMITH. Could we get a copy of that detail, because I think it would be helpful?

Ms. BERTINI. Yes. Yes.

Ms. BELLAMY. And we can provide you with the overall consolidated appeal of which that's a part.

[The report appears in the appendix.]

Ms. BERTINI. But may I say, Mr. Chairman, to your point, that it is impossible to estimate the number of people, but what's critical now to keep people alive now who are very malnourished is a special kind of food that helps them when they're very vulnerable. So this is things like corn soya blend, like the dried skim milk, like biscuits and high-protein biscuits, and these are things that we do not have there and we are asking donors to urgently send, and those in fact will be life-saving if they can get them.

Mr. SMITH. Do you have the paper with you on that?

Ms. BERTINI. Yes.

Mr. SMITH. Because I think that's something Mr. Payne and Tony Hall and Frank Wolf and all of us could look at it. You were kind, Ms. Bellamy, in saying how grateful you were to the United States, but if the need is not being met, perhaps we can provide a bridge and in a bipartisan way try to up the ante. We certainly can try, but the more information we have from you regarding that, the better we can make a cogent case to the Administration.

Let me just ask—Mr. Eiffe had a more cynical view about the ceasefire perhaps than Ms. Bellamy. While it provides an opportunity, is there a potential that this is really a means by the government to advance some strategic aim, Mr. Eiffe?

Mr. EIFFE. Yes, the government has its back to the wall at the moment. The towns in there are besieged since January when the SPLA hit those towns and the population went out. The towns of Gogrial, Wau, and Aweil are really under siege; the town of Juba, the capital of the South, is under siege. So the government is recruiting students in northern Sudan, university students, school boys and forcibly recruiting them and they're also being attacked. There is a vicious fighting this week in Ulu, south of Damazein where the government suffered very serious losses. They committed 6,000 troops to that battle. That's up in the Upper Nile area. So they're really stretched, and when they're stretched in one area, then the ceasefire allows them a breathing space. This is not cynical. I've watched this; I can detail every ceasefire and peace agree-

ment. It's part of the government's war strategy. Even peace talks have become part of the war strategy, without going into detail, I mean.

Mr. SMITH. Is that view shared by other members of the panel?

Ms. BELLAMY. Well, I don't pretend to be the expert, but he is in terms of having lived in the country and, on the other hand, I don't want it be suggested that I'm naive, that I think the ceasefire's just a happy time, and there aren't many different reasons for it. Clearly, the government has lost in a number of recent battles. There is still fighting going on. There is some concern that the rebels are pulling together some strength down in the eastern equatorial, where we don't have access either. I don't happen to think there are any white hats, quite honestly, in this situation.

But what I was suggesting is if there is any way to take advantage even of the ceasefire, for all the reasons that there may be this ceasefire—and I'm not suggesting they are all for the best of reasons—but if there is any opportunity that one can take advantage to try and push more of the peace process, that's what I was suggesting. Not that we're talking about people who are sitting there saying, "Gee, isn't this nice and we won't kill each other."

Mr. SMITH. In your view, would this be an opportune time for the President to name a political envoy?

Ms. BELLAMY. I think one can try and take advantage of any opportunity.

Mr. SMITH. Would a political envoy be a prudent step on the part of the Administration as opposed to a humanitarian envoy?

Ms. BERTINI. Well, I agree with the assessment that there are lots of humanitarian negotiators, or whatever, and, of course, we are working with a United Nations, with a special representative appointed by the Secretary General. So another humanitarian person I'm not sure is going to be particularly useful, but there needs to be some strong political clout, and if the U.S. or other governments decided that that was through an envoy, I mean that would be a decision for you, the political leadership to make. But there needs to be strong political clout and some entity or person or department or group of countries that's very much committed to finding ultimate peace now.

Mr. SMITH. Can I ask, in terms of those children who are reunited with their families after having been abducted by Kony's group, what is the status of those children? I mean, they have been brainwashed. Is there any kind of assessment of that? I know right now the immediate need is to save people from starvation, but, you know, the children coming back from having been brainwashed or perhaps having committed some atrocities themselves, how do they fit in? How do they get reintegrated? Sister Atuu.

Sister ATUU. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. These children who have escaped and they are now back with their community, some of them are being cared for by the World Vision, but many of them are suffering psychological and traumatic upset. They do not know whether they have to obey the rule which is in the community or they have to follow the Resistance Army issue. Because even in the midst, when they are in with the World Vision, some of them even kill.

So it means that they need real orientation or a place where they can be actually at least helped, real rehabilitation, psychological rehabilitation, a real education, even some activities where they can play freely and do something which can take their mind away. But at this very moment they are living in the locality where they are being abducted and they are looked upon like living corpses, and some people they have remarked about them. And I want to add also that these children, some of them have been in the bush with the rebels for 12 years.

Let us say they are taken when they are 10; they have reached manhood, and some of them are children; they are in the bush. What kind of generation are we going to have? I feel that probably some of those who died, they are being released from this coming generation. Thank you.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you.

Ms. Bellamy.

Ms. BELLAMY. May I make just a brief comment? I agree with everything she said. We've learned some lessons, although these are not easy or we have learned from some of the demobilization efforts of child soldiers. The record on these efforts is still thin but Mozambique teaches some lessons and now we're learning in Liberia. But, this isn't just a simple matter of these young, even if they may still look like and act like in some ways, children; it's not just a simple matter of repatriation and reintegration into the community.

I mean they've been through just horrific circumstances. We understand from the Concerned Parents Association, which are the parents of the abducted children, that some of the LRA's latest campaign is to impregnate as many of the girls as possible to increase the ranks.

And so community becomes very important. They need in many ways to be integrated with other children at this point. There are extreme psychological consequences. Psychosocial damage has been done. Many of them have been very violent; many of them have killed; many of them have harmed; many of them have been really engaged in the most brutal acts, even though they've had brutal acts taken out on them.

So it's not just a simple, "isn't this wonderful; we have them back," and then they'll just go back. And so it does require a more complicated process. The World Vision Program is involved, but others need to be involved in this as well. As I said, we've been working with World Vision, but these children require psychosocial counseling, help in developing job skills, help to return to school. It's very much a family and a community type of coming together to begin to help these children get reintegrated.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Payne.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. I certainly appreciate the testimony of each and every one of you, and certainly probably one of the saddest, in my opinion, the saddest area in the world at the present time.

I certainly have had the experience of traveling—as a matter of fact, spent a good day or two with Mr. Eiffe in 1993 in southern Sudan in the area he was working in at that time, and I do have some somewhat difference of opinion of some of you. I listened to

my colleague, Mr. Hall, talk about the fact that in Bosnia and Northern Ireland by, you know, having talks we were able to come up with solutions, and therefore, supporting the opening of the embassy, and so forth. But I think both in Bosnia, where Muslims were being suppressed, where the unarmed were being attacked, and even in Northern Ireland with the Irish Catholic minority having much discrimination and even police brutality heaped on them, they were primarily victims almost unable to fend for themselves.

Finally, here in Sudan—and I'm not a person that advocates war and violence—the Government of Khartoum has perpetrated war for 30 or 40 years on the people of the south, and at a time when finally the SPLA has gained momentum to the point where there could perhaps be a military victory, we're finding that there is—and I think everyone except Mr. Eiffe feels that there should be a negotiated settlement.

Now, negotiated settlements are always good because they end the violence. There was a talk of a negotiated settlement when in Zaire, the then Zaire when Mobutu was on the last leg and the alliance forces were moving to Kinshasa, and it was said that Mr. Kabila should stop and should meet with Mr. Mobutu to have a solution. Well, at the door of Kinshasa there was no time to negotiate them.

I'm not saying that I'm pleased with what's happening, in the Congo with Mr. Kabila but, after all of the struggle, finally the SPLA seems to, without any real support from anyone in the West, some of the countries in the region are supportive, although they've gotten into conflict, Ethiopia and Eritrea with themselves, which have sort of ceased some of the support.

But for a ceasefire that will actually give assistance to the government, a government that can't be compared to any other government, I don't know how you could sit down and have a negotiated peace with people who supply arms to the Lord's Liberation Army that harbors terrorists, that have used food as a weapon for 30 years. What do you say to them? Do you say, well, let's all be friends, like when Rodney King said something like that?

Like I said, I think that I wish that our government would support the SPLA, so that there could be a military solution, that they could then sit down and try to then work out a solution to the problem in that country because, as it's been indicated, the ceasefire is just the time for them to re-arm; to re-tool; to strengthen their military; to take more youngsters out of their universities, as they've been doing. And they're finding resistance in the north of people who want their children to go to college and not to war. They've even imprisoned some students who refuse to go. They shot and killed some students who said, "I do not want to fight for the government."

And so I'm sort of, for once I guess, having a difference of opinion of having a negotiated peace talks, ceasefire settlement. Of course, it's not up to me because I'm not there and I don't have anything to do with what happens, but I just think that the difference in Bosnia and Northern Ireland is that in both of those instances the underdog was kept in, was still under, and far under, and had no way of coming out. In this instance, the underdog for 30 years fi-

nally has some semblance of the possibility of a victory that could therefore change.

It goes beyond north and south. There has got to be a tremendous, as you've been talking about, ethnic cleansing; there is a psychological difference of some of the leaders in the north as opposed to the African black Christian and animist people in the south. It goes just beyond north and south. It has to do with culture and discrimination and elitism and many other factors.

So I just really am so frustrated at the brutality of what has happened there so long; I mean, for the first time, sort of support a continued military advance by the rebels because it appears to me they have weakened the government; that's the only reason that they've agreed to the ceasefire, and if they ever get to, unfortunately, to the hydro-electrical plants which would darken Khartoum, it would all be over.

I wonder if any of you—I know you're all humanitarians, but maybe you can give me your response because it's totally atypical of positions that I normally take. Start with you, Ms. Bellamy.

Ms. BELLAMY. I haven't the slightest capacity of judging the military at this point. I'm sorry, I'm unable to respond to your comments in this case.

Ms. BERTINI. Well, we are humanitarians still; our job is not to give in to the political or military perspectives, and I have to say, Congressman, I can understand your concern, not coming from that direction before, but I think I would come from this perspective that we always, always, always, always have to try to sit at the table and come to some good, solid, peaceful conclusions that way. There have been a lot of very despicable people in the world who have ultimately sat at the peace table. So I would think that, just because of problems that have been caused by one side or another, that that does not automatically prohibit them from sitting down to finding ultimate peace, particularly if in this case both the government and the SPLA and all of their supporters and friends from elsewhere around the world were encouraging them to sit down and have these kinds of peaceful discussions.

Ms. BELLAMY. It has been suggested that by feeding people and keeping them alive, we're keeping a conflict going. It's a very strange argument. Again, I would only say that I think our responsibility is to try and create conditions that are human conditions, and we would ultimately hope that that will yield an environment where all people's rights will be respected. I mean, to merely talk about it, but I mean, you know, we are UNICEF, are anchored in the Convention on the Rights of the Child; that's the rights of all children, whoever they are, whatever their religion, wherever they live.

But, ultimately, the extent of conflict in the world today is so challenging to the ability of the rights of any human being to be respected, and so I would hope ultimately we would be able to see some kind of peace achieved in that country.

Ms. RONE. I'm really not able to comment on the larger points you're making, but I think you're very correct to point out that the war is not just in the south, but it's also being fought in the central part of the country and in the east; that it's not a regional war between north and south, but it also includes important segments of



a northern society who have had their human rights totally repressed by the current government, which will not permit any freedom of association or political parties to function, which doesn't have free speech except for some in the inner circle, and so forth. So it is not just a north-and-south issue, you're right in that.

I would like to add that when we were talking about envoys, there is something we can do to prepare for the future, to lay the ground, whichever way the conflict goes. I think any envoy should have as a very high matter on the agenda, and perhaps even half of his or her time, attention to human rights, specifically because human rights are what is causing the current famine, but also because there needs to be a lot more attention to them.

The U.N. Human Rights Commission has been fooling around for 2 years with the idea of having special U.N. human rights monitors inside Sudan. The government has been dodging this bullet for a long time. They've managed to defer by bureaucratic manipulation, and so forth, any actual decision being taken by the U.N. Commission on Human Rights on this. So I think an envoy, if we have one from the U.S. Government or another envoy from the United Nations, should make it a priority to see that this happens.

The government had first said they don't want any monitors on their soil. So there was a suggestion that the monitors be based in neighboring countries. It's a very good suggestion. They can get a lot of excellent testimony from refugees and from relief workers and everybody who comes back from inside. Then the government, I guess because that was going to happen, decided that they wanted to discuss technical assistance, so their discussion now has centered around technical assistance, which means "Give us land cruisers and give us faxes and we will do the monitoring." And I would hate to see the United Nations or anyone else fall for that.

There is also a lot that can be done to promote the rule of law in the south in territories that the rebels control, because right now they don't have a judicial system. They've been in rebellion for a long time, about 15 years. It's about time they developed a legal system, as most guerrillas armies have something akin by this time. And there've been proposals for paralegals and other things like that that I think would be very helpful. They need not only help for a judicial system, but also help for independent human rights monitors. I think that this would be a very good learning experience for the SPLA, and whatever role they have in the country in the future, they would benefit by this, by getting used to these kinds of democratic constraints.

Mr. EIFFE. Congressman Payne, I think it's a very important point to note that when the Government of Sudan and the SPLA sit together, the atmosphere in which they sit together is always dictated by the military situation. So when you're looking for a political solution, you need per se already a favorable military pressure. The government has become much more amenable recently in the peace talks, precisely because the SPLA has had a lot of military success on the ground, and this is directly related.

So we can't just stop at negotiation. Look, I'm for negotiation and talking, absolutely. But I've learned in my years' experience in the field observing this; that's the only time the negotiations become realistic. Like 2 years ago when the Sudan Government thought it

was winning, they went down to Nairobi, saying, "Forget the peace talks; our peace is working; we've defeated them. They're coming over in the thousands." These games are the history of negotiation here. So the military solution creates the environment for a political solution; that's No. 1.

No. 2, we've been talking today about this NIF Government. The actual issue goes way beyond this government. Sudan has never been a nation state; it's always had marginalized populations; it's been centrally controlled by a military merchant group. Before there was Sodiquel Mahdi; now it's the NIF. It doesn't matter. Maybe it's good that the Islamic Front has been there because it's brought Sudan to the forefront. It's a border that eventually erupted, but has never been a nation state. So the issue here is actually much more complex than making peace; it's actually one of identity. It's not a question of who's in power, like in Congo with this Kabila and Mobutu. It's a question of identifying Sudan as multi-ethnic and multi-religious with a complex history, and coming up with some kind of solution which would affect the whole region very seriously—not just Sudan, but regionally has very big implications.

Thank you.

Sister ATUU. Thank you, Mr. Payne. As far as human rights or something to help the people to come out from the misery they have like food and even money-wise, I feel and I think that it is very important that what is being sent to help the people is being monitored, because a lot of times the military and the government, they take advantage of this and I've seen with my two eyes many people who are in control, especially those of the government, they become richer. And they like the United Nations when it comes along and says this year we're going to get rich. Unless it is monitored, it cannot help the people; it is just a failure.

Then second, I feel even that the government should be advised, and like the United States, as to find a way, diplomatic way, of talking to our government because that is the center; it's our father, everything for the nation. So they have to accept any advice, something which can help in bringing peace to the country, and that is the most important thing because we need to get to the root of what is actually bringing this kind of thing.

And third, these rebels, is there anybody who can actually go or somebody who can capture them because they are not so many compared to our military soldiers? And is it so great, you know, so intelligent, that nobody can take this man somewhere? And again, also, we have Amin Dada who has actually killed so many people, and I don't hear anything about him. He has lived 20 years without any international court law of justice being put upon him. So everybody knows that when you take one thing, you can get away with it.

Thank you, Mr. Payne.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. I had some other questions. I guess it was kind of an unfair question to ask humanitarian people but all the frustration level, as you know, I think with all of us was relatively high. I do also note that there are problems in the north of Uganda and that whole situation the government needs to give more attention to northern Uganda, does not excuse

the brutal LRA movement, but it perhaps compounds the difficulty that they have in stamping it out. But using children in war is wrong.

I just hope that we can come up with a solution and I appreciate the Chairman calling this very important hearing, and I have to run back across the hall. Lucky, they've got a vote on that I have to vote for, and then I have to see my young children from Ireland. These are some visitors from Northern Ireland. They're young men who have seen peace come perhaps because of Mr. Mitchell and the groups coming together. And so hopefully, we can have at least a humanitarian envoy to go and try to sort out some of the issues.

But thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for calling this meeting.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Payne, and I want to thank our very distinguished witnesses for your wisdom, your insights, your recommendations, and I hope we can act on those very promptly. And I do have additional questions; I will submit them to you. And I do thank you again.

[The information referred to appears in the appendix.]

Mr. SMITH. The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:55 p.m., the Subcommittee adjourned subject to the call of the Chair.]

# APPENDIX

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH  
4th District, New Jersey

WASHINGTON OFFICE  
2275 ANNE ARUNDEL DRIVE, SUITE 600  
WASHINGTON, DC 20018-3004  
(202) 225-3700

CONSTITUENT SERVICE CENTERS

1540 BROADWAY  
SUITE 100  
NEWARK, NJ 07102-3028  
(908) 540-7810  
(908) 540-3000

100 CALIFORNIA  
SUITE 300  
WALTHAM, MA 02451-1331  
(603) 366-2300



**Congress of the United States**  
**House of Representatives**  
**Washington, DC 20515-3004**

**Statement of Representative Chris Smith**  
**Chairman, Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights**  
**July 29, 1998**  
**Crises in Sudan and Northern Uganda**

COMMITTEES

**INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**  
CHAIRMAN: INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS  
WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS

**VETERANS AFFAIRS**  
VICE CHAIRMAN: HOSPITALS AND HEALTH CARE

**COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE**  
CO-CHAIRMAN

I want to thank Chairman Royce of the Subcommittee on Africa for his leadership in scheduling this important hearing on the humanitarian and human rights crisis in Northern Uganda and Sudan.

A few weeks ago I received a visit from Sister Mary Rose Atuu, who shared her personal observations of the campaign of terror waged by the so-called Lord's Resistance Army, with the backing of the government of Sudan. The systematic torture, rape, and murder of children, who are then forced to become murderers themselves --- these are atrocities on the order of those committed by Hitler and Stalin. Yet the modern world simply watches while the rapes and tortures and murders continue. I hope our Administration witnesses today will tell us exactly what our government believes would be necessary to put an immediate end to the depredations of the Lord's Resistance Army, and what we are doing to see to it that these steps are taken.

The crisis in Uganda is inextricable from the plight of southern Sudan, whose people have been the victims of a vicious internal war inflicted by the radical military government in Khartoum, and who are now dying by the thousands as a result of a famine caused in large part by that war. The lesson of Sudan is also the lesson of the Soviet Union in its heyday, of Ethiopia in the 1980s, and of North Korea today: the primary cause of famine is not natural forces. The primary cause of famine is bad government. There is more than enough food in the world, and governments and other institutions in the free and civilized world are more than willing to deliver it. When these institutions fail, it is usually because they are impeded by the governments that caused the famine in the first place. This does not mean we should stop trying. It is not the fault of the children of Sudan or of North Korea that they were born in countries with evil governments. I hope to hear from our witnesses today exactly what needs to be done to end the starvation and malnutrition, and I pledge my support to make these things happen. We must bear in mind, however, that the long-term solution to the problem of hunger must include an end to the oppression, corruption, and disregard for human life that are the root causes of hunger.

I agree with several of our witnesses today that the people of southern Sudan need more than humanitarian assistance: they also need peace. I have joined with my colleagues Tony Hall and Frank Wolf in calling on the President to appoint a Special Envoy in an effort to turn the temporary and limited cease-fire into a lasting peace. But the people of Sudan have already

learned that no peace will really last unless it is peace with honor and justice. It would be tragically wrong to impose a peace that merely takes away from the people of southern Sudan what they have gained on the battlefield, allowing the Khartoum government to consolidate its power and bide its time before engaging in yet another round of brutal repression. Peace in Sudan means self-determination for all the people of Sudan: the people of the South must have the right to choose, in free and fair elections under international supervision, between independence and integration into a new Sudan that is both free and democratic.

I look forward to hearing the testimony of our distinguished witnesses.

Opening Statement of  
Congresswoman Cynthia McKinney  
Committee on International Relations  
Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights  
Subcommittee on Africa

Crises in Sudan and Northern Uganda

July 29, 1998

Thank you Mr. Chairman:

I would like to welcome Assistant Secretary Susan Rice along with the other witnesses. I look forward to their testimony.

Twelve years ago Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni marched a 20,000-strong rebel army to Uganda's capital, Kampala, and liberated the Ugandan people from the reign of two of the most oppressive dictatorships the world has ever seen. During their successive regimes Amin and Obote murdered over one million people. While the United States and the Western Powers did nothing, Museveni took action.

Since then, the story of Uganda is nothing short of phenomenal. President Museveni immediately formed a Human Rights Commission to investigate the atrocities committed under the former dictators. Today the Commission is chaired by a judge and overseen by Members of the High Court. The mandate of the organization is to serve as a watch-dog by monitoring government activities, and to educate the public about respect for human rights.

After the establishment of the Human Rights Commission, President Museveni began assembling judges, lawyers and other scholars for the purpose of drafting Uganda's Constitution. His administration actively solicited the involvement of men and women at the grass-roots level. Several thousand Ugandans submitted memorandums offering suggestions. An important component of the Constitution is a provision institutionalizing the Human Rights Commission.

Perhaps most astonishing has been Uganda's economic growth under President Museveni. Real GDP growth has averaged 6.7% over the last ten years. Inflation has been reduced from 250% to 6%. The country has liberal current and capital accounts, so there is no restrictions on foreign exchange. To ease the concerns of foreign investors, Uganda now offers insurance to investors through the Multi-lateral Insurance Guarantee Agency of the World Bank. Under Amin, Ugandans of South Asian heritage were stripped of their properties and forced to leave the country. President Museveni has allowed them to return, and has given back their businesses and land. To encourage American tourists and investors, citizens of the United States no longer need visas to travel to Uganda.

Understanding that an exclusionary government breeds its own opposition, President Museveni held elections and has an administration that reflects the diversity of Ugandan society. In 1987 a reporter asked him how he could afford to have such a large and diverse government. His answer was a simple one: "It is cheaper than war."

Mr. Chairman, this is what President Museveni has built in just twelve years. But even more important than what he has done for Uganda, President Museveni is perhaps the first of a new breed of leader on the Continent. He has proven that African leaders no longer need to follow the orders of their colonial masters to achieve success. Independence and security, Museveni has shown, are not mutually exclusive.

Unfortunately, all of this is threatened by an entity as evil as the world has ever seen. Northern Uganda is plagued by a rebel insurgency known as the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), led by Joseph Kony. The LRA is notorious for looting homes, and abducting and enslaving thousands of Ugandan children. Boys as young as 11 years old are forced to serve as soldiers and to participate in extreme acts of violence. Girls of the same age are made into sexual slaves. Nearly all of the children who escape from the LRA are found to be HIV positive. The UN Children's Fund estimates that up to 10,000 youngsters have been victims of rebel atrocities. Backed by an oppressive and terrorist regime in Sudan, the LRA is a direct affront on the new Africa.

Mr. Chairman, it is time for Congress and the Clinton Administration to embrace President Museveni and Uganda as a partner for peace and stability on the African Continent. We must make a decision. Will the United States continue its centuries old neglect of Africa? Will it continue to support only the Mobutu Sese Sekos and Jonas Savimbi of Africa? Or, if President Clinton's trip truly marked a new beginning in relations between the United States and the countries of sub-Saharan Africa, will we support those that are doing the right thing?

The current crises in Northern Uganda poses this question. I, along with the countless others who care about the future of Africa, await the answer.

Thank you Mr. Chairman.

OPENING STATEMENT  
CONGRESSMAN DONALD M. PAYNE  
"CRISIS IN SUDAN AND NORTHERN UGANDA"  
JOINT SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA AND INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS  
AND HUMAN RIGHTS  
JULY 29, 1998

I would like to thank Chairman Smith and Chairman Royce for calling this hearing on the crisis in Sudan and Northern Uganda. Many people that I come across know the problems of the Sudan but cannot comprehend its depth. To me, the one predictable thing about Sudan is its unpredictability. An entire generation of southern Sudanese are dying in one of the world's most neglected civil wars. More than 1.5 million southern Sudanese have died over the past decade as a result of war, famine and disease.

The urgency of the humanitarian crisis in Sudan cannot be overstated. For the life of me, I can't understand how this has happened yet again. An estimated 2.6 million people are currently at risk of starvation. Relief operations are seriously threatened because of the Government's policy of starvation. The NIF government is primarily responsible for the escalation of the current humanitarian tragedy. Moreover, civilians continue to suffer needlessly, in part because of the indifference of the international community. Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), created to prevent humanitarian crisis in Sudan, is also responsible. OLS has become hostage to NIF's constant manipulation

The indiscriminate aerial bombardment of refugee camps and massive ground onslaught by Government forces appear targeted in depopulating southern Sudan and to crush the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA).

My first visit to Southern Sudan was in 1993 with many subsequent trips, and I must honestly conclude that almost eight years of repression and dictatorship have intensified opposition to the NIF-led government. I have never seen the people and the SPLA more determined. I was in Yei (YEE) last December with my good friend Congressman Campbell and I saw the devastation and desperate conditions people live under.

Mr. Chairman, I am sure everyone has seen the horrible photos in Time Magazine especially in the Bar el -Ghazal region which depicts a mother that cannot provide milk for her starving child, and men that are too frail and weak to walk. It is hard for me to fathom a Dinka herdsman who masters raising cattle not being able to provide for his family. This brutal Islamic regime in Khartoum can not compare in its viciousness to the Christians and animist in the South.

Let me just conclude by saying that I must commend Assistant Secretary Susan Rice for our Administration's effective Sudan policy. It is precisely this policy that has brought both parties to the negotiating table. If we change course by opening the



Embassy, without any tangible evidence of reform, the IGAD [E-GAD] talks scheduled for next month have the potential to be circumvented. Most important, the government in Khartoum will interpret this move as a sign of approval at a time when we should be clear about our objectives in Sudan.

Moved by the situation, I have introduced H. Con. Res. 309 with Chairman Gilman, Chairman Smith and Ranking Member Menendez that seeks to halt the forced abduction and recruitment of child soldiers by the al-Bashir government in collaboration with the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). It encourages the President to appoint an envoy for the region. I would also like to submit this letter to the Pentagon for the record which asks for the use of the numerous C-130 planes we have just sitting in reserve.

The record should be set straight--The NIF government remains an obstacle to peace and a threat to regional stability. It is cruel and inhumane to use food as a tool of war on the most vulnerable. The U.S. should not be used by Khartoum as a prop for their sinister games.

Thank you once again.

The Honorable Robert Menendez  
Subcommittees on Africa and Intl. Operations and Human Rights  
"Crises in Sudan and Northern Uganda"  
July 29, 1998

Once again, the Sudanese people find themselves confronted with famine and death and once again the culprit is Sudan's 15 year long civil war. Ten years ago, 250,000 Sudanese perished in the famine of the late 1980s. Today, Operation Lifeline Sudan has mounted its largest relief operation ever to manage the more than 2.6 million people facing starvation and the estimated 350,000 people who are near death. And while a cease-fire is in place, it is temporary and sadly, Sudan's civil war appears no closer to ending today, than it did in the 1980s. .

An estimated 1.5 million people have died in Sudan's civil war. In addition to the internal turmoil, the war has extracted an enormous cost on Sudan's neighbors, the civil war in Sudan is the root cause of instability in east Africa. The government in Khartoum is responsible for funding and supporting regional insurgent groups and international terrorist organizations.

Uganda has been disproportionately affected by the war in Sudan. Khartoum continues to support the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) which has abducted some 10,000 children, some as young as eight years old, in northern Uganda which it uses to support its efforts to overthrow

the Government of Uganda and to fight for the Sudanese government in southern Sudan.

Today, we are charged with looking at the humanitarian crisis in the region, but clearly we can not look at the humanitarian crisis without acknowledging the civil war as the cause of the famine. The government in Khartoum uses food as a military weapon, attempting to starve fighters in the south as it did earlier this year when it barred all relief flights to the south in February and March, in response to military losses in the region. In addition, the war in the south has kept farmers from harvesting their crops. The reality is that Sudanese people

will cycle in and out of famines until there is peace and stability which allows for sustainable farming throughout the country.

I know that Sudan and even the provision of humanitarian relief are the subjects of divisive political debates. I think we can clearly state that no one supports the National Islamic Front and everyone seeks peace and reconciliation for a people who have suffered for far too long. I can only agree with the conclusion reached by reporter Bruce Nelan in his recent article for Time magazine, he says:

“But peace is the commodity the Sudanese

people need the most. Their starvation is all the worse because it is so unnecessary.

Southern Sudan offers some of the most productive land in Africa, and the people who live there are hardworking farmers and herdsmen, past masters at raising cattle, coping with scanty rainfalls and husbanding seeds. If the battles would only end, they could make it on their own. Instead, tens of thousands of them are likely to die in this famine and the next one, which is sure to come.”

Clearly, part of work here today must be to consider not

only how we address this crisis, but we can and should do to forestall the next. The status quo can only yield yet another famine.



TONY P. HALL  
 1988-1991  
 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
 POLYMER COMMITTEE ON RULES &  
 PARLIAM. AFFAIRS & CONSTIT.  
 SUB-COMMITTEE ON RULES AND  
 PARLIAM. AFFAIRS OF THE HOUSE  
 CHAIRMAN  
 CONGRESSIONAL TALK FORCE ON HUMAN RIGHTS

1988-1991  
 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
 POLYMER COMMITTEE ON RULES &  
 PARLIAM. AFFAIRS & CONSTIT.  
 SUB-COMMITTEE ON RULES AND  
 PARLIAM. AFFAIRS OF THE HOUSE  
 CHAIRMAN  
 CONGRESSIONAL TALK FORCE ON HUMAN RIGHTS

**Congress of the United States**  
**House of Representatives**  
**Washington, DC 20515**

Remarks of

**U.S. Representative Tony P. Hall**

at the House Committee on International Relations  
 Joint hearing of  
 the subcommittee on Africa and  
 the subcommittee on International Operations & Human Rights on

**THE HUMANITARIAN CRISIS IN SUDAN  
 AND NORTHERN UGANDA**

July 29, 1998

**INTRODUCTION**

I want to thank the distinguished Chairman, Mr. Royce, and my good friend Chairman Chris Smith, for holding this hearing, and for inviting me to participate as an honorary Member of this respected panel.

I am pleased to join the committee today to talk about the grave situation facing the people of southern Sudan, who have suffered greatly in the longest running war on the African continent. They are now dying of starvation and disease by the thousands. It is the third serious famine to hit Sudan in the last decade. Having recently visited Sudan for the third time, I will focus on the crisis in that country. I appreciate that this hearing also covers the related situation in northern Uganda, where horrendous suffering has been inflicted by the Lord's Resistance Army, a guerilla group operating from Sudanese soil.

I share the world's and my colleagues' outrage at what is happening in northern Uganda, especially the abuses inflicted on innocent children. I traveled in northern Uganda several years ago, and was horrified to see some of the LRA's gruesome handiwork at a hospital I visited. A group of beautiful little girls, no more than 10 or 12 years old had their noses and ears cut off by LRA rebels. I applaud my colleagues' efforts to address this situation, and strengthen the United States' support for initiatives aimed at stopping this kind of senseless violence.

\*\*\*\*\*



## FAMINE IN SOUTHERN SUDAN

In southern Sudan, the prospects are dim for more than a million Sudanese who are facing starvation in the next three months. I was in Sudan a few weeks ago, visiting people in the famine-stricken region of Bahr-el-Ghazal, and meeting with aid workers and government officials. Since my visit, one of the feeding centers I went to has been bombed, and a village -- where I watched the United Nations' biggest humanitarian airlift in history in operation -- has been attacked. The small amount of food captured was turned into a funeral pyre for the people who were too weak to run from the raiders. It was a small village, and I'm sure that some of the people I met were among those who either died or fled if they had the strength.

I have seen the tragic human toll of humanitarian crises in many parts of the world, but for me, nothing had rivaled Ethiopia in the depth of its famine --- until I saw the people of southern Sudan a few weeks ago. The feeling of slowly starving is unimaginable for most of us. So is the agony of watching our own children slide into the nightmare of famine. Of course we cannot help but feel compassion for their suffering when we see the wrenching images of the starving that now confront us more and more in our media. But we also feel anger and frustration, which I think was best captured by the recent *Time* magazine piece on Sudan's tragedy, which read: "**Why is this happening again?**"

## HUMANITARIAN AID IS NO SUBSTITUTE FOR A POLITICAL SOLUTION

We can be proud of the fact that the United States has led the international community in providing humanitarian relief to Sudan. European nations, except for Great Britain, have lagged shamefully. And nations such as Japan and those in the Middle East -- who have ample resources to share, and whose own security is threatened by turmoil in Sudan -- have been downright stingy. Our allies and others should do far more to respond to this crisis, and America's generosity gives us the moral authority to press them harder.

Half of the U.N. appeal remains unmet. This means that the United Nations is struggling to get food to those in need, and that some of those who are starving are being turned away every day. Many of these people have walked for days to reach a feeding center, only to find little or no food available. The amount of food still needed is well within our capacity to provide, and we should respond to the actual need, rather than congratulating ourselves on percentage points.

The root causes of the war that has brought yet another famine to 2.6 million Sudanese people are complex, and have been much discussed and analyzed by many experts who have appeared before this Committee over the years. We will hear from some of those experts today.

However, it is increasingly clear that our policy on Sudan can no longer ignore what many humanitarian agencies have been saying for years, and what USAID itself has said of the current crisis: that humanitarian aid cannot continue to be a substitute for a political solution to Sudan's war. The time has come to back up our humanitarian leadership with an equal commitment to joining with the other donor nations and our regional allies in a renewed political push for a just and lasting peace in Sudan.

We of course share a responsibility to respond generously and urgently to Sudan's plight. Our values dictate that we reject the cynical notion of some critics that washing our hands of this situation and simply letting people die is any kind of a solution.

The grain-purchase initiative that President Clinton announced last week may help some American farmers significantly, but it will be the difference between life and death for hundreds of thousands of people facing starvation and malnutrition. In Sudan, although our donation will not arrive for months to come, it will be welcome relief, because war has prevented planting throughout much of this fertile region and so food shortages will continue even after the fall harvest.

Resources are only part of the problem. Equally challenging for aid agencies has been securing consistent access to populations in need, and overcoming the immense logistical obstacles to mounting a response of this scale in an area as vast and remote as southern Sudan. The cease-fire now in effect in some areas will help some. But we should give the United Nations Operation Lifeline Sudan the support it needs to maximize this window of opportunity. And we should lend full diplomatic support to efforts to translate this cease-fire into meaningful confidence-building measures that will improve the chance of success for the next round of peace talks set for August.

We also should consider an immediate loan of cargo planes to Operation Lifeline Sudan. Our laws permit such action, and the urgency of this crisis certainly warrants it. The *Washington Post* recently reported that the GAO as well as the Air Force itself, have identified an excess of 50 C-130 cargo planes in the Department of Defense inventory.

## A PUSH FOR PEACE NEEDED IN SUDAN

As urgently as they need humanitarian aid, though, the people of Sudan desperately need peace. As surely as we have a moral obligation to respond to immediate needs, we have an equally compelling obligation to help end the war that has again triggered famine. Without such a push for peace by the U.S. and other western powers, Sudan's people almost surely will be condemned to another turn in the cycle of war, famine, and dependence on external aid.

Congressman Frank Wolf and I, along with other Members who share our concern, have called on President Clinton to make peace in Sudan a higher priority. When the need for peace in Northern Ireland became acute, President Clinton sent one of our nation's leading negotiators. Former Senator George Mitchell traveled to that country 100 times to secure an agreement. In Bosnia, and again in Kosovo, Richard Holbrooke was dispatched. Former Secretary of State James Baker III is making superb progress in western Sahara's dispute.

But when it comes to black Africa, our "A Team" has remained on the bench. Those Americans who are involved -- and who have been involved in the past -- are dedicated, but they do not move in the high-level circles where decisions are made that can make a difference in Sudan. Our allies in Kenya and Britain (the regional leader and the former colonial power, respectively) are doing their best to press for peace. But they lack the high-level American counterpart that could lend momentum to their work.

Let us be clear on a couple of points. No one disputes that the declaration of principles agreed to by all parties to the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development should remain the one and only negotiating framework. No one argues that we should take a softer line with Khartoum. No one suggests that we let the legitimate aspirations of the people of southern South be compromised.

I simply am saying that there are others ways of accomplishing the same ends with the National Islamic Front. I know that, because I saw it during the Dayton Peace Accords, which were held in my home town. If we had waited for regimes like Slobodan Milosevic's to reform or be overthrown before we had engaged in intense diplomacy to end Bosnia's war, it still would be going on today.

A few days ago, Sudan's government and rebels agreed to a cease-fire. This might help aid workers do their jobs -- if they can get the food and medical supplies they need. But this first cease-fire in four years also dangles the possibility that it could be extended

into a lasting peace, or at least allow confidence-building measures on which to base peace talks.

Next month, Sudan and its neighbors will return to peace negotiations. It is an opportunity we should not squander. Naming a well respected special envoy -- someone with stature who can work with our allies toward peace, and who can inform policy making in our country -- would let us seize that opportunity, and the one presented by the cease-fire.

A high-level envoy would put Sudan on the priority track that its desperate situation warrants. And it would uphold the commitment that President Clinton made on his historic trip to Africa earlier this year. He promised then that the United States would never again let atrocities like we saw in Rwanda go unanswered. Yet the slavery and butchery that happens every day in Sudan rival Rwanda's violence. And the number of people who already have died is three times the number of Rwandan dead.

### **POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF A PEACEFUL SUDAN OUTWEIGH THE RISKS**

A peaceful Sudan could feed its own people -- and much of Africa. It almost certainly would stop undermining the fragile economic and political progress of its many neighbors. Peace would allow Sudan to flourish without relying on terrorists and their sponsor states for support. Most importantly, peace would cap Sudan's rising death toll, which already has passed the two million mark.

It is in our national interest to help provide such hope to Africa's largest nation, and especially to the 2.5 million people there who face starvation this year. We cannot afford to see Khartoum continue to be the "viper's nest of terrorists" that Secretary of State Albright has described. We should not consign ourselves to merely continuing to support Sudan's neighbors in their battles against it -- until we exhaust the opportunities for peace. And we certainly cannot afford to feed Sudan and vast areas of Africa that Sudan's people could feed without U.S. aid if they were left in peace.

I understand that the Administration is considering an Envoy for Sudan --- however, it would not be a high-level person who would focus on the peace process, but instead a Humanitarian Envoy. That would be the wrong way to go, and little more than a token gesture. Punting now would mire us further in the unsustainable practice of using humanitarian aid as a cover for lack of political will.

We have a tough policy on Sudan, a policy put in place by one of the finest African Affairs teams any Administration has ever assembled. It is one that enjoys broad bi-partisan support in many respects. But in part because of that policy's success, conditions now have shifted. Now, we need to take another look at the value of our engagement in that part of the world, especially our role in helping to advance and accelerate the peace process in Sudan. Both sides are weary. Both sides are questioning whether the war is winnable, or whether this stalemate could drag on indefinitely. Now is the time for the United States to weigh in with all of its considerable diplomatic skills, on behalf of peace.

When the President was in Rwanda, he apologized for not doing enough to prevent mass deaths. It is time that we invest in a just and lasting peace that can stop the cycle of violence, starvation, and mass displacement that has killed many more Sudanese.

## CONCLUSION

I have found that when Americans learn about what is happening in Sudan, they agree that helping to ease suffering there is in keeping with their own values. Christians in particular hear this call to help, because so many of our faith face persecution as part of this bitter conflict.

I have appreciated the kind offers of help that have been extended by our colleagues, as well as the many concerned Americans who have contacted me. There are strong, responsible humanitarian organizations working to relieve suffering in Sudan, and some of the most heroic and dedicated aid workers I have ever met are on the job every day there.

I look forward to hearing from my colleagues and the distinguished witnesses. My written statement, which I would ask to have entered into the record, also includes a list of humanitarian agencies working in Sudan, along with contact information for those interested in learning more about their good work.

Again, it is a privilege to be here with you, and I thank you for the opportunity to join you today.

[APPENDIX FOLLOWS]

**APPENDIX**

Private Voluntary Organizations that are helping famine victims in Sudan:

Adventist Development and Relief Agency (301) 680-6380  
 CARE(404) 681-2352  
 Catholic Relief Services (800) 235-2772  
 Christian Reformed World Relief Committee(800) 552-7297  
 Church World Service (212) 870-3151  
 Doctors Without Borders(212) 679-6800  
 Friends of the World Food Program(212) 963-9550  
 International Rescue Committee(212) 551-3000  
 Islamic African Relief Agency(573) 443-0166  
 Jesuit Refugee Services(202) 462-0400  
 Lutheran World Relief (800) 597-5972  
 Mercy Corps International(503) 242-1032  
 Norwegian People's Aid  
 (c/o U.S. Committee for Refugees)(800) 307-4712  
 Oxfam International (202) 783-8739  
 Oxfam U.S.A.(718) 728-2409  
 Save the Children(203) 293-4170  
 World Concern Development Organization (206) 546-7201  
 World Vision U.S. (888) 511-6565  
 U.S. Committee for UNICEF(202) 296-4242

For additional information, those interested also can contact Interaction, the American Council for Voluntary International Action, at 202/667-8227.

An independent private humanitarian agency operating separately from Operation Lifeline Sudan, and reaching people in need regardless of government permission is:

Norwegian People's Aid - South Sudan Program  
 P.O. Box 39207  
 Cnr Muthangari & Mageta Road  
 Nairobi, Kenya  
 Tel: (254-2) 574063 / 4, 574072 / 3  
 Fax: (254-2) 574074

STATEMENT OF SUSAN E. RICE  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE  
FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS

BEFORE THE

HOUSE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA AND SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL  
OPERATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS

"CRISES IN SUDAN AND NORTHERN UGANDA"

WEDNESDAY, JULY 29, 1998

Good afternoon, Mr. Chairmen. I wish to thank the members of the House Subcommittees on Africa and on International Operations and Human Rights for this opportunity to address two pressing human rights crises of serious concern for the United States - the humanitarian crisis in southern Sudan and the heinous activities of the Lord's Resistance Army in Uganda and southern Sudan. Although these crises are occurring in two different countries and differ substantially in scope and character, they share one thing in common: both result in large part from the callous and repressive policies of the Government of Sudan.

SUDAN

Before turning to the humanitarian situations in southern Sudan and northern Uganda, I would like to review with you the key elements of our Sudan policy and the events that have shaped that policy. Traditionally, throughout Sudan's 42 years of independence, the United States has sought good relations with Africa's largest state. However, when the National Islamic Front seized power in 1989 by overthrowing the democratically-elected head of state, our relations deteriorated sharply. Today, Sudan is the only state in sub-Saharan Africa that poses a direct threat to U.S. national security interests.

During the past nine years, we have been at odds with the Government of Sudan over four fundamental issues. First, we condemn and strenuously oppose the Sudanese Government's active sponsorship of international terrorism. The Government has allowed international terrorists such as Saudi financier Usama bin Ladin and the Hamas organization safe haven in Sudan, has established training camps for extremist militants, and was also involved in the assassination attempt against Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. Second, the NIF regime continues to destabilize neighboring states through its assistance to a range of organizations, including the Lord's Resistance Army in Uganda, the Eritrean Islamic JIHAD and Oromo Liberation Front in Ethiopia, who have consistently targeted civilians. Third, the Government of Sudan systematically violates the human rights of its own citizens. Torture, religious persecution, slavery and forced imposition of Sharia law on Sudanese throughout the country are pervasive and well-documented. Fourth, the Government of Sudan continues to prosecute a vicious war

strategy in the south that is the direct cause of much of the starvation that is now killing so many in southern Sudan. Quite simply, the policies and practices of the NIF Government directly put at risk the lives of hundreds of thousands of innocent people – at home and abroad.

As a result, our policy is to isolate the Government of Sudan and to pressure it to change fundamentally its behavior. At the same time, we seek to contain the threat that it poses to U.S. interests, to neighboring states, and to the people of Sudan. Towards this end, we are working on two levels: undertaking specific bilateral measures and urging the United Nations and other concerned countries to act in concert to compel the government to change its behavior. On a bilateral basis, the United States designated Sudan as a state sponsor of terrorism in August 1993, and imposed comprehensive economic sanctions in November 1997. These sanctions froze all Sudanese assets in the United States, barred the importation of Sudanese products, and prohibited American companies from selling goods and services to Sudan. We believe these sanctions are now effectively denying Sudan access to American financial institutions and markets.

On a multilateral basis, we supported the 1996 United Nations Security Council Resolution that imposed diplomatic sanctions on Sudan. In addition, we introduced resolutions at meetings of the United Nations Human Rights Commission condemning Sudan's flagrant violations of human rights. We have also worked with other countries to restrict arms sales to Sudan and to try to impose an air flight ban on Sudanese airplanes. Through our Frontline States Initiative, the United States has provided non-lethal military assistance to several of the countries bordering Sudan so that they can defend themselves against NIF-sponsored aggression.

We recognize, however, that security and democracy will come to Sudan only when the warring parties opt for a resolution of the fifteen year civil war on the basis of a just and durable peace – a peace that is based on respect for fundamental human rights of all Sudanese. Thus, the United States is actively supporting, financially and diplomatically, the ongoing peace process sponsored by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD).

The United States strongly supports IGAD. We have assisted its revitalization efforts and provided direct assistance to the Sudan peace process. Our reasons are two. First, the IGAD peace process represents a genuine effort by the region to address its own problems. We want to support this encouraging trend. Second, and unlike any other negotiation effort, IGAD has successfully defined a framework for resolution which tackles the central question of religion and state. The Government of Sudan would like a proliferation of the peace process in order to delay, confuse, undermine the IGAD process. We must not allow these efforts to succeed. We remain hopeful that additional progress will be made when the next round of talks resumes in August.

To promote viable democratic systems in post-war Sudan, we also have encouraged the various Sudanese opposition groups to strengthen their cooperation, halt human rights abuses especially by the SPLA and splinter factions, and to develop democratic



institutions in areas under their control. Secretary Albright met last year with the leaders of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), the umbrella opposition organization, to encourage them to work together effectively to promote the rights and freedoms of Sudanese citizens. USAID is providing \$4 million in development assistance to areas administered by these opposition groups in an effort to enhance the establishment of transparent and democratic systems that can, over time, ensure that Sudanese citizens control their own destinies.

Unfortunately, Mr. Chairman, the humanitarian situation throughout southern Sudan remains dire despite massive U.S. assistance. Due to three years of drought, a dozen-plus years of internal strife and the decision by the Government of Sudan to ban relief flights for the most severely affected areas in February and March, an estimated 2.6 million people are facing starvation or malnutrition. Through direct pressure galvanized by the United States, the international community finally managed to persuade the Government of Sudan to grant access to relief flights on April 1. Without the direct intervention of the United States Government, I do not believe the flight ban would have been lifted. The United Nations umbrella agency for NGO operations in Sudan, Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), provides the bulk of the relief to the most affected areas.

Largely due to swift U.S. support, OLS should be able to provide the 15,000 metric tons of food per month needed by the most desperate people in the south beginning in August. OLS is using our most recent assistance to lease additional heavy-lift aircraft and will soon have 13 such aircraft, including C-130s, operating out of Lokichoggio, Kenya, and three newly opened regional bases. The current food delivery program will be the largest of its kind in history, surpassing the Berlin Airlift.

Members of Congress have urged that the United States also provide assistance to civilians living in areas that the OLS cannot reach. Let me assure you that we are already doing that. We feel that support for OLS is critical, both because it can deliver to needy civilians but also because the operation was agreed to, through negotiations, by both parties to the conflict. We cannot abandon that precedent, either for Sudan or for the many other hot spots in Africa where conflict has impeded our efforts to assist innocent civilians. That being said, we recognize that OLS faces serious constraints, and so continue to provide assistance to Non-Government Organizations working in non-OLS areas.

The United States has been the largest bilateral donor -- specifically targeting efforts to alleviate the suffering and end the humanitarian crisis in the south of the country. Since 1989, the United States has provided more than \$700 million in humanitarian assistance to Sudan. This year alone, we have already pledged more than \$78 million. The \$78 million includes 60,000 metric tons of food -- plus transportation costs -- emergency healthcare and tools and seeds for farming. More is likely to be provided. Already, the United States accounts for over one-third of the total relief being provided by the international community. We've also decided to allocate up to 100,000 additional metric tons of wheat being purchased from U.S. farmers for Sudanese relief efforts.

Today, Roy Williams, the Director of the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance at USAID is in Sudan assessing the magnitude of the current problem and the international effort being mounted to bring it under control. After his return, we will pursue appropriate next steps to expand efforts and capacities.

As we look ahead, we must work in concert -- the Congress, the Administration and the international community -- to end the current crisis in the south of Sudan. But we must bear in mind the root cause of this crisis. Too many Sudanese are going hungry largely because of indefensible government policies. Thus, we must continue our broader policy of pressuring the Khartoum regime to change fundamentally its behavior. Indeed, we must also note that the Sudanese Government's destructive policies are not limited to the south. In the northeast, for example, the GOS has taken reprisals against growing dissent from the nomadic Beja peoples who, notably, are deeply religious Muslims. Young men dependent on temporary labor in Kassala town have been fired from their jobs as punishment for rising Beja opposition. Thousands of the Beja people have been displaced, and are now dependent.

We will continue to support actively the IGAD peace process, which is the only viable route to ending the civil war. And we will continue to back the British-led initiative to convince all sides in the southern Sudan conflict to allow open international relief corridors to end the current crisis in south of Sudan and across the entire country.

### UGANDA

The situation in Uganda is stark evidence that Sudan's disregard for human rights extends well beyond its own borders. The Sudan-sponsored "Lord's Resistance Army" murders, tortures, rapes, kidnaps and forcibly conscripts the civilian population of northern Uganda. Its favorite targets for kidnapping are children. Kidnapped girls are forced to become sexual slaves to LRA commanders, while the boys are forced to fight. All can be subject to vicious corporal punishment and murder on the whim of a commander. Those who escape or are freed carry with them tragic psychological scars.

Although the LRA and its commander, Joseph Kony, have their origins in Uganda's own history of domestic conflict, it is Sudanese support for the LRA that has given it resources and the sanctuary necessary to terrorize the populations of the Gulu and Kitgum districts in northern Uganda. Sudan provides the LRA with safe-havens deep within its territory and supplies it with military equipment, food and other materials. After Sudan's support to the LRA increased significantly in 1994, the atrocities suffered by the people in northern Uganda rose exponentially. That suffering continues today.

During the first half of 1998, the number of incidents and the geographic spread of LRA depredations increased. Abductions appear to be down, but children continue to be victimized. In our Embassy's assessment, no areas of Gulu or Kitgum Districts can be considered safe. My colleague from the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, Valerie Newsom-Guarnieri, here today, can answer questions about the 400,000 people living in Internally Displaced Persons camps in the north. I want to emphasize, however, that the

situation in the north is of concern to all of us. Our Ambassador Nancy Powell visited one of the camps as recently as early July, and Secretary Albright visited Gulu during her December 1997 trip to Africa. We were all deeply moved by the experience of meeting the child victims of LRA atrocities. It left us even more committed to helping Uganda address this ongoing conflict.

The United States Government is engaged on many levels to promote a resolution to the conflict in northern Uganda and to meet the immediate needs of the population there. The Northern Uganda Initiative, announced by the First Lady in Kampala in March, is now a \$10 million, three-year program designed to provide targeted relief and promote development in the areas most affected by the war in the north. The program will focus on food security, trauma counseling for children, employment generation, and reconstruction of the infrastructure, particularly roads, necessary to regenerate economic activity. Although security is the prerequisite for sustainable growth and development in northern Uganda, it is our belief that progress can be made even before the conflict there is ended. Improved economic prospects, moreover, may generate additional support among the local population for the Government of Uganda's efforts to defeat the LRA insurgency.

In addition to our relief and development work, we are promoting other avenues of conflict prevention and resolution. We are delivering non-lethal, defensive military assistance to the Government of Uganda to help improve the effectiveness of its military response to Sudanese-sponsored aggression, in particular that of the LRA. We provided \$3.85 million in equipment in FY 1997, and are considering a similar amount for FY 1998. With Congress' help, we can maintain this if our requested FY 1999 budget is considered favorable. In addition, a \$400,000 International Military Education and Training (IMET) program is aimed at improving professionalism in the Ugandan Army to help it better protect the population in the north.

The Ugandan People's Defense Force (UPDF) has improved dramatically in the last ten years. Still, the UPDF has not been as efficient as it could be in combating the LRA and protecting civilian populations. Our IMET program and efforts by other like-minded donors are designed in part to redress this problem, but ultimately the Government of Uganda needs to enhance its own efforts in this regard. We recognize the very difficult challenges associated with fighting an insurgency that operates in a large and remote area and resorts to such brutal tactics, but this is all the more reason for the Government to make sure its own military has every advantage possible.

The UPDF as well as government-sponsored local defense forces must guard against human rights abuses. We believe that the Government of Uganda is working to implement a military campaign that respects the human rights of non-combatants and deals as humanely as possible with the insurgents, many of them forcibly conscripted by the LRA. But, the Government must do more and better in this regard. At the same time, it is critical that we understand the sharp difference between LRA and UPDF behavior. Abusive tactics are an aberration for the UPDF. For the LRA, they are the standard operating procedure.

At the same time, we are concerned that the Government's military response may not be enough. To date, it has not succeeded in eliminating the LRA. Thus, we have encouraged the Government of Uganda to pursue in parallel a political track to resolve the conflict. It is, frankly, difficult to imagine a negotiated settlement with a group like the LRA. Nonetheless, in the interest of arresting the serious costs of this conflict, we believe the Government of Uganda should consider seriously this option. To some degree, at least, we understand that communication has been established.

Perhaps more important for long-term stability in the region, we encourage the Government of Uganda to enhance its dialogue with community leaders in northern Uganda. Members of the principal ethnic group in the area, the Acholi, have been the principal victims of the LRA and the rebellions that preceded the LRA. At the same time, the rebellions have been the work primarily of Acholis. For lasting stability to be achieved, Acholi leaders must recognize the Government in Kampala as a legitimate partner seeking to protect their interests and they must work with local and national governments to build the foundation for peace.

Finally, we must return to the question of Sudan. The LRA would be a much less significant problem were it not for Sudanese support. I have outlined this Administration's policy that seeks to isolate and deny sustenance to the Khartoum regime until it changes its behavior on a number of fronts, including its destabilizing activities in neighboring countries. We continue to draw the attention of friends and allies to the crimes of the LRA in an effort to create the multilateral approach necessary to pressure Khartoum most effectively.

The human costs of the LRA insurgency in northern Uganda are immense. Because it requires the government to sustain high military spending, and because it keeps a large part of the country outside of the productive economy, the war in the north is also detracting from what has been one of Africa's strongest economic success stories in recent years. Sudan's regional aggression, in short, is costing Uganda and many others a great deal, and we must continue to work to contain it.

Mr. Chairmen, I believe the humanitarian crises in northern Uganda and southern Sudan threaten the substantial strides Africa has taken over the past decade towards stability, free market economies and democracy. Today, many Africans can dare hope that their children and their children's children will actually study and work in peace and security, and freely and regularly elect just and accountable leaders. We look forward to working with both the Africa Subcommittee and the International Operations and Human Rights Subcommittee to help all Africans enjoy the same opportunities as the continent approaches the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Thank you.



United Nations Children's Fund  
Fonds des Nations Unies pour l'enfance  
Fondo de las Naciones Unidas para la Infancia

3 United Nations Plaza  
New York, New York 10017  
212 324-3000  
Telex: 175999

STATEMENT BY CAROL BELLAMY  
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,  
UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN'S FUND

BEFORE  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON  
INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS AND  
HUMAN RIGHTS  
AND  
HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS  
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Presented  
Washington, DC  
July 29, 1998

I'd like to thank Chairmen Royce and Smith for inviting me to appear before you to speak about the emergency in the Sudan and also about the situation in Northern Uganda. I very much appreciate your leadership in bringing these issues before the United States Congress and the American people.

I also very much appreciate the leadership of Congressmen Tony Hall and Frank Wolf, both of whom I know have devoted considerable attention to the Sudan for more than a decade.

As you know from recent headlines, southern Sudan is facing its most severe humanitarian crisis since the 1989 famine that killed an estimated 250,000 people. Today, some 1.2 million people in the south alone are in need of urgent assistance, primarily in the Bahr El Ghazal region.

The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) is the lead agency in southern Sudan coordinating the humanitarian relief effort known as Operation Lifeline Sudan or OLS. For those of you who are unfamiliar with the relief operation, OLS is a coalition of two UN agencies -- UNICEF and the World Food Program (WFP) -- and 38 NGO's. It was set up in 1989 to ensure a unified international response to people in need on all sides of the conflict in Sudan. Among the NGO partners working in OLS are World Vision International, CARE, Save the Children, Doctors Without Borders and Catholic Relief Services.

OLS operates both in the northern part of the country controlled by the Sudanese government, as well as those parts of southern Sudan which are under the control of the rebel Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM). WFP is the other UN agency within OLS and is primarily responsible for the delivery of emergency food supplies. As I speak to you, WFP is presently in the midst of the largest airdrop in its history.

OLS is the largest humanitarian relief operation now underway anywhere in the world and, over the last decade, can be credited with saving tens of thousands of lives. Indeed, the fact that there have been no major outbreaks of cholera, measles or polio in the Sudan in recent years is a tribute to the work of all the partners in OLS, particularly those working to deliver vaccinations. Despite its obvious contributions to reducing suffering, however, OLS continues to be subject to a number of constraints and difficulties. Sudan is the largest country in Africa -- three and a half times the size of Texas -- and has been embroiled in a protracted civil war since 1983. In addition to the main warring parties -- the Government and the SPLM -- there are several other military groups with a political agenda and access to arms and munitions. No small part of the challenge facing OLS has been the difficulty of running a huge humanitarian effort that depends on maintaining a working relationship with all the participating factions in this civil war.

More than one million Sudanese have died as a direct result of the 15-year-old conflict and some two million people have been displaced. A long-standing drought has made the present situation increasingly desperate. Without exaggeration, the social, economic and political infrastructure in southern Sudan has been devastated.

As a result of the current temporary cease-fire declared on July 15 by the Khartoum Government and the SPLM, OLS began expanding the number of its food distribution centers in the Bahr El Ghazal area to a total of 48. UNICEF is assuming responsibility for ten of these centers. OLS continues to monitor malnutrition among children. A recent UNICEF survey indicates that malnutrition among children under five now stands at over 50 per cent.

The current cease-fire was welcomed by international aid agencies as an opportunity to save thousands of lives through a broadening and expansion of the relief effort. Following the visit to Sudan by Martin Griffiths, Deputy to the United Nations Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs, to assess issues related to an accelerated relief operation, I visited Sudan from July 21-23. The purpose of my visit was to meet with the leaders of both the government and SPLM and to see first-hand the magnitude of the crisis. I also wanted my visit to raise international awareness of conditions in Sudan that have been ignored for too long.

In government-held Wau town, where thousands of people have arrived in search of food, I visited a health center and a reception point where people who have barely survived for months on a staple of leaves and wild fruit were waiting to be admitted into the relief program. In SPLM-controlled Panthou, I saw relief workers ministering supplementary and therapeutic foods to young children. The suffering I witnessed in these famine-stricken areas was horrific.

I met in Khartoum with the Sudanese President, Minister of Foreign Affairs, State Minister for Social Planning and Assistant to the President, Riek Machar, who has been allied with the rebel forces but is now part of the Government. Later, in Nairobi, I met with SPLM leaders.

To all parties, I stressed the temporal and geographic limitations of the cease-fire. The present agreement applies only to the Bahr El Ghazal region and its duration is only three months. I also stressed that OLS will do everything possible to respond adequately to the needs of the Sudanese people. But we must be realistic. In agreeing to a cease-fire, the Government and the SPLM need to take responsibility for ensuring that non-regulated parties on both sides of the conflict observe the agreement. Also the corridors which have been designated under the cease-fire agreement to allow OLS to bring in food and essential supplies must remain open and safe passage for relief workers must be guaranteed. Unfortunately, as the rainy season has now set in, roads are often not passable. The water corridors for barges are all too often in need of dredging. And rail lines are often not operational due to past military disruptions; the challenge is enormous.

Clearly, the humanitarian effort is no substitute for a political settlement that guarantees the right of Sudanese to live in peace.

Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), now over 10 years old, is a complicated operation both in logistical and political terms. It is also expensive due to the constraints I have noted. At times over the past decade, and as a consequence of the lack of political will to resolve the long-running conflict that has created the humanitarian emergency, the donor community has experienced fatigue in terms of continued financial support to OLS. For example, in 1997 the

donor community contributed only 40 per cent of the total requirements published in the UN Consolidated Appeal for the Sudan.

In 1998, despite a slow start, I am pleased to report that UNICEF and its OLS partners have received a significantly higher level of support from the international community, including the public, and that the overall level of funding for both northern and southern Sudan combined is now 62 per cent of the UN Consolidated Appeal for the Sudan. It is also gratifying to note that the U.S. Government is the largest donor to UNICEF's operations in the Sudan, contributing over \$5 million of almost \$25 million received to date. The governments of Sweden, Norway and Canada, to name a few, have also made major contributions, as have a number of UNICEF's privately supported national committees.

No doubt, this level of support from both governments and the public is due in large part to the tragic footage we have all seen in recent months on television and in the newspapers. It is a humanitarian response to acute suffering on a massive scale. However, it also signals that governments and individuals continue to care about the people of Sudan and can be rallied to assist in finding a lasting peace. We must act quickly as the tenuous cease-fire now in effect could end at any time. UNICEF/OLS are redoubling our efforts to increase the coalition's delivery capacity during this period and indeed WFP has already expanded its request for food assistance. Donor governments should seize the moment as well to promote a political solution.

Mr. Chairman, you have asked also about the crisis in northern Uganda which involves among the world's most disturbing and flagrant abuses of the rights of children -- their abduction, torture, rape and murder at the hands of a rebel faction. I know Congressman Payne is deeply concerned about this issue. The rebel faction in question, based in northern Uganda and ironically called the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), is comprised in large part of abducted children -- sometimes as young as 11 years old -- who have been tortured and indoctrinated with brutal initiation rites to engage and kill Ugandan government soldiers.

We estimate that between 6,000 and 10,000 children have been kidnaped and removed from their communities, schools and homes in Gulu, Kitgum and other districts in northern Uganda to wage war both in Uganda and against the rebels in southern Sudan. In one case, 139 girls were abducted from a school run by nuns. Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have also reported these horrifying allegations, many of which have been made by the scores of children who have managed to escape. These children have graphically described the brutality they have suffered as foot soldiers, sexual slaves and porters to LRA members.

UNICEF supports a rehabilitation center in Uganda operated by World Vision that has provided both physical and psychological health assistance to children who manage to escape the LRA. In recent months, UNICEF has worked to secure the repatriation to Uganda of approximately one dozen children who had found refuge in Juba in southern Sudan and had come to the attention of our local staff. While approximately one-half of all such abducted children eventually manage to find their way home, they bear irreversible scars, both physical and psychological.



Mr. Chairman, the international community must speak loudly and clearly, and with one voice, on this matter and demand the immediate release of all children held by the LRA. Your firm resolve on this issue will make a critically important difference.

I thank you for this opportunity and would be pleased to answer your questions.

###



World Food  
Programme

Programa  
Mundial  
de Alimentos

Programme  
Alimentaire  
Mondial

برنامج  
الاغذية  
العالمي

---

The Food Aid Organization of the United Nations

**STATEMENT OF CATHERINE A. BERTINI  
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR  
WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME**

**COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS  
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES**

**The Crisis in Sudan**

**Subcommittee on Africa  
Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights**

**Presented July 29, 1998  
Washington, DC**

---

Via Cesare Giulio Viola 68/70, 00184 Rome - Italy  
Telephone +39-06-85131 Fax: +39-06-8590632/8590637  
E-Mail: [firstname.lastname@wfp.org](mailto:firstname.lastname@wfp.org) Website: [www.wfp.org](http://www.wfp.org)

Mr. Chairman, I will focus my remarks today on Sudan. We will, with your permission, submit additional written information to the Committee on World Food Program activities in northern Uganda.

Two weeks ago, WFP staff began distributing 250 tons of food air dropped for 30,000 people in the Western Upper Nile region. We never finished. Instead our staff members fled on foot for 18 hours, first through dense brush and then chest deep in swamps infested with mosquitoes. Armed militias pursued and fired on them, along with the poor Sudanese families who had gathered to obtain badly needed food. Despite the ceasefire, there is still significant danger for the dedicated people in Operation Lifeline Sudan and all the NGOs who are working to reach the hungry of Sudan.

Ten years ago, the World Food Program gave up and pulled out of southern Sudan altogether after a fleet of our trucks was attacked and hijacked -- the final straw in a series of security incidents. The donor community -- including the United States -- pressed us to return to the field and we did just that creating, Operation Lifeline Sudan with our partner UNICEF. Catholic Relief Services, MSF, Oxfam and World Vision joined the effort.

For nearly a decade, Operation Lifeline Sudan -- UNICEF, the World Food Program and our NGO partners -- have been delivering tens of thousands of tons of food to the victims of civil war in Sudan through Operation Lifeline Sudan. Since 1992 we have delivered more than 360,000 tons of food to 4.7 million victims of war and drought.

It has never been easy. We have, of course, had casualties. This is increasingly an ugly part of our daily work -- all told, in Sudan, Uganda, Angola and other trouble spots, WFP has lost 14 staff in a little more than a year and a half. A staff member was murdered just last week in Burundi. Mr. Chairman, I would be grateful if we could enter into the Record the names of all these dedicated individuals who have sacrificed their lives.

WFP has not been not alone in this sacrifice -- the United Nations announced on Monday that more civilians than soldiers had been killed in UN missions around the world.

The dangers of providing humanitarian aid continue to grow.

### How We Reached the Crisis Stage

As we meet, 50 people a day are dying in and around Wau in southern Sudan. Other feeding centers are reporting an alarming rise in deaths as people struggle on foot from the countryside, many already too weak to save. The strong arrived earlier. Today we are seeing the walking dead. The death toll so far in the region is at least in the tens of thousands. We can turn on our television sets and watch almost live coverage of this horrible pain. Families short of food have stopped feeding the old, the infirm, and the weaker of their children.

WFP and the Food and Agriculture Organization predicted a major food emergency as far back as last September, though not of the scope that intensified fighting and drought has now brought us today. Other agencies and NGOs were also sounding the alarm.

In 1994 aid agencies faced a similar crisis and we managed to reach victims sooner and more effectively. We had more access to areas then so we could predict the extent of the damage being done by a deadly mix of war and drought. This year that was not the case. Widespread fighting and the ban on relief flights in February and March hurt us very badly both on deliveries and on information about the nutritional state of the people. Without access, we could not pinpoint or assess needs as well as in 1994.

Once we had access, we sounded the alarm again -- only more strongly. Our Special Alert in May told donors, "Intensified civil conflict since January, particularly in Bahr El Ghazal, has resulted in fresh waves of population displacement...with starvation-related deaths. In Bahr El Ghazal alone 350,000 people are at risk of starvation...". We have since raised our estimate of needs from roughly 82,500 tons to 129,000 tons. Our total target population has increased to now 2.6 million, including 1.2 million in rebel held areas. Most of the tonnage increase is in needing to provide larger rations since crops have failed from drought and that will have a devastating impact during the hunger gap that will last through October. The

prospects for the current harvest were made far worse when so many farmers were unable to tend to their fields earlier in the year because of the fighting.

#### The Harsh Reality of Sudan

How have we dealt with the unfolding crisis this summer? Before describing some of our efforts to you, it is important to highlight a few basic facts that will give the Committee some perspective on the realities of Sudan.

-- in all of southern Sudan there are 6 kilometers of good paved roads, six kilometers -- less than the distance from this hearing room to Arlington, Virginia

-- on the other hand, hundreds of kilometers of unpaved roads are littered with pot holes and mines planted by both sides in the conflict. Airstrips and rail lines have suffered a similar fate.

-- the unpaved roads flood badly in the rainy season -- mudslides, broken bridges and washed out roads lock or severely delay transport. Airstrips flood and our relief pilots leaving from Lokichoggio are never sure they can land food until they are over the airstrips themselves.

-- barges are sitting ducks for militias on both sides and other armed groups, like the Popular Defense Force who operate as bands of armed thugs. The current drought has made several rivers useless for barge transport.

-- repairs to rail lines, roads and bridges either support one warring party or another, and they are quickly undone. We repair again, they bomb again.

All of our rail, barge and air operations are subject to approval by the warring parties -- the Government of Sudan and the SPLA. For surface transport we have the added burden of armed splinter groups who raid shipments. Sometimes we are not even aware of their existence until we have tried to move food. Clearance delays because of fighting have had a

devastating impact. It took almost two months to clear a barge that left Juba last week carrying 2100 metric tons -- more than a fifth of the monthly needs in the south.

In previous crises in southern Sudan, WFP relied heavily on a network of relatively large logistics bases. They contained living quarters for ground staff and food monitors, tractors and trailers, other vehicles, communications. All of these bases have been looted and destroyed in the last four years. This forces WFP to fly in personnel and equipment each time an intervention is planned and to leave immediately after it is executed -- and that adds immeasurably to the cost, logistical complexity and security risk of our operations.

#### A Lack of Resources

Despite the obstacles and the danger, the humanitarian agencies in Operation Lifeline Sudan -- UNICEF and the World Food Program -- and the NGOs in Sudan have stuck to the task. And they have done a far better job of feeding the victims of this war than the politicians have done in resolving it. NGOs have worked very hard on the nutritional and medical disaster created by this war -- Catholic Relief Services, Norwegian People's Aid, MSF, Oxfam, World Vision, the Irish NGOs Goal and Concern and the Lutheran World Federation.

But all of us must struggle with more than just the danger and the physical environment of Sudan. We desperately need more resources -- money, food, medicine. Today -- despite the horrible images in the media -- we have only 41 percent of our target.

The response we have had from some donors -- especially the United States -- is encouraging. But we urgently need corn soya blend, fortified dried skim milk, and high protein biscuits. We have been assured that the Administration will address these needs on a priority basis and I would like to take this opportunity to thank them. We have pressing needs for the current Emergency Operation and our Special Operations for Logistics. All told, we are asking donors for \$165 million to cover food and transport and logistical improvements until next April. The cost of our operation in this peak period is actually about one million dollars a day.

What we are seeing now in our newspapers and on our televisions will not fade away easily, we are worried about food supplies for a significant time to come and we are likely to have to keep up deliveries at current rates for more than a year.

With the lack of alternatives to air supply of food, this will be a very expensive proposition until we can ship more by road, rail and barge. Each C130 airdrop of food costs an average of \$15,500 and delivers 16 metric tons of food -- enough to feed 40,000 people for a day. An Ilyushin can drop twice the amount -- 30 tons for 80,000 people -- at a cost of \$29,700.

We hope that a portion of the recently announced donation of 2.5 million metric tons of U.S. wheat will be given to WFP to help us cope with this massive need. We applaud the United States for this act of generosity which can make so much of a difference in coping with food crises, not only in Sudan, but all over the globe.

#### The Issue of Access

The issue of access has always been the heart of the problem for Operation Lifeline Sudan and the NGOs. Could we have done more to pressure the Government in Khartoum for greater access? There have been dozens of press releases, media briefings, letters of appeal, meetings and written and oral complaints made by WFP, UNICEF and the NGOs.

Would it have been better to turn up the heat earlier, pressing Governments to take a course of direct confrontation? That's not clear and it is not a decision that we the humanitarian agencies are charged to make. The situation in southern Sudan was never any secret. And I know that pressure has already been applied by a few Governments, including the United States, on all parties in the conflict. Clearly the pressure has not been enough.

Are Governments prepared to go beyond what they have done so far? If we fly outside the OLS agreement, will the donors insure us? No one else would. Would they violate Sudanese sovereignty and provide military aircraft? Is the international community prepared to

intervene militarily to land food or secure humanitarian corridors? There have been no offers thus far. The experience in the Great Lakes crisis two years ago would not hold out much suggestion of military aid.

#### Where We are Today

Picking villains here will not feed anyone. Today we have more cooperation from the Government and the SPLA on access. We need to make the most of it to end this parade of near dead converging on the feeding camps.

The pace of air food deliveries has already skyrocketed. In January at the height of the fighting we had permission to fly only one aircraft, and we were barely able to deliver 150 metric tons by air out of Lokichoggio. Beginning in April, the Sudanese Government progressively granted WFP approval to operate more large aircraft in the south. By the end of April we were delivering 2,300 tons a month, in May nearly 4,000 tons, in June 6,400 and in July we will reach 10,000 tons. In August we should reach our target pace of 15,000 mt a month to war affected zones throughout Sudan -- 10000 to the south and 5000 to the north -- to feed 2.6 million people.

We are now delivering at a rate six times greater than in 1997 when we delivered roughly 32,000 tons for the year. This Monday we delivered 400 tons. Thirteen cargo aircraft will fly to 89 locations and OLS will double the number of feeding centers to thirty eight and the number of food monitors to 100. In August, we will deliver more than 12,000 tons by air from Lokichoggio, Nairobi, Khartoum and El Obeid. In addition, we will move 2,000 tons by barge, 2,000 by truck from the north and 1,200 from the south. We cannot now deliver by rail due to the condition of the tracks in many locations. Deliveries should reach 17,200 tons for the month.

Working with our partners in UNICEF and Save the Children, MSF, the Red Crescent and other NGOs we are speeding up the admission of children to special centers and beginning wet feeding for adults who have arrived at camps too weak to cook the food on hand.



Additional medicines, therapeutic and supplementary foods, and pumps for water are coming in to the region.

The ceasefire creates some opportunities. We applaud it, but it is far from a cure all. While we are naturally leery of investing in road, bridge and rail repairs given past experience, that is part of our new Special Operations appeal for \$11.3 million and assistance in kind. This appeal would also cover a fleet of 40 trucks, allowing us to insure a consistent supply of vehicles.

The appeal would also cover two additional aircraft giving us added capacity in case the ceasefire does not hold or there are other obstacles to more barge and land transport. All this should help reduce some of the exorbitant costs we are facing and cut insurance rates.

Even after food is delivered, we are having a hard time controlling it. Put simply, a man with a gun is always well fed -- women and children, the ill and the elderly do not fare as well. Our monitors actually watch the food distribution, but once it takes place we lose control and we are negotiating now with the SPLA to put an end to the forced taxation in food they have exerted from beneficiaries. We are doubling the number of food monitors as we continue to expand distribution, but we need the cooperation of the SPLA to end this abuse. To be fair, given the number of splinter groups and weak central authority among the rebels, it is not clear just how much control they can deliver in response to our complaints.

Where Will We be Tomorrow?

Mr. Chairman, this famine is the creation of politics. The solution to it must be political. So many years after the start of this bloodshed, we all know there will be no quick fixes or easy solutions, but it is time that the international community began to give the pain of southern Sudan the priority it so deeply deserves. Without strong commitment by all parties, there will never be a lasting solution to this crisis. Fifteen years of fighting have demonstrated that and made cynics out of all who work in the harsh reality of Sudan.

As a first step, we need this ceasefire to last more than three months and to cover all of southern Sudan. The Government of Sudan should fulfil its promise to the Secretary-General on access to the SPLA held areas in the Nuba Mountains and complete and impartial investigation of the murders of WFP and Red Crescent staff there. The SPLA must act to end the so-called tax on food given to the needy and other forces must end the pillaging. We are not in the business of feeding soldiers who are already well fed.

Political commitment can end this war. Righteous indignation will not. We need the continued support of the United States, and the generosity of the American people who have always been first in coming to our aid. We welcome the initiatives already being discussed here in the Congress to take a more active role in brokering peace.

Famines are avoidable. I can remember testifying in the Congress in 1992 about an impending drought in southern Africa that threatened the lives of 15 million people. Congressmen Hall and Emerson called a hearing early to draw attention to what could have been the largest famine in history. With the help of USAID, USDA, and other donors the World Food Programme mobilized food quickly in a relief operation that is still the largest in UN history. And at the same time we helped forge the first cooperative links between South Africa and its neighbors. Ironically, after what was a clear triumph, there was only one article in any newspaper of note -- the Christian Science Monitor. We beat a famine and no one seemed to know about.

We can beat this famine too. But ending this famine means ending this war - and that is the work of politicians. I urge the Congress and the Administration to do all they can -- not to find villains or heroes, but to help broker a lasting peace.


A hungry Sudanese mother too weak to nurse her dying baby does not care who is at fault. She just wants it all to end.

\*\*\*\*\*

Mr. Chairman, please let me express my gratitude to you for holding this hearing and to all those who are here to testify to the tragedy that has unfolded in southern Sudan.



### SOUTH SUDAN TRANSPORT CORRIDORS



## RE Resourcing Update as of 28 July 1998

<b>Project Title:</b>	Emergency Operation 'Emergency Food Assistance to War and Drought-Affected Populations'		
<b>Project Number:</b>	5826 01		
<b>Recipient country:</b>	<b>SUDAN</b>		
<b>Project Life:</b>	12 months	From: 1/5/98	To: 30/4/99
<b>Number of Beneficiaries:</b>	2.6 Million		

Confirmed Contributions	EMOP Requirements			
	(\$) Value		(MT) Tonnage	
<b>Donors</b>	<b>\$ 154,542,862</b>	<b>% of requirements</b>	<b>97,166</b>	<b>% of requirements</b>


Australia	\$ 440,402	0.3%	292	0.3%
Belgium	\$ 699,369	0.5%	656	0.7%
Canada	\$ 3,291,832	2.1%	1,754	1.8%
Denmark	\$ 481,324	0.3%	307	0.3%
Germany	\$ 1,272,139	0.8%	876	0.9%
Ireland	\$ 562,568	0.4%	387	0.4%
Italy	\$ 411,529	0.3%	127	0.1%
Japan-Private	\$ 38,334	0.02%	n/a	
Netherlands	\$ 3,928,241	2.5%	2,764	2.8%
Norway	\$ 664,242	0.4%	n/a	
Rissho Kosei-Kai (Japanese-NGO)	\$ 21,127	0.01%	n/a	
Sweden	\$ 519,480	0.3%	344	0.4%
Switzerland	\$ 3,076,687	2.0%	1,134	1.2%
U.K.	\$ 23,500,000	15.2%	14,398	14.8%
U.S.A.	\$ 25,548,500	16.5%	16,603	17.1%
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$ 64,466,694</b>	<b>41.7%</b>	<b>39,642</b>	<b>40.8%</b>
<b>Shortfall</b>	<b>\$ 90,087,268</b>	<b>58.3%</b>	<b>57,524</b>	<b>59.2%</b>

# CONTRIBUTIONS TO SUDAN THROUGH WFP

From May 1998 to Date

(EMOP 5826.01)


58.3%  
SHORTFALL  
\$90,981,268



UNEP  
Australia  
Belgium  
Denmark  
Germany  
Ghana  
Italy  
Japan Private  
Lithuania  
Mexico

Shortfall
  Switzerland
  Canada
  Netherlands
  Others
  U.K.
  U.S.A.

**WFP Quarterly Food Deliveries (1996 - 1998)**



NB 3rd quarter 1998 only includes July

■ 1996 ■ 1997 □ 1998

**HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH**  
 1522 K Street, NW Ste 940  
 Washington, DC 20005  
 Telephone 202-371-6452  
 Facsimile 202-371-0126  
 E-mail: hrw@cdhrw.org  
 Website: http://www.hrw.org



**"Crises in Sudan and Northern Uganda"**  
**Testimony of Jemera Rone, Human Rights Watch**  
**Before the House Subcommittee on International Operations**  
**and Human Rights and the Subcommittee on Africa**  
**July 29, 1998**

**AFRICA DIVISION**  
 Peter Takouyev  
 Executive Director  
 Janet Fluhman  
 Washington Director  
 Sulman Ab Bakko  
 Senior Researcher  
 Alex Vines  
 Researcher  
 Bronwen Masite  
 Bonafide Mwangi  
 Counsel  
 Alison L. DesForges  
 Consultant  
 Ariana Pratirosh  
 Juliet Wilson  
 Associate  
**ADVOCACY COMMITTEE**  
 William Consoer  
 Chair

Robert Algran  
 Robert L. Bernstein  
 Julian L. Chambers  
 Michael Chege  
 Michael Clough  
 Roberto Cohen  
 Carol Condon  
 Alison L. DesForges  
 Adrian W. DeWind  
 B. Hartoun Douda  
 Steve Elmans  
 Aaron Ezra  
 Thomas M. Franck  
 Gal M. Gerhart  
 Jack Greenberg  
 Arthur C. Helton  
 Alice H. Herman  
 Robert Joffe  
 Jeth Johnston  
 Richard A. Joseph  
 Thomas Kane  
 Stephen L. Kass  
 Vincent Mai  
 John A. Marcum  
 Guy McDougall  
 Tom Morrison  
 Samuel E. Murumba  
 Muna Ndulo

James C. H. Poole  
 Norman Redlich  
 Randall Robinson  
 Sidney S. Roudsacher  
 Dirk van Zyl Saut  
 Howard P. Venable  
 Claude E. Welch, Jr.  
 Maureen White  
 Annule B. Zollberg  
**HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH**  
 Kenneth Roth  
 Executive Director  
 Michele Alexander  
 Development Director  
 Carroll Bogert  
 Communications Director  
 Reed Brody  
 Advocacy Director  
 Cynthia Brown  
 Program Director  
 Barbara Guglielmo  
 Finance & Administration  
 Director  
 Susan Orvas  
 Associate Director  
 Wilder Taylor  
 General Counsel  
 Lotte Lestch  
 Brussels Office Director  
 Joanna Wochalec  
 United Nations  
 Representative  
 Jonathan Peaton, Chair

**INTRODUCTION**

Thank you for holding this important hearing on the crises in Sudan and northern Uganda today and for inviting Human Rights Watch to testify. My name is Jemera Rone and I have been the Sudan researcher for five years at Human Rights Watch, and counsel since 1985, specializing in international humanitarian law or the rules of war. I most recently visited rebel areas of Southern Sudan and the Nuba Mountains twice in the last year, and Uganda once. My March 1998 application for a visa to visit government-controlled areas of Sudan, including the capital Khartoum, was not granted despite the Sudan government's representations that it is "open" to all human rights monitors. My last visit to Khartoum was in 1995.

The wars in Sudan and Uganda overlap. Both states back and fund the other's rebels. It is fair to say that this region is convulsed in war and its spin-offs, including famine and disease. The situation of human rights in the two countries is different, however. My remarks will focus on some ways in which the two conflicts intersect, and on some human rights abuses that are endemic to the conflicts.

The biggest crisis in the area right now is undoubtedly the famine in southern Sudan to which the Ugandan government contributes indirectly through its support of the rebel Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). All parties to the southern conflict, however, have contributed to the famine. With regard to the famine-producing human rights abuses set forth in this testimony, Human Rights Watch recommends the following steps for donor governments, including the U.S.:

- insist on full international monitoring of relief efforts, with unrestricted access for food monitors and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) not aligned with any party, possibly in "poll-watching" teams including the relevant authorities;
- support the recently-created Technical Working Group and Taskforce (composed of U.N. and SPLA representatives) to find solutions for relief issues in the rebel areas, including diversion and mismanagement. Donors should require that a similar effort be undertaken regarding relief going into government-controlled areas of Sudan;

BRUSSELS HONGKONG LONDON LOS ANGELES MOSCOW NEW YORK RIO DE JANEIRO WASHINGTON



- refuse to supply spare parts for the Babanusa-Wau train or to use it to deliver relief; this train has been used for years solely for military resupply and to commit human rights abuses. Permit instead a train under the U.N. flag dedicated solely to relief, with international monitors to ride on the train to guarantee its proper use and to deter SPLA attacks.
- insist that those who caused the famine help defray its cost: the Sudan government can contribute grain from a good harvest in western Sudan, and the SPLA might contribute the labor of its soldiers for humanitarian purposes during the three-month ceasefire in famine-affected areas.
- require the government, without further ado, to live up to its promise on May 20, 1998 to permit a U.N. assessment team (and relief if needed) into the rebel-controlled areas of the Nuba Mountains, where the government has never allowed any kind of relief whatsoever at any time during the war;
- require the parties to the conflict to cease all targeted and indiscriminate attacks on civilians and civilian objects;
- require the parties to end looting and punish the looters, and those who buy and sell looted goods;
- require the parties to respect freedom of movement so that anyone may move to and from rural areas to cultivate, require the parties, particularly the government of Sudan, to end arbitrary detentions of persons fleeing the famine, and protect the safety of the displaced; and
- fully support and fund the establishment of full-time in-country U.N. human rights officers to operate throughout Sudan, to promptly inform the world community of human rights abuses, particularly those that lead to famine.

Another serious crisis in the region is the large-scale abduction of Ugandan Acholi children by the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), a Ugandan rebel group supported by the government of Sudan. The Sudan government's support for the LRA appears to be in retaliation for Uganda's support of the SPLA. However, the activities of the LRA are so dominated by the abduction of children that the Sudan government must find another way to approach Uganda on this topic, one that does not sacrifice the children of northern Uganda. Human Rights Watch recommends that donors pressure the Sudan government to:

- cease all military aid and other support to the Lord's Resistance Army, until it complies with the requirements of international humanitarian law (i.e., until the LRA stops abducting children, stops killing children, stops torturing children, stops sexually abusing children, releases all the children in its captivity, and generally respects the human rights of civilians in the areas of conflict); and
- use Sudanese influence over the Lord's Resistance Army to stop LRA abduction, killing, torture, and sexual abuse of children, to ensure that all LRA captives are treated humanely, and to bring about the immediate release of children held by the LRA.

The U.S. and other governments should find ways to pressure the LRA directly on the issue of abuse of children.

## BACKGROUND TO THE WAR IN SUDAN

The war in Sudan, now in its fifteenth year, has many causes: racial, religious, regional, resources (the Nile water and oil), and cultural. Sudan is a highly diverse country; numbers in this very poor country, Africa's largest in land mass, are elusive, but some 40-50 percent of the 27 million population claims Arab descent and 60-50 percent is African; 60 percent are Muslims and the rest Christian and practitioners of traditional African religions; nineteen major languages (and some 600 dialects) are spoken. Since decolonization in 1956 Sudan has been ruled by a Khartoum elite which identifies with Arabic and Islamic culture.

The current government came to power via a military coup that overthrew an elected government. This government is now run unofficially by the National Islamic Front (NIF—now reformed as the only legal political party, the National Congress). It declared Sudan an Islamic state and is attempting to impose its version of Islam and Arabism on the rest of Sudan. Under its shari'a laws, for instance, apostasy or a Muslim changing his religion warrants a death sentence. Mekki Kuku, a Nuba schoolteacher living in the north who converted from Islam to Christianity is to be tried for apostasy and faces the death penalty, according to a report.

Peace negotiations drag on but the central issues of federalism versus the current centralized state versus a referendum for self-determination remain unresolved. The most recent government peace proposal is for a vote for self-determination, but it would include only the south within its 1956 boundaries, and exclude the Nuba Mountains (where the SPLA has had a front since 1989), the eastern Ingessana Hills (where the Beja Congress has been in armed rebellion allied with the SPLA since 1995), and the traditional Dinka area around Abyei, gerrymandered out of the south under the British. It would also exclude northern political forces, both modern and traditional, who have taken up arms against the government in 1995 under the rebel umbrella group the National Democratic Alliance (which includes the SPLA).

The Sudan government appears keen to maintain power and regain international credibility, even if it means succession of the south as the price of consolidating an Islamic state in the north. It is assumed, however, that the government of Sudan will not permit the oil-rich Western Upper Nile area (Al Wihda state) of the south to secede. The northern opposition parties and those in SPLA liberated areas of the north probably fear anything that would legitimize the government, entrench its religious extremism and intolerance, and enable it to redeploy all its forces to the central and eastern fronts.

Sudan has a history of multiparty politics but under the current government parties are banned and elections have for the most part been boycotted by the opposition. Civil and political rights are sharply curtailed, except for government supporters. Lack of free expression, free association and peaceable assembly rights make a mockery of elections. For a few months before March 1998, it appeared that the government was going to take a real step toward political pluralism and respect for international human rights and, in its new constitution, permit the reestablishment of political parties. These changes would have signaled a new hope for settlement of the war. This reform movement was squelched by the Islamist hard-liners, however, who will certainly not retain their control if the system opens up. During the 1986-89 period of democracy, the NIF did not win more than 20 percent of the vote and was consistently out-pollled by two northern political parties that are banned today.

There is a feisty group of attorneys who defend political cases. They continue their activities despite being frequently detained. Most recently they are defending prominent political activists accused

of sabotage, and the Muslim clerics who protested these arrests, who are now facing jail sentences. The lawyers play an important role in preventing the government from railroading political detainees in death sentence cases, but are unable to stop torture and deaths in detention or prolonged arbitrary detention of suspected political activists.

The war in Sudan has lasted through four governments and predated any assistance from Uganda to the SPLA: the NIF government took power in part to prevent the finalization of a peace agreement with the SPLA by the elected government. The war then spread from the southern region and the central Nuba Mountains in 1989 to the east in 1995.

The Museveni government in Uganda has supported the largest Sudanese rebel force, the SPLM/A, with varying levels of commitment for several years. Eritrea and Ethiopia, Sudan's neighbors to the east, have given support to the SPLA and to the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), the umbrella group for all opposition, armed and unarmed, in exile. A separate hearing would be needed to understand the abuses committed by the Eritrean and Ethiopian governments against their own citizens and the abuses committed by rebel groups which the Sudan government supports against both states, not to mention the recent war between Eritrea and Ethiopia. Both states seem to agree, however, that the root cause of their problems with the Sudan government is its "ideology of intolerance," exemplified by its policy "of trying to homogenize Sudanese society around what are perceived to be the principles of Islam," according to Ethiopia's president.

The SPLA, which has been fighting since 1983, has its own human rights problems. It has not developed internal democracy nor the rule of law. Therefore there is no real system by which commanders or soldiers can be held accountable for abuses committed against the civilian population and there is little military discipline actually taken against abusive commanders and soldiers. The result is that relations between the SPLA and the civilian population in the vast areas the SPLA controls in the south turn on the personality of the local commander; there are a number of commanders who are respectful of the civilian population. The SPLA at the highest levels, however, has refused to respond to inquiries by Human Rights Watch and others about cases of summary execution and disappearances of SPLA detainees, which leads to the inference that these were sanctioned by the SPLA.

The most common SPLA abuses include summary executions, rape, taking local girls as brides without their consent or the consent of the families (or payment of dowry), indiscriminate attacks, looting or taking food by force (and manipulating relief), forced recruitment, and recruitment of boys under age eighteen. The last two abuses have diminished in recent years, thanks in part to international pressure, which must now address the other abuses.

The SPLA's practice of forcibly taking food, including relief food, from the civilians for "taxes" has come under fire recently, although Human Rights Watch denounced the practice in 1990 and thereafter as a violation of the rules of war. Aid agencies straining to prevent a growing number of civilian deaths by starvation and disease have denounced the SPLA for "taxing" food away from the very needy during the 1998 famine. A Technical Working Group on these and other relief issues already has been set up (composed of U.N. organizations and the SPLA), with a Taskforce to assist it, to investigate why those in need may not be receiving adequate food, and in August to propose practical remedies. This is a welcome development.

A ceasefire for three months from July 15 has been agreed to by the government and the SPLA. It is limited to famine-affected areas.

## BACKGROUND TO THE WAR IN UGANDA

The ethnic composition of Uganda, a land-locked state only a fraction the size of Sudan with a population of about 20.6 million, is quite different from Sudan. Most Ugandans are Africans who are Protestants or Catholics, and political and regional differences have often paralleled these religious divisions. Muslims are only about 10 percent of the population, and they are not Arabs but a religious minority that has suffered discrimination. The notorious dictator Idi Amin expelled Uganda's substantial Asian population in 1971.

The Museveni government took power in 1986 through the armed rebel group the National Resistance Army (NRA). His government followed a series of brutal military dictatorships and is credited by some governments and relief agencies with bringing stability to Uganda. Uganda, like Sudan, is a "no-party" state, but elections nevertheless produced some antigovernment parliamentarians, particularly in northern Uganda.

The movement or "no-party" political system which the National Resistance Movement (NRM) is trying to implement in Uganda places severe restrictions on political and civil rights, however, allowing political parties to exist only in name but not allowing them to hold public rallies, sponsor candidates for elections, or hold delegate conferences. In the past month, a nongovernment organization, the Foundation for African Development, suspended operations after the security services dispersed three seminars held by the group on the topic of "Human Rights and Democracy," on the grounds that the seminars had a political content. The National Resistance Movement of President Museveni has also transformed itself into a state-funded body, headed by President Museveni and administered by a National Political Commissar responsible for the political education of the population. It would be hypocritical to criticize violations of political rights elsewhere on the continent, such as Sudan, but to ignore similar abuses in Uganda. A Human Rights Watch report on civil and political rights in Uganda is forthcoming.

There has always been armed internal resistance to the Museveni government, and there are rebel groups operating in the west and north of Uganda today. Northern soldiers were dominant in the Amin and Obote armies which preceded Museveni's NRM, and when he won, many northern soldiers fled to Sudan, partly in fear of retaliation by the NRA. Much of the population of the northern districts of Kitgum and Gulu, which are most affected by the LRA, is Acholi, a tribe that straddles the Sudan/Uganda border.

.. In Sudan these northern soldiers formed the Uganda People's Democratic Army (UPDA) which soon took on a millenarian dimension as the Holy Spirit Movement under the leadership of Alice Lakwena. This ultimately developed into the Lord's Resistance Army led by Joseph Kony. The LRA and the Ugandan government came close to a negotiated peace in 1994 but in that year the Sudan government stepped up its support for the LRA, providing sanctuary and bases inside government-controlled south Sudan and effectively reigniting the conflict. This seems an obvious tit-for-tat for Museveni's support for the SPLA.

What the LRA is best known for is its abduction of thousands of Acholi Ugandan children to serve as involuntary soldiers and, in the case of girls, "wives" or concubines for the LRA officers. Extreme brutality is used to keep the children in line, including torture and forcing children to participate in the killing of other children who try to escape. Whenever there is a successful escape (of the 10,000 estimated to have been abducted, some 2,000 may have escaped), those who remain behind are punished.

It is in this brutal treatment of children that the I.R.A. has distinguished itself among all the abusive rebel armies of the world.

#### THE FAMINE IN SUDAN, AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES THAT CAUSED IT

The 1988 famine in Bahr El Ghazal cost an estimated 250,000 lives. It was caused primarily by looting, raiding, displacement, killing, and abduction of Dinka by *murahleen*, a militia formed by the Arabized Baggara (cattle owners) tribes. The international community took little action to aid the starving in the 1988 famine but as a result Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) was formed by the U.N. to prevent another famine in Sudan. OLS operates across borders into Sudan, serving civilians on both sides of the lines with the consent of the parties to the conflict.

Ten years later, however, Bahr El Ghazal again faces famine. The 1998 famine in Bahr El Ghazal and other parts of the south, which affects 1.2 million people in rebel-controlled areas of southern Sudan, 1.2 million people in government-controlled areas of southern Sudan, and 200,000 people in northern Sudan, according to U.N. estimates, is the result of one natural disaster (drought caused by El Nino) and a long series of human rights abuses, one of which is the same *murahleen* raiding.

The scorched earth tactics of raiding, looting and burning by all parties prior to 1998 caused forced displacement of hundreds of thousands of civilians and led to a progressive erosion of the three-point means of their livelihood, whereby entitlement and/or access to crops, herds and wild food (mainly fish) have all been reduced. By the same token kinship networks and local ties of reciprocal obligation were weakened. This has been cumulative and unremitting: year by year every crisis is harder to cope with. The amount of food aid getting to Bahr El Ghazal over the last few years from the international community has not been enough to significantly improve nutritional status. What makes the drought intolerable are the constraints on survival strategies caused by the war and the illegal way the war is waged.

The raiding laying the groundwork for the 1998 famine is also the fault of a southern warlord, Kerubino Kuanyin Bol. Kerubino, a Dinka from Bahr El Ghazal, helped found the SPLA and switched to the government after the SPLA held him five years in incommunicado arbitrary detention for plotting a coup (he was there during the 1988 famine). While on the government's side he conducted a scorched earth campaign against his own people in Bahr El Ghazal for four years, but in January 1998 switched back to the SPLA after falling out with the government, or "Arabs," as southerners refer to all Sudanese governments.

The SPLA also has played a role in the famine. Its policy of putting garrison towns under siege has led to the successful interdiction of almost all overland and river transport, through land mines and ambushes. This means that most relief goods must be delivered by air, which makes this a very costly operation, although there are other reasons the air bridge has been resorted to, such as the absence of all-weather roads. The SPLA has been responsible for looting and diversion of relief food from civilians, as mentioned, although the government has been guilty of this as well. For instance, in the garrison town of Wau, Bahr El Ghazal, assorted government forces looted the property of the Dinka who had fled for their lives in January 1998, and of the U.N. and NGOs who evacuated the town before the SPLA attack on it.

The government has done its best to encourage south-south fighting, by arming any southern group that will fight against the SPLA as in the case of Kerubino. Southerners are not absolved from all blame, however. There are divisions among them because the SPLA has treated some ethnic groups

roughly, forcibly conscripting their youth, raping women, and stealing food.

Northern Bahr El Ghazal is primarily inhabited by the Dinka, a black African people practicing their traditional religion or Christianity, and speaking Dinka. They live in other areas of the south and many have migrated (the sole railway in the south) into the north looking for work where there is no war. The Dinka are the most numerous tribe in Sudan though they comprised some 11.5 percent of the population in 1983, according to the Encyclopedia Britannica (all such numbers are estimates).

The murahaheen was armed beginning in 1985 by the government to attack their Dinka neighbors. This is a form of counterinsurgency on the cheap. The Dinka are regarded as the civilian base of the SPLA, and the Baggara (and soldiers) are rewarded with total impunity and war booty: cattle, grain and slaves. Now government soldiers conduct joint operations with the murahaheen, so the raids are larger and more devastating.

In October 1997 the U.N. forecast that because of drought and continual raiding, about 250,000 people would be at risk of hunger in Bahr El Ghazal in 1998. In January 1998 tens of thousands more people were precipitously added to this needy population, they were urban Dinka displaced after the failure of Kerubino's "Trojan Horse" operation in Wau (the second largest town in the south, with population estimated between 100-150,000,) and two nearby garrison towns, Aweil and Gognal.

The SPLA, in league with Kerubino, had faked a mass "surrender" of several thousand of its forces a few weeks earlier in late 1997. The "surrendered" SPLA men moved into Wau with their guns. The two forces might have captured Wau because they outnumbered the government troops, but when they stopped their offensive to loot, the government regrouped and routed them with its artillery. We regard this looting as a human rights violation that led to the loss of Wau that led to the unexpected displacement of tens of thousands of civilians, with no food, clothes or shelter, into the famine area.

Almost the entire Dinka population of Wau, Aweil and Gognal fled, fearing retaliation by the government; there has been a history of ethnic conflict inside Wau. In 1987 the local Fertit militia, with the army's cooperation, killed hundreds of Dinka inside Wau, until the Dinka police, who comprised 70-80 percent of the police force, intervened. In 1998, the Dinka police protected the civilians as they fled Wau, and then joined them in the famine zone.

Many Dinka (and Jur, a smaller group related to the Dinka) were shot and killed by government troops and militia as they fled Wau across the Jur River to the east. There were later reports that vengeful government troops and militia, in the ten days after the fighting, massacred hundreds of Dinka who stayed behind in Wau, including hospital patients and government employees. A few Dinka who stayed behind, including government employees, fled in the next few months because they observed that, even after the killing spree ended, many educated Dinka were being "disappeared."

The government contributed heavily to the famine because on February 4, 1998 it suspended all relief flights into Bahr El Ghazal immediately after the World Food Programme (WFP) announced that it was airdropping food to the Wau, Aweil and Gognal displaced, whom it estimated as 150,000 destitute people. Because most relief goods were delivered by air, banning flights effectively stopped relief deliveries. We regard this as a human rights cause of the famine because the government acted with full knowledge of the U.N.'s projections and wide publicity about the growing famine. The flight ban was imposed on a very large area and was unrelated to any immediate or legitimate military need. The civilian population far outnumbered SPLA combatants in the famine zone. The relief flight ban was a

classic example of using starvation of civilians as a method of combat, a violation of the rules of war.

The flight ban continued for almost two months, until high-level U.N. pressure, press coverage of the famine, and the immediacy of peace talks led the government to lift the flight ban on March 31. In addition, the government finally granted permission for the relief operation to add extra large-capacity C-130 planes to airdrop 1,600 pounds of food per flight. But for many vulnerable persons (children, the elderly, the infirm), the pipeline was reopened too slowly, and too late, and the death toll rose.

The famine continued to deepen in northern Bahr El Ghazal, where the murahleen stepped up their raiding and slave-taking in April through June. There are at least two causes for this: Kerubino, once he switched sides back to the SPLA, at least stopped raiding the Dinka. But he then turned his guns on the murahleen, their civilians, and cattle, which he claimed to be taking back because it had been looted from the Dinka. Looting and killing civilians is a violation of human rights, no matter who the target.

The murahleen, on horseback and as part of a large army operation with troops on vehicles, struck back at civilian rural Dinka in northern Bahr El Ghazal, the area of coveted grazing lands and water sources needed for Baggara cattle. It was a scorched earth operation, killing civilians and abducting thousands of women and children, and looting tens of thousands heads of cattle. Many Dinka allege that such operations, that killed so many and drove the survivors away, were intended to clear Dinkas from their land so "the Arabs" could settle it. These displaced people were already suffering from the famine, and the impact of new attacks on them was devastating.

The relief operation, which is now the largest WFP airlift in its history, could not keep up with the cascading number of newly displaced and foodless civilians. The famine spun out of control. Now, with little rain, it is obvious that the harvest expected for September and October 1998 will be poor, and that the famine will therefore last for more than one year—until the next harvest, in September or October 1999. Little rain also means that the other food supplies of the Dinka—fish and wild foods—will be scarce. The cattle the Dinka depend on for milk as an important component of their diet have been looted by the tens of thousands. Where Dinka still have cattle, they too suffer from the drought and from constantly being moved to avoid raids.

The famine is so bad—affecting probably 700,000 people in the rebel-held areas of Bahr El Ghazal—that the Dinka have begun to go into the lion's den in order to find food. Thousands who fled the garrison towns of Wau, Aweil and Gognal have actually gone back, and some rural Dinka have joined them, despite the widespread belief that hundreds of Dinka in Wau were massacred there in the ten days following the failed January 1998 Kerubino/SPLA attack on Wau. These desperate people are looking for food, and in some cases, searching for their children who have been abducted and taken back to the garrison towns before they are transported further north as slaves. These recently displaced and malnourished Dinka are reported to number some 47,000 in Wau, and 9,000 in Aweil. These are estimates, like most other population numbers in Sudan, and they change almost daily.

In Wau, the army and security set up five checkpoints to screen Dinka coming in to town. It appears that they detain all the men, and allow the women and children to proceed. We fear that the men are being arbitrarily arrested, solely on the basis of their ethnic origin, and that they may be tortured in order to elicit military information the suspect may or may not have.

This also could be a setback in terms of recovery from the famine. If the men are detained and/or disabled or killed, they cannot plant or engage in other work to support their families. If all Dinka, once they enter a garrison town, are prevented from leaving (as was the case during the 1988 famine), then they cannot plant.

Bahr El Ghazal Dinka typically migrated north to look for work, even in non-famine times, because the single railway in the south runs north from Wau. Now some are driven by the famine north into the Western Kordofan towns of Meiram and Abyei, two towns in which they died in shocking numbers during the 1988 famine because they were not allowed access to international relief intended for them. There are estimated to be 9,000 newly famine-displaced Dinka in the two towns. There are also reports that they have been attacked on ethnic grounds and are not receiving the physical protection they need from the authorities.

#### **THE TRAIN, RELIEF FOR THE DISPLACED IN GARRISON TOWNS, AND SLAVERY IN SUDAN**

One of the most dramatic abuses of human rights in Sudan, the resurgence of slavery, is a by-product of the war: children and women are abducted in military-like raids on civilian Dinka villages.

The murahleen descend on civilian villages on horseback, armed with the government's automatic weapons. The raids are conducted where there is no SPLA presence; the objective is not to kill enemy troops but to enslave "enemy" civilians and weaken the Dinka, economically and socially. The Dinka are oungunned and horseless: they cannot protect their women, children, or cattle. Those who resist are killed.

These raids now are often conducted by the murahleen accompanying the train from the north to Wau, the southernmost terminal of the line. This train has been used for solely military purposes for years, taking troops and military supplies to Wau and Awel and other military posts along the route. The train transports murahleen horses, which they use to raid and loot Dinka villages along the way, taking women and children captive. On the way north, they take the looted cattle they could not sell in the Wau market on the train, and sometimes they take the abducted women and children, although usually the abductees are forced to walk, hands tying them to each other, behind the horses.

Now the government offers to use the train to transport relief food to the government garrison towns where the Dinka, fleeing murahleen and government army raids, are now starving. The government, however, has had ample opportunity to transport relief food on this train but has not done so for years. The current motivation appears economic, or sanctions-busting: the government wants U.S. economic sanctions on Sudan lifted so that it can acquire the spare parts needed for the train, which are said to be manufactured in Dayton, Ohio.

The government may be hoping that the U.S. government is ignorant of the history of the 1988 famine in Sudan, when the government promised to deliver relief on this train and complied with about five percent of its promise (using most of the train's capacity for military supplies and troops, and the rest for merchants' goods). It also may hope that the U.S. government is ignorant of the terrible role the train plays in human rights abuses in Sudan in 1998, including as an important means of transportation for slave-raiders.



## THE LOOMING FAMINE IN THE NUBA MOUNTAINS, CENTRAL SUDAN

The Nuba Mountains are special. They are in the center of Sudan and not contiguous to SPLA territory. Because of government blockade these mountains remain one of the most isolated places on earth. The Nuba are Africans, half Christian and half Muslim. They speak some fifty different dialects. Their lingua franca is Arabic.

The Nuba Mountains remain isolated and marginalized politically, economically and socially: there was no secondary school in the Nuba Mountains until the 1970s. The Nuba were raided for their cattle by the Baggara (who live to the west) and were under land pressure by Arabs. The mountains are actually hills, but they provided protection from many raiders over the decades, as the Nuba sought to preserve their unique and tolerant culture.

The NIF wages a war of attrition by starvation and displacement of the Nuba. Having failed to defeat the SPLA militarily, in 1992 the NIF declared jihad or holy war on opposition Nuba, even the Muslims—and Nuba commander and governor Yousif Kuwa is a Muslim (although his children are Christians, which he has never opposed; this tolerance is typical of the Nuba in SPLA territory).

In 1992 the government set up "peace camps" ringing garrison towns and forced rural Nuba it captured to live there, under guard lest they escape to their homes. In the camps, women and girls are subjected to sexual abuse by PDF and soldiers. All family members are punished if one manages to escape.

International relief is provided in the Nuba Mountains, but only on one side: the government side. Some food, usually an inadequate amount, goes to peace camps. The government has refused and delayed all U.N. efforts to conduct even a needs assessment in SPLA areas, despite the most recent pledge (May 1998) to U.N. Secretary Kofi Annan that such a mission could proceed. After a compromise was reached regarding the composition of the assessment team and their point of departure, the government denied permission for the team to proceed, and the visit has now been postponed indefinitely. This time the government uses the pretext of an ambush killing three relief workers that must be investigated before anything else happens; responsibility for the ambush is not clear. Many see the U.N.'s failure to push for equal access to the rebel areas of the north as colluding in the government's attempts to starve the Nuba into submission.

At the same time as it delays food relief for the needy in SPLA areas of the Nuba Mountains, the government is engaging in scorched earth tactics against this civilian population, looting animals and crops, and burning what abductees cannot carry. It also displaces those living in fertile valleys into the higher and less fertile land. Now hunger is driving Nubas to the garrison towns and peace camps, in search of food and clothes. Because the Nuba Mountains are isolated from any international border or SPLA area, the government has successfully cut off most ordinary commerce to the area, so basic items such as used clothes, salt and sugar are rarely available, at any price.

These tactics, coupled with the drought, have resulted in a food crisis in the SPLA areas of the Nuba Mountains in 1998. A food assessment done by an NGO in April estimated 20,000 were at risk and later estimates have climbed to 100,000: the population in SPLA areas of the Nuba Mountains may be 300-500,000. Urgent international pressure must be brought on the Sudan government to prevent a food crisis from developing into a famine in the Nuba Mountains.

### THE FAMINE IN WESTERN UPPER NILE, GOVERNMENT-CONTROLLED SOUTHERN SUDAN

There are about 1.2 million people in government-controlled areas of southern Sudan said to be at risk of famine. These people include those living in the garrison towns of Wau, Aweil and Gogrial mentioned above, and people living in Western Upper Nile, who are mostly Nuer, the second-largest tribe in southern Sudan and distant cousins of the Dinka.

Those in Western Upper Nile are at risk of famine because of fighting between two government-supported forces, both of them Nuer: the Southern Sudan Defense Forces (SSDF) forces led by Riek Machar, chairman of the Southern Sudan Coordinating Council (a body set up pursuant to a 1997 peace agreement between the government and Machar and other former SPLA leaders), and the forces of Paulino Matiep, a Nuer leader who was never in the SPLA but always with the government, and who joined Machar's forces in the mid-1990s. Paulino's forces, now seceded from Machar's SSDF, are called the South Sudan Unity Army (SSUA). The two forces are drawn from different sections or subtribes of the Nuer.

They have engaged in scorched-earth campaigns in the territory of the other, looting cattle and grain, burning homes and facilities such as clinics and feeding centers, and killing civilians. Many U.N. and NGO staff have had to flee or be evacuated because of these rapid strikes, disrupting efforts to contain the food crisis.

The dispute is ostensibly over the "election" in December 1997 of a governor for Unity (Al Withda) State in Western Upper Nile where rich oil resources are located, and where thousands of Chinese laborers are now building a pipeline to take the oil to northern refineries, a sore point with the south even before the civil war started. The candidate backed by Riek Machar won the gubernatorial race and Paulino, unsatisfied with the result, took military action. The electorate was composed of less than forty electors, all local government officials, mostly selected by the central government.

Many believe that part of the conflict is attributable to the Sudan government's recent provision of military supplies to Paulino, so he could serve as a counterbalance to Riek's forces. Prior to Kerubino's defection from the government side back to the SPLA in January 1998, Kerubino had apparently served as the military and political counterbalance to Riek.

The government now has declared that the two sides in the fighting have agreed to a truce, but the damage to civilian goods and infrastructure, and the delay in planting, cannot be reversed. Several hundred thousand Nuer civilians are at risk of famine as a result. Many have been displaced and fled north to the Nuba Mountains and Western Kordofan.

### NORTHERN UGANDA AND SUDAN'S SUPPORT FOR THE LORD'S RESISTANCE ARMY

The Sudan government is responsible for terrible abuses of Ugandan children through its support for the LRA, which kidnaps Ugandan children and takes them to its base camps inside government-controlled Sudan.

Human Rights Watch's 1997 report, *The Scars of Death: Children Abducted by the Lord's Resistance Army in Uganda*, documents the abduction, enslavement, rape, torture and killing of an estimated six to ten thousand Ugandan children by the LRA. In addition to being forced to serve as rebel soldiers and to participate in acts of extreme violence, as the boys do, girls are given as wives to rebel

soldiers and live as sexual slaves. For all abducted children, their labor, their bodies, and their lives are at their commanders' complete disposal.

According to independent sources, between 1,200 and 1,500 abductions were reported in Kitgum district between August 1997 and February 1998 alone. They also report that the LRA has begun abducting very young girls in the belief that such young girls will be free of the HIV virus and will thus be more suitable for (forced) sexual relations with LRA commanders once they reach puberty.

Testimonies of LRA abuse of children abound. Charles, age thirteen, was abducted by the LRA on Christmas day, 1996 and escaped in early 1998. A few hours after being abducted, the rebels told Charles to lay down and said they would kill him because he was too slow: "They told me to lay down and said they would kill me because I was too slow. I laid down and expected to die. They started laughing, saying they just wanted to scare me."

A few days later, Charles was forced to participate in the killing of a boy who tried to escape, an experience which became a regular part of his young life.

"If the rebels caught the escapees, they would send us to kill them. They would tie the hands and they would make us kill. Sometimes they would give us pangas [machetes] and make us cut them to pieces. I felt a lot of pain and started seeing images of those people visiting me. I would start feeling dizzy and they would scare me saying that if I behaved that way, they would kill me. We were forced to kill in a group. The boys we had to kill would cry and tell us we were killing them for nothing. It was very bad. There are many times when I think about those kids and my conscience tells me that I was too young, that I was forced to do the killing."

Finally, he was sent back to Uganda to fight in Kitgum district: "Kony told us to kill and abduct people. He instructed us that we were coming to take over, that he would follow as President." Just before Charles managed to escape, he was instructed to kill an older boy by himself, with a bayonet.

The story of Charles is told a hundred fold in the testimonies gathered by Human Rights Watch. When one mother pleaded with the LRA not to take her child, she was given the choice between losing her child or having her hand cut off. One girl told us how she was "given" to a rebel commander as a "wife," and beaten with a machete which was put in a fire when she refused to have sex with the older man. She also received daily beatings from the commander.

The abuses by the LRA are not limited to abductions of children. Many civilians described incidents of abuse by the LRA, including mutilations and amputations. One man described the condition of his brother's body which he found after an LRA attack: "He was killed using an axe, his head was cut open, they removed all his teeth and he was cut all over the body." Human Rights Watch met a four year old girl whose whole family was put in a hut and burned to death. Out of twelve people put in the hut, eight died. The girl was pulled out, but the rebels put her hands back in the fire and burned off the hands. She was one and a half years old at the time. One woman described how the rebels cut her lips off because they suspected that her husband was a soldier.

A man in a "protected camp" said they were not allowed by the Ugandan authorities to go work on our farms. "But it is the rebels who make our life difficult. We cannot go home even if the army lets us because of Kony. Kony should come back for peace talks because the fighting is killing many civilians. The insurgency has now gone on for eleven years and there have been no changes and no

winners."

Other LRA abuses include disruption of humanitarian relief work in the north. This work addresses three separate populations: the Sudanese refugees in Uganda (an estimated 170,000 who are fleeing government or SPLA abuses, or both); Uganda civilians forced into or willingly in "protected camps" created by the Ugandan army, the Uganda People's Defense Force (UPDF); and the OLS cross-border relief operation, which uses Ugandan roads to deliver relief into southern Sudan for the internally displaced Sudanese there. All three programs have been jeopardized by LRA ambushes and land mines, another area in which the two countries' conflicts overlap.

In 1994 life began to be difficult for these relief efforts and for ordinary people living in northern Uganda. The two districts most affected by the LRA are Gulu (population 338,427) and Kitgum (population 357,184). The LRA placed land mines in the roads, looted relief trucks, and attacked ordinary Ugandan civilians.

The LRA recently informed NGOs in northern Uganda that they would be considered legitimate military targets; it accuses them of materially supporting the Museveni government (aiding the internally displaced in protected camps created by the UPDF). This legal conclusion is erroneous; the activities described do not make NGOs legitimate military targets under international law.

On several occasions, the LRA has physically threatened the lives of NGO workers in the north, and most NGOs have withdrawn from the Kitgum district during April to July, 1998 out of concern for the safety of their workers. Minimal teams of humanitarian workers have now returned to Kitgum, but their activities are confined to Kitgum town because of continuing instability. Several attacks on humanitarian food convoys by suspected LRA rebels have taken place in recent months, some causing a loss of life. There are also increasing reports of the use of anti-personnel and anti-tank land mines in Kitgum district, further complicating the work of humanitarian organizations and endangering civilians.

The suspension of many humanitarian operations in the north, because of LRA attacks and threats, aggravated an already severe situation, as most people living in the "protected camps" created by the government in 1996 and 1997 are highly dependent on humanitarian relief for nutrition and other basic requirements. In Gulu district, the majority of the civilian population is living in the fifteen "protected camps" created by the UPDF, according to a 1997 U.N. assessment mission.

According to UPDF spokespersons, the camps were created to protect the civilian population from further LRA abuses, although many believe that another reason for the camps was to isolate the LRA and deny them civilian support, a familiar counterinsurgency tactic. A significant number of civilians moved to the camps on their own initiative, but those who chose to remain behind were ordered to move to the camps by UPDF officers, and in some cases were beaten if they refused to move. A number of witnesses claimed that the UPDF shelled near reluctant villages in order to create fear and force the civilians to move.

Under the Geneva Conventions, a government which displaces civilian populations must take all possible measures to ensure that the displaced population is received under satisfactory conditions of shelter, hygiene, health, safety and nutrition. (Article 14, Protocol II) However, UPDF officials admitted that little had been done to prepare the infrastructure of the "protected camps." Living conditions in the camps are harsh, with insufficient access to clean water, insufficient food, non-existent educational facilities, and significant levels of diseases associated with overcrowding and malnutrition. Residents of

the camps complained of inadequate security against LRA attacks. Several witnesses complained about cases of indiscriminate shooting by UPDF or local defense units during LRA attacks, sometimes resulting in civilian casualties.

Apart from the situation in the protected camps, the abuses by the UPDF fall into two categories, namely abuses against civilians, mostly committed by off-duty soldiers, and abuses against suspected rebel sympathizers by on-duty soldiers. Human Rights Watch documented a number of cases of rape, beating and looting of civilians by UPDF troops which seemingly went unpunished.

Some suspected rebel sympathizers have been detained and tortured by the UPDF. Such cases occur in the west and north, and Human Rights Watch found such suspects who had been subjected to severe canings, various forms of physical torture, and mock executions and burials. Such brutal tactics are often used to extract confessions or identify other rebel suspects. More than one thousand persons are currently in Ugandan prisons on remand for treason charges often based on such coerced evidence. They usually often remain in jail without trial for a mandatory one-year period, after which bail is available. Many are detained for years on treason charges without trial, in violation of the constitutional limits on pre-trial detention.

Sudan's support for the LRA is a principal source of external support for the LRA. The evidence gathered by Human Rights Watch and other independent sources clearly establishes the extent of Sudanese support for and collaboration with the LRA. The Sudanese government's denial that it supports and has long supported the LRA is simply not credible in light of consistent evidence to the contrary.

A number of LRA abductees who escaped told about the names, locations, and infrastructure of the LRA camps in Sudan. The interviews clearly establish that the camps are located in territory controlled by the Sudan authorities, near Sudanese army outposts, and that the Sudan government actively provides support for the LRA by supplying the camps with weapons and food. According to the testimonies of the former abductees, the LRA conducts joint operations against the SPLA together with the Sudanese army.

The current LRA camps in Sudan include Jebellin, Kit II and Musito. Jebellin is located at kilometer 38 near Juba. According to one thirteen-year-old former abductee who spent two years in LRA captivity at Jebellin (sometimes spelled Jabalayn or Jebelen), approximately thirty miles south of Juba:

In the camps, we were together with the Arabs [Sudan government army]. The Sudan government gave food to the commanders, but we had to find our own food. I saw Sudanese Arab soldiers deliver weapons to the commanders of the LRA. The guns were brought to the LRA camp by airplane, and the soldiers unloading the guns were Arabs. They were big guns, machine guns. Other times, the guns were brought by lorries. The camp was called Jebellin, near Juba. [LRA leader Joseph] Kony was stationed there.

The LRA also operates other camps inside Sudan, similarly placed in close proximity to Sudanese garrisons. These camps include Kit II, located near a prominent bridge on one of the tributaries of Kit river between Pageri and Juba, and a camp called Musito [Nisito]. Both camps were described by a thirty-four-year-old former abductee:

We went to Kit II, near Juba. It is about twenty-five kilometers north of Zabular. There were about four brigades [of LRA] there, about 6,500 people. The camp was very large, and some were taken to Nisito, where the sick were kept. Those are the LRA camps I know: Kit II and Nisito. The main supplies always came from Juba, but the main base is Kit II. Kony was staying at Kit II when I was there. The Arabs had a camp about two kilometers away. The Arabs brought uniforms and ammunition, which they exchanged for marijuana. I stayed at Kit II for eight months. We of older age were just used to dig in the gardens like slaves. We were not used as soldiers.

At first when we arrived at Kit II, the Arabs would bring us sorghum. But after they saw that Kony had dug [planted food crops], they brought sorghum without grinding. Sometimes we would go rob food from the Dinkas, then we would have to fight the SPLA. We built a big house for Kony at Nisito, with three rooms. Kony had ten wives at Nisito, but others were in Juba.

A seventeen-year-old girl who had spent two years in LRA captivity gave a similar picture of the Biroka camp in which she stayed, which has since been attacked and dispersed by the SPLA and Uganda People's Defense Force:

In Sudan, we went to a place called Biroka, which was an LRA camp. It is near a place called Pageo, but the rebels are no longer there. The UPDF fought against the rebels together with the Dinka [SPLA] at the end of October 1995 and closed the Biroka camp. From Biroka, we went to a camp called Pajok, which is near the junction of the road to Juba and Torit. There were very many people at Pajok, probably 6,000 with all the children. The Sudanese army camp is just nearby, less than one hundred yards away. We did everything together with the Arabs. We drank the same water. We fought together and went on mission together. There were about 300 Arab soldiers. The Arabs gave food and weapons to the LRA. I saw the Arabs bringing durra [sorghum], sugar, cow peas, beans, and other foods. The weapons were brought in by big lornes: land mines, SMGs [submachine guns], RPGs [rocket-propelled grenade launchers], silencer guns. They would just empty the lornes and bring more guns. It happened three times. Whenever groups went back to Uganda, the Arabs would first bring guns.

Another camp, located approximately forty-seven miles south of Juba, was called Aru, but was disbanded by a combined UPDF/SPLA attack on April 9-10, 1997. Again, former abductees described the proximity of the Aru camp to a Sudanese garrison:

In Sudan, we went to Aru. Aru was next to the main road and there are many trees and grasses. There are many hills in the distance, and one nearby. It is on a slope, and the camp is on a very large area. The children were uncountable. The Arabs were less than a mile away, and there were about ten Arab defense positions near the camp. In April, we were attacked by the NRA [*sic*, referring to the UPDF]. They scattered the whole camp, even the Arabs. The rebels at first pushed back the NRA, but then they came with big bombs and we were forced to run away. Many people died and we were scattered all over, but Kony communicated by radio and gathered us together. From there, we walked for two days to Jebellin. We were divided in two, some in Jebellin and others to Nisito.

One of the main activities of the LRA was to fight against the SPLA, suggesting that one reason for Sudanese support for the LRA is to use the LRA to fight the SPLA. One young former abductee said:

After the training, we were given guns and right away went to fight the SPLA. We fought many times against the SPLA, especially laying ambushes for the SPLA. We would wait along the road for the SPLA to collect the food which was brought from Uganda and then attack them. Kony told us that the Ugandan government is assisting the SPLA. We often fought the SPLA and UPDF together.

This was confirmed by other abductees, including a thirteen-year-old:

We fought many times against the SPLA. We would go for raids and fight the SPLA. If you remain behind, you do not get food. Many times, when we went to raid the SPLA would fight us. The SPLA has mambas [armored personnel carriers]. We would get defeated most of the time because the SPLA is very tough. Sometimes, we would lay ambushes for them.

According to the testimonies of former abductees, the UPDF repeatedly entered Sudanese territory to attack LRA camps inside Sudan. For example, former abductees told Human Rights Watch that the UPDF had attacked the LRA camp at Palataka, on the east bank of the White Nile south of Juba, in late 1996 or early 1997, dispersing the population of the camp and causing many casualties among the children.

Sudan's own actions betray its support for the LRA. After the mass abductions from St. Mary's School for girls in Aboke, Uganda, the Sudanese government permitted a Ugandan delegation which included the deputy headmistress of St. Mary's School and a representative of the Concerned Parents Association of Aboke to visit three LRA camps (which it said were refugee camps) in June 1997. According to an abductee who had been at one of the camps during the delegation's visit:

When Sister Rachele [of St. Mary's School] came, we were told to go hide in the bush. Some of those who tried to talk to her were later killed. I remember one girl who was put in front of a firing squad for talking to the nun.

This confirms earlier reports that two captive girls who had spoken to members of the visiting delegation were killed soon thereafter.

The circumstances surrounding the March 30, 1998 repatriation of fourteen children and three adults from Sudan to Uganda, which was facilitated by UNICEF, further show the existence of the LRA camps in Sudan and the Sudan government's cooperation with the LRA. All seventeen were abducted by the LRA in Uganda and managed to escape LRA captivity in Sudan and find refuge at the UNICEF offices in Juba. They were repatriated to Uganda through Khartoum. Human Rights Watch interviewed two of the repatriated children. One said he escaped from Jebellin camp but was caught and imprisoned in a Sudanese jail by government soldiers in Juba, from where he was later escorted by a prison guard directly back to the LRA camp. The boy managed to escape again and this time made it to the UNICEF office in Juba. The other LRA escapee in jail with him may remain in captivity in Sudanese prisons.

The Sudan government handed over an additional three abducted Ugandan children to the U.N. Secretary General's Special Representative for Children in Armed Conflict, Olara Otunnu, during his visit to Khartoum in June 1998. The government has pledged to assist with ongoing efforts to obtain the release of children abducted by the LRA. Its efforts so far are negligible. Several thousand abducted Ugandan children are still in LRA captivity, however, most of them inside Sudan.

Without the active support of Sudan, it would be much more difficult for the LRA to continue its abusive campaign. Sudan not only grants sanctuary to the LRA: it actively supports and collaborates with the LRA by providing them with weapons and food, basing military detachments near LRA camps, working with the LRA in military maneuvers, and even returning escaped captives to LRA camps. These abuses of Ugandan children cannot be justified by the fact that Uganda supports the SPLA; if it wants to engage in tit-for-tat, the Sudan government must find a way to do so that does not trample the rights of children.

*Human Rights Watch, Africa Division*

Human Rights Watch is dedicated to protecting the human rights of people around the world

We stand with victims and activists to bring offenders to justice, to prevent discrimination, to uphold political freedom and to protect people from inhumane conduct in wartime.

We investigate and expose human rights violations and hold abusers accountable.

We challenge governments and those holding power to end abusive practices and respect international human rights law.

We enlist the public and the international community to support the cause of human rights for all.

Its Africa division was established in 1988 to monitor and promote the observance of internationally recognized human rights in sub-Saharan Africa. Peter Takarambude is the executive director; Janet Fleischman is the Washington director; Sulman Ali Baldo is the senior researcher; Alex Vines is the research associate; Bronwen Manby and Binaifer Nowrojee are counsels; Ariana Pearlroth and Juliet Wilson are associates; Alison DesForges is a consultant; and Peter Bouckaert is the Orville Schell Fellow. William Carmichael is the chair of the advisory committee.

Web Site Address: <http://www.hrw.org>

Listserv address: To subscribe to the list, send an e-mail message to [majordomo@igc.apc.org](mailto:majordomo@igc.apc.org) with "subscribe hrw-news" in the body of the message (leave the subject line blank).





NORWEGIAN PEOPLE'S AID

---

Testimony of

**Daniel Eiffe**  
Liaison Officer

**NORWEGIAN PEOPLE'S AID**

on

**Crises in Sudan and Northern Uganda**

before the

**SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS  
AND THE  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA**

July 29, 1998

---

Mageta Road off Muthangari Road, Lavington, P.O. Box 39207, Nairobi, Kenya  
Tel: (254) 2 574063/4/5 or (254) 2 574071/2/3. Fax: (254) 2 574074  
E-mail: [NPAIDKE@FORM-NET.COM](mailto:NPAIDKE@FORM-NET.COM)

I am Daniel Eiffe, Liaison Officer of an international non governmental organization (NGO), Norwegian People's Aid (NPA). I have been working in southern Sudan for eleven years, and I thank you for the opportunity to testify.

Norwegian People's Aid was founded in the late 40's by the trade union movement in Norway, at the time to combat fascism. It is a value-based organization that works with groups who have been denied their basic human rights, with people who struggle for their freedom, for human dignity and for justice. While we work in areas of humanitarian emergency, providing relief and other forms of developmental assistance, our primary concerns are with the establishment of democracy by supporting the empowerment of marginalised groups. NPA's mandate goes beyond neutrality and is expressed as one of solidarity with the vulnerable, the poor, and the oppressed.

In the case of southern Sudanese, we believe that theirs is a genuine struggle for survival against successive political regimes in northern Sudan. We therefore have combined humanitarian assistance (being the largest NGO in southern Sudan), with human rights and political advocacy.

NPA is also unique in that we operate independently of the United Nations/Operation Lifeline Sudan (UN/OLS), which requires prior permission from the government of Sudan to function in each locality.

This independence from UN/OLS has allowed my organization to assist needy civilians within the rebel sector throughout the crisis in Sudan. We have stayed with the people despite heavy government aerial bombings on our four hospitals, our convoys and our compounds. We have never evacuated the field in the face of extreme danger and have been able to serve people in areas outside those to which the government of Sudan permits UN/OLS access (usually the most needy areas).

While NPA therefore operates in south Sudan in defiance of the National Islamic Front (NIF) regime, our organization is based on the internationally agreed humanitarian principle of wars: that all civilians in such situations have a right to humanitarian assistance and protection. The government of Sudan's control of OLS food as a weapon of war in south Sudan has resulted in large scale starvation and death. NPA's independence enables us to adhere to internationally accepted humanitarian principles despite the dictates of the "sovereign government" in Khartoum.

NPA receives considerable support from USAID for its operations. We are currently working to develop civil society structures for an emerging new Sudan. This is

the biggest challenge facing the Sudan as the war has destroyed all elements of law and of civil administration in the south. NPA held workshops with the liberation movement, (the Sudan Peoples' Liberation Movement/Army – SPLM/A). The key priorities of these sessions were to identify the main challenges facing the society besides relief:

- The empowerment of civil society;
- Consolidation of local government structures as a basis for good governance, and
- Roles and functions of humanitarian affairs.

Currently NPA has proposals pending with USAID covering certain aspects of this project. We believe that, to empower civil society structures, to curtail abuses of law and order, the priority is to develop a system of justice by establishing a legal system and also to develop the judiciary by training legal and paralegal personnel. Many of these structures are already in place, but the enormous brain drain in Sudan has created a great lack of human resources to run these institutions. This is the single largest problem facing the areas liberated by the SPLM/A.

Mr. Chairman, in the eleven years I have served in Sudan I have witnessed terrible, terrible things. I have seen hundreds of thousands of civilians flee in the face of government offensives. I have been in the conflict zone through thick and thin in order to save the lives of the civilians who have been the soft target of the Sudan government in this conflict. You can't work in Sudan for long in the face of great personal risk and not have very strong feelings about the war.

Mr. Chairman, I am very pleased that you have included both northern Uganda and Sudan in this hearing. My organization works along the Sudan/Ugandan border, and we have depots in northern Uganda through which we take our relief assistance. Three of our four hospitals are only a few miles from the Ugandan border in southern Sudan.

For years, I have been traveling from Gulu and Kitgum in Uganda into Sudan. I have seen the havoc and brutality in Uganda that the Sudan government-sponsored Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) has wreaked on the population on the east bank of the Nile; witnessed similar government-sponsored terror on the west bank of the Nile, carried out by the West Nile Bank Front (WNBF), which had its headquarters inside Sudan in Morobo. The WNBF was overrun by the SPLA in March 1997, with the capture of more than 1,000 WNBF rebels, along with Sudan government troops.

I have first-hand experience with these groups because our medical team treated them and cared for them; I frequently visited them when they were prisoners of war to ensure they were properly cared for. The SPLM/A has subsequently released more than 2,000 prisoners of war back to various locations inside Uganda and Sudan.

I witnessed the release of 400 of these in May in Yei town. These prisoners, both senior Sudan government officers and leaders of the Ugandan WNBF, made clear

that they were working together. In fact they were all together when captured by the SPLA.

On the east bank of the Nile, the Lord's Resistance Army has their main bases close to Juba and Torit inside Sudan. They launch their attacks into Uganda from these bases. The LRA have been attacking our Lubone and Mugali centers where the Sudanese displaced civilians are, and where the LRA enter Uganda from Sudan. The SPLA frequently engage the LRA in Sudan. Establishing peace in south Sudan is an absolute prerequisite for peace inside Uganda. They have become one and the same war.

#### The SPLA/M Movement

I have seen the worst and the best of the SPLM. During the Cold War it aligned itself with the Mengistu regime in Ethiopia. Its rhetoric then was one of militarism and Marxism, with little political development.

Since 1991, the SPLA/M has gone through a radical transformation and renaissance. It has developed its political structures and opened up to its critics. Since 1994, in particular with the convening of a civil society conference and the opening up of political debate, it is emerging as a responsible administration. Many of its top leaders today were its critics and adversaries in 1991. There is still a long way to go, but the process to establish good governance is underway. The SPLM has become a people's movement with overwhelming support in the south for it today.

Sudan, and the south in particular, has suffered from the worst underdevelopment in Africa. Because the SPLM is the poorest liberation movement in the world, the government of Sudan is able to lure people away from it with pay offs. This in part explains why the SPLM/A has had and likely will continue to have such internal problems. That southerners have resisted and fought for so long and have re-emerged since 1994, when they seemed finished, should testify to the genuineness of their cause.

Mr. Chairman, my concern is not as much with the war as with the future scenario in the south, given the serious lack of political development or experience in governance there. It is a very welcome development that USAID has recently made a grant, the first of its kind, to respond to the challenge of developing good governance practices. Each year, probably up to \$200 million is spent on relief supplies. Yet at the end of each year, there is absolutely nothing to be seen on the ground. To date, not a single dollar has been given to develop local civil governance structures or to improve the internal human rights capacity. Yet many observers are ready to blame when leaders in the south make mistakes. They stand in judgment without understanding the nature of the society and the lack of resources required to change it.

The SPLM is trying to set up an administration, collect taxes, restore schools, create a judicial system, train a police force, and generally establish the function of a nation state in the areas it controls. Though their ideas are good, lack of resources financial and human make progress slow. The SPLM is making efforts to exploit its own

resources, particularly of gold and timber, to gain some revenue in order to support the civil administration.

#### Current Political and Military Situation

Peace talks between the warring factions have been used to buy time and to confuse foreign opinion. President Beshir and the National Islamic Front leader Dr Hasan al Turabi are creating confusion and prolonging the war rather than working toward a speedy and peaceful end to the long standing conflict

Unlike the previous peace accord of 1972, which led to the Addis Ababa agreement of 1972, the so-called Inter Peace accord, or Peace Within, has no popular backing and no legitimacy either at home or among the exiled Sudanese leaders. To date no comprehensive round table conference has been held in which both northern and southern political opinions could be expressed in this "internal" peace initiative. The Peace Within, signed by principally Dr. Riek Machar and Mr. Kerubino Kuanyin Bol, was designed to mislead international opinion, further divide the south, intensify the war and develop the "warlords" fiefdoms within the south, similar to those existing in Somalia today.

The Sudan government's objective in recruiting defectors from the SPLM/A was clearly to mobilize an army of southerners to fight southerners. These defectors were then urged to recruit from among their tribesmen, who in turn were heavily armed by the NIF.

Consequently, the single major cause of famine in Upper Nile and Bahr El Gazal has been the war for the past three to four years, in which Dr. Machar and Mr. Kerubino spearheaded the conflict on behalf of the NIF in their home provinces. The northern supported Arab militia (Murahadeen) systematically destroyed homes, looted cattle, raped women, forcibly conscripted young boys, looted all properties and abducted thousands of Dinka as slaves. A trail of terror and destruction was waged against civilians, particularly in northern Bahr El Gazal area. Many fled to survive without their cattle, with no possibility to cultivate this rich and fertile land.

Periodic drought and sometimes late and heavy rains occur in these areas, and a three-month hunger gap is not unusual. However, the population has had coping mechanisms on which to fall back, such as access to wild fruits, trading their cattle for cereals, while they await the next harvest.

I found one woman in a field sifting grass for wild seeds, she had lost 40 cattle, and her two teenager children had been abducted. When I asked her what she would do, she replied she was simply waiting to die.

I have been working in these areas during the past months while these armed militia, wearing government of Sudan uniforms, come south, killing people, looting cattle, and abducting women and children. We aid workers have had to flee, and the

Janger currently does not allow us to reside in the center of Twic county (Turalei) It is not the ceasefire that will protect the people - no one including myself has any trust in that It is the rains that protect the people because the horses and armored cars are now unable to move

In previous ceasefires we were being heavily bombed, such as in 1994, when the government of Sudan forces tried to capture Nimule on the Ugandan border Ceasefires in Sudan provide the government of Sudan a breathing space, buying them time to forcibly recruit young men, university students, etc and to prepare their logistics until the next phase of the war.

In the past, the government of the Sudan has agreed to ceasefires only when its back was to the wall Never have they had their back to the wall as they do now

Currently the SPLM/A control more than 80% of southern Sudan The government of Sudan is limited to a few garrison towns, which are under heavy siege right now. The significant change in this war is that it has shifted from being an internal conflict to a regional one.

Dr. John Garang believes that this shift is the only lasting solution to the problems of Sudan, and so do the leaders of the political parties that represent the vast majority of northern Sudanese The very important Declaration of Asmara is proof of this

On June 6, 1995, the political leaders of the political parties that represented more than 70% of the northern Sudanese in the last free election in Sudan all signed the Declaration of Asmara along with the SPLM

This important historical document commits the leaders of the majority political movements and parties in both the south and the north to a common political agenda based on the right of the south to choose unity or independence and a democratic, secular constitution that guarantees equal rights for each citizen of Sudan and envisions a decentralized form of government for the Sudan. This is the common political vision solemnly declared in a written declaration that unites all the members of the opposition National Democratic Alliance - the NDA - an opposition organization that contains the leaders of the majority in both the south and the north. This unity cannot be too heavily emphasized.

When analyzing the Sudan, too many people forget the fundamentalist government of Sudan represents only a tiny minority of northern Sudanese. Before the fundamentalists illegally seized power in a military coup, they were never received more than about 15% in national elections. The only way this unpopular, illegitimate minority government can stay in power is to terrorize its own population with "Ghost Houses" where Iranian-trained Sudanese secret police interrogate, torture, and kill political opponents

Yet many people are urging Dr. John Garang to seriously negotiate a long-term solution to the problems of Sudan with this NIF government, which represents only a small minority of northerners and must use terror to stay in power. These observers believe that somehow an agreement with such a government will solve the problem of famine and war in the Sudan. I submit to you that this is fantasy thinking.

The real solution to the problem of Sudan is contained in the heart of the NDA's Declaration of Asmara. That solution is a democratic secular constitution, which guarantees the equal rights of each Sudanese citizen – regardless of religion or race or place of birth – and which envisions a decentralized form of government acceptable to the people of southern Sudan. This vision has been signed and endorsed by the leaders of the majority parties and political movements in both the South and the North. Being the vision of the representatives of the majority, it is the only possible lasting solution to the problem of war and famine in Sudan. I urge those who desire a genuine lasting solution to support the political vision of the SPLM and the NDA as contained in the Declaration of Asmara. This is the real answer.

## REUTERS REPORT

REUTERS

25 MARCH 1998

15 15 25 Mar South Sudan province faces hunger crisis -agencies

By Matthew Bagg

NAIROBI, March 25 (Reuters) - Hundreds of thousands of people in a vast province in southern Sudan face a major food shortage after they were displaced from their homes by civil war, aid agencies said on Wednesday.

But aid workers disagree on the gravity of the situation in the Bahr el-Ghazal region of southwest Sudan. Around 350,000 people face the early stages of famine and children in Pakor, Thiet Thou and other feeding centres are already starving, according to United Nations and non-governmental agencies.

"It is a very difficult situation and a lot of people are affected, but to talk about famine and starvation death is a little premature," Gillian Wilcox, spokeswoman for the U.N.'s Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), told Reuters.

OLS groups United Nations and other aid agencies.

"The feeling is that we have imminent problems, though I don't know whether we are going to go over the edge," U.N. World Food Programme spokeswoman Brenda Barton told Reuters, adding that it was a "pre-famine situation".

Hunger was compounded by a decision by the Khartoum government to limit aid agency landing rights to eight strips in Bahr el-Ghazal out of a possible 21, Barton said.

Greater access to landing strips would make it easier to fly emergency food to parts of the remote province before the arrival of rains that could start as early as April, aid workers said.

"When the rains hit, large parts of Bahr el-Ghazal will be completely unnavigable," said Philip Maher of World Vision Canada.

Sudan's civil war pits the National Islamic Front government in Khartoum against rebels from the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA).

The rebels demand self-determination for south Sudan and more freedom of religious expression in a country deeply divided along religious, cultural and political lines.

Around 100,000 people fled the provincial capital Wau and the towns of Gognal and Awei in January because of fighting between the government and Kerubino Kuanyin Bol, a regional leader who switched sides to the rebel cause.

Those who fled the fighting joined around 250,000 people displaced from their homes and fields by skirmishes involving Kerubino in the years leading up to his defection in January.

Other aid workers said the situation was comparable to the early stages of other African famines in Ethiopia in 1984 and Somalia in 1992.

→ "The situation is really desperate. It is the worst scene ever in Bahr el-Ghazal and it is compounded by government bombing of civilians," said Dan Eiffe, a senior aid worker at Norwegian People's Aid, which is outside the OLS umbrella.

Government planes bombed civilians who fled the fighting in January and on March 5 bombed a hospital in Yei, Western Equatoria province, killing seven people.

At Pakor, a feeding centre about 50 km (32 miles) north of Gognal, 15 out of 60 children were skeletal after walking for days to receive food, World Vision said.

"From all the indications and all the conversations we have had, we think that there are people like this in other villages," said Maher.

Some adults were similarly thin, a sign that starvation was beginning to bite, he said.

The modern phase of Sudan's civil war began in 1983 with the birth of the SPLA under John Garang and since then an estimated 1.3 million people have died in war and famine. South Sudan suffered widespread famine in 1992 and 1993.

((Nairobi newsroom, +254 2 330261/2 fax +254 2 338860, nairobi.newsroom@reuters.com))

For related news, double click on one of the following codes:

AFN] [G] [MD] [C] [GRO] [MTL] [SOF] [SD] [KE] [POL] [DIP] [VIO] [LDC] [EMRG] [AFE] [NEWS] [FOD] [GRA] [DIS] [LEN]

Wednesday, 25 March 1998 15:15:38

:NDS [nFLLW3P244]



**Testimony Information**

**Name:** Mary Rose Atuu  
Department of Chemistry  
Villanova University  
Villanova, Pennsylvania 19085

**Title & Organization:**  
Sister (Nun) of the Catholic Religious Congregation Called Little  
Sisters of Mary Immaculate of Gulu, Located in Gulu, Northern  
Uganda, Africa

**Date of the Hearing for Testifying:**  
Wednesday, July 29, 1998

**Congressional Committee:**  
House Committee on International Relations

**Congressional Subcommittee:**  
Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights

Ladies and Gentlemen:

Please allow me to express my most sincere sympathy for the events that took place last Friday, and the tragic losses that you and the Capital community have suffered. My prayers are with the two brave police officers who were slain and their families.

I am very grateful for your kind invitation. My purpose for being here is of utmost importance and I thank God, and you, for this opportunity. I am here to testify before this Subcommittee.

My name is Sister Mary Rose Atuu and I am a member of the community of nuns of the Little Sisters of Mary Immaculate. What follows is a brief summary of a terrible situation that has existed for over twelve years in my homeland.

### **The Children are Killing and Dying: The Unspeakable Situation in Northern Uganda**

During the military rule of Idi Amin Dada in the 1970s, many Americans were familiar with the east African country of Uganda. Since his ouster in 1979, little has been reported about my country. Since this time there has been numerous ruling parties and governments in Uganda. The current leader, President Yoweri Museveni, took over the Ugandan government militarily in 1986. Around this time an armed conflict in Northern Uganda began as a politically motivated rebellion against the government's army. Although some rebel factions were eventually defeated, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) was not, and this group has kept wreaking havoc, particularly in the Gulu and Kitgum districts. Since January 1986, thousands of children and civilians have been abducted and enslaved in northern Uganda by the LRA, which blindly follow the orders given by their leader, Joseph Kony. The government has been unable to stop the LRA due to corruption and an unwillingness to explore alternative solutions to fighting. I am here today to bear witness to these atrocities and ask that the United States takes a more active role in bringing peace to Northern Uganda.

At first Kony tried to abduct adults, but he soon found that children are more easily brainwashed to believe that killing and dying for the rebel cause is honorable. During the first two weeks after abduction, children are given guns and are forced to kill anyone who disagrees with these ideas -- including their parents, siblings, neighbors and friends. Furthermore, these children are used as combat shields on the front lines in fighting between the rebels and the government soldiers.

If any of the children try to escape and are caught, the rebels make examples of them to discourage and prevent further escape attempts. These examples include the mutilation of ears, noses, arms, legs and even lips, or brutal killings while their peers are forced to watch. Worse still, the rebels even force the onlookers to participate in killing those who have tried to escape. Girls are sexually abused and enslaved by their abductors and are forced into servitude. Refusal to cooperate results in brutal beatings, torture, and death.

The children that are not abducted are barely better off. Because of the war, the upbringing and education of the children is extremely difficult because of poverty and the lack of structured families. Numerous schools have been destroyed by the rebels. Many children are afraid to go to the few remaining schools due to fear of being abducted.

Hundreds of thousands of people are displaced from their homes and forced to live in camps or protected villages. There is abject poverty, famine, hunger, and malnourishment. The displacements have led to overcrowding, resulting in serious health consequences, with the AIDS epidemic and other diseases spreading at an alarming rate. Rape and other forms of sexual violence and torture have led to various physical complications, emotional stress, psychological disorders, and the breakdown of families. What is particularly distressing is that the LRA has destroyed the innocent minds and the conscience of the next generation of Northern Uganda.

I want to tell you my personal witness of the abduction of 44 girls at Sacred Heart Senior Secondary School in Gulu, where I was a teacher. In the early morning of July 19, 1992, a group of rebels broke into the girls dormitory. I was in the convent next to the dormitory. We soon heard chopping sounds at our door with the rebels screaming, "OPEN!, OPEN!" They broke through the first door and tried to chop down the second door, but because we had an iron bolt, they were not successful.

At dawn, we went out to see if the rebels had gone. To our disappointment and sorrow, we found out that 44 of our girls were abducted and that the others had run away. Immediately we reported this to the military who were less than a mile away. When we found the six policemen, who were hired to guard our school at night, they said that they had not heard anything. None of these men who were supposed to protect us were ever reprimanded. In the following months, groups of our girls escaped from the rebels and returned to us badly beaten with sore feet. They were all admitted into the hospital for treatment. They described to us their experiences and explained how two of our girls were killed.

Jane had been killed for planning to escape. She was a transfer student from Kitgum High School, and had been abducted by the rebels once before. The rebels knew ahead of time that Jane was going to try to escape, so they summoned hundreds of the children into an open area. They put Jane in the middle and said, "We want you to know that if you try to escape we will do this."

Jane knelt down and pleaded for a long time for her life. She said, "I want you to forgive me. I will try to do all that you want me to do if you can only spare my life." Then, in front of all of the children, they pierced her body sixteen times with a bayonet. The rebels left her lifeless body there on display as a reminder to the remaining children of the punishment for trying to escape.

A few days later, we heard that one of our girls was killed. Immediately we summoned the military, but they said that we could not go because security was tight. Some of us searched for her anyway. One month later, we found the body of Jane wearing our uniform: a pink skirt. We collected her remains and took the body home to her parents.

The LRA remains mobile by forcing the children to carry supplies they have looted. Alice, our second girl who was killed, was given to a man who beat her every day because she could not endure the long walks carrying so many supplies. Two months later, when Alice could no longer walk, he shot her.

We know of Jane and Alice today only because we were very persistent. There are many other children that have been abducted, and nobody knows whether they are still alive or dead. And, tragically, many more children will be abducted in the future unless an end to this unspeakable situation is found. I am here as a voice of the innocent children who have died, of those who are still suffering, and of all future victims.

The people of Northern Uganda are torn between the rebels who burn their houses, abduct, mutilate, and kill them, and the government which does not protect them. Nearly half a million displaced people are forced to live in supposedly "protected villages" in crowded, inhumane conditions. The villages are actually frequent targets for rebel attacks and abductions because they are built around military barracks as shields.

Although the United States is already supporting Uganda economically, it has not yet effectively addressed these violations of human rights. U.S. donations are indirectly funding a corrupt military which cares more about its reputation and less about protecting innocent civilians and children.

The problems of the southern Sudan and the Northern Uganda must each be given individual attention separately. Therefore, I kindly request that the United States, at this crucial moment for Northern Uganda, appoint a special envoy specifically to look seriously into the situation of the Northern Uganda with the following goals:

- to stop Joseph Kony from abducting and attacking children and civilians
- find ways to protect the people from abduction and attack from the rebels
- to advise the Ugandan government to explore alternative solutions to end this war
- provide funding for shelter, clothing, etc., for those people that are suffering, particular those that live in the so-called protected villages
- funding to assist the education and rehabilitation of many children is greatly needed

Any monetary aid provided for the people of Northern Uganda must be strictly specified and monitored. It is very important that it goes to protect the people and for rehabilitation of Northern Uganda. The Ugandan government has spent too much money and lost of many lives on the war with Kony over the last twelve years without any success

I beg you to help stop this war being waged against innocent children and civilians in Northern Uganda. We ask that pressure be put on the government of Uganda and on the rebels so that this senseless war can be stopped through a peaceful settlement.

In closing, I thank you in advance for helping me get this message known in the United States, and I pray that God will bless us both for doing His work on earth.

God Bless You

**References**

- de Hoyos, Linda. "End Museveni's Silent War in Northern Uganda". *EIR International*. May 29, 1998.
- Human Rights Watch. "The Scars of Death: Children Abducted by the Lord's Resistance Army in Uganda." Human Rights Watch Children's Project. September 1997.
- Raftery, Kay. "A Plea for Children in the Heart of Uganda." *Philadelphia Inquirer*. March 26, 1998.
- Rubin, Peter. "Our Children are Killing Us." *The New Yorker*. March 23, 1998.
- Slevin, Peter. "Albright Reveals Africa Hidden Victims" *Philadelphia Inquirer* December 11, 1997.
- "Thou Shalt Kill" 60 Minutes. Broadcast on CBS on March 26, 1998. Episode item # SM80322A.



Testimony of  
**ROGER WINTER**  
Director

**U.S. COMMITTEE FOR REFUGEES**

on

**"CRISES IN SUDAN AND NORTHERN UGANDA"**

submitted to the

**HOUSE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

**SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS**

and the

**SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA**

**JULY 29, 1998**

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1998 O-485-000

## Introduction

I am Roger Winter, director of the U.S. Committee for Refugees. Thank you for conducting this hearing on "Crises in Sudan and Northern Uganda." We ask that this written testimony be included in the official record of today's hearing.

The U.S. Committee for Refugees is a nonprofit, nongovernmental organization that regularly monitors and assesses the plight of refugees and displaced people around the world. We have defended the rights of refugees, displaced, and war-affected people for 40 years. To do that seriously, we regularly go on site in the midst of war and conflict situations to document conditions, analyze the political environment, and offer informed policy recommendations.

## USCR Involvement in Sudan Issues

As director of the U.S. Committee for Refugees (USCR), I have been a close observer and often an eyewitness of events in Sudan for 17 years. I first traveled to Sudan in 1981 and have conducted multiple visits to Sudan annually on behalf of USCR since 1988.

As a participant in nine previous Congressional hearings on Sudan, dating back to 1989, USCR has consistently documented the massive human toll imposed by civil war, human rights atrocities, harsh Sudanese government policies, blockages of humanitarian relief efforts, huge population displacements, and man-made famines. A review of previous Congressional hearings offers a sobering and revealing list of hearing titles: "Terrorism and Sudan" in May 1997; "War and Famine, Peace and Relief" in May 1991; "War and Famine in the Sudan" in May 1991; "War and Famine in Sudan" in November 1990; "War and Famine in Sudan" in October 1990; and "War and Famine in Sudan" in early 1990.

In addition to Congressional testimony, USCR has published reports on the Sudan conflict. A USCR report, *Sudan 1990-1992: Food Aid, Famine, and Failure*, published in May 1993, traced the Sudan government's political manipulation of relief programs. USCR's report, *A Working Document: Quantifying Genocide in the Southern Sudan 1983-1993*, published in late 1990, was a groundbreaking study of the death toll in southern Sudan. It concluded that at least 1.3 million people had died due to war-related causes. The death toll has risen dramatically in the four years since the report was published.

USCR staff have conducted three site visits to Sudan in the past three months. USCR has hosted a series of briefings on the current Sudan crisis and has published several policy recommendations and analyses in recent weeks. Copies can be obtained through our office here in Washington.

USCR also has extensive experience in Uganda, which is another focus of today's hearing. USCR's most recent site visit to northern Uganda occurred last year. I have traveled to Uganda regularly since the early 1990s. We plan to undertake our next visit to northern Uganda later this year.



## Scope of Testimony

This testimony consists of five main sections:

- Famine and Displacement in Sudan
- Humanitarian Response Recommendations
- Political and Military Situation in Sudan
- Political Policy Recommendations
- Northern Uganda

## Famine and Displacement

The current famine in Sudan has belatedly captured the world's attention and is the stimulus for today's hearing. A major famine in southern Sudan in 1989 claimed a quarter-million lives, many of whom could have been saved. The immediate question is whether the international community will respond quickly and effectively to this newest famine, unlike nine years ago.

Based on USCR's own site visits to the famine zone, we are convinced that, at a minimum, thousands of severely malnourished southern Sudanese have already perished or soon will. It is too late to save their weakened bodies. But it is not too late to save hundreds of thousands of other malnourished southern Sudanese whose physical condition would improve rapidly if adequate food is delivered to them.

### People At Risk

Some 2.6 million people throughout Sudan are at risk of serious food shortages and famine, according to United Nations estimates. This total includes 1.2 million persons in rebel-held areas of southern Sudan; 1.2 million persons in government-controlled areas of southern and central Sudan; and 200,000 people in northern Sudan. The heart of the famine is in southern Sudan's most heavily populated area, Bahr el-Ghazal province, where an estimated 700,000 people are affected by famine.

Estimates of the number of people at risk might increase in coming weeks as relief workers complete additional assessments. Southern Sudan's annual "hunger season" traditionally peaks in August when even more rural families tend to exhaust their remaining food stocks while awaiting the annual September-October crop harvests. Recent reports indicate that thousands of displaced people, in a last desperate search for food, are returning to government-controlled towns in the worst famine area. Despite recently declared cease-fires in the worst famine area, persistent attacks by government-supported militia and bandits might continue to burn crops, push people from their farms, and steal cattle—consequences that potentially would make even more families dependent on international food relief for survival.

### Intensity of Risk

Although 2.6 million Sudanese are at risk of serious food shortages and famine, it is inaccurate to assume that all 2.6 million people are on the brink of death.

Of the 1.2 million people at-risk in rebel-held areas of southern Sudan, about 180,000 of them—about 15 percent—have virtually no access to food and are totally dependent on food relief, according to estimates by the UN World Food Program (WFP).

Another 680,000 people—55 percent of the at-risk population in rebel-held areas—have access to at least minimal amounts of local food and therefore require moderate rations of food relief. The remaining 360,000 people at risk require relatively small amounts of food relief to maintain their health for the next two months, until the crop harvest of September-October allows them to regain a degree of self-sufficiency.

Massive amounts of food aid are needed, to be sure. But the estimates above indicate that large numbers of affected people can survive the current emergency and can eventually feed themselves if the international community rapidly comes to their aid during this current food shortfall.

#### **Duration of Famine**

Famines do not materialize instantaneously, nor do they disappear overnight. Although the current phase of the famine might temporarily ease in October after the harvest, food shortages will continue for at least 14 months, through October 1999. Late rains and widespread population displacement ensure that the October 1998 harvest will be poor, leaving many families in jeopardy and dependent on food relief for another year, until the harvest in October 1999.

As result of these factors, Sudan requires an extraordinary aid effort now to save lives, as well as a sustained aid effort until late 1999. It is virtually certain that "phase two" of this famine will hit southern Sudanese extremely hard next year during March to October, necessitating another round of massive food deliveries. It is important that members of Congress and other policy makers understand this fact now, in advance, and plan accordingly.

#### **Death Toll**

The famine death toll is unknown. Relief workers have been unable to conduct comprehensive surveys so far, due to the remote locations, impassable roads due to rains, and ongoing security concerns.

Based on mortality rates at emergency feeding centers and word-of-mouth reports, aid workers on the ground believe the death toll is already in the thousands and could grow into the tens of thousands in coming weeks, depending on relief efforts, violence, and other factors.

USCR's site visits to the famine zone indicates that a surprising number of famine victims are adults. During two days in one small town in Bahr el-Ghazal, the village of Thior, residents and aid workers reported to USCR that at least 14 people died of causes related to malnutrition—including eight adult deaths. At the epicenter of the famine zone, in the Bahr el-Ghazal province town of Ajiop, aid workers last week reported that 20 children are dying weekly in the local feeding clinic, and an average of six adults are perishing each day. In the government-held town of Wau, aid workers report that up to 50 people per day are dying of malnutrition or related diseases.

Despite the lack of scientific mortality studies, it is clear to aid workers and journalists in southern Sudan that this famine is claiming large numbers of lives. Unfortunately, there is no reason to believe the death toll has peaked.

### **Malnutrition Rates**

Malnutrition rates vary considerably according to location in southern Sudan. A recent survey at 12 locations in the famine zone found that 50 percent of the children are malnourished, according to UNICEF. As many as six of every ten children are malnourished at some places, UNICEF reports. Bad roads, dispersed populations, and security problems continue to hamper health workers' efforts to conduct broader nutritional studies.

### **Feeding Centers**

Relief agencies operate about 20 special emergency feeding centers in southern Sudan as a last-ditch effort to feed the worst malnourished children and adults. Nearly half of the feeding clinics have opened only in the past two months. Aid agencies hope to establish another 15 to 20 feeding centers if funding and security permit.

Feeding centers provide five daily servings of fortified milk, cooked enriched grain paste, and high-energy crackers to patients who typically weigh less than 70 percent of normal body weight. Most existing feeding centers have become immediately overcrowded to two or three times beyond capacity. Some feeding clinics are forced to turn away severely malnourished children and adults due to lack of space. As a result, USCR's recent site visits documented numerous cases of people who literally died at the front gate of feeding centers while waiting to gain entrance.

Although more feeding centers are needed and should be established, they do tend to cause unfortunate side effects. The clinics tend to create greater population displacement by drawing hungry families from surrounding areas. Parents who spend weeks at a feeding center hoping to save a child are often unable to tend their farms, which leads to reduced harvests and renewed food shortages months later. This troubling pattern is evident in southern Sudan. Despite these disadvantages, additional feeding centers are clearly necessary.

### **Food Aid Required—Short-Term**

In the short-term through October 1998, Sudanese nationwide need 15,000 tons of food aid per month, according to WFP and the UN Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS). The 1.2 million people at-risk in rebel-held areas of the south—where locations are most remote and deliveries are most difficult—require 10,000 tons of food per month through October.

This is a massive amount of food relief. To put it in perspective, the OLS program operating primarily from Kenya must deliver more food during July to October—40,000 tons—than it delivered during three previous calendar years combined—32,000 tons.

Currently the United States and Great Britain are providing most of the donated food. WFP figures indicate, however, that the food pipeline is sufficient to meet demands only through August or early September. Additional food donations are required to address the current peak of the famine.

### **Food Aid Required—Long-Term**

Although the current phase of famine will subside slightly after October, serious food shortages will persist until October 1999, food experts say. In fact, "phase two" of the famine will probably strike with a vengeance in early 1999.

The reasons were evident during our recent site visits to southern Sudan. USCR

talked with many malnourished farmers who were unable to farm this year for a variety of reasons: some have been forced to flee from their farms; others ate their seed reserves to survive and therefore have virtually no remaining seeds to plant; some emaciated adults said they are simply too weak to engage in their agricultural chores.

Sudanese require some 54,000 tons of relief food through the end of 1998; an estimated 74,000 tons are needed during the 10-month period from July 1998 to April 1999. Tens of thousands of additional tons will be needed after next April, when the famine will predictably peak again.

#### **Food Aid Delivered**

Relief programs delivered some 33,000 tons of food into southern Sudan during the first six months of 1998—an average of about 5,500 tons per month. Delivery totals for July are not yet available, but are expected to surpass 7,000 tons for the month.

OLS and its partner relief agencies have delivered about 85 percent of the total food tonnage. Non-OLS agencies, led by Norwegian People's Aid, delivered about 15 percent of the food reaching the south.

The emphasis on total food tonnage is important but should not be allowed to obscure problems in the delivery system. Aid workers complain that some donated grains—flown into Sudan at tremendous expense—are poor quality and at times are so spoiled as to be virtually inedible even by starving beneficiaries. Aid workers on the ground expressed concern to USCR that many food distributions are occurring without proper registration of beneficiaries and other normal controls.

#### **Mode of Food Delivery**

About 90 percent of relief food is currently delivered by plane due to impassable roads, remote locations, and security concerns. WFP characterizes its Sudan operation as the largest airdrop in the agency's history.

Planes deliver food using two methods. Relatively smaller planes with capacities of eight tons or less typically land on dirt airstrips to off-load food. As the current rainy season intensifies, however, fewer dirt airstrips are suitable for landing. This will increase reliance on airdrops, in which planes with capacities of up to 32 tons drop food from 700-foot altitudes, or lower.

OLS delivers food to 89 locations throughout Sudan, including 37 locations in Bahr el-Ghazal. Relief workers on the ground then gather the sacks of grain and transport the food to hundreds of local distribution sites for distribution to local residents.

#### **Airplane Capacity**

OLS currently operates eight planes, including two large 32-ton capacity Ilyushin aircraft that began deliveries last week. The eight operational OLS planes have the capacity to deliver 152 tons of food per flight rotation (one flight per aircraft, equalling eight flights, equals one rotation). The ninth OLS plane, another Ilyushin, has arrived in Nairobi and is expected to become operational this week.

More aircraft are needed. The Sudan government has given OLS approval to expand its fleet to 13 planes. The 13 planes would have a combined capacity of 232 tons of relief food per flight rotation. OLS is in the process of contracting and preparing the additional

planes and crews, but the process has been painfully slow at a time when Sudanese are dying of starvation each day.

Last week the *Washington Post* reported that the U.S. Pentagon has a surplus of well-maintained C-130 cargo planes that it is retiring ahead of schedule. A report by the U.S. General Accounting Office concluded that "some C-130 aircraft have been retired with substantial service life remaining and/or shortly after the aircraft had been modified." The *Washington Post* article, published July 23, states that "the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Air Force...determined there were 50 more [C-130s] in the inventory than needed." Congress and the Administration should consider loaning these surplus planes to the OLS airlift for several weeks or months to bolster food deliveries into southern Sudan during this critical period.

#### **Population Displacement**

A major factor contributing to the famine is the extent of population displacement in southern Sudan. More Sudanese are internally displaced from their homes than any population on earth—up to 4 million are uprooted within the country due to 15 years of civil war, human rights abuses by combatants, government policies of ethnic cleansing, and the current famine. An estimated 350,000 Sudanese are refugees in neighboring countries.

New population displacements continue to occur. More than 50,000 people reportedly have fled their homes in the past two months to escape government-supported militia and other factional violence among combatants. Uncounted thousands or tens of thousands are on the move in search of food. In recent days, thousands of southerners who fled in terror several months ago from government-controlled towns are now returning to those towns. Their desperation for food has driven them back into the hands of the same government officials and soldiers who have killed and persecuted them.

This is a sad phenomenon that has occurred previously in southern Sudan: government officials use food—and the imposed lack of food—to uproot populations and entrap them in locations convenient to the government's political and military strategies. As the peace talks on Sudan—sponsored by neighboring states under the umbrella of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)—inevitably begin to focus in the near future on issues related to the boundaries of southern Sudan and a political solution to Sudan's trauma, including a southern referendum on possible independence, forced population displacement and ethnic cleansing will continue to be a weapon of choice, particularly by officials of Sudan's extremist government.

#### **Recommendations for Humanitarian Response**

There is much to criticize about the initial slow response of the U.S. government to the emerging humanitarian disaster in Sudan. Once U.S. officials became focused, however, the response of the U.S. government to Sudan's famine has been superior to all other nations. Only Great Britain has rivalled the size of the U.S. government's food donations. A stronger response is needed, however, as the desperate needs on the ground continue to outstrip the capacity of existing relief efforts. The U.S. should continue to play a leading role.

**1 • Commit to a sustained relief program.**

Massive and immediate relief efforts are needed to curtail famine and save tens of thousands of lives in southern Sudan. Even if these aid efforts are successful, however, a poor harvest later this year is almost certain and virtually guarantees that severe food shortages will continue until September or October 1999. Therefore Congress and the Administration must be prepared to support emergency relief programs on a *sustained* basis, until late 1999.

**2 • Immediately increase the relief capacity and political strength of OLS.**

Operation Lifeline Sudan was a unique, ground-breaking effort when inaugurated in early 1989. The political and operational environment for OLS changed, however, when the current Sudan government came to power. The Sudan government persistently manipulates OLS for military and political purposes.

Despite its imperfections, however, OLS should receive full financial and diplomatic support from donors. It provides the coordination and logistical expertise needed to respond to this famine. OLS requires more than funding, food, and planes, however. It also requires aggressive diplomatic intervention by the United States and other donor nations when Sudan officials impose restrictions on OLS operations. Now is the time to pursue institutional change within OLS to avert such abuses in the future.

Congress should urge the Administration to consult now with other major donor governments to revise the OLS mandate to ensure that OLS can operate with the humanitarian neutrality and objectivity originally envisaged.

**3 • Provide surplus U.S. military cargo planes to the emergency OLS airlift effort.**

As discussed earlier in this written testimony, the Pentagon reportedly has up to 50 surplus C-130 cargo planes. Pentagon officials are retiring the planes early because the planes are not needed, according to a July 23 newspaper account citing the General Accounting Office. Congress should examine this matter and press Administration officials to use these planes to deliver life-saving food to southern Sudan.

**4 • Strengthen non-OLS agencies.**

Several relief agencies regularly deliver food and development assistance to southern Sudan by operating outside the framework of OLS. These agencies essentially operate in defiance of Sudan government restrictions. These non-OLS relief efforts should be strengthened because they serve as a cushion against potential new obstructions on OLS by the Sudan government.

USAID currently provides funding to some non-OLS agencies, such as Norwegian People's Aid. USAID should strengthen this support. Evidence that the United States and other international donors are increasing support for non-OLS relief programs might serve to bolster OLS by making all aid efforts more immune to obstructions by the Sudan government.

**5 • Fund more emergency feeding centers.**

Additional emergency feeding centers are required to aid the most severely malnourished. The approximately 20 feeding centers that currently operate are inadequate and overcrowded. Donors and relief agencies should attempt to double the number of feeding centers.

**6 • Provide funding for more WFP and NGO food monitors.**

WFP has doubled its staff of food assessment specialists and food distribution monitors to 44 in southern Sudan. More are needed, however, to conduct ongoing assessments of food needs and distribution programs on the ground.

Additional food monitors can help identify problems of food diversions and gaps in the distribution system, and can help correct those problems.

**7 • Plan now to supply seeds for farming in time for next year.**

International donors should make commitments now, not later, to deliver crop seeds for distribution to Sudanese farmers in early 1999. Timely seed distributions will give Sudanese an opportunity to escape the famine by regaining food self-sufficiency. One thousand tons of seeds for planting equals 60,000 tons of food.

Seeds sent to Sudan should be suitable to the local climate and soil conditions. This reportedly has been a problem with some previous seed donations.

**8 • Fund a reliable truck fleet for OLS and non-OLS agencies.**

Congress and the Administration should respond positively to the recent appeal for funds by the WFP to establish its own trucking fleet for food deliveries. Establishment of a WFP fleet would reduce trucking expenses, increase the size and reliability of deliveries, and would enable OLS to continue aid deliveries despite flight bans routinely imposed by the Sudan government.

Improving the truck fleets of non-OLS agencies would have similar benefits, and would enable relief operations to evade future restrictions by Sudan officials.

**9 • Fund road improvements in southern Sudan and in border areas of Kenya and Uganda. Provide U.S. military engineers and equipment for road improvements.**

Less than 20 miles of paved roads exist in southern Sudan, an area nearly the size of Texas. Poor roads hamper truck deliveries of food, particularly during the current rainy season when roads deteriorate into impassable mud.

Main highways linking southeastern Sudan with Kenya, southern Sudan with Uganda, and southern Sudan's border areas with Bahr el-Ghazal should receive priority attention. Funding to improve key highways in Kenya and northern Uganda is also desirable to facilitate food shipments to staging areas. Improvements such as bridge repair, drainage ditches, and better grading and elevating are critical to ensure an effective humanitarian response in the future.

Improvements in major roads would diminish reliance on expensive airdrops and would enable relief agencies to continue aid deliveries even during flight bans regularly imposed by the Sudan government. Deliveries by road would reduce expenses while increasing delivery size. Road improvements would also enable local traders to transfer food from crop surplus areas (such as Western Equatoria) to food deficit areas, eventually lessening dependence on relief food.

**10 • Enhance local food production in surplus areas.**

Southern Sudan has the potential to feed itself and surrounding countries. Congress and the Administration should plan now to enhance southern Sudan's agricultural production by increasing funding for agricultural aid programs in crop surplus areas of southern Sudan—such as Western Equatoria province—that are relatively safe from conflict. Donors should seek to duplicate relatively small agricultural surplus aid programs that currently exist in Western Equatoria.

**11 • Assist returning Sudanese refugees.**

Congress and the Administration should encourage the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to seek opportunities to enhance its reintegration program in relatively secure areas of southern Sudan, where more than 50,000 Sudanese refugees have repatriated without assistance in the past year. The Administration should give UNHCR funds to implement "quick impact projects" in safe return areas for those who have already repatriated.

**12 • Improve peer administration by southern Sudan's relief officials.**

The Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association (SRRA), the relief arm of the rebels' Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), has itself been starved of resources and is thus an inconsistent and unreliable aid delivery partner in many areas of southern Sudan. Congress and other U.S. policy makers should seek to improve SRRA's skills and capacity.

SRRA should take internal steps to improve the quality of its administrative and humanitarian work. As a first step, SRRA should promptly compile accurate registration lists of food beneficiaries.

**Political and Military Situation**

Based on my frequent site visits to Sudan and constant monitoring of the political and military situation there during the past 17 years, I believe that several fundamental findings should guide our understanding and policy making on Sudan. I would like to mention a few of these findings briefly, to lay them out as markers for decision-makers and other interested parties.

- More civilians have died unnecessarily in Sudan than all the casualties of this decade's conflicts in Bosnia, Somalia, and Congo/Zaire combined. About 1.5 million Sudanese have died of war-related causes during the past 15 years. The suffering of southern Sudanese people is, by any measurement, the most under-reported tragedy of our time.

- More than 4 million Sudanese have been uprooted from their homes. An independent, productive way of life has been stolen from them.

Sudanese government military and their militia continue to target uprooted populations for additional violence, in an apparent campaign of ethnic cleansing. The Sudan government tends to view citizens in the south as automatic enemies to be killed, forced from their homes, or starved into submission. Southern Sudanese generally have the status of fourth-class citizens in their own country.



• The National Islamic Front (NIF) government of Sudan is an unpopular minority regime pursuing an extremist ideology that is opposed by the great majority of Sudanese Muslims and non-Muslims.

Recent anti-government bombings in Khartoum are the latest sign of intense opposition to the NIF regime among northern Sudanese. More importantly, the emergence of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) in opposition to the NIF government during the past two years is a critical development that further isolates the NIF regime.

The NDA is a comprehensive alliance of NIF opponents, including northern political parties and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), the political wing of the southern rebels. It is important to understand that the NDA primarily consists of Muslim organizations and includes many of the traditional and very conservative Islamic leadership which claims the loyalties of much of Sudan's Muslim population. The strength and popularity of the NDA disproves the NIF's claim that it is the victim of an anti-Muslim attack by secularists and the West.

Some northern NDA members have militarized and have joined the SPLA in opening a military front in eastern Sudan against the NIF. The NDA military initiative has the potential to shut down Khartoum's vital pipeline and corridor to the sea. Another military front opened by NDA troops threatens a strategic dam that supplies 80 percent of Sudan's electrical power. NDA forces have had the military initiative for the past two years.

• The NIF has actively worked to destabilize neighboring countries in the region.

While waging war inside Sudan, the NIF regime has actively engaged in undermining secular governments in the Horn of Africa, particularly in Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Uganda. Several insurgencies afflicting these countries have a guiding hand stretching back to the NIF regime in Khartoum.

There is evidence that the Sudan government has assisted at least two Eritrean rebel groups, the Eritrean Islamic Jihad and the Eritrean Liberation Front. Eritrean government forces killed dozens of Sudanese-backed Jihad militants inside Eritrea in 1994. The Sudan-based Eritrean Jihad group is believed responsible for placing dozens of landmines in Eritrea and for conducting terrorist attacks there since late 1996. Eritrea has retaliated by severing diplomatic relations with Sudan and allowing Sudanese opposition groups to operate in Eritrean territory.

The NIF regime has provided support to several Ethiopian opposition groups, according to sources in the region. The government of Sudan provides financial and material support to the Islamic fundamentalist group al-Itahad and to the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Oromia. The latter group claimed responsibility for terrorist hotel bombings in Ethiopia in 1996 and is responsible for the attempted assassination of a high Ethiopian government official.

In Uganda, three rebel groups are known or believed to receive arms and other assistance from the Sudan government. The final section of this testimony includes a longer discussion of the situation in northern Uganda.

• The main rebel group, the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), has rebounded from near-defeat four years ago and has greatly improved its military position in the past couple years.

Splits within the SPLA, exploited by the Sudan government, caused the rebel movement to splinter in 1991, seriously weakening it militarily. This enabled Sudanese government forces to recapture virtually all significant towns and villages in the south, pushing SPLA troops to the Ugandan border between 1991 and 1994.

Infighting continues to plague southern Sudanese factions, but the SPLA/M has revitalized itself with a string of military victories, the creation of a fledgling civil administration in the south, and more diverse political dialogue within the movement. Government forces cling to a handful of towns and villages in the south, while the SPLA holds most southern rural areas as well as a growing number of towns.

• Combatants in Sudan's civil war are unlikely to achieve full military victory. Ultimately only a just political settlement will end the conflict. The ongoing IGAD peace process is the process most likely to produce a just political settlement.

Regional government members of IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on Development), particularly the leaders of Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, and Eritrea, launched a peace negotiation process in 1993 to seek an end to Sudan's civil war. It is important to understand that this so-called IGAD peace process is by no means an artificial peace negotiation imposed on Sudan and its neighbors by the international community. On the contrary, it is a regionally created process that includes, directly or indirectly, all important political parties in Sudan as well as governments of neighboring frontline countries. All participants in the IGAD negotiations have a direct, vital stake in the future of Sudan and its stability.

The IGAD process has moved slowly but has made progress. Participants in the IGAD negotiations have agreed on important principles that could eventually provide a formula for real peace. As part of the IGAD negotiations, the NIF and its domestic opponents have agreed in principle on the relationship of religion and government in Sudanese society, and have agreed on the right to southern self-determination to be decided by popular referendum. The referendum would allow southerners to vote for unity or separation.

Many serious details remain in dispute, including the referendum process, the territorial definition of the area subject to referendum, and enforcement of any truce agreement. These issues are on the IGAD agenda for next month.

### **Political Policy Recommendations**

1 • Appoint a special U.S. Presidential Envoy on Sudan with a well-defined mandate to maximize the effectiveness of the U.S. humanitarian response to the Sudan famine, and to energize the IGAD peace process. The position, however, should include several essential components to be useful.

In the aftermath of President Clinton's recent visit to Africa, it is time to put more of

the President's personal commitment and prestige on the line to alleviate suffering in Sudan and seek lasting peace there.

The Administration should create a Presidential Envoy position that incorporates several important ingredients essential for effectiveness. If the position fails to include these essential criteria, the position would likely fail and, worse, could become counterproductive.

Firstly, the new Special Presidential Envoy should be an individual with internationally recognized stature—someone such as former Secretary of State James Baker, or former U.S. Senator Sam Nunn, or former Senator George Mitchell, who has mediated the new peace agreement in Northern Ireland. A Special Envoy who is widely known and respected would signal to Sudanese and regional frontline states that peace in Sudan is a high U.S. priority. An individual of stature would also be better able to command the attention and resources of the State Department.

Secondly, the new Presidential Envoy should possess a strong and well-defined mandate. The mandate should include: the power to devise strategies for humanitarian relief; the specific task of helping to revise and strengthen OLS and restore its ability to withstand Sudan government manipulation; and the purpose of helping to facilitate the IGAD process to bring peace inside Sudan and greater stability to the region.

It is important to emphasize that a U.S. Presidential Envoy should not be an alternative to the IGAD process—the Special Envoy should strengthen IGAD and help rejuvenate its momentum. The IGAD peace process remains the best vehicle to end Sudan's long war. IGAD has an established framework, directly or indirectly represents all Sudanese parties, involves neighboring frontline states that have a strong stake in a Sudanese peace, and has already helped combatants in Sudan reach agreements on several fundamental principles.

Thirdly, the Presidential Envoy should receive adequate staffing and resources to do the job. As past experience suggests, an understaffed and poorly-budgeted envoy office can sidetrack rather than enhance U.S. diplomatic efforts.

**2 • Provide training and resources to help establish at least rudimentary systems of justice, health, education, and development in rebel-held areas of southern Sudan.**

Congress has pressured USAID in the past two years to fund projects in SPLM-held areas to promote growth and civil administration. Congress should maintain this pressure on USAID, because such projects are precisely the initiatives needed. The people of southern Sudan have been neglected too long. Recent military gains by the SPLA have put huge areas of southern Sudan back under the administrative control of the SPLM, which is in great need of training or resources to improve its civil administration.

An important first step is to help establish a justice system that will operate based on principles of human rights, accountability, and rule of law. Hospitals and health clinics are sorely lacking. As few as three secondary schools reportedly operate in SPLM areas of the south, and students walk hundreds of miles to seek admission. The lack of basic water systems and usable roads is striking.

More funding targeted at basic rehabilitation and development is important. These development initiatives should start in major rebel-controlled towns and rural areas that are

relatively safe from the war and are attempting to achieve some semblance of normal life.

## Northern Uganda

It is useful that the scope of today's hearing also seeks to focus attention on the emergency in northern Uganda. The situation in northern Uganda is dangerous, and threatens to undermine the otherwise impressive progress Ugandans have made to bring peace to their country in the past decade.

The NIF regime in Khartoum continues to support insurgent groups in Uganda, resulting in severe destabilization in northern and western areas of the country. The violence and vicious terrorist tactics perpetrated by the NIF-backed insurgent groups have forced an estimated 300,000 or more Ugandans to flee their homes, including at least 200,000 people displaced in northern Uganda. The United States government has appropriately declared northern Uganda a "disaster zone."

Uprooted families in northern Uganda have congregated in schools and churches in main towns, especially at night. Others hide each night in caves, bushes, and underground dugouts before returning to work their farms during daylight hours. Some rural areas of northern Uganda have reportedly become deserted. The insecurity has forced three-quarters of the schools and health clinics to shut down in the hardest-hit areas of the north. Government officials have attempted to move families into so-called protected villages—a strategy that many families have resisted. Many of the "protected villages" are overcrowded and lack adequate shelter, food, water, and social services.

The most dangerous insurgent group operating in northern Uganda calls itself the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). It is a bizarre, self-proclaimed "Christian" group that operates out of southern Sudan with arms, training, and other support supplied by the Sudan government. The LRA has terrorized innocent civilians in Uganda's northern area for several years. LRA combatants routinely cut off victims' lips, ears, and other body parts to heighten the sense of terror among the local population. The LRA has abducted thousands of children, forcing many of them into combat, forced labor, or to serve as concubines. More than 100 Sudanese refugees seeking shelter in northern Ugandan refugee camps have been killed by Ugandan insurgents, primarily believed to be the LRA. Frequent highway ambushes by LRA combatants impede relief convoys trying to deliver aid to displaced Ugandans, Sudanese refugees, and to famine-stricken populations inside Sudan.

The Sudan government has also backed the West Nile Bank Front, an armed group operating along the Uganda-Congo/Zaire border to destabilize Uganda. A third Ugandan rebel outfit, a shadowy group known as the Allied Democratic Forces, also operates from Congo/Zaire and has raided southwestern Uganda during the past year. Some analysts have alleged that this third insurgent group has received support from Sudan's NIF government.

Too often, outsiders and even members of Congress fall into the trap of assuming that instability and violence in this region of Africa are endemic, as if bloodshed is an intractable part of the natural disorder. In fact, many of the insurgencies in Uganda—and perhaps all of them—appear to have a guiding hand stretching back to the NIF regime in

Khartoum.

• • •

Mr. Chairman, and members of both Subcommittees, we at the U.S. Committee for Refugees thank you for convening this hearing. Our staff are available to provide you with regular updates and answer any questions you might have as the situations in Sudan and northern Uganda continue to unfold in the coming months. We welcome your continued interest and involvement.



LITTLE SISTERS OF MARY IMMACULATE OF GULU  
 GENERALATE OFFICE  
 P.O. BOX 928, GULU - UGANDA  
 TEL: GULU 386

16 June, 1998

MR. AND MRS. RONALD FEHER  
 1023 TENBY ROAD  
 BERWYN, PA 19312, USA.

Introduction:

The general situation in the Northern region of Uganda particularly in Gulu and Kitgum Districts (Gulu Diocese) is very bad, since 1986, the people in Gulu Diocese have known only misery.

The armed conflict in Northern Uganda started as a politically motivated rebellion against the National Resistance Army (NRM) which took over power in 1986. The insurgency however, soon took different trend of indiscriminate killings in which the civilians bore the brunt of the prolonged war (1986-1998). Although some rebel factions were eventually defeated and the Uganda Peoples Democratic Army (UPDA), concluded successful Peace Negotiations with the National Resistance Movement (NRM) Government in 1986, the Lord Resistance Army (LRA) of Joseph Kony has kept wrecking havoc in some areas of the North, particularly in Gulu and Kitgum districts with untold sufferings to the inhabitants of the areas. People are caught up between the fighting forces, suffering the looting, brutality and scorched earth policies of both sides.

Youth in and out of School have been abducted by rebels and deployed back to kill, maim, mutilate, abduct, loot and destroy homes and properties. Innocent civilians have been dehumanised, disabled, lost relatives and are traumatized. Hundreds of thousand people are displaced from their homes and live in camps or protected villages. There is abject poverty, famine and malnourishment. The displacements have led to overcrowding, resulting in serious health consequences, with AIDS pandemic and other diseases spreading at alarming rate. Rape and other forms of sexual violence or torture have led to various physical complications, emotional stress, Psychological problems and breakage in families.

Children who are most vulnerable are not spared of the brunt of the war. The effect of the conflict on them is that, very many children and youths are out of School, orphaned, dehumanised, traumatized and lack proper shelter. The upbringing and education of the children is extremely difficult because of abject poverty.

It is within this situation and with / for this people that the Little Sisters of Mary Immaculate of Gulu are working. They therefore need assistance in order to alleviate the suffering of innocent children to some extent.

### The Activities of the Sisters

The Congregation of the Little Sisters of Mary Immaculate of Gulu (LSMIG) is a religious order of women, founded by Bishop Angelo Negri and Mother Angioletta Dognani in 1942

Today the Congregation is present in ten dioceses in Uganda, Kenya and Italy. We plan also to send sisters in Southern Sudan to work with the refugees. In total we have 325 professed sisters of which 280 are perpetual consecrated to God. Wherever we are working, we minister in the areas of Education, Health, Charity work, Social activities, Spiritual and Pastoral work.

Because of great need arising from the prolonged insurgency in Northern Uganda particularly in Gulu and Kitgum districts, we have about 230 of our members ministering in the Northern region and about 60% of this are working in Gulu and Kitgum districts alone. The LSMIG carry out the following activities:

#### 1. Education

- a) Educating children and youths of various ages and levels like nursery kids, Primary School children, Secondary School students and youths in Post Secondary Institutions.  
Giving basic skills to both Primary and Secondary School drop outs due to war with particular attention to girls. We train them in areas like: -
  - tailoring,
  - management
  - Basic health care,
  - craft work
  - needle work
  - bakery and cookery
- b) giving literacy education to adults especially women. We teach them reading and writing, and basic health care.
- c) Educating the disabled children (the dumb, blind, deaf and crippled children).
- d) Training youths on charity works.
- e) Teaching the Word of God and basic Christian principles both in Schools and to people in villages.

#### 2. Health

- a) Working with the sick in hospitals, dispensaries, health clinic protected camps and in villages.
- b) Giving counselling services to Aids patients and educating people on how to relate and care for aids patients. Due to rape, sexual violations and abuse, Aids infection is rampant.
- c) Treating and counselling the Returnees (victims of abductions) and the traumatized.
- d) Giving basic health education in Schools and villages.

#### 3. Charity work

- a) Helping the poor and weak who have been deprived of all properties, orphans, and needy by giving assistance like: Food, clothes, accommodations, Blankets, cooking and eating utensils and medical services.

- b) Help to educate some orphans and poor children by providing for them School fees, Uniforms and other School requirements. We assist very limited number of children due to financial constraints from our part.
- c) We provide education and other basic needs like feeding, clothing etc. to disabled children by the help of some charity organisations
- d) We also distribute food and donate agricultural land for the people in camps and protected villages to ensure food security.

#### 4. Social Work

- a) The workers work with and animate various women groups and youths organisations. Besides teaching them moral and cultural values, we initiate mainly Agricultural, brick laying, quarry projects etc. To help them to be self reliance.
- b) We organise Seminars and workshops for different groups on issues like - Good moral and Cultural values, Peace, Reconciliation and Forgiveness etc.
- c) We visit camps and protected villages where people are displaced. We pray with them and Counsel them.  
We provide Spiritual and Psychological rehabilitation by providing guidance and Counselling to:
  - ⇒ Returnees, (Victims of abduction)
  - ⇒ Traumatized children and adults
  - ⇒ People who have been maimed and / or mutilated,
  - ⇒ Victims of rape, Sexual violations and abuses, etc.
- d) We work with the group "Acholi For Peace and Reconciliation" working for peace through non-violence means. We organise peace prayers, teach Peace, Forgiveness and Reconciliation.
- e) We are also working in various established institutions as secretaries, accountants, administrators, caterers and matrons.
- The above mentioned are some of the activities we are carrying out in the region. However, due to gross financial constraints, we are not able to do enough for the people.

### RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SENT

Regarding current or Urgent needs

#### 1.0 Population

- 1.1. The number of people in the protected camps is approximately 300,000. There are 30 camps in all, 20 camps in Gulu and 10 in Kitgum.
- 1.2. Numerous School going age children live in both protected camps and villages around towns, Convents, missions, hospital, dispensaries and learning institutions.

They generally lack all the basic requirements for good living e.g. food, proper shelter, clothing, education and health facilities.

- 1.3. A great number of children are traumatized either due to their abductions, loss of parents or other related brutality witnessed. They all need counselling services



1.4. The number of the needy adult and children the sisters are providing food, clothes and counselling services for, are relatively small due to lack of fund and required facilities. For example, in the Mother House Convent the sisters feed daily 50 adults and children. In all the other 22 convents the sisters feed on the average 10 people each.

## **2.0 FEEDING PLAN**

2.1. The sisters plan to provide at least lunch to all displaced children and orphans around who are unable to have at least a meal a day. We lack the food or fund for buying the basic foodstuff.

2.2. The most needed foodstuff are beans, maize, cooking oil, salt.

## **3.0 HEALTH FACILITIES**

3.1. There are urgent needs for health care services among the affected people. Such services can assist greatly those who can't afford to get treatments from hospitals, clinics or dispensaries because of lack of fund for hospital bills.

3.2. The availability of the required drugs would facilitate the activities of the sisters.

3.3. There is need to train more medical personnel for the health services e.g nurses, midwives, primary health educators and counsellors.

## **4.0 CLOTHING NEEDS**

4.1. We need clothes for the displaced; both adults and children roughly numbering as follows:-  
men - 2.000, women - 5.000, children between (5 - 14) - 10.000.

4.2. The type of clothes suitable for these groups are trousers, shirts, dresses, sweaters and children's wear.

## **5.0 OTHER BASIC NEEDS**

5.1. We need bedding especially blankets and sleeping mats. Beds and mattresses are too expensive to afford.

5.2. There is need for cooking, eating utensils like saucepans, plates, cups, bowls, basins and jericans for carrying water.

5.3. Cleaning facilities especially washing soap is essential.

## **6.0 GAMES AND SPORTS**

6.1. Games and sports activities would keep the children active, healthy and joyful.

6.2. We need kits for games like football, netball, volley ball, tennis, cards, scrabble and other relevant games for children.

Play ground can easily be improvised in the Convent premises

## 7.0 PURCHASE OF ITEMS

All the needed items can be purchased in Uganda to, avoid taxation on imported goods and for faster services.

## 8.0 EDUCATIONAL SERVICES

8.1 It has ever been our desire to provide educational services to, the displaced and traumatised children of primary going age, but up to now we have not realised the dream because of financial constraints.

8.2 We wish to open a simple primary School on the Convent ground to take about 1.000 (one thousand) children from primary one to primary seven.

8.3 Our target group are children who are not able to meet basic requirements like clothing and other charges in the public Schools

- a) Temporary Structures for 14 classrooms, office of two rooms, pit latrines, and temporary kitchen for preparing lunch for the children. Materials needed are:- Poles, mats (puparus), touplines, timbers of various sizes, nails and ropes.
- b) A good source of drinking water e.g. hand pump bore hole.
- c) Scholastic materials: textbooks for various subjects, exercise books, pens pencils, rubber, mathematical sets, chalks, manila cards and portable blackboards.
- d) Stationeries: Duplicating papers, ink and machine, typing papers, and a type writer, and other relevant materials for office use.
- e) Transportation: 3 motorcycles, 20 bicycles and wheelbarrows.
- f) Personnel: Since it will be private initiative the government may not provide personnel and will not cater for their remuneration. Therefore, there is need to pay salaries for 16 teachers, 4 support staff (secretary, caterer, bursar, nurse) and 10 group employees (cooks and cleaners). While we apply for secondment of teachers by the government.

## 9.0 SHELTERS FROM INSECURITY

9.1 Walling around structures like institutions of learning, Convent, hospitals etc. offer some security from abduction for only few children. Moreover it is very expensive to construct. Many more children in the villages remain defenceless and unprotected from the violence of abduction.

9.2 All possible measures towards peace negotiations could bring abduction of children and other related brutalities towards human beings and their properties to an end.

9.3. For the emergency need we require simple fence around the temporary structures for feeding and education to avoid trespassing.

**10.0 BANK ACCOUNT**

10.1. An account has been opened with the name "Little Sisters of Mary Immaculate of Gulu Funds for the Needy"

10.2. This money is always given to the desperate people who are in need of cash or kind. We suggest that any fund for the needy be directed to this account.

**LONG TERM PLAN**

1. Of the 30 protected camps in the diocese, only very few have some land for cultivation. Of recent, about 500 acres have been allocated for cultivation in the diocese for the internally displaced people.
 

Near one of the camps, the Little Sisters of Mary Immaculate owns land of 2000 (two thousand) acres, of which 110 (one hundred and ten) acres has already been allocated to the displaced for cultivation in an effort to address the longer term food requirement of the beneficiaries.

Since the displaced do not have foodstuff, they receive a ration of foodstuffs while they work to produce their own foodstuff.

To ensure food security for more displaced people, we need Farm implements in order to expand the farm activities.
2. It is safe to build a Primary School and a Social Centre where counselling, leadership training, Seminars, workshops, skill training and retreats can be organised for the youths, children and adults.
3. For cultivation of the land we need:-
  - a) Farm implements like tractors, tractor ploughs, hand hoes, panga knives, axes and power saw for felling trees.
  - b) Personnel: Skilled labourers.
  - c) Food items e.g. Cereal, pulses and vegetable oil to distribute to people as they work on the farm.
4. There is need for professionals who have to be trained e.g.
 

Child psychologists, therapists, pastoral healing teams, engineers, agriculturists, teachers, doctors, nurses and skill labourers. Volunteers workers from within and overseas are needed for technical advice.
5. Sisters very much need additional training and resources.
 

A) Training:

Sisters need to be trained in the areas of:-

  - Child psychology.
  - Guidance and Counselling.
  - Therapy.
  - Pastoral healing.
  - Engineering.
  - Medicine and nursing.
  - Etc.

**B) Resources**

Sisters need resources which can facilitate their works in the areas of -

- I. Education: Infrastructures like classroom, administration block, latrines, etc.
  - Scholastic materials,
  - stationeries,
  - transportation,
  - personnel,
  - funds,
  - sport facilities etc.
- II In the area of Health we need
  - drugs,
  - Transportation e.g. bicycles, motorcycles,
  - personnel etc.
- III Pastoral, Social and Charity works we need:
  - Infrastructure like putting up a social centre,
  - Transportation like cycles, motorcycles and vehicles,
  - Communication system e.g. Fax; E-mail; phone,
  - Hand-held radios,
  - computer etc.
  - Personnel. Funds,
  - Water source e.g. Hand pump bore hole.
- IV. In farming we need:
  - Farm implements.
  - Trained personnel.
  - Funds.
  - Transportation e.g. tractor trailers, pick-ups and lorry trucks.
  - Storage facilities e.g. Pallets, weighing scales etc.
  - Field Pest control: items like Pesticides, Protective wears, spray pumps etc

6. (A) Departments run by the LSMIG include the following:

- Schools:- Nurseries, Primary, Secondary, Tertiary and Disabled Schools.
- Health services:- dispensaries, health centres, maternity centres and drug stores.
- Agriculture:- Crop production and animal farming.
- Pastoral, Social and Charity work.

(B) Some of the physical needs of the facilities run by the sisters are indicated in 5 b; I-iv above.

Our hopes and dreams for our ministry in the region includes the following:

- a) To see an end to the armed conflict in the region through peace negotiation other than fighting.
- b) To build a Primary School which can cater for the Primary School going children between the ages of 6-14 year in order to give to them some basic education. Our target is on children who are out of School due to abject poverty.
- c) To build a Social centre comprising of:
  - I. Multipurpose hall.
  - II. Hostel
  - III. Training rooms.
  - IV. Kitchen.

V. Dinning hall.

VI. Administration office.

The plan for having the Social centre has been conceived out of the current war prevailing situation in the region. The centre will benefit the following:-


- Traumatized victims who will be offered guidance and counselling.
- Rural women and youths who will be given seminars, workshops, courses and various training
- Primary and Secondary School children who have dropped out of School as a consequence of the war. They will be trained in Basic skills and, or given seminars, workshops, courses etc.

D To ensure food security for a good number of people in the areas by improving and expanding on our farm activities.

Briefly, this is the information we can sent you at the moment.

In conclusion, we hope to hear from your group. In case you need detail information on certain areas, we shall make sure you get all the information you need.

Sincerely,



Sr. Viola Akulu

Councillor - LSMIG

c.c. Sr. Rose Mary Atuu

DONALD M. PAYNE  
10TH DISTRICT, NEW JERSEY

COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION  
AND THE WORKFORCE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EARLY CHILDHOOD  
YOUTH AND FAMILIES

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE  
RELATIONS  
HONORING MINORITY MEMBERS

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL  
RELATIONS

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL  
OPERATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS



**Congress of the United States**  
**House of Representatives**  
**Washington, DC 20515-3010**  
29 July 1998

WASHINGTON OFFICE  
2244 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING  
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-3010  
(202) 225-3438

DISTRICT OFFICES  
MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.  
FEDERAL BUILDING  
AND COURTHOUSE  
50 WALNUT STREET  
ROOM 1018  
NEWARK, NJ 07102  
(973) 645-3213

333 NORTH BROAD STREET  
ELIZABETH, NJ 07208  
(908) 629-0272

The Honorable William Cohen  
Secretary of Defense  
The Pentagon  
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Secretary Cohen:

An entire generation of southern Sudanese are dying in one of the world's most neglected civil wars. More than 1.5 million southern Sudanese have died over the past decade as a result of war, famine and disease. Millions have been forced into exile and many others have been displaced internally. The people of southern Sudan have become invisible and their suffering ignored.

The urgency of the humanitarian crisis in Sudan cannot be overstated. An estimated 350,000 million people are currently at risk of starvation. Relief operations are seriously threatened because of the Government's policy of starvation. The National Islamic Front government is primarily responsible for the escalation of the current humanitarian tragedy. Moreover, civilians continue to suffer needlessly, in part because of the indifference of the international community.

I would like to request that the C-130 airplanes that the government has in reserve be used to help facilitate airdrops in the most critical areas in Southern Sudan. In response to the deteriorating humanitarian situation in south Sudan and increasing food aid needs, both parties involved in the civil war have committed to a cease-fire. Although some air operations have been extended by other relief organizations, it is still not enough.

Thank you very much. If you have any questions or concerns, please do not hesitate to call me or my foreign affairs advisor, Charisse Glassman on (202) 225-3436.

Sincerely,

Donald M. Payne  
Member of Congress

**RECENT DEATHS IN THE LINE OF DUTY OF  
WFP STAFF MEMBERS**

- ✦ **RICCIARDI, Renato**, Finance Officer, Burundi -  
murdered on 23/7/98.
- ✦ **KAWUKI Abby**, Driver, Uganda -  
died in a work-related truck accident in Rwanda on 18.7.98;
- ✦ **BASHARYAR Mohammed Hashim**, casual worker, Afghanistan -  
kidnapped on 13.7.98. His body was found on 18.7.98;
- ✦ **ASIKU William**, Driver, Uganda -  
murdered in an ambush on 08.7.98;
- ✦ **SUMAIN Samson Ohiri**, Driver, Sudan -  
murdered in an ambush on 09.6.98;
- ✦ **El HAG Ali**, Field Officer, Sudan -  
murdered in an ambush on 09.6.98;
- ✦ **ACELLAM Ben**, Food Aid Monitor, Uganda -  
murdered in an ambush 06.3.98;
- ✦ **BARYAMUJURA Naboth**, Driver, Uganda -  
murdered in an ambush in Rwanda on 20.10.97.
- ✦ **GIORGIS Kidane Tekle**, Driver, Ethiopia -  
murdered on 19.9.97;
- ✦ **AMASIAS Abraham Michael**, Programme Assistant, Ethiopia -  
murdered on 19.9.97;
- ✦ **MURWANASHYAKA Jean de Dieu**, casual worker, Rwanda -  
murdered sometime before 17.6.97 in unclear circumstances;
- ✦ **NKEZABERA Didace**, Field Assistant, Rwanda -  
murdered on 14/6/97. Murdered with family;
- ✦ **KANEZA Sylvere**, Tally Clerk, Rwanda -  
died in a work-related truck accident on 15.01.97
- ✦ **LEITAO Jorge**, Head of WFP Sub-Office in N'Dalatando, Angola  
murdered in an ambush on 11.12.96.

**BUDGET REVISION FOR EMOP No 5826.01 "EMERGENCY FOOD ASSISTANCE TO WAR AND DROUGHT AFFECTED POPULATIONS" In the SUDAN.**

**Introduction**

1. EMOP 5826.01, "Emergency food assistance to War and Drought Affected Populations" in the Sudan and the fifth in a series of emergency operations since 1992, was approved on 29 April 1998. The one year operation -from May 1998 through April 1999- had been designed to provide emergency food assistance to 2.48 million beneficiaries at a total cost of US \$ 65.8 million. Total quantities estimated at the time amounted to about 82,500 MTs of which 32,000 MTs were carried over in stocks and pledges, resulting in a net requirement under EMOP 5826.01 of some 50,500 MTs.
2. At the time the related document was processed, it had become clear that the situation continued to deteriorate in the war affected areas of southern Sudan, and particularly in the province of Bahr el Ghazal. In January and February 1998, WFP was targeting its food assistance to 525,000 people affected by war, insecurity and erratic rainfall in the southern sector (i.e. the non Government held areas of southern Sudan). Escalation of conflict in northern Bahr el Ghazal and western Upper Nile in late February resulted in additional displacement of civilian people. Prolonged displacement and continued attacks by armed militias in several areas of the affected region resulted in further increases in the numbers of people in need of food assistance. In April 1998, the caseload in the southern sector had increased to 713,000 beneficiaries. At the time the EMOP was signed, this number had been raised to 978,000 people in the southern sector. The caseload for the northern sector, including almost 200,000 drought affected people in North Darfur and the Red Sea Hills, stood at 1.5 million.
3. As time went on, more data came in confirming the seriousness of the situation. On 15 May 1998, the FAO issued a special alert pointing out the grave food supply situation in the southern sector, while WFP stepped up its number of field monitors from 23 to 40, following the relatively easier access to previously inaccessible unsafe areas. This resulted in an increased number of field assessments. Newly available nutritional data, collected by NGOs and UNICEF revealed global malnutrition rates in certain locations and among food aid beneficiaries of up to 60 percent, and the numbers of children qualifying for supplementary feeding started to outgrow the capacity of NGO-managed feeding centres. New evidence of an alarming situation continues to reach the outside world on an almost daily basis.



- 4 As was already stated in the EMOP document of 29 April, the requirements were conservative. The need for a budget revision was already expected as soon as more field assessment work was completed to justify WFP demand for donor contributions, not only in terms of the quantities of food needed, but also in terms of food aid delivery by air - the latter being the most feasible way to reach the people in need. On 25 June, WFP organised a donor briefing in Rome on the Sudan emergency operation, and an update was provided. This budget revision is based on information available mid July. The duration of this revised EMOP remains the period from May 1998 through April 1999, and the text will highlight the changes relative to the basic document of 29 April 1998. As things stand now it is estimated that the gross requirements for emergency operation 5826.01 amount to about 129,000 metric tons against the original estimate of April 1998 of about 82,500 metric tons. Since a total of about 32,000 MTs had been carried forward, the net requirements have been revised from 50,623 metric tons to 97,166 metric tons. This represents an increase of about 46,500 metric tons. The earlier estimated requirements were calculated on the assumption that most beneficiaries would receive a partial ration only. The proposed revised requirements will enable WFP to provide larger rations to a greater number of beneficiaries than originally planned, as explained in paragraph 7 below.

#### General

5. Although EMOP 5826.01 is treated as one operation, it has been historically divided into the southern and northern sector, and was managed from Nairobi/Lokichokio and Khartoum respectively (with the exception of the barge operation managed by WFP Office in Khartoum), under general direction from the Regional Bureau for Africa at Hqs. The targeted food aid beneficiaries covered by the southern sector were supplied from the WFP Office in Kenya and the food aid beneficiaries in the northern sector from Khartoum. This situation is changing with the deployment of additional aircraft stationed in Khartoum and El Obeid which will mainly serve the people in the southern sector. For the purposes of definition, the northern sector comprises the people in Government-held areas (many of them in Southern Sudan), while aid to the people in the non-Government controlled areas are counted as southern sector. Often however, populations are on the move and seek refuge moving from one area into another as is the case in Wau at this moment where the town of Wau (Government held) continues to receive large numbers of refugees (of about 50,000 people as of mid-July 1998) from the hinterland (non-Government controlled).

Numbers of beneficiaries

6. In the revised EMOP the number of beneficiaries has gone up from 2.48 million people to over 2.6 million people. While the numbers in the north have decreased somewhat, total numbers have increased as a result of the increase of people in need in the southern sector, from 978,000 to 1,226,000 beneficiaries, including 701,000 in Bahr el Ghazal instead of the 595,000 originally foreseen.

Northern sector: 1,376,000

(as per following details):

580,000 displaced in urban areas

602,000 various IDP camps

194,000 north Darfur/Red Sea hills

southern sector: 1,226,000

(as per following details):

701,000 Bahr el Ghazal

182,000 Equatoria

181,000 Jonglei

162,000 Upper Nile

Rations

7. Food rations, as well as the duration of assistance, continue to depend on the vulnerability of the region as well as on the food economy of the various socio-economic groups. The food economy methodology has been developed by SCF/UK. The actual quantity of food aid per beneficiary depends on other sources of income (e.g. milk/livestock) and coping mechanisms (e.g. wild fruits). People who are absolutely destitute will receive a full ration, while at the other end of the scale, e.g. people who would be hosting displaced persons would receive 25 percent rations. While the overall number of beneficiaries has not changed much, total requirements have increased with 46,500 metric tons. As the crisis intensifies, beneficiaries are now scheduled to receive bigger rations especially in the southern sector than was originally the case.
8. Standard full rations originally would provide about 1830 Kcalories, based on 400 g of cereals, 60 g of pulses, 15 g of oil and 5 g of salt. This earlier ration was based on the assumption that it was rare to have people who were completely destitute. This situation has changed and rations are now going up to 2,100 Kcal to those without any access to food. To facilitate this and to provide immediate assistance, the revised EMOP includes the provision of high protein biscuits in such cases, and food requirements now include 500 MTs of biscuits, 200 MTs for the northern and 300 MTs for the southern sector. Larger amounts of CSB, DSM, oil and sugar are included in view of the increased need for supplementary and therapeutic feeding, given the continuous increase in the number of (very) malnourished children. These commodities are distributed via NGO managed feeding centres and are in addition to the quantities the NGOs themselves are able to fund.

Volumes and transport costs

9. Food aid requirements have increased substantially as a result of the crisis in southern Sudan. While the original gross food aid requirements under EMOP 5826.01 amounted to about 82,500 MTs, they have been revised upwards to about 129,000 MTs, an increase of 46,500 MTs. The revised requirement is based on distribution plans which take into account different ration levels for reasons given in paragraph 7 above. This requirement would meet only part of the food consumption needs of the affected population, which will continue to depend on local resources except for the most destitute amongst them who will receive a full ration.
10. The increase of 46,500 MTs is reflected in the substantial increase in ITSH. Average ITSH costs per MT have increased somewhat, because the percentage of the food that needs to be flown in has increased. The needs are highest during the hunger gap of July-October when roads are impassable because of the rain. Moreover, under the EMOP 5826.01 it was not foreseen to airlift food to Wau, which is now necessitated by the influx of people from the surrounding rural areas.
11. All in all, 90% of the food requirements in the southern sector during the next few months will have to be flown in, with the emergency requirements for Wau mostly flown in by commercial aircraft from El Obeid. It is realised that these high transport costs in the longer run are not sustainable. However, modes of transport basically depend on security. WFP is seeking to contribute towards rehabilitation of barges and railways in the northern sector, and will be launching, separate from this EMOP, a Special Operation in order to improve road transport, repair/build roads and bridges and constitute a trucking fleet in the southern sector.

Direct support costs

12. Direct support costs have increased in line with the increase in food requirements. The number of field monitors in the southern sector have been increased to one hundred for a period of six months in order to facilitate airdrops, food distribution and monitoring of post-food distribution. Since taking field staff in and out of southern Sudan is only possible by air (Caravan aircraft), travel costs have increased steeply relative to the April EMOP. For the northern sector, the budget includes 27 additional field monitors. Other staff positions have also increased. However, in relative terms, i.e. the amount of US dollars needed for DSC per metric ton of food has actually decreased from US\$ 255 originally budgeted to US\$ 222 in the present budget revision.

Recommendation

13. The budget revision for EMOP 5826.01 is hereby recommended to meet urgent humanitarian assistance needs in Sudan. The revised budget will permit the provision of assistance to about 2.6 million people for the period up to April 1999, with the highest requirements being in July-October 1998, at a total cost of US\$ 154.5 million instead of US\$ 65.8 million originally foreseen as per details given in the attached annexes. It is further recommended that the food situation in Sudan be kept under review and that FAO/WFP crop assessment mission visit Sudan in October/November 1998 to further assess the food situation and make appropriate recommendations.

## 14. Approved by



Catherine Bertini  
Executive Director, WFP



J. Diouf  
Director-General, FAO

Date: 22 July 1998

Date: 22 July 98

## REVISED PROJECT BUDGET

## CATEGORY PROGRAMME

ANNEX I

Project Title:	Emergency Operations	
	Emergency Food Assistance to War and Drought-Affected	
	Population	
Project Number	5026.01	
Recipient country	SUDAN	
Project Life	12 months	
Number of Beneficiaries	2 602 000	
	From: 1/5/98 to 30/6/99	

## ALL OF SUDAN

FOOD COST

Direct operational Cost	Existing EMOP Quantity Metric Tons	Revised EMOP Quantity Metric Tons	Difference Metric Tons	Existing EMOP Avg. Cost Per-MT of Food (US\$)	Revised EMOP Avg. Cost Per-MT of Food (US\$)	Existing EMOP Total Value (US\$)	Revised EMOP Total Value (US\$)	Difference EMOP Total Value (US\$)
<b>Commodities</b>								
Cereals	40 173	77 530	37 358	154.73	200	6 215 840	15 511 000	9 295 160
Pulses	4 965	9 100	4 135	400.79	440	2 034 600	4 004 000	1 969 400
Vegetable oil	1 960	2 613	653	821.81	790	1 610 351	2 061 320	450 969
Salt	347	720	373	200	150	69 400	108 000	38 600
CSB	1 499	4 714	3 215	368.84	320	548 396	1 508 680	960 284
Sugar	796	473	-323	300	350	238 800	165 550	(73 250)
DG	883	1 506	623	3000	1 800	2 649 000	2 710 000	61 000
HA	0	500	500		1 900	0	950 000	950 000
<b>Total Commodities</b>	<b>50 613</b>	<b>97 166</b>	<b>46 553</b>			<b>13 346 387</b>	<b>26 749 000</b>	<b>13 402 613</b>

TRANSPORT COSTS

	Existing EMOP Total Value (US\$)	Revised EMOP Total Value (US\$)	Difference EMOP Total Value (US\$)
External Transport	3 710 863	4 853 098	1 142 236
Superintendence	127 863	437 347	309 484
LTSII			
a. Landside Transport	3 740 027	9 759 872	6 019 845
b. ITSH	29 128 980	82 399 840	53 270 860
<b>Sub-Total Direct Operational Costs</b>	<b>49 174 029</b>	<b>124 198 937</b>	<b>75 024 908</b>
<b>DDP/CT SUPPORT COSTS</b>	<b>12 913 236</b>	<b>21 596 316</b>	<b>8 683 080</b>
<b>TOTAL DIRECT COSTS</b>	<b>62 087 265</b>	<b>145 795 153</b>	<b>83 707 888</b>
<b>INDIRECT SUPPORT COSTS</b> @ 6% of Total Direct Costs	<b>3 725 237</b>	<b>8 747 707</b>	<b>5 022 470</b>
<b>TOTAL COSTS</b>	<b>65 812 502</b>	<b>154 542 860</b>	<b>88 730 358</b>

## REVISED PROJECT BUDGET

## CATEGORY PROGRAMME

ANNEX 12

Project Title:	Emergency Operations	
Emergency Food Assistance to War and Drought-Affected		
Project Number:	5816.01	
Recipient country:	SUDAN	
Project Life:	12 months	
Number of Beneficiaries:	1 126 000	
From 1/5/76 to 30/6/77		

## SOUTHERN SECTOR

## FOOD COST

Direct operational Cost	Existing EMOP Quantity Metric Tons	Revised EMOP Quantity Metric Tons	Difference Metric Tons	Existing EMOP Avg. Cost Per-MT of Food (US\$)	Revised EMOP Avg. Cost Per-MT of Food (US\$)	Existing EMOP Total Value (US\$)	Revised EMOP Total Value (US\$)	Difference EMOP Total Value (US\$)
Commodities								
Coriander	25 858	64 878	39 020	186	260	4 807 990	13 175 600	8 367 610
Peas	1 742	1 471	4 730	410	640	1 124 130	2 327 140	1 203 010
Vegetable oil	943	1 874	1 101	823	790	516 746	1 486 000	969 254
Salt	347	730	373	300	150	97 000	109 500	12 500
CSB	379	3 874	3 495	300	320	126 714	1 239 680	1 112 966
Sugar	124	102	-24	300	290	188 000	29 580	-158 420
Oil	283	1 020	777	1 000	1 000	799 000	1 020 000	221 000
HTW	0	300	300		1 900	0	570 000	570 000
<b>Total Commodities</b>	<b>28 688</b>	<b>71 102</b>	<b>42 414</b>			<b>6 610 870</b>	<b>20 675 720</b>	<b>14 064 850</b>

## TRANSPORT COSTS

	Cost Per-MT	Cost Per-MT	Difference Per-MT	Existing EMOP Total Value (US\$)	Revised EMOP Total Value (US\$)	Difference EMOP Total Value (US\$)
External Transport	72.89	87.1	-14	3 234 643	4 263 818	1 029 175
Superintendants	4.8	4.8	0	137 961	343 111	205 150
LTSM						
a. Landside Transport	122	128	-6	3 740 276	9 799 872	6 059 596
b. ITSM	829	966	-137	25 418 682	73 664 834	48 246 152
<b>Sub-Total Direct Operational Costs</b>				<b>20 129 251</b>	<b>108 779 664</b>	<b>88 650 414</b>

## DIRECT SUPPORT COSTS

	0 265 642	14 251 607	13 985 965
--	-----------	------------	------------

## TOTAL DIRECT COSTS

	40 394 893	122 031 271	81 664 449
--	------------	-------------	------------

## INDIRECT SUPPORT COSTS

@ 6% of Total Direct Costs

	2 414 225	7 321 866	4 907 641
--	-----------	-----------	-----------

## TOTAL COSTS

	42 809 118	129 353 137	86 572 090
--	------------	-------------	------------

## REVISED PROJECT BUDGET

CATEGORY PROGRAMME	Project Title	Emergency Operation	ANNEX 10
	Emergency Food Assistance to War and Drought Affected		
	Project Number:	Population	
	Recipient country:	SIIDAN	
	Project Life:	11 months	From: 1/5/76 to 30/6/77
	Number of Beneficiaries:	1 375 000	

## NORTHERN SECTOR

FOOD COST

Direct operational Cost	Existing EMOP Quantity Metric Tons	Revised EMOP Quantity Metric Tons	Difference Metric Tons	Existing EMOP Avg. Cost Per-MT of Food (\$US)	Revised EMOP Avg. Cost Per-MT of Food (\$US)	Existing EMOP Total Value (\$US)	Revised EMOP Total Value (\$US)	Difference EMOP Total Value (\$US)
Cereals	14 315	14 600	285	100	190	1 431 525	2 772 000	1 340 475
Pulses	3 223	1 629	-1 594	410	640	1 321 430	1 065 760	(255 670)
Vegetable oil	1 217	741	-476	822	750	1 000 274	555 750	(444 524)
SALT	0	0	0	300	150	0	0	0
Oil	1 130	840	-290	300	320	339 000	268 800	(70 200)
Sugar	440	371	-69	300	350	132 000	129 850	(2 150)
DSM	630	476	-154	3 000	1 800	1 890 000	856 800	(1 033 200)
MFB	0	200	200	0	1 900	0	380 000	380 000
<b>Total Commodities</b>	<b>19 755</b>	<b>20 217</b>	<b>462</b>			<b>6 563 549</b>	<b>6 973 360</b>	<b>(409 811)</b>

TRANSPORT COSTS

	Cost Per-MT	Cost Per-MT	Difference Per-MT	Existing EMOP Total Value (\$US)	Revised EMOP Total Value (\$US)	Difference EMOP Total Value (\$US)
External Transport	23.06	23.06	23.06	476 346	499 800	23 454
Supervisance	4.5	4.5	0	89 843	94 127	4 284
LTSH						
a. Landside Transport				0	0	0
b. ITSH	106	410	304	3 713 490	6 743 306	3 029 816
<b>Sub-Total Direct Operational Costs</b>				<b>10 848 246</b>	<b>15 409 873</b>	<b>4 561 627</b>

DIRECT SUPPORT COSTS

<b>TOTAL DIRECT COSTS</b>	<b>4 347 843</b>	<b>7 804 547</b>	<b>3 456 704</b>
<b>INDIRECT SUPPORT COSTS</b> @ 6% of Total Direct Costs	<b>911 747</b>	<b>1 344 665</b>	<b>432 918</b>
<b>TOTAL COSTS</b>	<b>16 107 537</b>	<b>23 751 084</b>	<b>7 643 546</b>

## EMOP 5826 - Direct Support Costs

ANNEX II

EMOP 5826/1				
Southern Sector				
	Description	Existing EMOP US\$	Revised EMOP US\$	Difference US\$
<b>Staffing</b>				
Int'l full-term officers	staff salaries and benefits	1 446 850	1571833	124 983
Int'l consultants & SSA holders	staff salaries and benefits	1 474 000	2412000	938 000
Local staff & temporaries	staff salaries and benefits	748 050	1238333	490 283
Subtotal		<u>3 668 900</u>	<u>6 222 166</u>	<u>1 683 266</u>
<b>Travel</b>				
Int'l staff travel (blanket travel)	DSA and travel related expenditures	551 045	820988	269 943
Local staff travel	DSA and travel related expenditures	97 007	200949	103 942
Accommodations and Meals for staff		299 480	731150	431 670
Hazardous allowance	Hazardous allowance for staff inside south Sudan	263 250	472620	209 370
Staff insurance	Insurance for national staff on SSA	13 200	22000	8 800
Staff transport by aircraft (Caravan)	Cost of travel into south Sudan and Nairobi-Lodi-Sudan	1 440 000	2925000	1 485 000
Subtotal		<u>2 683 982</u>	<u>6172707</u>	<u>2 608 725</u>
<b>Technical and Support Services</b>				
Post-distribution evaluation	one consultant, materials, supplies	35 000	74000	39 000
Socio-economic/Nutritive studies	one consultant, materials, supplies	18 000	40000	22 000
Workshops/Training (f/s)	staff accommodation and supplies for workshops	54 500	106000	51 500
Support for Counterpart personnel	accommodation, meals and DSA during ANA	24 000	24000	0
Subtotal		<u>131 500</u>	<u>244000</u>	<u>112 500</u>
<b>Vehicle Operations</b>				
New vehicles	purchase of forklift, minibus and vehicle	169 000	406000	237 000
Vehicle maintenance	spare parts and repairs for 18 WFP vehicles	70 000	100000	30 000
Fuel	fuel for vehicles(excluding food aid transport)	33 600	70000	36 400
Security escort for vehicles	salaries, fuel, staff	0	36500	36 500
Other	purchase and spares for bicycles, tractor tyres	43 200	83200	40 000
Subtotal		<u>315 800</u>	<u>685700</u>	<u>379 900</u>
<b>Office and Base Maintenance</b>				
Rental of facilities	offices in Nairobi and living quarters in Lodi and Uganda	98 000	85000	-13 000
Utilities and maintenance of facilities	office	58 000	142125	83 125
Communication costs	telephone and e/mail running costs	150 000	235000	85 000
Office supplies and materials	paper, copying, printing, computers, accessories	68 700	85000	16 300
Other running costs and repairs	general maintenance, wear and tear of premises	62 100	163000	100 900
Subtotal		<u>437 800</u>	<u>710125</u>	<u>272 325</u>



<b>Equipment and Materials</b>				
Communications equipment	repeater, V-Sat tel exchange antennas, radios	138 000	609000	471 000
Information technology equipment	computers, printers, Lolu network upgrade	135 700	221500	85 800
Office equipment	office air-conditioners and photocopiers	8 000	127000	119 000
Increase warehouse capacity	new rubb-halls and cementing floors	171 000	458000	287 000
Warehouse/delivery accessories	heavy duty scales, sewing machines	17 000	30000	13 000
Field equipment kits	field kits for food monitors	30 000	173000	143 000
Workshop equipment and materials	improvements, tools, machines	30 000	90000	60 000
Other materials	publications, WFP visibility items	6 000	32500	28 500
<b>Subtotal</b>		<b>636 700</b>	<b>1741000</b>	<b>1 206 300</b>
<b>Operational Improvements</b>				
River wall construction	WFP contribution for river wall construction	50 000	100000	50 000
Road repair	access road to the camp (last part)	50 000	426000	376 000
Office and living quarters constructions	building a living quarter and office extension	52 000	75000	23 000
Road repair and maintenance	Road in E. South Sudan (E. Equatoria)	560 000	0	-560 000
Runway repair and maintenance	Airstrips in South Sudan	100 000	0	-100 000
Improvement of drainage system in Lolu	Improve drainage system	0	30000	30 000
Construction of WFP base in S. Sudan	WFP base camp in S. Sudan	0	100000	100 000
Facilities for Staff	Recreation center and equipment	0	45000	45 000
<b>Subtotal</b>		<b>812 000</b>	<b>776000</b>	<b>-38 000</b>
<b>Total Direct Support Cost</b>		<b>8 565 682</b>	<b>14 561 698</b>	<b>5 996 016</b>

## EMOP 5826 - Direct Support Costs

Northern Sector	Description	ANNEX 4a		
		Existing EMOP US\$	Revised EMOP US\$	Difference US\$
<b>Staffing</b>				
Int'l full-term officers	staff salaries and benefits	1 384 417	2370000	985 583
Int'l consultants & SSA holders	staff salaries and benefits	731 780	1801500	786 750
Local staff & temporaries	staff salaries and benefits	737 917	827887	88 750
Subtotal		<u>2 854 114</u>	<u>4 939 187</u>	<u>1 044 363</u>
<b>Travel</b>				
Int'l staff travel (blanket travel)	travel related expenditures	27 800	26000	7 800
Local staff travel	travel related expenditures	18 000	28000	10 000
DSA/Hazardous allowance	hazardous allowance for staff inside southern Sudan	438 880	617530	80 570
Staff transport by aircraft (Caravan)	cost of travel in Sudan	800 000	800000	0
Subtotal		<u>1 684 680</u>	<u>1 177530</u>	<u>106 070</u>
<b>Technical and Support Services</b>				
Post-distribution evaluation	consultancy, materials, supplies	19 000	19000	0
Socio-economic/nutritive studies	consultancy, materials, supplies	18 000	18000	0
Workshops/Training	staff accommodation and supplies for workshops	19 000	19000	0
Support for Counterpart personnel	accommodation, meals and DSA during assessments	18 000	18000	0
Subtotal		<u>74 000</u>	<u>74000</u>	<u>0</u>
<b>Vehicle Operations</b>				
Vehicle maintenance	spare parts and repairs for WFP vehicles	20 000	48000	28 000
Fuel	fuel for vehicles for assessments	18 000	40000	25 000
Vehicles	for assessments and monitoring air ops.	0	180000	180 000
Subtotal		<u>38 000</u>	<u>268 000</u>	<u>233 000</u>
<b>Office Maintenance</b>				
Rental of facilities	offices in sub-offices & Khartoum offices and workshop	88 000	120000	24 000
Utilities and maintenance of facilities		18 000	30000	15 000
Communication costs	telephone and e-mail running costs	88 000	180000	85 000
Office supplies and materials	paper, copying, printing, accessories	18 000	30000	12 000
Other running costs and repairs	general maintenance, wear and tear of premises	8 000	19000	10 000
Subtotal		<u>199 000</u>	<u>249000</u>	<u>146 000</u>
<b>Equipment and Materials</b>				
Information technology equipment	computers, printers, network upgrade, software	18 000	28000	10 000
Office equipment	office air-conditioners and photo-copiers	32 000	82000	20 000
Information and publicity	publications, WFP visibility items	10 000	10000	0
Medical/security kits	evacuation, first aid kits	8 000	18000	7 000
Field equipment kits	field kits for food monitors	3 000	18000	13 000
Nutrition kits	weighing scales, bands, rules, etc.	3 000	3000	0
Small aluminum boats	aluminum boats (3)	30 000	2,0000	0
Generator	for field offices and air bases	0	38000	38 000
Ford/RV	loading aircraft	0	130000	
Heavy duty Weighing Scale	weighing food	0	3800	3 800
Satellite Phones	improve communication with Lokl, NBI and KH-TT air-bases	0	57000	57 000
HF Radio	improve communication with Lokl, NBI and KH-TT air-bases	0	12000	12 000
HF Antenna	improve communication with Lokl, NBI and KH-TT air-bases	0	18000	18 000
Batteries	improve communication with Lokl, NBI and KH-TT air-bases	0	3000	3 000
Solar panels	improve communication with Lokl, NBI and KH-TT air-bases	0	7700	7 700
Walkie Talkies	improve communication with Lokl, NBI and KH-TT air-bases	0	8250	8 250
Air band VHF Radio	improve communication with Lokl, NBI and KH-TT air-bases	0	3000	3 000
Stitching machines	for air operations	0	18000	18 000
Rubb hulls	increase storage capacity for air operations	0	25000	25 000
Subtotal		<u>194 000</u>	<u>479 000</u>	<u>235 000</u>
<b>Total Direct Support Costs</b>		<u><u>4 335 844</u></u>	<u><u>7 834 547</u></u>	<u><u>2 869 063</u></u>

NETTED REQUIREMENTS/SHORTFALLS FOR THE SUDAN OPERATION  
FROM 01 MAY 1998 TO 30 APRIL 1999

ANNEX III

ANNEX III

MONTH MAY 1998 TO APRIL 1999	CEREALS	PULSES	OIL	SALT	CSB	SUGAR	DSM	HPB	TOTAL
MAY (ACTUAL DELIVERIES)	6398	338	48	3	0	1	6	0	6794
JUNE (ACTUAL DELIVERIES)	6668	939	228	45	0	0	0	0	7880
JULY	13337	1867	497	100	680	57	217	65	16755
AUGUST	14434	2004	531	100	680	57	217	65	18023
SEPTEMBER	13940	1942	516	100	680	57	217	65	17452
OCTOBER	13800	1925	512	100	680	57	217	65	17291
NOVEMBER	7549	1094	304	75	545	54	182	65	9803
DECEMBER	5281	759	221	50	410	50	146	35	6917
JANUARY	5125	740	216	50	410	50	146	35	6737
FEBRUARY	5125	740	216	50	410	50	146	35	6737
MARCH	5398	774	225	50	410	50	146	35	7053
APRIL	5539	792	229	50	410	50	146	35	7216

SUMMARY									
MAY 1998 TO APRIL 1999	CEREALS	PULSES	OIL	SALT	CSB	SUGAR	DSM	HPB	TOTAL
TOTAL GROSS REQUIREMENTS FOR 5826.01	102594	13914	3743	773	5315	533	1786	500	128658
CARRY-OVER STOCKS FROM 5826.00	25056	4814	1128	53	601	60	280	0	31992
NET REQUIREMENTS AGAINST 5826.01	77538	9100	2615	720	4714	473	1506	500	97166
PLEDGES AGAINST THE 5826.01	31143	5534	1500	200	2830	390	987	120	42704
NET SHORTFALL AGAINST THE 5826.01	46395	3566	1115	520	1884	83	519	380	54462

**REQUIREMENTS/SHORTFALLS FOR THE SOUTHERN SECTOR OPERATION  
FROM 01 MAY 1998 TO 30 APRIL 1999**

ALL FIG IN MT

ANNEX III

MONTH MAY 1998 TO APRIL 1999	CEREALS	PULSES	OIL	SALT	CSB	SUGAR	DSM	HPB	TOTAL
MAY (ACTUAL DISTRIBUTION)	3700	146	11	3	0	0	0		3860
JUNE (ACTUAL DISTRIBUTION)	5509	713	151	45	0	0	0		6418
JULY	7979	1197	299	100	540	14	142	40	10271
AUGUST	7979	1197	299	100	540	14	142	40	10271
SEPTEMBER	7979	1197	299	100	540	14	142	40	10271
OCTOBER	7979	1197	299	100	540	14	142	40	10271
NOVEMBER	5984	898	224	75	405	11	107	40	7704
DECEMBER	3990	598	150	50	270	7	71	20	5136
JANUARY	3990	598	150	50	270	7	71	20	5136
FEBRUARY	3990	598	150	50	270	7	71	20	5136
MARCH	3990	598	150	50	270	7	71	20	5136
APRIL	3990	598	150	50	270	7	71	20	5136

SUMMARY									
TOTAL GROSS REQUIREMENTS FOR S234.01	67059	9535	2332	773	3915	102	1030	300	84746
CARRY-OVER STOCKS FROM S234.00	6181	2064	458	53	41	0	0	0	8797
NET REQUIREMENTS AGAINST S234.01	60878	7471	1874	720	3874	102	1030	300	76249
PLEDGES AGAINST THE S234.01	37721	4474	980	200	2030	100	400	80	35983
NET SHORTFALL AGAINST THE S234.01	33157	2997	894	520	1844	2	630	220	40266

NOTE : 16,520 MT OF CEREALS TO BE DELIVERED BY AIR FROM THE NORTHERN SECTOR TO THE SOUTHERN SECTOR. MEANING OF THE 84 746 MT NEEDED, ONLY 68,226 MT WILL BE DELIVERED VIA LOKI AND NBO

**REVISED REQUIREMENTS/SHORTFALLS FOR THE NORTHERN SECTOR OPERATION  
FROM 01 MAY 1998 TO 30 APRIL 1999**

ALL FIG IN MT

MONTH MAY 1998 TO APRIL 1999	CEREALS	PULSES	OIL	SALT	CSB	SUGAR	DSM	HPB	TOTAL
MAY (ACTUAL DELIVERIES)	2698	192	37	0	0	1	6		2934
JUNE (ACTUAL DELIVERIES)	1159	226	77	0	0	0	0		1462
JULY	5358	670	198	0	140	43	75	25	6484
AUGUST	6455	807	232	0	140	43	75	25	7752
SEPTEMBER	5961	745	217	0	140	43	75	25	7181
OCTOBER	5821	728	213	0	140	43	75	25	7020
NOVEMBER	1565	196	80	0	140	43	75	25	2099
DECEMBER	1291	161	71	0	140	43	75	15	1781
JANUARY	1135	142	66	0	140	43	75	15	1601
FEBRUARY	1135	142	66	0	140	43	75	15	1601
MARCH	1408	176	75	0	140	43	75	15	1917
APRIL	1549	194	79	0	140	43	75	15	2080

SUMMARY									
MAY 1998 TO APRIL 1999	CEREALS	PULSES	OIL	SALT	CSB	SUGAR	DSM	HPB	TOTAL
TOTAL GROSS REQUIREMENTS FOR S234.01	35535	4379	1411	0	1400	431	756	200	43912
CARRY-OVER STOCKS FROM S234.00	18875	2750	670	0	560	60	200	0	23195
NET REQUIREMENTS AGAINST S234.01	16660	1629	741	0	840	371	476	200	20717
PLEDGES AGAINST THE S234.01	3422	1060	520	0	800	290	587	40	6679
NET SHORTFALL AGAINST THE S234.01	13238	569	221	0	40	81	-111	160	14038