

USAID'S LONG-TERM STRATEGY FOR ADDRESSING EAST AFRICAN EMERGENCIES

HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, AND HUMAN RIGHTS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION

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THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 8, 2011

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH,
AND HUMAN RIGHTS
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 o'clock p.m., in room 2200 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher H. Smith (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. SMITH. Two months ago, this subcommittee held a hearing on Somalia that revealed the extent of the suffering from what witnesses agreed was the worst drought in the Horn of Africa since the 1950s. Our hearing today is in part a follow up to that July 7th hearing in order to examine the U.S. Agency for International Development's long-term strategy to address the humanitarian crises in East Africa such as the current devastating drought. The need for this continued focus on the region is apparent, given the on-going very disturbing reports that we are receiving about Sudanese attacks on its Blue Nile state that will drive residents into South Sudan and reports of theft of international food aid.

We know that an estimated 13.1 million are in need of urgent humanitarian assistance, and every month that number goes up. The United States to date has devoted a total of \$604.6 million in humanitarian assistance funding for the Horn of Africa. At the same time, our Government has devoted \$370 million in Fiscal Year 2011 to help the newly-independent Government of South Sudan respond to the crisis largely caused by the Republic of Sudan's attacks that have sent people streaming into this young nation.

The drought in East Africa apparently is part of a persistent weather trend in the region. But there is disagreement on the extent to which La Nina or El Nino, two weather phenomena, will affect weather patterns in East Africa over time. The current La Nina phenomenon which began in August 2010, resulted in wetter than normal conditions in Australia and parts of Asia from December to February, and drier than normal conditions over equatorial East Africa over the same period, leading to the current drought in the region. But while drought is one reason for food shortages, it is exacerbated by stagnating agricultural development and unsustainable forms of livelihood.

In our July 7th hearing, Nancy Lindborg, Assistant Administrator in the U.S. Agency for International Development's Bureau

for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance, raised the issue of the long-term need for changes in livelihoods in the region. She quoted a local cattle herder saying, "We are seeing the end of the pastoral lifestyle as we know it." In countries across the region, Ms. Lindborg testified, nomads are without water and pasture and unable to migrate safely. Many of them are left without assets or income and as they migrate out of rural areas to urban areas, they strain an already stressed situation. There are nomads in Africa from Western Sahara to Sudan. If weather conditions have conspired to end what in some cases are livelihoods developed over millennia, who will work with these pastoralists to develop new ways of surviving?

Part of our humanitarian strategy, therefore, must involve working with African governments on developing viable strategies for helping nomads transition into new livelihoods that fit their skills and are sustainable in often resource-poor conditions. In the long run, donors will be increasingly less likely to continue to support the people suffering through repeated droughts in the same areas. We must break this cycle now and help them to find durable solutions for the future.

In Somalia, the hardest hit country in the region, the terrorist group al-Shabaab has obstructed the delivery of humanitarian assistance and directly threatened aid agencies. It also has interrogated aid workers and accused them of spying for the West or proselytizing. Maritime piracy and the hijacking of aid shipments has also hindered the provision of aid. By late 2009, threats against humanitarian workers and attacks against aid compounds had driven many international groups out of al-Shabaab controlled areas. Most of the remaining groups left southern Somalia in 2010.

The result has been an estimated 2.2 million people in southern Somalia, representing some 60 percent of those who remain in the country, in need of aid, but currently out of reach of most aid agencies.

We face serious questions about how to meet the desperate needs of people like those living in areas controlled by al-Shabaab. We want to prevent terrorist organizations from benefitting from humanitarian aid, but we must balance this concern with our deep desire to keep alive those needing food, water, and medicine.

There has to be a solution that not only prevents aid from going to terrorists, but also prevents the terrorists from perpetrating further violence against their own people by denying them access to life-saving food assistance. We don't want food being used as a weapon as we learned so bitterly during the Mengistu regime.

Meanwhile, our Government is helping the new Government of South Sudan to effectively respond to the expectations of the population for essential services and improved livelihoods, as well as containing the conflicts that are likely to erupt. This new government is learning to handle the normal business of establishing a government even as an estimated 371,455 people have migrated from the north to South Sudan as well as to the Blue Nile in Southern Kordofan States in the Republic of the Sudan and the disputed area of Abyei since October 30th of last year.

Apparently, continuing attacks in Southern Kordofan and now Blue Nile State will only continue the flight of thousands of people

into South Sudan. Given its troubled relationship with the Republic of Sudan to the north, our assistance to the new government must build its capacity as a democratically-elected institution and help enable it to avoid and address such crises. Empowerment should be our focus as we will help this new government take its place among the world's nations.

Drought and other natural disasters and man-made catastrophes due to conflict have been a persistent story in East Africa. In an era of limited resources, we must encourage adapted lifestyles, develop strategies for delivering aid in conflict areas and enable our partner governments to manage crises more successfully.

I look forward to hearing from our distinguished witnesses. I thank them in advance for taking the time to be here to share their expertise and their recommendations. And I would like to yield to my friend and colleague, Mr. Payne, for any time he would like to consume.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for calling this very important hearing, what is surely the worst humanitarian crisis facing the world today. Prior to our recess, we had several meetings dealing with this issue, however, we are continuing to see the crisis continue. This crisis is indeed the worst in a generation affecting food security for more than 12 million people across Somalia, Ethiopia, Djibouti and Kenya.

Many of us remember the famines in Ethiopia in that region for many years. Back beginning in the '60s when they started to come at about a 10-year frequency there was the drought of the '60s, early in the '60s, then in the early '70s and the drought in the '80s. And then we went into Somalia in the early '90s and we all recall the "Blackhawk Down" incident which ended that particular era when we went in to try to feed the children. Back in the '70s cycle, I went to Wollo Province with French and German pilots to deal with the '73 drought and out of the city of Dessie in Wollo Province in Ethiopia when we saw millions of people who were mobile and we had to locate them by planes and then drop food to wherever we could find them. We called it the Mobile Million. We saw that we needed to do better planning.

Once again, we see the situation is continuing and the international community was very slow to respond then, resulting in more than 1 million deaths in that cycle. Then, of course, we started to do better planning and we started to project when famines would come and we try to preposition our supplies and actually probably this situation would be even much worse, as bad as it is, had it not been for some prepositioning by USAID and the U.N. predicting that this drought was coming.

We now face the worsening humanitarian disaster that will take even more lives. The scope and scale of today's crisis is virtually unprecedented. As crops have failed and livestock have died, food prices have soared in the past year. In addition, poor infrastructure and security and internal unrest have compounded the problem facing the region. Somalia, where drought conditions have exacerbated the long-term complex emergency, is the country hardest hit by the disaster and Islamic insurgency led by al-Shabaab complicates the delivery of international aid to famine-struck areas.

On July 20, the United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator for Somalia issued a famine declaration into regions of southern Somalia. Now all south and central regions of Somalia are in the midst of this famine, including regions that used to be the breadbasket of the country like the Juba Valley. Nearly half of Somalia's population, some 3.7 million people have been impacted. Over 2.4 million located mostly in the south-central region have fled their homes in search of food and water. Nearly 900,000 of these men, women, and children have fled into neighboring nations, greatly straining their already insufficient resources.

The road to camps in northern Kenya and eastern Ethiopia have been described as roads of death. Thousands of women, children, and elderly are left on the side of the road unable to continue, resting on those who have already died. Those fortunate enough to reach the camps find filled beyond capacity with horrendous sanitary conditions and a lack of food. The international community have recognized the magnitude of the crisis. The World Food Program is currently feeding 8 million people with more to be accessed in the coming weeks. The U.N. Central Emergency Response Fund has granted \$51.3 million for the region. The Organization of Islamic Conference met last week and pledged \$350 million to Somalia. The African Union matched this amount with \$300 million coming from the African Development Bank.

The United States has contributed over \$604 million in humanitarian assistance so far this year, with nearly 70 percent of it going to emergency food aid. Despite these considerable efforts by the international community to respond to the crisis, there remains a significant funding shortfall. The U.N. has issued an appeal for \$2.5 billion, U.S. Funding to date has been approximately \$1.1 billion, leaving \$1.4 billion short.

The needs of these affected are expected to increase in the coming months with emergency conditions expected to persist well into 2012.

First, we must make every effort to get the life-saving aid to these people who are desperately in need, especially those who are trapped inside al-Shabaab-controlled territory in southern Somalia. I join with my colleague, Steve Cohen, and other members in sending a letter to the State Department requesting that licensing restrictions be lifted for NGOs desperately trying to access to most hard-to-reach areas, those under al-Shabaab control. The licensing restrictions were lifted, but it is still unclear whether the aid is reaching those living in the al-Shabaab-held territories.

As the United States and the international community attempt to pull these populations back from the brink, long-term investments are needed such as risk-reduction strategies and helping communities that diversify their livelihoods adapt to climate-change conditions and build resilience to face inevitable future crises.

In July, I introduced H Res 361 calling attention to the crisis encouraging the United States and other donors to take a long-term strategic approach to addressing the root causes of the crisis and urging all parties to allow assistance to flow to the most vulnerable populations. The resolution has more than 50 cosponsors and many of our colleagues have been deeply concerned and vocal on the

issue including our chairman, Jim McGovern, Jo Ann Emerson, Rosa Delauro, Steve Cohen, Barbara Lee, Maxine Waters, Gwen Moore, and Leader Pelosi and many others. Yet, in the face of the graphic depictions of starving women and children, many in Congress have proposed deep cuts to our international affairs budget that could cripple the ability to provide even basic emergency responses.

Levels of funding proposed by the House Appropriations Committee will make it difficult to meet both short and long-term needs and emergencies today as long as the preventative programs we need to put in place. I know that Chairman Smith is also concerned about this issue and we hope to work with him and his colleagues to ensure that adequate funding in spite of our difficult times here are put forth to deal with the crisis. In regard to South Sudan, I was very pleased to be at the independence celebration in Juba and have followed closely the development in South Sudan. Of course, we're still concerned about Abyei; the disputed territory, Southern Kordofan, where belligerents are still at each other, and the south Blue Nile. We have to resolve these issues so that Sudan can move forward and we have to remember that Darfur still remains unresolved.

Thank you to our distinguished witnesses for joining us today. I certainly look forward to your testimony. Thank you. I yield back.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. The Chair recognizes the vice chairman of the subcommittee, Mr. Fortenberry.

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this important hearing. I'm going to pass so that we have time to get straight to the witnesses. Thank you.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Carnahan, the gentleman from Missouri.

Mr. CARNAHAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am going to submit my opening statement for the record, too, so we can get on to our witnesses and again, thank you for holding this important hearing today.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. I'd like to now introduce our first witness, Ms. Jandhyala, who has served as the USAID's Deputy Administrator for Africa since October 2010. In that capacity, she oversees the Offices of Sudan Programs and East African Affairs. Prior to joining USAID, Ms. Jandhyala worked as a senior advisor and head of the Peace and Security Division in the Department of State Office of the United States Special Envoy to Sudan. Ms. Jandhyala is an expert on national security with a focus on war to peace transitions and public policy reforms in countries affected by conflict. The floor is yours.

STATEMENT OF MS. RAJAKUMARI JANDHYALA, DEPUTY ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, BUREAU FOR AFRICA, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Ms. JANDHYALA. Good afternoon Chairman Smith, Mr. Payne, and members of the subcommittee. Thank you for inviting me to speak with you today about East Africa. It is always an honor and pleasure to have the opportunity to discuss our work in Africa. I request the chair recognize the written testimony.

Mr. SMITH. Without objection, your full statement will be made a part of the record.

Ms. JANDHYALA. Thank you. As many of you have mentioned, the worst drought in over half a century has left 12.7 million East Africans in need of emergency humanitarian assistance. Under the leadership of President Obama and Secretary Clinton and our Administrator Shah, the U.S. Government in coordination with the international community is delivering emergency food assistance to help local populations in the worst affected areas of Ethiopia, Kenya, and parts of Somalia.

The assistance immediately concerns about local food, nutritional support to malnourished children, water, and other essential services to save lives.

East Africa has two faces, a face of conflict, security, and corruption is one many know best. But there is another one of hope, progress, and promise. And we try to balance in our work how to manage both at the same time. Recently, Deputy Administrator Don Steinberg, Assistant Administrator Nancy Lindborg, testified on the complexities of providing and delivering assistance in humanitarian crises such as this when we're dealing with both conflict issues, local tensions within the communities, and the cross border issues of on-going military situation.

Today, I'm here to discuss with you about our continued development engagement in the region which has helped many people experiencing rising incomes, improved health, and better educational opportunities for their children. USAID's on-going work, bolstered by strong policy and diplomacy, serves as a crucial force to lessen the severity of the humanitarian crisis we're facing. Our work has a long-term view to the region's development in order to work with our host country governments, regional organization and the broader international community with the focus on health, agricultural productivity, environmental stewardship and conflict mitigation with the emphasis on empowering people to participate in democratic processes in their country.

Recognizing the potential of 342 million people in East Africa, USAID is investing \$3 billion in development assistance in FY2011. While this is a significant amount, it's far less than what we might need to spend in future humanitarian crises in absence of our concerted support for development. Our belief is that long-term food security and stability is key to lessening the impact of recurring crises such as the one we're facing today. Our focus is to strengthen early warning systems in the region, build resiliency, as mentioned by the chairman, in communities through livelihood support, safety-net investments, and implement measures to help populations and communities adapt to climate change and prevent conflict over resources by underlying issues of fragility that gives rise to violence.

Most importantly, we hope to unlock the enormous potential of African agriculture as the driver of prosperity through Feed the Future initiative that the President has announced. And our continued engagement with the governments at national and local levels to advance a reform agenda that takes into consideration how to prevent future disasters and how to mitigate the impact on their populations.

We see a difference in the impact of the drought in Ethiopia and Kenya on one hand and Somalia on the other. More than 40 per-

cent of Somalia's 9.8 million people are in crisis and the famine is expected to only get worse. It expanded to three regions this week and we're seeing a very different situation in Ethiopia and Kenya. One sees a need both in the Ethiopia and Kenya to be sure, but also one of resilience. Just 6 percent of their combined population is at risk while the situation is great in Somalia and we do expect it to deteriorate.

Ethiopia serves as an important example of USAID's development assistance working in hand with the humanitarian which has helped to generate the resiliency that mitigates the severity of the humanitarian shocks that they could have been experiencing during this crisis. Since 2003, the number of Ethiopians in need of emergency assistance has dropped to almost two thirds. The Government of Ethiopia has developed comprehensive economic and agriculture plans which the U.S. Government is supporting. For instance, the government's Productive Safety Net program that addresses chronically food insecure populations has helped 7.5 million survive the current crisis and avoid having to sell off their livestock asset base at the moment.

Kenya reflects another factor that exacerbates our effects of the drought: Erratic weather, degraded land, and high cost of energy. USAID is helping the country adapt to some of these changes and the communities, the pastoral communities of northern Kenya deal with the food insecurity that they are facing as well.

We're focused on better management of water, land, and natural resources that allow them to adapt to these changing situations and also engaged in the markets in the productive region.

Through global climate change, USAID and its Kenyan partners are exploring innovative ways for new energy systems and have a high cost of applications in rural areas for those who have limited access to electricity. Although Somalia has lacked a functioning central government for over two decades, Somalians have been remarkably resilient to difficult circumstances. I was recently in Somaliland a few weeks ago and the enormous effort of people there to provide for themselves with the assistance that they have received shows a great commitment on what we can do in terms of when there is stability.

In other parts of Somalia, we have a USAID transition initiatives to bridge between immediate humanitarian assistance and longer term development programs. In areas of relative stability, our assistance has helped nearly 200,000 children in schools; 41,000 communities have access to water; and nearly 10,000 youth and livelihood programs. We continue to look for opportunities for relative stability to empower the population.

USAID focuses on these issues in Somalia because where we find opportunities with communities, we're able to build community cohesion and security for those communities, when they've invested in their communities and see that there is a future.

I would like to turn to the other part of our work which is countries like Sudan which are emerging from conflict and I would like to acknowledge it was a pleasure to have the opportunity to travel with Mr. Payne to the inauguration on July 9th for the emergence of the new country.

USAID has been present in Sudan since 1958. Since 2005, after the signing of the CPA, we've worked in South Sudan to help the ministries establish a new government, deliver social services, work with local populations to mitigate conflict and in the post-independence era, we hope to continue our commitment and we are implementing a 2-year transition strategy that has an overall goal of increasing stability in the post-CPA period in South Sudan. That does not take away from the on-going commitment we have made to encourage both parties to continue to negotiate and resolve the outstanding issues that are still remaining from the CPA.

We see South Sudan's development policy challenges revolving around five key issues: Transparency, accountability and reconciliation for good governance; human capital development, given the enormous need head; sound, natural resources and revenue management based both on the oil and non-oil potential that rests with the country; delivery of social services, and creating an enabled environment for private sector investments. We're working with the international community to build a broad coalition so that the government can build confidence with its own population that it can deliver on their aspirations. The U.S. Government is committed to continuing to work with the Republic of the South Sudan in efforts to build a new country and deliver the needs of its people.

As we assist the government, we are also working to plan an international engagement conference for South Sudan that allows us to hear from them their development vision and their priorities and how they hope to move forward in the next few years.

Mr. Chairman, this year USAID celebrates 50 years of generosity of the American people. We believe we can make the world a better and safer place, if we use our wealth, expertise, and our values and invest wisely. Each of the countries I've discussed today presents a combination of hope, accomplishment and a challenge. And the region itself is a balance of all of that at the moment.

The United States' overall investment goes far beyond the immediate and we continue to work with you and look forward to having a discussion on East Africa today and in the coming months. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Jandhyala follows:]

**Testimony by U.S. Agency for International Development
Deputy Assistant Administrator for Africa Raja Jandhyala
U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs
Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, and Human Rights**

September 8, 2011

“USAID’s Strategy for Addressing the Recurring Crises in East Africa”

Good afternoon Chairman Smith, Mr. Payne, and members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for inviting me to speak with you today about east Africa. It is always an honor and pleasure to have the chance to discuss our work in Africa with you and hear your input.

President Obama is committed to working with the governments and people of east Africa to realize their development aspirations and minimize the impact of man-made and natural disasters now and in the future. Although the worst drought in over half a century in Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Somalia has left over 12.7 million people in need of emergency assistance, as a result of our continued engagement, there are many more people in the region who are experiencing rising incomes, improved health and better education for their children.

Recognizing the potential of the 342.5 million people in the east Africa region, USAID is investing \$3 billion in development assistance in FY 2011.¹ While this is a significant amount of funding, it is far less than what we might potentially have to spend in future humanitarian crises in the absence of the concerted support for east Africa’s own development endeavors. As a result, USAID’s ongoing work in the region, bolstered by strong U.S. policy and diplomacy, serves as a crucial mitigating and facilitating force to work in partnership with east Africans to prevent and respond to man-made and natural catastrophes in order to break the cycle of humanitarian crises.

The difference in the impact of the drought in Ethiopia and Kenya, on the one hand, and Somalia on the other, is sobering. More than 40 percent—4.0 million—of Somalia’s 9.8 million people are in crisis, and the famine is expected to get worse. Even under the best environmental circumstances, 20 ungoverned years have left the Somali people scrambling to survive normal, day-to-day pressures. Insecurity and conflict have rendered development nearly impossible in the regions of Somalia that are now experiencing famine. It is no coincidence that those areas suffering the most are the same areas that are wracked with conflict. Nevertheless, ongoing drought and increasing insecurity in the region have led to a number of urgent challenges yet also some targeted opportunities to utilize our development assistance programs to mitigate future man-made and natural humanitarian shocks.

We are seeing a very different situation in Ethiopia and Kenya—one of need, to be sure, but also one of resilience. Just 6 percent of the total combined population of 121 million people is at risk, and while the situation is grave, we do not expect it to deteriorate into famine. The crisis is the

¹ East Africa refers to Burundi, the Central African Republic, Comoros, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, the Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda.

biggest news of the day, and aid workers from the U.S. Government and other donors and organizations are working day and night with their partners in the Horn of Africa to save lives. Americans, Europeans, Africans, and Asians are reaching into their pockets and engaging their communities to help alleviate the suffering. But the emergency is not the only story, or the only dynamic at play.

Developing Resiliency

We will never be able to prevent a natural disaster from happening, but the United States' commitment and long-term work with Ethiopia, Kenya, and many of their neighbors have reduced the populations' vulnerability to crises like this one and greatly reduced the need for expensive emergency assistance. East Africa has geopolitical strategic importance, economic potential, and generally positive development performance. We rely heavily on diplomacy to open the door for us to deliver on our long-term vision and commitments to the well-being of the people of the region and sound principles and processes of good governance. In addition to responding to emergencies as they emerge, USAID also works in the region with a long-term view to the development challenges and opportunities that will improve economic growth, health, agricultural productivity, and environmental stewardship. Our work with national and local governments and international donors has built on positive trends of economic, technological, and infrastructural growth, and has significantly lessened the effects of climatic shocks for many east Africans. We expect this progress to continue through these continued partnerships, regional investments, and President Obama's three major initiatives: Feed the Future, which aims to address hunger and unlock the enormous potential of African agriculture as a driver of prosperity; the Global Health Initiative, which is saving millions of lives while building sustainable health systems; and the Global Climate Change Initiative, which helps mitigate the potentially dire consequences of climate change on African ecosystems, food production, and economic development. These important Presidential initiatives demonstrate the Obama Administration's genuine commitment to transforming the region while also working to mitigate future humanitarian shocks. As these efforts proceed, we will be adjusting programs where appropriate to make them more effective in addressing populations that are vulnerable to current crises.

Ethiopia serves as an important example of how USAID development assistance helps to generate resiliency within that country to mitigate the severity of humanitarian shocks. Since 2003, the number of Ethiopians in need of emergency assistance has dropped by almost two-thirds, despite the country having one of the highest population growth rates in Africa. Since 2005, Ethiopia has achieved a real economic growth rate averaging 8 percent per year and has seen a tremendous expansion in the number, diversity, and market share of private businesses. The Government of Ethiopia has also developed comprehensive economic and agricultural development plans to foster the growth of domestic and export markets and has allocated 17 percent of its budget to the agricultural sector.

Long-term USAID interventions in support of the Government of Ethiopia's plans have helped some of the country's most vulnerable people become more resilient to natural disasters, like the current drought. As a result of our sustained development efforts, an estimated 7.5 million fewer

Ethiopians require emergency support to survive this crisis. USAID has supported transitional programs that have mitigated the need for emergency assistance during this drought. Early warning systems such as the USAID-supported Famine Early Warning System Network (FEWS NET) predicted the drought and allowed donors to take quick action before the worst conditions set in. In those areas that were expected to be hit the hardest, USAID helped households with “commercial de-stocking”—selling off some livestock while the prices were still high, which helped families bring in enough income to feed themselves and their remaining livestock. USAID also pre-positioned significant amounts of food and non-food commodities and worked to rehabilitate wells before the worst drought conditions, preventing the need to launch expensive water trucking efforts in those regions.

USAID’s long-term development assistance in Ethiopia serves to effectively augment national policies. USAID plays a lead role in the Donor Assistance Group, a collaboration of multilateral institutions and other donors that work within an agreed-upon framework with the Government of Ethiopia on a range of development issues. USAID provides critical support to existing effective national programs and policies such as the Government of Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Program, which is designed to address the needs of chronically food-insecure populations. Since 2005, this program has received significant support from the Donor Assistance Group in order to, for instance, provide the poor with staple foods during the annual hunger seasons in exchange for labor to build sustainable community assets, such as water catchments and managed rangelands. This has helped millions of Ethiopians survive food shortages and avoid having to sell off the productive assets, like cows and sheep, that they need to feed their families, which has softened the blow of this year’s drought. As a result of these long-term development assistance efforts, USAID has been able to decrease the scope of the short-term humanitarian response that would otherwise be required in Ethiopia.

Long-term, sustainable economic growth is crucial for a country’s ability to effectively respond to and mitigate the severity of humanitarian crises. To spur overall economic growth, Feed the Future is investing in a “push-pull” model: preparing chronically food-insecure households and pastoralists to participate in improved agricultural markets and livelihood opportunities (“push”) resulting from improved productivity and commercialization in Ethiopia’s productive regions (“pull”). At the same time, USAID will seek to improve the overall nutrition of women and children through sustainable and comprehensive interventions concentrating on especially vulnerable regions like Oromia.

While Ethiopia has seen significant progress in recent years, the country still faces many challenges, particularly in terms of democratic governance. The repressive aftermath of the 2005 elections reversed democratic progress in Ethiopia, and the 2010 national elections were widely judged as anything but free and fair. The ruling party continues to repress opposition and increase its dominance, actively reducing the space for civil society. Despite progress, the private sector remains hobbled by red tape and arbitrary new rules. USAID is seeking opportunities to improve the enabling environment and accountability in order to foster more transparent growth.

Kenya’s economic, political, social, and ecological landscape makes for an unusually compelling combination of opportunities and challenges. Kenya’s relatively high per capita income level hides the fact that half the population lives in poverty and that it has one of the highest population growth rates in the world. Kenya’s food insecurity results from a number of factors

including erratic weather, a degrading land base, corruption, a lack of security in some areas, the slow pace of infrastructural development, the high cost of energy, ongoing political instability, and periodic shocks such as the 2008 post-election crisis. In addition, the global economic downturn and consecutive poor harvests have constrained this progress. The current drought has swelled Kenya's refugee camps; the largest complex, Dadaab, originally built to host 90,000 people now hosts 440,000, and as many as 1,200 new refugees arrive each day. This surge of refugees has not only created a humanitarian crisis, but it has also put enormous strains on the local communities and the capacity of the Government of Kenya to support and assist these growing populations.

As one of Kenya's most important partners, the United States is committed to supporting the Kenyan Government's overall goals of political, social, and economic reform—and we are dedicated to Kenya becoming a cornerstone of regional stability. Agriculture drives much of Kenya's economy, accounting for one-quarter of the gross domestic product and employing three-quarters of the labor force. As a result, the Government of Kenya has demonstrated a renewed commitment to agricultural development. Its Agricultural Sector Development Strategy aims to reduce poverty and food insecurity in line with the Millennium Development Goals, increase agricultural sales, transition from a state-owned to a private-sector-led system, and reform research and regulatory bodies to be more efficient and effective. Tariff reductions and policy reforms are showing early progress in this area.

Feed the Future has a robust approach to supporting Kenya's agricultural strategy, including market development, business service facilitation, natural resource management, farmer-friendly policies, organizational capacity building, and the economic empowerment of women. Through Feed the Future, USAID targeted value-chain activities involving maize, dairy, and horticulture have made significant progress in increasing agricultural productivity and rural incomes over the past seven years. Working with over 600,000 farmers, more than half of whom are women, USAID programs have demonstrated the potential of investing in agriculture while promoting equity.

In order to mitigate against future famines in Kenya, USAID is helping the country adapt to climate conditions that contribute to food insecurity through better management of their water, land, and other natural resources. The Government of Kenya is currently working on a country strategy for climate change management, and the Global Climate Change Initiative is supporting that strategy. USAID and its Kenyan partners will explore innovations in wind energy, solar energy, biomass, biogas, sustainable charcoal harvesting policies, and hydropower systems, which all have large- and small-scale applications that are cost-effective in rural areas where access to electricity is limited. Other projects will protect critical ecosystem services important to adaptation, including constructing water catchments, improving forest management, building the resilience of rangelands in arid and semi-arid pastoral areas, and promoting sustainable agronomic practices, including the use of drought-tolerant crops, water harvesting techniques, and drip irrigation farming. These approaches especially emphasize local community involvement in governance, for example, by establishing water and forest resource associations to oversee and implement national-level plans. USAID also works with pastoralist communities to improve their access to markets and trade activity, which increases incomes and improves food security.

Although Somalia has lacked a functioning central government for over two decades, Somalis have shown remarkable resiliency to difficult circumstances, developing robust telecommunications and economic networks, fueled mainly by the transfer of an estimated \$1 billion to \$2 billion a year from members of the Somali diaspora. The semi-autonomous Somaliland region has made significant progress in democratization and economic growth, seeing a successful and largely peaceful political transfer of power last summer.

Bringing about stability and security in Somalia is one of the Obama Administration's principal foreign policy priorities and seeks to accomplish four goals: ensuring Somalia is not a safe haven for international terrorists, preventing Somalia from destabilizing the region, responding to and mitigating humanitarian crises, and combating piracy. USAID is working within a dual-track to strengthen the Djibouti Peace Process, strengthen regional governments, and alleviate humanitarian needs.

Despite the difficult operating environment, USAID is working in Somaliland and other stable regions of the country to solidify progress and build more resilient communities. While the programs are smaller than those in neighboring countries, they are contributing piece by piece toward recovery. USAID support has given thousands of Somalis access to social services like health and education programs, including an interactive instruction program using radio and mobile phones to reach students across Somalia. Thousands more have benefited from community water projects that have not only mitigated humanitarian needs but also prevented conflicts over resources; 47,000 students and their families have directly benefited from rehabilitated or newly constructed wells and boreholes near schools, and 41,000 have benefited from community water projects, including city projects in Hargeisa and Garowe. More than 8,700 youth have participated in a youth livelihood program to address unemployment, a situation that has been exacerbated by the drought and other factors. USAID has also pioneered the use of SMS technology to connect students with potential job opportunities, notifying employers and job-seekers of matches. In Somaliland, Puntland, Galmaaduug, and other emerging local administrations, USAID is working on improving key livestock and agricultural value chains, rehabilitating infrastructure, and supporting good governance.

But make no mistake: we cannot work toward broad, long-term stability and resilience in most of Somalia until those who exercise control over the territory do so with the well-being of the Somali people as their first priority. The people suffering most from this terrible drought are those who live in areas controlled by armed groups motivated by personal interest.

Providing Assistance During Conflict

Nearly 60 percent of Department of State and USAID foreign assistance goes to 50 countries that are in, recovering from, or at high risk of armed conflict. The challenge of conflict prevention and management is not just a matter of responding to crises and shocks when they occur, but of addressing the dynamics of fragility that give rise to violence and vulnerability to disaster. The inverse of fragility is resilience—the capability to absorb shocks while maintaining political

stability, preventing violence, and making incremental progress toward sustainable peace and development.

Complex crises require robust, coordinated, and sustained approaches by the international humanitarian and development community. These approaches must extend beyond emergency response, early recovery and lay the groundwork for stability and sustainable development. We see the challenge of conflict prevention and management as not just a matter of responding to crises and shocks when they occur, but of addressing the root causes of fragility that give rise to violence and vulnerability to disaster to ensure that conflicts do not flare up again after the immediate crisis subsides. This integrated approach is core to USAID's broader development mission, because those countries that suffer from low levels of social cohesion and weak governance lack the foundation for sustained economic and socio-political development. The World Bank recently noted that, as a group, the most fragile states had yet to achieve a single Millennium Development Goal.

The United States was among the first donors to recognize that this unique development challenge required a distinct development response. USAID issued its Fragile States Strategy in 2005 and will soon issue a new policy paper on the development response to violent extremism. These approaches prioritize early recovery. Often referred to as the "missing middle," early recovery is the catalyst for longer-term reconstruction and development, and we are beginning this recovery earlier in the post-crisis response—sometimes implementing recovery and relief interventions simultaneously, when appropriate.

In Somalia USAID's strategic goal is to increase peace and stability through targeted interventions that foster good governance, support economic recovery, and reduce the appeal of extremism. One of USAID's flagship programs working to strengthen vulnerable communities impacted by the conflict is the Transition Initiatives for Stabilization (TIS) program. This program is the bridge between our immediate humanitarian assistance and our medium- to longer-term development programs that need peace and stability to be sustainable and effective. Through TIS, USAID conducts quick-impact, high-visibility work that creates short-term employment opportunities for at-risk youth, displaced people, and other vulnerable groups. As all projects are carried out in a consultative process between the local authorities and the community, they also allow the civilian population to do something good for their communities while interacting and engaging with a legitimate governance structure. This in turn furthers the program goals to mitigate conflict, promote stability and community cohesion, and strengthen and support relationships between residents and their government officials. To address emerging power vacuums, USAID is now exploring expanding TIS into the areas of Mogadishu recently vacated by Al Shabaab and other liberated pockets of the country.

Supporting a Path of Progress for South Sudan

East Africa has two faces. The face of conflict, insecurity, and corruption is the face many know best. But there is another—one of hope, progress, and promise. South Sudan, like Somalia, suffered over two decades of horrific conflict. Not that long ago, South Sudan seemed a place of

perpetual bad news, where the need for emergency assistance seemed to stretch endlessly into the future.

Not so today.

In 2005, peace-minded men and women demanded an end to the war. In the six years since, a better future for South Sudan has taken root. With the pride of becoming the world's newest nation, the Southern Sudanese today are vibrant with the energy of possibility.

While South Sudan's challenges hardly ended with independence, the Government of South Sudan, with USAID support, has built roads to facilitate trade with its neighbors; established systems to provide healthcare and education for its people; installed checks that ensure transparent management of its resources; and developed policies to protect its extraordinary natural resources.

USAID has been a partner to the Government of South Sudan since its inception under the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) as a semi-autonomous, subnational government, through today, as the government of the newly independent nation continues to establish the many structures needed to govern a pluralist democratic state.

During this important time of transition for South Sudan, USAID is implementing a two-year transition strategy that has the overall goal of an increasingly stable post-CPA South Sudan. Increasing stability in South Sudan will depend on a combination of strengthening core governance institutions and processes and making them more inclusive, responding to the expectations of the population for essential services and improved livelihoods, and containing conflicts while addressing the grievances behind them.

We will help South Sudan accomplish these goals through four development objectives: mitigating conflicts in flashpoint areas; strengthening effective, inclusive, and accountable governance; developing and maintaining essential services; and expanding agriculture-based economic opportunities.

One of South Sudan's greatest assets is its land. Nearly 85 percent of South Sudanese rely on agriculture for their livelihood, and while much of the land is arable, only 4 percent of the land is cultivated, and almost all farmers work at a subsistence level. The Government of South Sudan has made agriculture the centerpiece of its economic strategy to diversify away from oil and improve food security. By training farmers, providing better seeds and tools, and increasing farmers' access to markets where they can sell their crops, Feed the Future is contributing to the Government of South Sudan's aim to significantly increase its staple food production by 2013, which would help the new country become nearly self-sufficient in agriculture—and continue to propel it on its path of progress. We are working on plans now to help South Sudan hold its first agricultural trade fair later this year.

To help reduce and mitigate conflict, USAID is working in the volatile states of Jonglei, Upper Nile, Warrap, Lakes, Northern Bahr el Ghazal, and Unity, where conflict in many cases is fueled by competition over natural resources, including water and grazing land, as well as livestock.

USAID seeks to reduce and mitigate harmful effects of violent conflict and promote long-term stability in areas where violence is high and government presence is low by building the capacity of local authorities to extend their reach to rural areas where most conflict occurs, while providing productive economic activities to vulnerable groups. These efforts include the establishment of a high-frequency radio network across a vast swath of territory regularly affected by violence and insecurity, providing transportation equipment such as motorcycles and motorboats that enable government authorities to quickly respond to violence, and supporting indigenous peace initiatives to help local leaders address inter-ethnic violence. In at least a couple of instances this year, planned cattle raids that could have become violent were averted because of the effective use of the high-frequency radio network USAID established. We have also brought together youth from ethnic groups that have been in conflict with each other and fostered a new attitude of solidarity through training them to make soil blocks for construction, which are then used to build or rehabilitate local government buildings. This in turn helps local authorities to achieve more visibility and functional space to conduct their work. Some youth have used their new block-making skills to launch a private enterprise in areas where employment opportunities are nearly non-existent, and they have worked side by side with ethnic groups they may have known before only through conflict.

To help strengthen effective, inclusive, and accountable governance in South Sudan, USAID is targeting specific institutions, processes, and actors that played a critical role in advancing stability and building governance capacity during the CPA period. Political competition through more effective political parties and electoral processes and citizen engagement with government at the national and sub-national levels is critical to this support. We supported the process of drafting South Sudan's transitional constitution and engaging citizen participation in its review, and will support creation of a permanent constitution, while helping to improve citizen participation and oversight.

USAID also helped South Sudan create a fully functioning Central Bank, provided monetary policy advice on the country's new currency, and helped the Central Bank hold its first currency auction. We designed and supported development of a new tax system for South Sudan that will allow automated taxpayer registration and track individual payment information, replacing the manual system that was in use. We also helped South Sudan's central and state governments institute a financial management information system for transparent budget planning and tracking.

Despite these many development interventions, the vast majority of the population of South Sudan still lacks access to the essential services of education, health, nutrition, safe water, and sanitation because of ineffective service delivery systems, a weak enabling environment, and institutions lacking adequate governance, management, financial, and operational systems. To address this, USAID will support the ongoing delivery of essential services (with development and humanitarian assistance), build human and institutional capacity, develop systems, and improve the enabling environment for effective and increasingly sustainable essential services that meet the needs and demands of all South Sudanese.

As we assist the Government of South Sudan with these goals on the ground, we are also working closely across the U.S. Government and with other international partners of South

Sudan to plan an International Engagement Conference on development and investment in South Sudan that will provide the new nation a platform to present its development vision and investment framework, and to engage the international community in support of its development and private investment priorities. This conference will focus on the new government's policy commitments toward enhancing aid coordination, ensuring sound resource and revenue management, addressing the critical gap in human capital, creating a framework for governance and accountability, and engaging the private sector as a critical development actor. By placing itself squarely in the spotlight, the Government of South Sudan is boldly making itself accountable to their people and the international community to meeting these goals. If fulfilled, these commitments will become the architecture for the sound macroeconomic and governance foundation for a new nation. The conference will take place in Washington in the coming months.

The Long View

Climatic shocks are a daunting development challenge. No nation, large or small, rich or poor, is immune to their impact, and no nation can afford to sit idly by while the effects unfold. This drought is a stark reminder that we must act quickly and effectively to help Africa prepare for the wide-ranging, long-lasting environmental challenges. Without effective preparation for inevitable climatic shocks, Africa will only see the contributors to hunger, disease, and conflict increase. But if we work together on climate change across every sector, we can forge a way forward that not only prepares Africa's most vulnerable people to cope with new pressures, but also creates better opportunities, better living conditions, and better lives.

Addressing climate change, food insecurity, and poor health in east Africa requires a cooperative approach, so regional integration is crucial to achieving our objectives. USAID works closely with African regional institutions, which play a vital role in bringing together member states to address challenges that cross boundaries. USAID, working with the Departments of State and Defense, has increased its support to regional integration efforts by closely working with the African Union, the East African Community, COMESA, and other regional groups to ensure that common security and economic issues can be the platforms for creating peace and security in the region. Work with regional institutions is critical to reducing trade barriers and facilitating free markets, which are especially important for regional food security. We are also expanding our work with local organizations to build home-grown capacity and institutionalize our efforts to strengthen relations between the people and their governments to support lasting, sustainable civil society organizations, government institutions, and health care and education providers that can exist long after USAID support has run its course.

For USAID to accomplish its goals, we must get the most out of every taxpayer dollar spent—that is why we are committed to making crucial reforms that are already having an effect on our work in Africa. With an eye on cost-effectiveness and comparative advantages, USAID is leveraging and empowering America's private sector to achieve development goals, especially through Feed the Future. Smart USAID investments are paying off in Tanzania, where Feed the Future is leveraging the local private sector and working to truly transform food production and the economies of our African partners. In Kenya, through PEPFAR and the Global Health

Initiative, USAID coupled HIV/AIDS treatment to maternal and child health services, which extended the availability of reproductive health services from just two of the country's regions to all eight—and at no additional cost.

This year, USAID celebrates 50 years of the caring generosity of the American people, who believe that we can make the world a better and safer place if we use our wealth, expertise, and values to invest smartly. Africa matters to the American people. Our partnerships are based on mutual shared desire for peace, security, democracy, good governance, health, education, and economic opportunity for all.

Each of the countries I have discussed today represents a combination of hope, accomplishment, and challenges. The United States' overall investment in the Horn of Africa goes far beyond the immediate—yet crucial—emergency assistance. We are also investing for the long term so that millions throughout the region will be more equipped to withstand future emergencies.

Africa's future is driven by Africans, but the United States has a continued commitment to a partnership grounded in mutual responsibility and respect. We have a moral imperative to help to solve the planet's biggest humanitarian and development challenges, and a very real role in safeguarding the United States' national security and economic opportunities. As we continue to work with our partners toward our shared goals over the coming months, I very much look forward to a continued conversation on USAID efforts in Africa.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Payne, and members of the Subcommittee. I look forward to responding to any questions you might have.

Mr. SMITH. Ms. Jandhyala, thank you very much for your testimony and for the very detailed, extended testimony you have provided. It gives us a great deal of information and the subcommittee certainly needs that.

Let me ask you just a couple of questions. In our July hearing on Somalia, the USAID made it very clear that FEWS NET, the Famine Early Warning System, made it clear that there was a famine perhaps, or a drought certainly, on its way as early as last year. We knew that, and our Government wasn't able to preposition food, but in your opinion was the handoff of that information to taking action done as swiftly as it could or should have been? Or were there gaps somewhere that we could learn from so if there were gaps it doesn't happen again?

Ms. JANDHYALA. We have worked over the last year with our FEWS NET colleagues, our international partners, tracking the situation. And I think we've done an enormous, we've put in an enormous effort into reaching out to, informing host country governments, partners in the region, the U.N. agencies, to see how we can jointly work together on this. I'm sure there are some things that we can improve on. However, our biggest constraint continues to be working with host country governments and advancing and working with them to strengthen and respond to their populations.

Mr. SMITH. We seem to have been taken by at least some surprise by the severity and pervasiveness of the famine. Was it more than what the FEWS NET and some of the analyses that went into what might be coming their way? Or did we just miss something?

Ms. JANDHYALA. I think the failure of the rains in the first October, November, that was recognized. And then the recent poor rains in June, July has intensified the problem that we've been dealing with. But it is a difficult situation that we're having to deal with.

Mr. SMITH. I guess what I'm getting at is: Was there anywhere along the chain of command where good, actionable information might have been missed about the severity of this drought? And if there wasn't, please say so.

Ms. JANDHYALA. As far as our colleagues tell us that we were able to take that information and turn it into an action plan and to preposition, to inform, to educate and seek access immediately to get to those areas and find creative ways such as voucher programs to see how we can be creative in how we deliver assistance in this circumstance.

Mr. SMITH. Now on the voucher programs, have you found that empowering people, particularly with work so they can buy locally-grown foodstuffs, is preferable to just bringing food in? Is that one of the reasons why some of it was stolen in the first place because it was in competition with local merchants?

Ms. JANDHYALA. It's a multi-track process. One is delivering food. The other is vouchers. So we're trying to find as many different ways that we can minimize the impact of this crisis on the population. And sometimes, our visibility into what's going on in these communities also restricts us on how we track this. So we're working on a monitoring system with our partners on the ground.

Mr. SMITH. Is there an analysis about whether or not more vouchers are needed, rather than less?

Ms. JANDHYALA. Currently, we have \$8 million in our voucher program and we've launched it, so we're now assessing with our teams. How do we expand it, what are the consequences of this program, vis-à-vis other types of assistance we're delivering, and if there's room for improvement in how we roll this, expand this type of activity out.

Mr. SMITH. When will those kinds of decisions be made?

Ms. JANDHYALA. We're in discussion at the moment, so we should come back to you and your staff within the next few weeks.

Mr. SMITH. Let me ask you about licensing. I think everyone on this committee is very concerned about the fact that non-U.S. supported NGOs who have people on the ground, partners with whom they can collaborate with have not—they've been given a general verbal "you won't be prosecuted," but why hasn't that translated into a durable statement of something in hand where the NGOs will not be fearful of prosecution, and who would make that decision? And will it be made, in your view, soon? Because it seems to me we're losing an asset on the ground to feed hungry people because of a concern that somehow we might be aiding and abetting al-Shabaab.

Ms. JANDHYALA. I think we're committed to trying to get as many different partners to take part in this effort to minimize the impact with the population. We are committed and our colleagues at the State Department and Treasury are currently working to see how we can review the situation on a case-by-case basis and I think we can provide additional information in the coming weeks. These discussions are on-going at the moment in the administration regarding.

Mr. SMITH. Is the problem the Treasury Department? Are they the ones who are objecting to USAID's requests? It seems to me with this drought and its consequences growing worse by the moment, why wouldn't you want to just get this done today, for example?

Ms. JANDHYALA. The discussions are ongoing at the moment amongst all of us, USAID, Treasury, and State, and we're trying to balance what's the impact. Even if we move forward, what are the issues of access and security. So we'd be able to give additional information as these conversations conclude.

Mr. SMITH. I guess what I'm trying to get at is where is the bottleneck? Is it at Treasury? Is USAID actively advocating for the provision of those licenses to these NGOs? Especially since they are people on the ground who know the risks and are indigenous Somalians in most cases, willing to get that food. But there may have to be some collaboration, some contact with al-Shabaab, and they fear prosecution. It seems to me that you take that off the table, and you talked about opportunities a moment ago, a new opportunity for relief will find its way to those people.

Ms. JANDHYALA. I think our State Department colleagues have spent a lot of time with the diaspora community as well as our leadership trying to identify where the opportunities exist and what kind of a process we need to put in place. And I think the discussions are ongoing.

Mr. SMITH. Okay, but again I'm trying to get at where the bottleneck is. Is it Treasury?

Ms. JANDHYALA. I couldn't say, sir, because we're still continuing the discussions.

Mr. SMITH. I do think there is a great deal of support, certainly on this subcommittee for ensuring that those licenses are granted ASAP and I would say today with an exclamation point.

Ms. JANDHYALA. I'll take that—

Mr. SMITH. Please do.

Ms. JANDHYALA. I will.

Mr. SMITH. I would think that a call from the Secretary of State to whoever may be the bottleneck in Treasury, if that's where it's at could undo a huge long pipeline of discussions that could mean more dead or severely hurt people. So please take that back and if you could apprise us soon as to what you find out.

In his testimony, Kent Hill of World Vision says that U.S. response to the worst drought in the Horn of Africa in 60 years is only 60 percent of what it was for the 2008 drought in the region. My question is where is the missing funding? According to what the U.N. has said is needed, there is about a \$1 billion funding gap. I know in past crises, I've been here 31 years and no matter who is in the White House and at State Department, at USAID, money is often in something as catastrophic as this is, drawn down from multiple spigots as you're doing and from multiple accounts.

Is there going to be an effort to draw down additional dollars and hopefully get it back to those sources later, to meet this emergency crisis? I mean \$600 million, we're all happy and grateful for that, but it seems that there needs to be more.

And secondly, if I could, I know Saudi Arabia has stepped up with some \$60 million. I might be wrong on that number. But is there a move to try to get our Persian Gulf allies who might have much more persuasion with al-Shabaab leaders to use their diplomatic efforts to open up more areas so people get food and medicine?

Ms. JANDHYALA. On the first issue about funding, there will be a mini summit on the Horn of Africa at the sidelines of UNGA in the next 2 weeks. And part of that discussion is discussing about the current status of the appeal that's been put out by the U.N. agencies.

The other issue is also what our partners in the region, Turkey has stepped up. The OIC partners have stepped up, Saudi Arabia. So what we're trying to see is how can the U.N. harness all of these funding sources to account for what the gap is. So there is currently an on-going assessment that we're working with our U.N. partners to assess where the funding gaps are, given that the non-traditional partners have also provided leadership and providing their own funding to the situation.

So we can come back to you once we have a better picture on that gap analysis and then we're able to adjust our funding accordingly. But we wanted to really work with and take advantage and leverage all these other funding partners that traditionally have provided leadership and stepped up in the situation. I know Turkey is wanting to work with us to see how we can coordinate programs. AU is working with us. We really try to see what the actual picture of the gap is because for us it's not the funding at the moment. It's access and security. But even if it is funding, how do we account

for all these other nontraditional partners and how do we take advantage of theirs and see how we can use their money in areas that we can't use our monies and sources of funding. That's the discussion we're having with our U.N. colleagues at the moment.

Mr. SMITH. Finally, in Dadaab, the world's largest refugee camp, what is being done to ensure that sex trafficking, sex for food and other kind of gender-based violence is hopefully being stopped, and where there is a violence, where have those who have committed it been held to account and the victims given assistance?

Ms. JANDHYALA. I know that our colleagues at PRM at State, our own gender advisor, Carla Koppell, has been out there and we're working—the coping mechanisms that the people in the refugee camps has led to some behavior, frustration and leading to some of the protection issues that we're dealing with. So what we have done is to see how we can work with the UNHCR and the Kenyan Government and other partners to see how better we can put a protection and see how we can deal with the gender-based violence. That is a priority for us.

As you know Deputy Steinberg of the Agency has made a commitment to this and we are currently working to see what systems, what policies and what programs we need to put in place into those camps to address that. It's a major worry for us and given that it leaves this population much more vulnerable than other situations we've seen around the world.

Mr. SMITH. I would ask—I probably didn't phrase it as a question, but do you anticipate further drawdown from various accounts to exceed the \$600 million on the near term? And how much do you anticipate would be needed over the next several months?

Ms. JANDHYALA. I think for now we're working with our \$600 million that we have pulled in from. Once we have this conversation with the U.N. and the partners we'll explore to see where the needs are and then come back and really explore what flexibilities and what support we might need from you to allow us to do that as well.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. We certainly have a question in regard to the licensing. I would also like to have it clarified. The meeting that was held several days after we adjourned, the Administrator Raj Shah attended it and many of the NGO groups were there, CARE and Oxfam and most of them. But the concern at that time about the whole question of licensing, and as we know the agencies take a lot of risk, first of all, to have an interest and still try and I just have to commend people who put their lives in harm's way. The World Food Program since 2008 has lost 14 workers, have been killed trying to deliver life-saving food and aid to Somali civilians, so we do have some very heroic people. I've met some of them on my last trip to Mogadishu about 2 years ago when I visited there last. But then to worry about the license or whether their agency is going to be held liable if some of the food falls into the hands of al-Shabaab, to me, really is putting a cart before the horse. I mean it's bad if al-Shabaab did get control of some of the food as we have heard.

However, I think there was too much holding back or not enough clarification to agencies who were willing to put themselves out

there in harm's way, but worried about the legal consequences if some of the food they had fell into the hands of some of the bad people. You know, it seems to me that the overall goal should have been saving the children, saving the women, saving the people in need.

However, it seems like, Mr. Smith asked, it was Treasury fooling around with whether a license could be issued or not issued. And can you explain is that issue clear and can the NGOs and PVOs work without worrying about if indeed something fell in the hands of some less than desirable groups, that they're going to be held accountable and prosecuted? Absolutely. I mean they were fearful at that meeting, it was unclear. It was several weeks ago. And I think that many lives would have been saved if we didn't fool around about a license and some food falling into the hands of the wrong people. Children were dying while we were trying to debate in court was legal, what was not. Should we allow it? We were on the Voice of America, there was a program 3 or 4 weeks ago where NPR, did any food fall in the hands—the chairman made it clear and myself that it's unfortunate if some falls in, we hope it didn't. However, the basis goal is to try to save lives. And so I just wonder if that issue has been clarified.

Ms. JANDHYALA. Mr. Payne, I agree with you. Our commitment is about saving lives. After recently coming from my recent visit, it can't be anything other than our commitment to save lives. We're approaching this on two tracks, as I mentioned earlier. One is everything who receives U.S. funding is covered by the license. The other is those who are not being funded by U.S. Government, that's the ongoing discussion at the moment.

So we're encouraging as many people as possible to work with us to see how we can take advantage and efficiently maximize in working with us in that regard. The ongoing discussion about the second track, non-U.S. Government funding, those discussions are being had at the moment.

Mr. PAYNE. We were just chatting. People need to be assured with a legal document in hand. Agencies are still reluctant to know whether they are going to be, like I said, not only cited, but prosecuted and fines and penalties and I don't know if it probably goes as far as imprisonment. This seems to me that sometimes it's great to have lawyers around, but I think that we really, and I'm not blaming you. I'm sure you would love—that's what you do, you give food out. You're not trying to hold it in. However, perhaps we have the wrong agency here. We really need to see if we can get through this red tape.

We have currently as it's been indicated, \$604 million. Now how does the DART team in the countries there? Are they a separate entity and how is that operating?

Ms. JANDHYALA. We have the DART team in Nairobi and Addis and their primary function is to identify and coordinate with other partner response agencies so they work with on three functions, how efficiently to get our resources out there, find creative partners who can help us deliver the assistance, work with host country systems to see where we can bring greater efficiency to their services and lastly, to work with partners. It's a real rapid, real time team

that's on the ground trying to build better management of the situation.

Mr. PAYNE. And how has the fundraising with the other countries, I think we mentioned that the Arab League finally came in with something. We know we did \$604 million. Where did the other nations, any other large donors?

Ms. JANDHYALA. The United Kingdom, which is one of our other partners, currently is providing \$115 million. The EU has committed to \$300 million. So we're trying to find how best to pull all of our resources together to impact this.

Each of us has our own restrictions, our own programs, so we're working—and the World Bank has committed to \$500 million for disaster recovery and development. So in the next week or 2, we're trying to bring all of us together and look at not only about the emergency, but also the long term recovery efforts where maybe we should start doing some things now that lend to a greater resiliency and recovery in the coming months.

Mr. PAYNE. Now at the Dadaab camp, what is the current population? Two years ago—there's a lot of people now, but I understand that the growth has grown by maybe 25 percent, 20 percent since that time. What is the current estimated number of people actually in the camp? And I assume that many of them can't actually physically get into the camp, so are they in the surrounding areas? And how are they serviced? Are they serviced as if, in fact, they were in the camp with rations, etcetera?

Ms. JANDHYALA. The camps right now are hosting about 440,000 refugees, more than 116,000 which have arrived since January. Approximately 1500 new refugees are arriving on a daily basis. So our colleagues at the State Department are closely working with the Kenyan Government about opening up the new site, the new refugee camp to relieve some pressure off the original camp.

The services are being delivered in some ways trying to help WFP and others, loosen some procedures up, so that the food and the immediate services goes to these populations. So there is a full effort now to maybe be creative in a way that we not just view it as a physical camp, but led by needs and services, rather than saying somebody who is in the camp, because expecting 1500 people a day in, it's hard for people to say where they belong and in which physical location.

Mr. PAYNE. Just a final question or two. A number of Somalis have gone into Ethiopia which is really great that they've opened their borders. However, as you know, in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia the Somalia population is at odds with the central government. I have spoken to just recently, just today in person, one of the ONLF representatives who allege that in the Ogaden region there is difficulty and less than a uniform delivery of relief supplies.

Have you heard of any complaint of this nature at the State Department, to your knowledge or at USAID?

Ms. JANDHYALA. I'm not aware of anything, but what I could do is check with our colleagues in Ethiopia, our mission in Ethiopia and our State colleagues and come back to you with some additional information on that.

Mr. PAYNE. I really would like to have you follow up on that. And finally, I spoke to the second person in charge in Eritrea a week ago and asked about the situation there. Of course, as you know, they indicate that they have had a bumper crop last year and they also purchased expecting a problem this year. And I have been asked to come and visit if time permitted.

Have you had any conversations with the Government of Eritrea? There had seemed to be a lack of communication with the government. I know there sometimes has been some difficulty, but hopefully, there will be some ongoing conversations between the officials of Eritrea and the U.S. Government. What is your assessment? I was told that if they needed help, they would indeed be in touch with us. So I can just take it at that word.

Ms. JANDHYALA. We don't have an AID mission in Eritrea. However, the European Union is a big partner of the Eritrean Government, so a lot of our visibility into the humanitarian situation has been through our partners who have presence and programs there. What I could do is talk to our State colleagues and our colleagues, partner colleagues at the EU to see where we can get additional information on the crops, the situation about the food.

Mr. PAYNE. I have one last question. In regard to South Sudan, there was a donor, a conference, I was really unclear, but Ambassador Steinberg was going to have a bit to do with. And of course, Ambassador Steinberg is an outstanding person and usually does a great job on his projects. However, I was wondering what happened to the conference that was scheduled to begin about 2, 3 weeks from now?

Ms. JANDHYALA. We're committed, the President made the commitment to this International Engagement Conference for the new country to come to Washington and meet a variety of partners that could help them in implementing their development vision.

We had talked to them about coming as a new government with a new cabinet and they appointed their cabinet and installed their cabinet last Friday. So we thought between now and then, UNGA, which is in the next 2 weeks, that they would not really have the time necessary to cohesively come with the policy vision. And we wanted them to succeed at the conference and wanted to give them an additional time to engage us on their development vision.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you, we look forward to that.

Ms. JANDHYALA. We hope to have all of you participate as well.

Mr. PAYNE. Great. And also, there still seems to be some confusion in parts of State Department about South Sudan not being on sanctions. So maybe you could bump into anybody over at State, tell them it's a new country, and not a part of Khartoum any more.

Ms. JANDHYALA. I'll carry that message, sir.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Carnahan.

Mr. CARNAHAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Ranking Member again for leading us today. Thank you for being here and for the work that you do.

I wanted to follow up. My colleague from New Jersey, Mr. Payne's question about Deputy Administrator Steinberg, when he recently returned from the region, he indicated that emergency humanitarian response must put women front and center in the proc-

ess assuring that they address not just the victims of the current emergency, but make them part of key solutions going forward. He further stated that the U.S. is involving women as planners and officers and recipients on programs including relief to pregnant women and projects to prevent and respond to disturbing reports of sexual violence.

I want to commend the administration on making these priorities and with women and children disproportionately vulnerable to malnutrition, disease, sexual and gender-based violence in the wake of this crisis, I think these issues are critical and especially challenging.

I'd like to hear you elaborate more on the strategy to ensure that these most vulnerable populations are supported through the recovery efforts and how they really fit in to the long-term development process?

Ms. JANDHYALA. Deputy Steinberg in our Agency has really made this an agenda of everything we do across all the sectors, health, education, agriculture. It's really a multi-sectoral commitment and we work sort of at three levels, one at the policy level in these host countries to ensure that women participate in this decision-making process when decisions are being made about camps and about food deliveries, that they should be influencing these decisions. On my recent visit, I have seen other camps and I have never seen a camp that is so full of women and children as I've seen both in Ethiopia and Kenya. And sometimes it becomes a hard thing to kind of absorb at the enormity of the suffering that they face.

And so we have made commitment to three levels. One is that they participate during this process and not just be recipients of assistance because a lot of times we tend to say we treated this many women. Our push right now is to say we need these women to participate in the decision-making process in the policies that are made. The other big issue is access to assets, land and credit. Because in any household women make some of these decisions about children's education, food security. So we think part of it is making food security, having women participate in food security and production, land, access to credit.

We're working with the African women in agriculture research and development to help us think through these strategies much more and especially in crisis situation. We have a lot of knowledge on how to do deal with it in the longer term, but we really have to ramp up our efforts in these complex crises and go beyond just protection. And how can we make them productive because so far we deal with protection, but we also want to deal with economic viability of households which is dependent on women.

Mr. CARNAHAN. When you were there, share with the committee some of the impact of that involvement in terms of getting better results.

Ms. JANDHYALA. In the camp in Ethiopia, I found that the decisions around water, decisions around health care were really meaningful in the way that we were able to say how to not only survive this crisis, but let's start talking about how do we recover from it. That provided sort of a hope and that allowed people to be motivated because a lot of—as the chairman and Mr. Payne have said,

a lot of women made tough decisions walking to these camps, leaving children behind and—sorry.

Mr. CARNAHAN. Thank you. The other issue I wanted to ask about on my time here is on climate change. Under the generous clock of the chairman, climate change, one of the causes of the drought, what should we be doing to help mitigate the impacts of climate change on vulnerable countries? Scientific evidence suggests that extreme weather events such as flooding and drought will likely become even more severe in terms of frequency and severity around the globe, but especially in areas like Horn of Africa.

Can you talk with us about the administration's global climate change initiative, address these trends especially in Africa and what else we need to be doing to address those?

Ms. JANDHYALA. From an AID perspective, we deal with communities who face water shortages, who lose livestock because of lack of rain. We deal with the impact and the consequences. So one of our efforts is working with local governments. For example, in Ethiopia, before the drought we did a commercial de-stocking program where they didn't have to wait until the livestock died and lost all their asset bases. So we said is it possible to sell off some of your livestock now, get some income and be prepared to deal with purchasing food within a few months' time when we know you will not be able to grow crops.

The other is water management. In northern Kenya with the pastoral community, Mr. Chairman, that you mentioned, our objective there is some pastoral communities are able to adapt and move near rivers and maybe start farming. Others aren't. So we have to—we're working on two tracks within our Feed the Future. One is how to sort of have them engage in the market, link them to the on-going markets where food production areas to food deficit areas. And the other is give them tools to manage the resources they need to sustain their lifestyle currently.

It's a very complex combination of factors of managing livestock, land, water, and at the community level that's where we have worked and continue to work with in most of the Horn at least today. I can bring some additional information through your staff about what we're doing throughout the continent. Today, I sort of have focused on East Africa, but we're willing to share that information with you.

Mr. CARNAHAN. Thank you. I'd certainly like to see that and again, thank you for being here.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Carnahan. Ms. Bass?

Ms. BASS. First of all, I wanted to thank the chair and ranking member for putting this hearing on and all the work that you've done over this year and I especially want to thank the witness for your work, your contributions and I've never been to one of the refugee camps, so I can't even imagine the suffering that you must have seen.

You were giving some examples in regard to climate change, but I wanted to ask if maybe you had a couple of other examples about how USAID is addressing the long-term needs of the region since we know that the cycles of drought and famine occur, recurrently. Maybe you could point out a couple of other examples?

Ms. JANDHYALA. Our \$3 billion of development assistance, the region is amazingly dynamic, even with the drought. It leads in terms of trade. It leads in terms of financial services, innovative mobile banking. I mean on a development front, the regional integration platforms, the infrastructure that's being discussed within Tanzania, Uganda, and Kenya, it is a very vibrant economy that is in that region at the moment.

So what we have said is we make a commitment to how do we create economic opportunity in that region? How do we improve governance in that region? And our investments long term have actually helped us think through why is it that we're not—how do we mitigate? We can't avoid another drought or shortage of rain, but we can mitigate it. We can lessen the impact. We can be more responsive as the chairman said, and quicker. Where have we learned our lessons? So we're spending an enormous amount of time with the governments themselves saying that as Mr. Payne has said in the '60s, '80s, '90s, we need them to commit. So our huge effort is a reform agenda with the governments to make policy commitments now so that we don't have to face the same situation over and over in the coming years.

For us, the development assistance is the long-term solution to the region and I think that Feed the Future, unlocking the agriculture productivity in that region is key to stability in that region because nearly 80 percent of the population earns income in the agriculture sector. So productivity is our commitment and governance is a huge commitment to the region and regional integrations where they take advantage of it, so if there are food deficit areas and food productive areas, how do we create the markets to link them because we may not be able to grow food in all parts of the region, but we need to make sure that the food that is grown is reaching populations that can access it.

Ms. BASS. Thank you. On governance, I did want to ask you a question about that. The area that I represent in Los Angeles, there's a neighborhood that's referred to as Little Ethiopia. And it's a commercial area, but there's a lot of Ethiopians that live in the area and they are always talking to me about democracy and human rights, especially in the wake of the 2010 elections. And a little bit off subject, but I wanted to know if you could kind of address that in terms of what we're doing to support the democratic efforts since they will ask me when I get back.

Ms. JANDHYALA. AID approaches this issue from two tracks. One is strengthening civil society in terms of participation because as long as you don't have populations participating and making these choices about their future that's always our biggest constraint. We're providing tools. We're providing instruments. But at the end of the day you do need a population that participates. So we're working on that.

The other is a much more interesting thing that we're doing in Ethiopia, actually, at local governments. We're working with the governments about social accountability, so whether they're delivering health services or education, we have had much better success with local governments having populations participate in those decisions. So we feel that we try to use different platforms to get the communities participating and holding local officials account-

able for those services that they've made commitments to. And that's our big effort right now in many parts of Ethiopia working and deploying to reach, working with regional governments. And our State colleagues continue to work on the broader governance issues in the country.

Ms. BASS. And then finally, just one last question. I know that there will be some cuts in the next year's budget and I wanted to know if any of the cuts that are being proposed would impact the Food for Peace and international disaster assistance, would affect your ability to respond to the current emergency or is it something we need to take a look at again?

Ms. JANDHYALA. As of today, we don't see it. We're not experiencing it. But I think once we have this conversation on the sidelines of UNGA about where the international resources are flowing to, we have a better idea where the gaps are and then come back and review where our situation is.

Ms. BASS. Thank you.

Mr. SMITH. Just a couple of follow ups. If you could, Ms. Jandhyala, get back to us early next week to the subcommittee?

Ms. JANDHYALA. Yes.

Mr. SMITH. And update us on the progress or lack of progress on the licenses in that conversation. Because it seems to me delay is denial, and if there's something we can do, we'll ask Treasury to come here and provide their rationale for denial of those licenses. It seems to me that a call from the Secretary of State would do this, at least I would think. This is that urgent.

So if you could let us know by early next week exactly what the lay of the land is, that would be most appreciative, and we'll share it immediately with all the members of the subcommittee for sure.

Secondly, if you could, on Iran's PR wire there's a story that they are now providing their eleventh convoy, this one some 40 tons of relief material, food, medicine and the like, and this is their eleventh time. So they seem to be responding for whatever reason, humanitarian or political or both.

My question is what is your take on that? Is it real? Are they really providing foodstuff? Is this something that is just being done for PR purposes?

Secondly, with regards to the Persian Gulf states, Saudi Arabia has some \$500 million a day in oil profits. They've provided \$60 million in relief which obviously is welcomed, but my question is what kind of robust diplomacy is being done among our Persian Gulf allies, including Saudi Arabia which would have, I think, the most to contribute to meet that billion-dollar gap and to do it immediately. Who is coordinating that? Are the phone calls being made, especially in light of the excessive wealth of countries like Saudi Arabia?

Ms. JANDHYALA. On the first two, I'll come back with additional information regarding—I'll take back your request and come back—I'll take back your request to our colleagues about the discussion on the licensing.

On the issue about Saudi Arabia and the diplomatic strategy with our Gulf partners, there's an intense effort by our State Department colleagues in the region, outside the region, nontraditional donors, at every opportunity we have, at UNGA, at G-20, at

every international event and bilateral discussions this topic has been raised with our partners. And that's led by our State Department colleagues. And we're working closely with them by providing them information on where and how they can participate in this large international effort, humanitarian effort and development effort for the recovery.

The other issue is some have started on recovery activities, so we're also trying—not everybody wants to deal with the immediate humanitarian. Some would like to focus on recovery issues. So we're catering to both those conversations at the moment, but there is a large, intense effort by our State Department colleagues to move this agenda forward.

Mr. SMITH. I want to thank you, Ms. Jandhyala, very much for your testimony. We look forward to hearing from you early next week. Thank you for your service.

Ms. JANDHYALA. Thank you for having me.

Mr. SMITH. We will now welcome our second panel to the witness table and I'll do the official introductions. Beginning first with Ms. Katherine Zimmerman from the American Enterprise Institute. Ms. Zimmerman is a foreign policy analyst at the AEI critical threat project. As AEI's team leader for the Gulf of Aden region, her work has focused on al-Qaeda and its associated movements in the Arabian Peninsula and the Horn of Africa. Ms. Zimmerman specializes in the Yemen-based group al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and Somalia's al-Qaeda link, al-Shabaab. She has conducted numerous briefings for policy makers, published analyses of U.S. national security interest in Yemen and Somalia.

We'll then hear from Dr. Kent Hill, who joined World Vision in February 2011 after more than three decades serving in the U.S. Government and in academic and nonprofit leadership roles. As head of the World Vision U.S. international programs, he collaborates with World Vision's international partners to coordinate the allocation of government grants and donations from individuals and corporations. From 2001 to 2005, Dr. Hill served as head of USAID's Bureau for Europe and Eurasia. Between 2005 and 2009, he led USAID's Bureau for Global Health heading up their health programs and representing them in several large health initiatives.

I will note that while Dr. Hill was Assistant Administrator for Global Health in the Bush administration, I asked him to administratively initiate a robust fistula program within USAID. I'm happy to say that he did so and did it wholeheartedly with a great deal of skill and compassion. Thanks to this program, USAID has dedicated nearly \$60 million to address fistula between FY 2005 and 2010 and approximately 20,000 women have received fistula repair surgery since 2005 and had he not taken that leadership role, I can tell you that would not have happened. We had passed a bill. I sponsored it. Passed in the House, died in the Senate. We asked if administratively Dr. Hill could initiate that program, and he did. We're now in some 30 USAID-supported fistula repair centers, mostly in Africa, in 11 countries and again 20,000 women have received repair.

Then we'll hear from Ms. Shannon Scribner of Oxfam who has been with Oxfam since 2003 and is currently leading the humanitarian policy team in Washington, DC. She was worked on many

of Oxfam's humanitarian responses around the world including in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Liberia, Ethiopia, and Somalia. She has testified previously before Congress and has been interviewed on humanitarian topics by many well-known media outlets.

Ms. Scriber began her career as a healthcare volunteer in a small rural village in Zambia.

Ms. Zimmerman, if you could begin.

STATEMENT OF MS. KATHERINE ZIMMERMAN, GULF OF ADEN TEAM LEAD, CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE

Ms. ZIMMERMAN. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, members of the subcommittee, it is an honor to appear before you today to discuss this important topic. Before I begin, I would like to direct you to a reference map of Somalia provided in an appendix to my statement. I will briefly outline al-Shabaab's history with humanitarian assistance before going into detail about current conditions and the issue of providing humanitarian assistance in al-Shabaab controlled territory.

Al-Shabaab's position toward humanitarian assistance has evolved over the years as hard-line, radical Islamists gained prominence in the group. Since mid-2009, the group has progressively banned many Western organizations claiming that they have a Christian agenda and do not pursue the interests of the Somali people. Local NGOs also face pressure from al-Shabaab for working with these groups.

Al-Shabaab's leadership particularly targeted the U.N.'s World Food Program. First, al-Shabaab prohibited all branded aid, including aid with the American flag on it. Then, it required the World Food Program to only purchase food locally and to empty all food warehouses by the end of 2009. On January 1, 2010, al-Shabaab militants raided a World Food Program warehouse in Marka and burned over 300 sacks of food. The World Food Program responded by suspending its operations in the south, citing a lack of security. It has not been able to resume operations there.

The experience of the World Food Program is not unique. By mid-September 2010, at least seven other agencies were banned from al-Shabaab's territories. The organizations that remain face restrictions on activities and many are subject to some form of taxation. Al-Shabaab's actions have exacerbated the effects of the drought in the region.

In early July this year, al-Shabaab's spokesman announced that "all aid agencies whose objective is only humanitarian relief are free to operate." Despite this proclamation, agencies such as the World Food Program are still banned. There have been certain openings into the south. UNICEF, for example, has delivered supplies into Baidoa, the capital of Bay region. By and large, however, al-Shabaab remains hostile to most international aid agencies.

Many Somali families, unable to survive under al-Shabaab's rule, are fleeing. In response, al-Shabaab has established roadblocks along primary travel routes and has forced truckloads of people to turn back. Residents have also been required to feed al-Shabaab militants or face punishment for refusing to do so. The group pub-

licizes its drought-relief work, but the sheer number of people leaving its territory is indicative of the poor conditions and the limited access to food.

It is necessary to recognize very real restrictions on humanitarian aid activities when considering the prospect of expanding operations into southern and central Somalia. First, the humanitarian operating environment is precarious even without the presence of al-Shabaab. There have already been attacks on aid convoys in Bay and Hiran regions during which at least one aid worker was killed. The only clear realized gains since the U.N. first deployed peacekeeping forces in 1992 have been made in Mogadishu, where a peacekeeping force assists the Transitional Federal Government or the TFG.

The African Union Mission in Somalia or AMISOM, has a force presence of about 9,000 peacekeepers. Territory outside of the TFG and AMISON's control is contested by armed factions and it is likely that any insertion of resources into such a volatile environment will result in violence. A significant escalation in humanitarian activities throughout southern and central Somalia will very likely increase the risk to aid workers' safety.

Second, while al-Shabaab is not the only obstacle to humanitarian relief in Somalia, it is clearly the greatest threat to aid workers. Al-Shabaab's shura council has made clear that it will not accept the presence of many international humanitarian aid organizations and has enforced this ban with violence. Humanitarian aid organizations are ill equipped to deal with the threat posed to their personnel by al-Shabaab militants and it would be naive to ignore the security aspect of any humanitarian operation there.

Third, al-Shabaab has a very strong power base in major cities in the south such as the ports of Marka and Kismaayo. There's a high likelihood that any humanitarian operation, which would entail establishing security in the heartland of al-Shabaab's territory, would be met with significant armed resistance. Al-Shabaab is able to operate military training camps openly and will be able to call up forces quickly. Its militias have already exhibited the ability to withstand AMISOM operations in Mogadishu, especially during its 2010 Ramadan offensive. It has taken a 50 percent increase in peacekeeping troops and sustained effort by the TFG to develop its own security forces to reestablish temporary control over the majority of the capital. Whereas in Mogadishu, al-Shabaab conducted an insurgency against AMISOM and TFG troops, in southern Somalia, al-Shabaab is the dominant power.


An armed conflict in southern Somalia will likely require the deployment of ground forces that could readily defeat al-Shabaab.

The decision to pursue a humanitarian operation in southern Somalia ought to be made with these substantial costs in mind. Opting for humanitarian aid operation will likely require a military commitment. Seeking to purchase consent from or to cooperate with al-Shabaab to insert humanitarian assistance incurs future costs. Purchasing consent does not guarantee future security or even the delivery of assistance to the people in need. What it does, however, is fund a virulent radical insurgence group that has stated its intentions to attack America, and has increasingly established ties to al-Qaeda's operational franchise, al-Qaeda in the Ara-

bian Peninsula across the Gulf of Aden in Yemen. Cooperating with al-Shabaab will likely permit it to dictate aid distribution strengthening the group.

A humanitarian operation to respond to the spreading famine, however morally imperative, must not be undertaken without an understanding of the full requirements and the associated risks. I thank the subcommittee for its attention.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Zimmerman follows:]



Statement before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs
Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, and Human Rights
On "Addressing the Humanitarian Emergency in East Africa"

Al Shabaab and the Challenges of Providing Humanitarian Assistance in Somalia

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The views expressed in this testimony are those of the author alone and do not necessarily represent those of the American Enterprise Institute.

Somalia is one of the most inimical countries to humanitarian aid workers. The security context and the humanitarian operational environment that both local and international aid agencies face have severely restricted humanitarian activities, particularly in areas under the control of the radical Islamist group, al Shabaab. Aid organizations responded to al Shabaab's threats by limiting areas of operations or fully suspending operations in southern Somalia. The majority of the organizations that remain active in Somalia have concentrated operations in and around territory under government control in Mogadishu, territory under the control of government-aligned administrations in central Somalia, and in the semi-autonomous regions in northern Somalia of Puntland and Somaliland. In the south, the withdrawal of humanitarian aid organizations has exacerbated the effect of the Horn's severe drought on the Somali people.

The drought in the Horn of Africa has left over 3.2 million Somalis in need of immediate food assistance. Of these, 2.8 million live in southern Somalia, an area that has proven to be the most inaccessible in the country. There is a famine in Bay and Lower Shabelle region, in parts of Middle Shabelle and Bakool regions, in the internally displaced persons (IDP) camps in the Afgoi Corridor, and also in the IDP camps in Mogadishu. The UN has noted that two other regions, Lower and Middle Jubba regions, are expected to be experiencing famine conditions. The hardest-hit regions remain under the control of al Shabaab.

Denial of access by al Shabaab militants, and in some cases by other armed militias, is the single greatest obstacle to the provision of humanitarian assistance, as noted in the UN's most recent monitoring group report. Al Shabaab not only creates a prohibitive security environment, but also restricts humanitarian operations in southern Somalia. The group has banned many international aid agencies from operating within territories under its control. Al Shabaab has enforced this ban with violence: militants raid local offices, destroy foodstuffs and medical supplies, and kidnap aid workers. The group's actions against aid organizations have created the humanitarian emergency that many Somalis now face.

Al Shabaab's History with Humanitarian Assistance

Al Shabaab has increasingly become an obstacle to the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Somalia, the majority of which consists of food aid. There has been an evolution in al Shabaab's position toward international aid organizations. Over the years, the group has solidified its stance against the activities of aid organizations, claiming that many American and UN-funded organizations have a "Christian" agenda and do not pursue the best interests of the Somali people. Local non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have also faced pressure from al Shabaab to end their activities. The group has frequently accused aid workers of spying for Western intelligence agencies or has targeted those organizations whose operations also support residents living under the authority of the UN-backed Transitional Federal Government (TFG).

On July 20, 2009, al Shabaab announced its establishment of the Office for the Supervision of the Affairs of Foreign Agencies (OSAFA) to monitor the movements of all NGOs and international organizations operating within Somalia. The same day, al Shabaab accused the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the United Nations Department of Security and Safety (UNDSS), and the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) of engaging in activities deemed hostile to Islam and ordered all of the

organizations' offices closed. Al Shabaab militants immediately enforced this edict, raiding the UN offices in Baidoa in Bay region and in Wajid in Bakool region. The group had already forced CARE and the International Medical Corps to close on suspicion that the two organizations provided the intelligence leading to the successful U.S. airstrike on former al Shabaab leader Aden Hashi Ayro. By November 2009, the local al Shabaab administration in Bay and Bakool regions required that humanitarian aid agencies abide by 11 conditions, including a registration fee, the removal of all logos from vehicles, and a ban on female employees.

Al Shabaab leadership particularly targeted the UN's World Food Program (WFP), severely impacting its operations in southern Somalia. In early November 2009, al Shabaab deputy leader Sheikh Mukhtar Robow Ali, also known as Abu Mansur, accused the WFP of destroying Somalia's local agriculture market through its distributions of food aid during harvest time and banned branded aid, including aid with the American flag on it. Al Shabaab then ordered the WFP to only purchase food from local farmers and to clear out all food warehouses by the end of the year. On January 1, 2010, al Shabaab militants raided a WFP warehouse in Marka, a coastal city in Lower Shabelle region, and burned over 300 sacks of food, claiming that the food had expired. The WFP responded by suspending its operations in Wajid, Bu'aale, Garbaharey, Afmadow, Jilib, and Beledweyne, citing a lack of security. The WFP has not been able to resume operations in southern Somalia.

The experience of the WFP was not unique; over the course of 2010, al Shabaab's shura council consolidated power and enforced bans on humanitarian aid agencies. By mid-September, at least seven other agencies were banned from Somalia, including Mercy Corps, Med-Aid, Horn Relief, World Vision, ADRA, Diakonia, and Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET). Al Shabaab was able to enforce this ban in Kismayo, Lower and Middle Shabelle regions, Hiraaan region, and Lower and Middle Jubba regions. For those organizations that remained operational, access to communities became more restricted as the power structure of al Shabaab became more centralized in the shura council. These organizations also faced restrictions on their activities and were subjected to taxation. The conditions that forced the suspension of humanitarian aid activity in areas under al Shabaab's control continued into 2011 and remain in force today.

Current Conditions Under al Shabaab

People who have fled al Shabaab-controlled territory in southern Somalia tell the same story – that draconian measures imposed upon the local population have driven many to leave. Local al Shabaab administrations follow the group's strict interpretation of *shari'a*, enforcing public observance of its laws with corporal punishments. Al Shabaab requires that both men and women abide by what it has determined to be Islamic dress and that women work only in the home and receive a male relative escort when out in public. The group has banned such activities as listening to music or watching soccer. There are reports that school-aged children have been forced to attend sessions with al Shabaab officials, to receive either religious or military training. In some cases, al Shabaab has required that every family provide a son to fight for the group, or pay \$50 per month. In addition to forced conscription, al Shabaab exacts taxes from local communities and businessmen. Further, local aid workers have noted that al Shabaab has repeatedly threatened them.

Many of the communities living under al Shabaab have been in need of food aid for months and the drought that has affected the region has compounded this need. Local community elders called on al Shabaab to lift its restriction on humanitarian assistance in April 2011 and warned of imminent starvation should food aid not arrive. Certain humanitarian aid organizations do have access to al Shabaab-controlled territories, such as Islamic Relief and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC); however, these organizations remain limited in their capabilities to combat the spread of famine.

On July 6, al Shabaab spokesman Sheikh Ali Mohamed Rage announced, “All aid agencies whose objective is only humanitarian relief are free to operate” in al Shabaab-controlled territory and required that these agencies contact al Shabaab’s “Drought Committee.” Rage later clarified that the ban on certain agencies, such as the WFP, remained in effect and denied that there was a famine in Somalia. There are reports that local al Shabaab administrations may be more amenable than al Shabaab’s shura council to cooperation with larger international aid organizations. UNICEF, for example, landed a plane of food and medical supplies in al Shabaab-controlled Baidoa, the capital of Bay region. By and large, however, al Shabaab has remained hostile to many humanitarian aid agencies, claiming that they hold political agendas. Rage said of the famine, “Yes, there is drought, but the conditions are not as bad as they say. [The aid agencies] have another objective and it wouldn’t surprise us if they were politicizing the situation.” Al Shabaab’s leader, Sheikh Mukhtar Abu Zubair, reiterated this sentiment, “Aid agencies and some countries declared famine and pretend they want to help you. They do so for these reasons: for trade purposes, to convert you from your religion and to colonize you.”

Al Shabaab administrations have exploited local food resources, to the detriment of communities. As the conditions have deteriorated, al Shabaab has made exacting demands on the population. For example, in Bu’aale district in Middle Shabelle region, al Shabaab demanded a payment of \$30 for every hectare of arable land along Jubba River. In Afmadow in Lower Jubba region, some residents were required to feed al Shabaab militants, facing punishment should they refuse to do so. In Afgoi outside of Mogadishu, reports say that al Shabaab executed local herders who had refused to turn over animals for slaughter to the group. Al Shabaab militants have also diverted river water to commercial farmers who provide financial support for the group. Widespread relief efforts in these regions remain impossible because of al Shabaab. Those relief efforts that are conducted remain smaller in scale and many are run under the auspices of al Shabaab administrations.

The severity of the situation in southern Somalia has driven many families to seek humanitarian assistance in areas outside of al Shabaab’s control. An estimated 1,500 people arrive daily in Kenya’s Dadaab refugee camp, and about two to three hundred refugees arrive in Ethiopia’s Dolo Ado camp. The journey to the camp carries risks – banditry and armed militias throughout Somalia pose a threat to displaced persons. In some cases, al Shabaab has taken action to prevent Somalis from leaving its territory. The group has established roadblocks along primary routes used by refugees and has forced truckloads of people to return from where they came. For example, al Shabaab established roadblocks and checkpoints along the roads near Dhobley, a town on the Kenyan border, preventing many from gaining access to assistance across the border. Militants have also frequently inhibited Somalis’ entry into TFG-controlled territory in Mogadishu. Overall, al Shabaab has consistently denied freedom of movement to Somalis living under its control.

Prospects for Humanitarian Assistance in Southern Somalia

It is necessary to recognize very real restrictions on humanitarian aid activities when considering the prospects of expanding operations into southern Somalia.

The humanitarian operating environment is precarious in the country even without the presence of al Shabaab. There have been few improvements on the security conditions since the UN first deployed a peacekeeping force in 1992 to secure the supply lines for humanitarian aid delivery. The only clear realized gains have been made in Mogadishu, where a peacekeeping force assists the weak, UN-backed TFG. The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) has a force presence of about 9,000 Ugandan and Burundian peacekeepers. Territory outside of the TFG and AMISOM's security perimeter has often been contested by various armed factions, and it is likely that any insertion of resources into such an environment will result in violence as it did in the early 1990s. There have already been documented attacks on aid convoys in Bay and Hiraan regions, during which at least one aid worker was killed. A significant escalation in humanitarian activities throughout southern Somalia will very likely increase the risks to aid workers' safety.

Though al Shabaab is not the sole guarantor of security in Somalia, the group poses the greatest threat to aid workers in southern Somalia. Al Shabaab's shura council has made clear that it will not accept the presence of international humanitarian aid organizations and that it will enforce this ban with violence. This fact remains true even as humanitarian conditions continue to deteriorate in areas under al Shabaab's control. Humanitarian aid organizations are ill-equipped to deal with the threat posed to their personnel by al Shabaab militants and it would be naïve to ignore the security aspect of any humanitarian operation in southern Somalia.

The international community should be under no illusions about the requirements of undertaking a humanitarian operation in southern Somalia. There is a high likelihood that any such operation, which would entail establishing security in the heartland of al Shabaab's territory, would be met with significant armed resistance. Al Shabaab's militias have already exhibited the ability to withstand AMISOM operations in Mogadishu, especially during its 2010 Ramadan offensive. During this offensive, al Shabaab militants successfully advanced the frontline of fighting toward AMISOM and TFG headquarters, despite the presence of 6,300 peacekeepers. It has taken a fifty percent increase in peacekeeping troops in Mogadishu and a sustained effort by the TFG to develop its own security forces to re-establish temporary control over the majority of the capital. Whereas in Mogadishu, al Shabaab conducted an insurgency against AMISOM and TFG troops, in southern Somalia, al Shabaab is the dominant power.

Al Shabaab has a very strong power base in major southern cities such as the ports of Marka and Kismayo. Al Shabaab is able to operate military training camps openly and will be able to call up forces quickly if challenged. An armed conflict in southern Somalia will likely require the deployment of Western ground forces, forces that could readily defeat al Shabaab militarily if called upon. The international community should not cling to the false belief that a humanitarian operation in southern Somalia could be successfully accomplished without ground forces supporting the mission.

The decision to pursue a humanitarian operation in southern Somalia ought to be made with these substantial costs in mind. Opting for a humanitarian aid operation in southern Somalia will require a military commitment. Seeking to purchase consent from or to cooperate with al Shabaab in order to insert humanitarian assistance into the south incurs future costs. Purchasing consent from al Shabaab does not guarantee future security or even the delivery of assistance to the people in need. What it does, however, is fund a virulent radical insurgent group that has stated its intentions to attack America and has increasingly established ties to al Qaeda's most operational franchise, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, across the Gulf of Aden in Yemen. Cooperating with al Shabaab will likely permit the group to dictate aid distribution, strengthening al Shabaab in its territories. A humanitarian operation to respond to the spreading famine, however morally imperative, must not be undertaken without a full understanding of the full requirements and the associated risks.

APPENDIX: MAP OF SOMALIA



Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much.
Dr. Hill.

**STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE KENT HILL, SENIOR VICE
PRESIDENT OF INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS, WORLD VISION**

Mr. HILL. Mr. Chairman, thank you for your kind words about the work together we did on fistula and a number of other topics. I appreciate that very much and Congressman Payne, I remember your support when I testified before this subcommittee, I believe on TB, and we managed to get some major progress there as well, so I appreciate that very much.

I testify to you today on behalf of World Vision, and thank you for the opportunity of doing so. World Vision is a child-focused Christian humanitarian organization that serves the most vulnerable people in about 100 countries and I might just add that in our calculation of the 100 countries or so Somalia is the top of the list in terms of difficulty the place in which to work.

The World Vision International 2010 budget was approximately \$2.5 billion and the World Vision U.S. portion of WVI raised about \$1 billion of that with 75 percent coming from private donations. Our supporters include 1 million donors from every state and congressional district and we partner with more than 6,000 churches and thousands of corporations as well.

With respect to the crisis in the Horn, we've been working to strengthen communities and respond to emergencies for 60 years. In 2010, World Vision served 15 million people through responses to 80 different humanitarian disasters around the world including Haiti, the flooding in Pakistan, the severe drought in China. We've been operational in the Horn for a number of decades.

This drought is the worst in the Horn in 60 years. Just a couple of days ago the U.N. has warned that as many as 750,000 Somalis may die in the coming months. This is approaching the number of people who died and probably will exceed that which occurred during the '84-'85 Ethiopian famine.

An incredible 58 percent of the children in Somalia's Bay region are suffering from acute malnutrition. In total, more than 12 million people are presently at risk. Their crops have died. Their animals have died and now they are dying in the tens of thousands. Half of them or more are children, many in southern Somalia, where the famine has been declared in a number of places. Many tens of thousands more will die unless the world responds in a way that's more convincing than it is now responding.

World Vision is reaching out to about 2.5 million people with life-saving aid and other assistance in this particular crisis. Let me say just a word about how smart aid saves and transforms lives. While droughts are cyclical and more droughts will certainly come in the future, famines are entirely preventable with the right response.

Let me insert something here. There's been a lot of discussion here today about the problems of food security and the things that the world needs to do on this, but it would be silly not to note the importance of the testimony we have just heard.

In situations where there is political instability or anarchy, you're always going to have a crisis exacerbated, so droughts and famines are never going to have just rain or climate problems when

you've got this kind of governance issues at work in Somalia. Read any standard history of this region, and it is frightening the degree of the complexity and the difficulty of solving that.

If we don't find a way to address the governance issues in places like this, our international development attempts to help will always be severely limited. So we've got to keep that in mind.

We can and we must respond and we must respond quickly if the devastating consequences of this famine in the Horn are to be significantly reduced.

Now we know firsthand from our experience that there are things you can do that will make a difference. Throughout the Horn of Africa World Vision has delivered water to communities whose water sources have dried up. We've provided emergency nutrition to malnourished children. Our clinics in Somalia will serve people who have fled their homes or on their way to Ethiopia or Kenya. We have put up 5,000 tents in Dadaab, the largest refugee camp in the world, perhaps the first shelter that these Somali refugees have had in more than 30 days. Many times, these people have walked for days and they're malnourished.

It's sobering to think how many more people, especially children, will die if we and the world do not respond energetically and quickly. Now this is important. Famine prevention has got to be a priority. For two and a half decades World Vision has worked in programs like the Morulem Irrigation program which has enabled families in northwestern Kenya's Turkana Country to grow, eat and sell crops.

Now I bring this up for this reason. If you compare the places that groups like Oxfam or World Vision or any of the other good organizations that do work, if you look at the work that they did over a long period of time, 10 or 15 years, you compare what happens during a famine, the groups that will have the famine are the ones that we have not been in a position to help. It does make a difference what we do and when we do it. And to what scale we do it.

Other areas that we don't touch or haven't had the resources to touch, they're the ones that are most victimized.

Now let me say something about this very touchy issue of U.S. funding with respect to this. We all know this is a tough, political, and budget environment right now with many Americans struggling to make ends meet and with much legitimate political attention on reducing the U.S. Government debt. But reducing the U.S. budget deficit and living within our means, however much it is a moral issue to do that and I think it is a moral issue to live within our means, it is also a moral imperative to save vulnerable children from hunger and effects of disaster when we have it within our capacity to make a difference.

I insist on believing and World Vision believes and I know my colleagues believe this as well. We believe that we can do both. We can get our fiscal house in order, make the steps necessary to do that, and yet we can continue to fund at appropriate levels, the important global and humanitarian programs that we believe in.

For many years, the U.S. has been and continues to be the leading donor government to humanitarian crises in the Horn, but listen to this. Our share has shrunk from approximately 53 percent

of the world's response to the drought in 2008 to about 30 percent today. We are simply not playing the proportionate weight we once did, just a few months or years ago, to crises like this.

Or consider this, the U.S. Government's response to what may be—what is the worst disaster, a drought in the Horn in 6 years is about 60 years in what it was in 2008 and that concerns us.

With respect to appropriation issues, this is not the time for America to pull back. It is not a time to reduce those life-saving accounts by 30 percent in some cases. It is a time to increase them. Disaster assistance accounts for $\frac{1}{10}$ of 1 percent of our national budget and it's highly cost effective in terms of saving lives. They should not be cut during a time of famine.

Therefore, I would request on behalf of World Vision and many of the other organizations and InterAction and in addition to submitting my full text for the record, Mr. Chairman, I'd like to submit that letter that has just gone out to congressional members on this point. We would request that funding be at least at the Fiscal Year 2010 enacted level which means \$1.85 billion for migration and refugee assistance programs; \$1.3 billion for international disaster assistance, that's what funds OFDA and \$1.48 billion for U.S. food programs through P.L. 480, Food for Peace.

I would like to include for the record, as I mentioned that letter signed by over 50 nongovernmental organizations asking that disaster assistance accounts be funded at these Fiscal Year 2010 levels.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you and the ranking member Payne for holding this hearing, for your on-going internal advocacy within the U.S. Congress to ensure a strong and moral response to the situation in the Horn of Africa and I look forward to your questions in a few minutes.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hill follows:]



Testimony by

Kent R. Hill

Senior Vice President for International Programs

World Vision U.S.

September 8, 2011

Before the

Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health and Human Rights

House Committee on Foreign Affairs

Regarding the Drought and Famine in the Horn of Africa

Introduction

Mr. Chairman, thank you for inviting World Vision to testify before your Committee and thank you for holding this hearing. My name is Kent Hill. I am the Senior Vice President for International Programs for World Vision.

World Vision is a child-focused, Christian humanitarian organization, serving the most vulnerable people in almost 100 countries, including the United States, through our committed 40,000 employees. Of World Vision International's \$2.5 billion budget in 2010, World Vision United States raised \$1 billion, with 75% coming from private donations. Our supporters include one million American donors, from every state and congressional District.

Crisis in the Horn

World Vision has been working to strengthen communities and respond to emergencies since 1950. In 2010, World Vision served 15 million people through our responses to 80 humanitarian disasters around the world, including the devastating earthquake in Haiti, flooding in Pakistan, and severe drought in China. We have been operational in the Horn of Africa for many years. Our work has included partnering with communities to improve their food security, access to water, and ability to earn a living.

This drought is the worst in the Horn of Africa in 60 years. On September 5, the food monitoring systems of the U.S. Government and United Nations warned that as many as 750,000 Somalis could die in the coming months unless they receive help. This is approaching the number of people who died during the 1984-85 Ethiopian famine. An incredible 58% of the children in Somalia's Bay region are suffering from acute malnutrition. In total, more than 12.4 million people are presently at risk. Their crops have died. Their animals have died. And now the people are dying in the tens of thousands, many of them children, many of them in Southern Somalia, where famine has been declared. Many more thousands will be lost unless the world responds. World Vision is reaching out to 2.5 million people with life-saving aid and other assistance.

Smart Aid Saves and Transforms Lives

While droughts are cyclical events and more will certainly come in the future, famines are entirely preventable with the right response. We can and must respond, and quickly, if the devastating consequences of this terrible famine are to

be significantly reduced. We know first-hand from our own programs that aid can make the difference between someone living or someone dying. Throughout the Horn of Africa, World Vision is delivering water to communities whose water sources have dried up. We are providing emergency nutrition to malnourished children. Our clinics in Somalia will serve people who have fled their homes, have already walked five to 25 days on desert roads, and are on their way to Ethiopia. These clinics will provide pre- and post-natal care to women, and immunize these soon-to-be refugees from the diseases that are breaking out in refugee camps. We have put up 5,000 tents in Dadaab, the largest refugee camp in the world, perhaps the first shelter that these Somali refugees have had in more than 30 days.

It is sobering to think how many more people, especially children, will die if we and the world do not respond energetically and quickly.

Famine prevention must also be a priority. For two and a half decades, World Vision's Morulem Irrigation program has enabled families in Northwestern Kenya's Turkana County to grow, eat, and sell crops. In this same region many other communities have often relied on food aid. Yet the residents of Morulem have avoided relapsing into famine since 1996. They also continue to move toward sustainable food security. They have even been able to sell extra crops to families from other communities who are unable to produce enough food.

Sadly, other areas in Turkana have not known the benefits of famine prevention, and they are now in crisis. In Morulem, 2,000 families have accessed these crops because their farms are part of the irrigation program. Without initiatives like this, drought in the Horn will always carry the potential of famine in the Horn.

U.S. Policy Integration

Americans rightly recognize that it is essential for the U.S. government to engage but that it cannot, and should not, solve these problems by acting alone. Transformation in the Horn requires local communities, governments, faith groups and the private sector to all come together. U.S. leadership is critical to ensure this happens.

The Obama Administration through its initiative called Feed the Future, and longstanding food aid programs like P.L. 480 - Title II, is working to focus on the short-, medium-, and longer-term issues around global hunger.

One such issue that must be prioritized is access to clean water and sanitation. Such projects help preserve community livelihoods and protect communities against drought.

U.S. Funding

It is a tough political and budget environment right now, with many Americans struggling to make ends meet and with much legitimate political attention on reducing the U.S. government's debt. Reducing the U.S. budget deficit and living within our means are moral issues, but so is it a moral imperative to save vulnerable children from death, hunger and the effects of disasters. There are important conversations happening across America and in Washington about taxes, spending and debt. These are all moral issues, and good stewardship is more important than ever.

Saving the lives of dying children and families in the Horn of Africa is a moral issue we are also facing now that must be on the front burner. Do we turn away and pretend as if we neither see nor hear them, as if they have less inherent worth and dignity than ours? Or, do we follow the Biblical example of the widow who gave even though she was struggling financially herself?

The United States can do both: get its fiscal house in order and continue its funding for important global humanitarian programs.

One of the great misunderstandings about American foreign assistance is the assumption that most of that assistance comes through the U.S. Government. In fact, the amount of foreign assistance provided privately through non-governmental organizations, educational institutions, foundations, corporations and remittances, dwarfs what the Federal government spends. The government portion, however, is still critical.

If America is going to respond to devastation in the Horn and help prevent famine, we will have to respond fully. This includes individual Americans, faith communities, foundations, non-governmental organizations, and yes, government. World Vision partners with all these groups. We have seen how many more vulnerable people our country is able to reach when America's resources are used together and smartly. Our Morulem project in Kenya is one of many examples of programming made possible because of our partnership with U.S. government agencies like USAID.

For many years, the U.S. has been, and continues to be, the leading donor government to humanitarian crises in the Horn. However, our share has shrunk from approximately 53 percent of the world's response to the drought in 2008 to around 30 percent today. Or consider this: **The U.S. government's response to what may be the worst drought in the Horn in 60 years is only 60 percent of what it was for the Horn drought of 2008!**

Tens of thousands of people are at risk of dying in the Horn unless they receive life-saving aid. Disaster response, refugee and food aid are only 1/10 of 1 percent of the federal budget. They are also the parts of the budget that for decades have been the most effective. Yet Congress is considering disproportionately cutting them and crippling America's ability to respond to people at risk in the Horn and elsewhere by as much as 30 percent.

It is tempting to think that whenever there is a new disaster, enough money can be raised at that moment. However, as InterAction, the membership organization of more than 190 U.S.-based non-governmental organizations, including World Vision, working in every developing country, noted in November 2008, "cutting appropriations for the humanitarian accounts in the regular appropriations bills causes program cuts, delays and disruptions that carry very serious, irreversible human consequences, regardless of any eventual 'make-up' funding provided in supplementals."

If you'll indulge an analogy: Imagine that you have a life-threatening medical emergency and go to a hospital. There are plenty of staff and they are very experience and skilled. The hospital is fully stocked with diagnostic and other equipment and has plenty of medicine.

Now imagine going to another hospital. It is empty. Staff need to be hired and trained. There is no equipment or medicine. Everything needs to be bought. By the time all that is done, you will be dead. That is what it is like when there is too little funding available to reduce the risk that communities face from disaster, too little funding for humanitarian agencies to plan, prepare, and respond.

Appropriations Issues

This is not a time for America to pull back. The Horn of Africa is suffering from its driest conditions in 60 years, causing famine in Southern Somalia and putting people at risk of famine in neighboring countries. More than 12.4 million people

need emergency humanitarian assistance. It is not a time to reduce these cost-effective and life-saving accounts by as much as 30 percent. If anything, it is a time to increase them.

Therefore, I would request funding be at least at the FY 2010 enacted level which includes:

- \$1.85 billion for Migration and Refugee Assistance Programs at the U.S. Department of State;
- \$1.3 billion for International Disaster Assistance, which funds the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance at USAID;
- \$1.84 billion for food aid through P.L. 480 - Title II, which funds the Office of Food for Peace at USAID.

I would like to include for the record a copy of letter signed by more than 50 non-governmental organizations asking for these disaster assistance accounts to be funded at FY 2010 levels.

Conclusion

Mr. Chairman, in conclusion, I want to thank both you and Ranking Member Payne for holding this hearing, for your on-going internal advocacy within the U.S. Congress, and for your public leadership to ensure a strong U.S. response to the emergency in the Horn of Africa.

I look forward to your questions.

Mr. SMITH. Dr. Hill, thank you so much.
Ms. Scribner?

**STATEMENT OF MS. SHANNON SCRIBNER, HUMANITARIAN
POLICY MANAGER, OXFAM AMERICA**

Ms. SCRIBNER. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Payne, thank you for this opportunity to testify today on the humanitarian situation in East Africa. Oxfam is grateful for your leadership and the work this committee has done to address the humanitarian situation in the region. Oxfam America is an international development and relief agency committed to developing lasting solutions to poverty, hunger, and social injustice. We are part of a confederation of 15 Oxfam organizations working together in more than a hundred countries with over 3,000 local partners around the globe.

The Horn of Africa, as we have heard, is experiencing the worst drought we have seen in 60 years. But the current crisis is also due to not heeding early warnings about the drought, the conflict in Somalia, high food prices, and the lack of investment in agriculture and programs that reduce the risk of disasters in the first place. The famine and on-going conflict in Somalia has displaced around 1.8 million people. Thousands have fled from rural parts of Somalia into Mogadishu while even more have walked for weeks across the desert with very little food or water in search of relief in neighboring countries. In Kenya, there are 430,000 refugees living in the camp of Dadaab, where 70–80 percent of new arrivals are women and children. In Ethiopia, there are 250,000 refugees living in Dolo Ado where there has been a rise in deaths among children due to measles, malnutrition, pneumonia, and diarrhea.

Oxfam is working in Kenya and Ethiopia directly operational and through partners, and we are also working in Somalia, but solely through partners. We are reaching over 1 million people and aim to reach 3.5 million. Oxfam's response includes providing water and sanitation services, food aid, cash transfers where food is available and providing livelihood support, such as rehabilitating livestock since those predominantly affected by this drought have been pastoralists.

In Somalia, Oxfam's partners are reaching over 800,000 people. While operations in south-central Somalia are extremely difficult, no doubt about it, it is possible to provide assistance, particularly for NGOs who have strong links to the communities, with some Somali partners, and who have a history of working in south-central Somalia.

In the Kenya refugee camps, Oxfam is providing water and sanitation assistance to more than 64,000 people and we are also providing water and sanitation to the 60,000 people that are sitting on the outskirts of Dadaab.

The current challenges to the response include funding, access, and coordination. The U.S. Government has been by far the most generous donor, but I would just like to echo Dr. Hill's comments about the need for the U.S. Government and others to do more. Other donors have also stepped up including nontraditional donors which we've heard a little bit about, but the needs are immense and as has been stated, there is a \$1 billion shortfall today. And we know that the needs are going to increase. Below average rain-

fall is predicted for the November to January rains in south and central Somalia which means we may not see recovery in Somalia until the next harvest in August 2012.

In terms of access, south-central Somalia is one of the world's most difficult environments to work in and Oxfam partners and other agencies are reaching Somalis and providing assistance where they can. But restrictions by armed actors or donor policies that also have restrictions can hamper efforts to provide lifesaving assistance. Therefore, all parties must lift restrictions and allow unfettered access to assistance in Somalia.

In addition to funding and access, we need to ensure that aid reaches those most in need. Therefore, coordination, information sharing, and transparency amongst all actors must be improved. In failing to respond to the early warning systems as has already been stated, we knew about this crisis, at least about some of the early warning about La Nina was coming in in August 2010. While a massive operation is now underway, little was done until the May 2011 rains failed, as was predicted by the early warning systems.

Looking forward, national governments, regional actors, and the international community, including NGOs must do a better job of coordinating a holistic response early on if food emergencies are to be avoided in the future. And I just want to say recently we've had a series of conferences, we've had two FAO conferences in Rome. The African Union also had a conference. There's a conference going on in Nairobi today and tomorrow by affected countries, but why did it take long to actually have those conferences?

In terms of improving access to food, a number of factors have resulted in reduced food production in the region. In the long term, we must address constraints to agricultural productivity. However, we must immediately increase people's access to food today. With high and rising food prices, basic staples are simply not affordable for tens of thousands of people throughout the region. The majority of people in the worst affected areas have no savings and few safety nets to support them when drought or other disasters strike.

Oxfam's assessments have shown that when food is available, cash-based interventions are a rapid, effective way of saving lives, supporting livelihoods and contributing to the functioning of local markets. As we look at the way forward, we know that the Horn of Africa is highly vulnerable to natural disasters, particularly drought, which will have impacts on livelihoods and food productions. Studies have shown that investing in disaster risk reduction which we have touched on, save lives and money. However, global expenditures on disaster risk reduction in 2009 was only 0.5 percent of total annual official development assistance.

Protecting core livestock herds is much cheaper than rebuilding them once they have been decimated by drought. In the far region of Ethiopia restocking sheep and goats cost 6.5 times more than supplementary feeding and restocking cattle costs 14 times more. DRR also builds community resilience.

In Ethiopia, Oxfam America has a project in the south where we've implemented a small-scale irrigation project that has pumped water from a major river to community fields enabling pastoralists to produce for their own consumption and to sell on local markets. Today, this community is no longer in need of food aid and they

do not have to migrate with their livestock because animal feed is available in their community.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to enter into the record an Oxfam paper on disaster risk reduction in the Horn of Africa that we prepared for the last FAO meeting in Rome as well as my testimony.

Mr. SMITH. Without objection, those documents will be made a part of the record and all submissions by our distinguished witnesses.

Ms. SCRIBNER. Thank you. So solutions do exist and crises on this scale can be avoided. But we have to act early and we have to invest in the right places. Therefore, the U.S. Government should use its foreign assistance and influence. To echo my colleague again, maintain the humanitarian emergency accounts at the FY2010 enacted levels and fully fund Feed the Future because that is what has been put forward by USAID as a way to address long-term needs.

Insure a majority of U.S. Government assistance, both humanitarian and development related to this current crisis reinforces resilience and reduces the risk of disaster by considering the long-term implications. Support national governments to establish stronger social protection and safety net programs such as delivering regular food, cash, or cash vouchers. Build the resilience and productivity of pastoralists and other small-scale food producers, including implementing policies and long-term investments that focus on drought cycle management and improving access to market for small holders.

Finally, we need to ensure a strong and strategic humanitarian response and once humanitarian principles are upheld and actors are encouraged to share timely, accurate information about their activities.

Thank you very much and I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Scribner follows:]

Addressing the Humanitarian Emergency in East Africa
Testimony
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health and Human Rights
Presented by Shannon Scribner, Humanitarian Policy Manager
Oxfam America

September 8, 2011

Mr. Chairman, Congressman Payne, and Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today on the humanitarian situation in East Africa and the importance of a coordinated and sustainable US strategy. Oxfam is grateful for the work this committee has done to address the humanitarian situation affecting 12 million people today living in Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia. We are also grateful for the leadership role the US government has played as the most generous donor, providing \$600 million since the beginning of the year. Oxfam America is an international development and relief agency committed to developing lasting solutions to poverty, hunger and social injustice. We are part of a confederation of 15 Oxfam organizations working together in more than 100 countries with over 3,000 local partners around the globe.

In my testimony today, I will be outlining the humanitarian crisis in the region and providing recommendations for the US government's response based on the situation on the ground.

Oxfam's response to the East Africa crisis

Oxfam teams and partners are rapidly scaling up activities to provide lifesaving assistance in Ethiopia, Kenya, and Somalia through water and sanitation and food security and livelihoods interventions. Working with our partners, Oxfam is rehabilitating wells and boreholes, building latrines, providing sanitation and hygiene services, providing cash transfers and cash-for-work assistance and supporting livelihoods through activities such as rehabilitating livestock. We are currently reaching over 1 million people and aim to reach 3.5 million with emergency relief, while at the same time addressing long-standing threats to livelihoods and further building the resilience of the communities.

- In Somalia: Oxfam has worked with Somali partners for over 40 years with programs that focus on building the capacity of local nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and Somali civil society to carry out both development and humanitarian activities. Through this network, Oxfam is able to support our partners in reaching hundreds of thousands of people in need throughout the country. Our partners have scaled up programs and seek to assist around 1.5 million people in 21 of south central Somalia's 45 districts. Our partners' programs include the single largest nutrition program in south central Somalia, which treats more than 12,000 severely malnourished children and pregnant and lactating mothers per month. We are also supporting the single largest public health program in Somalia, providing water and sanitation services to more than 250,000 displaced people in the Afgooye corridor and cash relief to over 16,000 vulnerable people.

- In Kenya, Oxfam's work combines development, campaigns and humanitarian response to contribute to the rights of communities in the Arid and Semi Arid Lands (ASALs) and in urban informal settlements. We also provide water and sanitation services in the Somali refugee camps of Dadaab in Kenya. In response to the current crisis we have scaled up our programs and aim to assist around 1 million people in Kenya. A key component of our work is providing cash to people affected by the drought so that they can buy food available in local markets. Our teams are drilling boreholes, rehabilitating water points and pumps, servicing generators that pump water from wells to communities and, where necessary, trucking water in and doing public health promotion work both for local communities in Turkana and Wajir and in the refugee camps of Dadaab.
- In Ethiopia, Oxfam has been working with local NGOs and Ethiopian civil society since 1962, building the capacity of local organizations in the effective planning and management of both development and humanitarian programs. In the current crisis, Oxfam seeks to reach over 1 million people with water and sanitation services, health care, and cash relief to buy food. Our teams are providing income and livelihoods support through cash for work programs and livestock feeding and vaccinations, so that people can protect their most important productive asset – their animals. As several hundred Somali refugees cross the border into Dolo Ado every day, Oxfam is working to provide water and sanitation facilities for an estimated 20,000 people in Hiloweyn camp, one of five refugee camps in Liben zone in the southern part of Ethiopia's Somali region.

Overview

The Horn of Africa is experiencing its worst food crisis in years. The UN has declared that six areas of southern Somalia are experiencing famine conditions and it is currently estimated that half a million people are at the risk of death if they don't receive urgent assistance. All signs point to the crisis extending into 2012, and the after-effects of this crisis will be felt for years to come.

The famine and ongoing conflict in Somalia has resulted in large-scale population movements, internally and throughout the region. Thousands have fled from rural parts of Somalia into Mogadishu, while even more have walked for weeks or months to Kenya or Ethiopia in search of relief. In Kenya, 70 to 80 per cent of new arrivals are women and children and half of the children arriving are severely malnourished. According to the United Nations, there are 430,000 refugees living in Kenya's camps of Dadaab, making it the largest refugee camp in the world.

In Kenya, the number of people facing food insecurity is estimated at 3.75 million. There has been near total crop failure in marginal agricultural areas and national corn output for the season is expected to be 15 per cent below average. Food prices in local markets reached record levels in July, with the highest price increases in pastoral markets.

In Ethiopia, over 4.5 million people require emergency assistance, alongside over 250,000 refugees, mainly from Somalia. Ethiopia's Somali region and southern Oromia are among the worst-affected areas. In these regions, pastoralists have lost much of their livestock and it is

anticipated that many more animals that families need to survive will die due to high disease prevalence among severely weakened livestock. In the Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples region, corn and sorghum crops have failed in many areas, and since January, the price of corn has increased by 150-200%.

In Somalia, ongoing conflict, poverty, insecurity and recurrent natural disasters have led to a severe humanitarian crisis. This week, the United Nations declared the country's Bay region to be experiencing famine, bringing the total number of famine areas up to six. Bay has been classified as having Global Acute Malnutrition rates of 58% and Severe Acute Malnutrition rates of 22%. Both figures massively exceed the respective emergency thresholds of 15% and 2%. The total number of people now living in famine conditions in Somalia is 750,000. There is an expectation that the famine could expand to parts of Gedo, Juba, Middle Shabelle and Hiraa regions in the coming weeks.

It is no coincidence that the epicenter of the crisis is also the place where it is most difficult to provide humanitarian assistance to those most in need. Ongoing conflict and insecurity, insufficient provision of social services for the population, limited freedom for local organizations and the politicization of aid both by parties to the conflict and donor governments have all played a part in preventing Somalis from receiving the help they need and deserve. Despite these challenges, our experience has shown that aid can be delivered and people can be reached if those delivering the aid are accepted by the local communities and if the aid is not linked to political or military agendas. Through Somali partners, we are currently reaching 800,000 people in Somalia and aim to reach 1.5 million as part of our emergency response.

The scale and severity of this crisis is unparalleled. The situation is set to worsen and swift action is needed to save lives and avoid further suffering. The severe drought, with some of the driest conditions we have seen in 60 years, triggered this disaster, but it is not the sole cause. The conflict in Somalia, entrenched poverty and decades of under-investment in small-scale food producers have also contributed significantly to the crisis, with pastoralists particularly hard hit.

According to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), below-average precipitation is predicted for the November to January rains in south and central Somalia and the greater Mandera triangle where Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia meet. This means that emergency conditions could persist well into March/April 2012. In southern Somalia, recovery may not start until the next harvest in August 2012.

Failing to respond adequately to the early warning signs

According to the Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWSNET), which is largely supported by USAID, back in August 2010, there were clear indications of the impending drought and its possible impacts on food security in the region. Initial warnings of increased risk were published even further back in April 2010, when the La Niña phenomenon was foreseen. While a massive humanitarian operation is now underway, little was done until the May 2011 rains failed – as was predicted by early warning systems.

Drought is common in many parts of Africa, but with early warning systems working, there is no real excuse for continued late responses to impending food emergencies. Looking forward, national governments, regional actors and the international community, including NGOs, must do a better job of coordinating a holistic response early on if food emergencies are to be avoided in the future. Recent droughts reveal a series of slow or delayed responses, including last year in the Sahel and Kenya during the 2008/9 drought. Such delays suggest a failure on the part of the national and international actors involved at multiple steps in the response. More should have been done to respond to these warnings, including strengthening the resilience of local communities to better endure drought and other shocks in the first place.

Improving access to food

A number of factors have resulted in significantly reduced food production in the region this year, including the failed rains and harvests, conflict, weak infrastructure, restricted access to agricultural inputs, a lack of market integration and restrictions on movement and trade. Addressing these constraints to agricultural productivity will require long-term assistance to help food producers, many of whom are women, grow more food while preserving and even enhancing a diminishing natural resource base.

At the same time, it is important to provide immediate assistance that will increase people's access to food. With high and rising food prices, basic staples are simply not affordable for tens of thousands of people throughout the region. The majority of people in the worst affected areas have no savings and few safety nets to support them when drought or other disasters strike. Oxfam's assessments have shown that cash-based interventions are a rapid, effective way of saving lives, supporting livelihoods and contributing to local market functioning. As the World Food Program faces ongoing challenges in procuring enough food to meet the immense needs, we must work to ensure that food aid is available in areas where markets are not functioning and cash assistance is available in areas where markets are functioning and food is available.

Mass displacement

Drought and conflict have resulted in massive population movement and displacement throughout the Horn. According to the United Nations, more than 100,000 people have fled from other parts of Somalia into Mogadishu.

Those who have been able to escape from Somalia take a harrowing journey through dry and insecure parts of southern Somalia, eastern Ethiopia and northern Kenya. Kenya has received about 130,000 new Somali arrivals since January, with 85,000 arriving since June. In Ethiopia, 120,000 Somali refugees have arrived in Dolo Ado, with 80,000 arriving this year. Over the last two weeks, thousands have begun to arrive in Yemen.

This rapid and massive increase in people arriving in both Kenya and Ethiopia has posed significant challenges to responding to need, and leaving humanitarian agencies struggling. Three existing refugee camps in Dadaab were originally built to house 90,000 people but the according to the United Nations, approximately 430,000 Somali refugees are currently living in and around Dadaab. After considerable delay, a fourth camp has been opened along with extension sites to an existing camp.

In Ethiopia's Dolo Ado region, new camps are being built. The state of health of those arriving in Dolo Ado continues to be extremely poor and there has recently been a worrying rise in deaths among children under the age of five, the main cause of which appears to be measles. Malnutrition, pneumonia and diarrhea are also causing high infant mortality rates and death in children.

UN agencies and NGOs are working around the clock to try to provide basic services in all these camps, but with the arrival of an additional 1,200 refugees a day in Dadaab and increasing numbers in Dolo Ado, it is an uphill battle. Steps must be taken to ensure these additional camps meet humanitarian standards, with improved coordination and safe transfer of refugees from one location to another. The massive influx of refugees is also causing considerable tension with the host communities over water, resources and land. These tensions must be addressed and a long-term solution to the situation in Dadaab must be found.

Challenges to response

Perhaps the greatest challenge to ensuring that lives are saved and this crisis does not worsen is making sure that all actors involved, including national governments, the international community, United Nations agencies, NGOs and civil society organizations respond swiftly and appropriately to the immediate and longer-term needs by ensuring adequate emergency and development funding and access, improving coordination and being flexible.

1. **Funding:** Currently, \$2.4 billion is required to cover immediate humanitarian needs. \$1.4 billion has already been provided and the United States is the lead donor, having provided just over \$600 million. Other donors have stepped up, including the African Union, Saudi Arabia and other non-traditional donors. Oxfam commends the United States for its leadership and early response to the drought. Secretary Clinton's announcement of \$17 million three weeks ago and USAID Administrator Shah's announcement last week of \$23 million are critical to the response and we hope that the US government will be able to continue responding generously as this crisis unfolds.

Increased funding for emergency accounts should not come at the expense of other relief and development accounts that fight poverty and often help prevent the need for emergency spending in the first place. In addition to emergency assistance, more investment in long-term solutions is required.

Feed the Future (FTF) is an important initiative in this regard, and Oxfam commends its comprehensive approach to investment in country-owned agriculture and food security plans that involve key stakeholders in planning and implementation. Agriculture and pastoralism provide critical livelihoods for the 237 million people in East Africa who live in rural areas. The agriculture sector (farming and livestock) is essential for food availability, livelihoods and economic development in the region. The sector comprises a significant portion of gross domestic product (GDP) in the Horn countries - 44.5 per cent in Ethiopia, 27.0 per cent in Kenya and 65.0 per cent in Somalia. Yet, globally, the share of official development assistance that supports agriculture has declined by 77 per cent,

accounting for only 7 per cent of the total official development assistance today. From 2005-2008, agriculture assistance as a share of official development assistance was 6.12 per cent in Ethiopia, 6.88 per cent in Kenya, and a mere 0.87 per cent in Somalia.

National governments must also play a role in directing investments toward agriculture. Ethiopia and Kenya have agreed to direct 10% percent of national budgets to agriculture, however the lack of investment in livestock production in the region is particularly stark. In Ethiopia livestock production contributes 40% of agricultural GDP, but the government only allocated 0.3% of its budget to investment in livestock production, while in Kenya livestock provides 50% of agricultural GDP, but receives less than 1% of the budget.

It is critical that the United States maintain full funding for the emergency accounts and make greater investments in agriculture, disaster risk reduction and long-term development assistance, such as Feed the Future.

2. Access: Along with donor funding, access remains another significant challenge, especially in Somalia. South central Somalia is one of the world's most difficult environments to work in, yet Oxfam's partners continue to operate and provide services to the community. Additionally, donors have placed legal restrictions on international NGOs that have compounded their ability to adequately respond to the needs. As the United States continues to respond to the famine in Somalia and drought in the region, it is critical that humanitarian assistance is given on the basis of needs alone and that response remains neutral and impartial.
3. Coordination and Flexibility: The scale and scope of this emergency presents numerous challenges to the humanitarian response, and we need to ensure not only that enough money is provided, but also that it reaches those most in need. Therefore, coordination, information sharing and transparency amongst all actors must be improved. Now more than ever, humanitarian actors need to be strategic and flexible in how we provide assistance.

Ways forward

The Horn of Africa is highly vulnerable to natural hazards, particularly drought, and climate variability is expected to increase in the future, which will have major impacts on livelihoods and food production. Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) seeks to analyse, manage and address the causal factors of disasters and their impact on men and women. DRR activities should be a core feature of humanitarian, rehabilitation and development programming going forward, because appropriate prevention not only saves lives but also money. Unfortunately there is a lack of priority given to resilience building, especially for poor farmers, in the region.

DRR funding represents a very small percentage of overall humanitarian and development activity expenditures. New global data shows slowly increasing expenditures, but still to only extremely low levels. Global expenditure on DRR in 2009 reached \$835 million – a mere 0.5 per cent of total annual official development assistance.

Studies have shown the wisdom of investing in DRR. For example, protecting core livestock herds is much cheaper than rebuilding them once they have been decimated by drought. One study found that in northern Kenya, it was three times more expensive to restock a core herd than keep animals alive through supplementary feeding. In the Afar region of Ethiopia, restocking sheep and goats costs 6.5 times more than supplementary feeding, and restocking cattle costs 14 times more.

In Ethiopia, as a result of Oxfam America's disaster risk reduction programs to build and preserve livelihood assets, communities that received emergency aid in previous droughts are not in need of assistance. For example, a small-scale irrigation project developed in Liban district of Guji zone pumped water from a major river to enable pastoralist households to produce grain not only for their own consumption but also for local market supply. Women report that they no longer worry about milk and food shortages for their children and families. In contrast to last year and neighboring pastoralists' communities, this community is no longer included in food aid targeting and they have not been forced to migrate with their livestock, due to the lack of animal feed. Oxfam is seeing similar resilience being built through support for community grain banks and cattle restocking programs. Cash-for-food programs have helped communities in Ethiopia develop more than 2,000 hectares of degraded land into grasses for herds to graze. More than 15,000 pastoralist households with which Oxfam has been working with are still benefiting during the current drought from having preserved hay, now used for feeding dairy cows in a "cut and carry" management system.

Solutions do exist to ensure that crises on this scale are avoided. Governments and the international community need to treat this as a long-term problem as well as an urgent crisis. This is not a standalone emergency but a recurring problem that will become more severe and frequent. The chronic cycle of food insecurity is leaving donors and affected communities limping from one crisis to the next. It is a cycle that must be broken.

Recommendations to the US government:

- Use its influence to ensure a strong and strategic humanitarian response, where humanitarian principles are upheld, and actors are encouraged to share timely, accurate information about their activities, any challenges they may face or limitations to what they can do.
- Fully fund and maintain the emergency accounts to ensure as many lives are saved as possible, including support for cash-based interventions and other alternative programs.
- Invest a portion of humanitarian and development assistance towards disaster risk reduction and promote a global compact between development and humanitarian actors that would put disaster risk reduction at the heart of development approaches in disaster prone countries.

- Fully fund Feed the Future and ensure that USAID has the flexibility to re-assess and if necessary realign investment priorities, in consultation with developing country stakeholders, in the context of the current crisis.
- Fulfill the pledges made to the L'Aquila Food Security Initiative (AFSI) to fulfill the US piece of the L'Aquila commitment of \$3.5 billion for agriculture and food security over three years. This should be seen as a down payment on a long-term commitment to funding agriculture and food security activities in a manner consistent with Feed the Future. Also should agree to a longer-term plan for fighting food insecurity and malnutrition after the AFSI expires in 2012.
- Support national governments in the establishment of social protection and safety net programs, such as delivering regular food, cash or vouchers, which will protect poor people from the impact of food crises, reduce and reverse malnutrition of vulnerable populations including children under the age of five and encourage national governments and other donors to do the same.
- Make concrete commitments towards building the resilience and productivity of pastoralists and other small scale food producers, including policies and long-term investments that focus on drought cycle management; development of dry land areas and affected pastoral communities; improving access to markets for smallholders; targeted support to women and provision of financial services including savings, credit and insurance.

Mr. SMITH. Ms. Scribner, thank you very much for your testimony.

Let me just ask you a couple of questions. You were here for the previous testimony, obviously. I wonder if you might want to speak to the licensing issue, how that has hurt operations on the ground and where you think the problem lies. Where's the bottleneck? Is it Treasury? And why has USAID, if they're pushing for this, been unable to get Treasury to change their policy?

Mr. HILL. The NGO community in general was I think very pleased with some of the movement in the last few days when it was announced that U.S.-funded projects would see more relief in terms of the restrictions, of peers of being held accountable if assistance somehow reached armed groups or someplace else it shouldn't go. But the NGO community recognized what was left out of that written statement. And what was left out of that written statement was us unless we happened to be implementing a U.S. Government grant. And even though there have been verbal assurances to us that we needn't worry, you can imagine what a donor might think when they prepare to give a gift to Oxfam or World Vision or some other organization and they don't know if there's going to be a problem with liability because of how difficult the environment it is in to work in.

So I think our request would be that the government make it very clear in writing that the same discretion will be given to us that has been given for U.S. Government funds. Now when you consider the amount of money that the private sector has available and is willing to put into this, this is really not a small point. And so we would like to see more guarantees put into writing that would allow us to engage.

Now that's not the only problem. I mean we were thrown out a year ago, World Vision was expelled. And like Oxfam, we have to work with other organizations to do our work there. We do some work with the Global Fund on Malaria and TB in south and south-central Somalia. So there are other times that we will have to pull out just because of security reasons, at least to be directly involved. But at least we would not have to take into consideration the fear that we will be held liable if we can't quite manage the risk as well as we would like to.

Ms. SCRIBNER. And if I could add to that, I agree that we have seen some real improvements over the last several weeks in terms of USAID implementing partners having these waivers as they go in, but it does get to those that do not. And Oxfam America does not take U.S. Government money. So for us, we've raised \$4.5 million from private, from Americans and from foundations. We cannot use that money in Somalia. It's not clear to us how we could use that money in Somalia. Because we're a confederation, luckily we have 15 organizations that are chipping into a pot and we do have other organizations, other Oxfams that are providing assistance in Somalia, but our assistance is going to Ethiopia and to Kenya.

Mr. SMITH. We're going to be working on this between now and next week. I plan on introducing legislation that would make clear that humanitarian organizations would be excluded from the USA PATRIOT Act concerns which is obviously what is so important

here. And if for no other reason, to give the administration whatever cover they think they might need or somebody at Treasury who thinks they need some kind of cover. I mean, we've had that same problem, as my friend and colleague Mr. Payne knows, with those who—like in Burma and elsewhere—find it impossible to get help here, asylum, because of material support, allegedly, or even in Iraq where they have paid someone off in order to mitigate the possibility of becoming a target of terrorism or as payment to get a loved one out. And then that is used against him to come to this country. It seems to me that sometimes our rules and regulations border on absurd.

Is there any estimation as to how many people might be assisted if the administration some time next week or soon were to provide this relief?

Ms. SCRIBNER. I don't have an assessment.

Mr. SMITH. Clearly, you want to be working with your partners on the ground in Somalia, but you're precluded from that opportunity out of legal risk.

Ms. SCRIBNER. Correct. And I mean just to provide assistance to the partners that are already operating because as I said we're reaching 800,000 people, but we want to expand those operations. Our partners want to expand those operations and we're working through two partners in Mogadishu, outside of Mogadishu, and then also on the Afgooye corridor and Lower Shabelle.

But I do want to make a comment about because these restrictions have been in place for some time, that the situation on the ground is that the NGOs and agencies that have been operating have developed systems and processes under very difficult situations to get the aid to go where it needs to. So it's Somalis who are delivering the aid, who know the culture, know the language. They're negotiating bit by bit. They have to negotiate with insurgent groups. It's the reality of Somalia. And we don't want to disrupt the good work that they're doing. So as other aid organizations come in, that's welcome because there are needs on the ground. They need to be sensitive to that, but they also need to test the waters.

For those agencies that haven't been working there, they're not going to be able because of the humanitarian operations scale-up. It's not going to be big. It's going to be small. It's going to be low profile. And so I don't see a scale-up, a large scale up happening overnight any time soon.

Mr. HILL. I would simply add two or three points on this. And I would reiterate something I said in my testimony. The difficulty for all of us to work there is going to be exceptionally high. But my colleague is absolutely right. The key is to work with implementing partners that we trust and who know the terrain. We just want the freedom to be able to at least do that.

Now the problem with not giving enough funding to this from the USG and hopefully we'll get more from the private sector as well isn't just in the epicenter of the famine in south and south-central Somalia. It is, in fact, in these overcrowded refugee camps. There is tremendous amount that can be done. There are all sorts of water problems and health problems that can be addressed right

now if we could just put the right resources to work further away from the epicenter in Kenya and Ethiopia and northern Somalia.

Mr. SMITH. The FEWS NET famine early warning system had predicted a serious drought was in the offing. In your view, was there a gap somewhere in leadership, in conveying that information to those who could take effective action to mitigate it? Or was this a textbook example of what can and should be done, but other issues like al-Shabaab are perhaps to blame? It seems to me like we were taken by surprise.

Mr. HILL. We shouldn't have been. When I arrived at World Vision a few months ago, one of the first things that came across my desk were the reports from my person who is in charge of humanitarian disasters that were coming. He's in the room. And he told me, he said the word from the U.N. and from other places, from the early warning systems is that something bad and something bad is coming.

But to be fair here, we tried to put out, World Vision did, many months ago to try to secure some funding, and frankly we didn't do very well. We didn't secure much and when I asked ourselves at the senior level what happened, why couldn't we do it, I mean some of the factors that we just have to face, there is a certain donor fatigue, not just on the part of governments, but the number of disasters is growing. All the experts say it's going to continue to grow. We had Japan intercede here which caught everybody's attention. And I think it's just human nature that until its right upon us, we don't always take the preventative action. But there was enough information that we should have acted sooner, both privately and publicly, to have mitigated this. We did some and that helped, but we should have done more.

Mr. SMITH. Yes.

Ms. SCRIBNER. Just on that point, I agree. The good news is that the early warning systems worked. But the bad news is once that happens, then what? There's no trigger. There's no—once we see that, then this is the next step and that needs to be in place. It is a matter of political will. It's a matter of donor fatigue and until we see those images of the famine and of people crossing the border, those horrible images we've seen, we don't act soon enough. But we need to do better. And I commend the U.S. Government for prepositioning supplies last year, but then my question would be what were we doing to work with national governments? What were we doing to work with regional actors and the international community early on? We need to do more than just preposition supplies ourselves and respond. All donors need to do more on that front.

I just want to mention that the Kenya Red Cross, there was a humanitarian, a Kenyan humanitarian forum in Nairobi back in January and they were talking about this and nobody was listening to them, including the Kenyan Government. It just did not get the attention that it needed to.

Mr. HILL. Mr. Chairman, if I could just add one thing?

Mr. SMITH. Yes, please.

Mr. HILL. This sort of amplifies the point of why the budget matters. In 2010, the total enacted in 2010 for the international disaster assistance was \$1.3 billion. Last year, it dropped to \$863 mil-

lion. And the House marked-up bill for this fund is now \$757.6 million. That is a 42 percent reduction in 2 years. Now what does that mean? That means that you can have all the early warning systems you want, but if you've already turned off the lights at the place that's going to respond, you're going to be slowed down for weeks or months, even if you had the political will and the money to do a supplemental.

So if we want to take seriously the investment we've made in early warning systems, we can't do this to funds like the International Disaster Assistant Fund.

Mr. SMITH. Would you recommend, not just in this budget, but that there be a urgent supplemental request from the administration to meet these gaps or can they draw down from existing pools of money to meet this emergency and then over time return it to those other—

Mr. HILL. You were right in the previous panel to note that it's USAID's obligation and the State Department's obligation to shift monies as they can and try to replace it if they can. But frankly, it is the kind of situation under normal circumstances would justify a supplemental.

Mr. SMITH. Right. To your knowledge, and I did ask Ms. Jandhyala if she knew whether or not are we out of money, is it that they just don't want to go after other accounts or what? We just don't know. Do you have any sense of that?

Ms. SCRIBNER. I don't. And it's mostly rumors where I hear Oxfam is running out of money and then suddenly they have money and then there's a pledge that's suddenly given. So I don't have a good picture. It doesn't mean that other people don't, but I personally don't at this point.

Mr. SMITH. Dr. Hill, you talk about the U.S. Government's response to what may be the worst drought in the Horn in 60 years and only 60 percent of what was for the Horn drought in 2008. Is that because of lack of resources, lack of will, a combination of both or what?

Mr. HILL. You know, to be fair to the administration, I served this administration during 8 years of the biggest increase in foreign assistance funding since John F. Kennedy. And yes, the President was committed to that and yes, we had a bipartisan consensus in Congress to address HIV and PEPFAR and malaria and the Millennium Challenge Account. There was a bipartisan support for it. In the wake of 9/11, we understood that it was important. We had the luxury of being able to respond.

Through no fault of its own, the present administration has been dealt a very much more difficult hand. I don't have any doubt that the administration would like to respond, wants to respond. I think they're distracted by lots of things right now. You know, in this nasty partisan bickering that we have right now in this country, it's my hope and prayer that this is one place that we put the partisan bickering aside. I believe there is support on both sides of the aisle to deal with $\frac{1}{10}$ of 1 percent of the national budget to exercise our moral responsibilities. I think the President is committed to this. I believe the Congress can be committed to this.

We have to help the American public to understand that what they think is a situation with respect to foreign assistance is not.

Repeatedly Gallup polls and others show that they think we spend about a quarter of the national budget on foreign assistance they say. We should cut it down to about 10 percent. And then it turns out, if you combine State Department, all foreign assistance together, it's about 1 percent. If you get down to foreign assistance, it's much less than that and by the time you get to these funds, you're talking about $\frac{1}{10}$ of 1 percent.

So we're not talking about the kind of money that's going to break the bank. Now we're going to have to be responsible, but this could be an example of something we can do together and we all should try to take credit for it together and take this one completely out of the banks of partisan bickering. It's just too important not to do it.

Ms. SCRIBNER. And if I could add on to that. I agree with all of that. But also say that we've already talked about more assistance is going to be needed. The needs are growing, so we should be asking those questions, Chairman, about where is the money, what do we have left in the coffers? Is the supplemental the right thing to do? So I welcome those questions and we'll ask them ourselves.

And then in the long term, we also need to look at Feed the Future, because that is what the U.S. Government, USAID in particular, is saying that is their response going forward in order to prevent this from happening again is going to be through Feed the Future. So then that brings into questions about development assistance overall actually being funded, Feed the Future as part of that. So I'm concerned about not actually having the funding to do the prevention that we've talked about, to do the resilience building that's been mentioned and the disaster-risk reduction because we won't have the funding in the future.

Mr. SMITH. Ms. Scribner, you mentioned cash-based interventions as being obviously a viable option for Somalia. That also suggests the availability of foodstuffs that can be purchased and I'm wondering: How would you break that up in terms of region? Is it mostly cities where the foods might be available and that's where that would work? Or how would that play out throughout the country?

Ms. SCRIBNER. It's counter intuitive during a time of food insecurity, but there is food available. Of course, not everywhere, but in northern Kenya and southern Ethiopia, there is food on the local markets. There are—and where food is not available in the local markets, in the nearby cities, they actually, traders actually have food, but they're not bringing them to market because people do not have the money to buy that food. So if we are able to give vouchers to those traders to bring the food into the communities or to do the cash vouchers. You can do cash for work. When people are experiencing food insecurity the most vulnerable populations aren't going to be able to do that. So you need direct cash, but you could do cash for work for people that are healthier in terms of building some of the resilience for the next time this hits. And you could also do vouchers.

I think we should be looking at where food is available and looking at cash as an intervention and then where food is not obviously food aid is needed. I think WFP needs to do, the World Food Program needs to do a little bit, a better job in determining what the

pipeline looks like, where food is available and where it's not so that as the international community can look at alternative interventions, we know the exact areas where food is available and where it's not.

Mr. SMITH. Now Ms. Jandhyala mentioned there's \$8 million allocated. Does that seem an appropriate order of magnitude to you or seems too low in terms of prioritization?

Ms. SCRIBNER. It seems low. It's a good start. I think the U.S. Government does well with direct food aid and that's really important in saving lives, of course. But if we could increase that amount it does seem low. Again, we are hearing that. Oxfam is doing direct food distribution, but we're also doing the cash for food. So we're looking at the communities where it works and where it doesn't work. USAID should be doing that as well and they may need to increase the \$8 million.

Mr. HILL. I think the answer where there's sufficient funds being put in, for example, into the Food for Peace, the answer would be no. If you gave the same statistics as I just did for OFDA because OFDA is what gets its money from the international disaster assistance, the fund in USDA which provides for Food for Peace was \$1.84 billion at the end of Fiscal Year 2010. That was the total enacted. And the bill before us right now is \$1.04. So there's a tremendous cut here in a specific food program.

And here's something else that has not yet come up that I think we have to address. Look, if you look at the percentage cuts in the total of state and foreign assistance, one of the big mysteries to me is why of all of those accounts are the deepest cuts here? I don't get it. I mean I know these are tough times, but even in foreign assistance and in State that you would cut most deeply the food and the disaster funds, it just—I think the prioritization there, we have to address that. And if there is some negotiation between the House and the Senate on the total amount, I would suggest that the negotiations center on these particular programs that have been gutted, that are being hurt because they were cut disproportionately. They should be restored first to the extent you can find the bipartisan consensus to do so.

Mr. SMITH. I appreciate that very much thank you. One last point, are the NGOs reaching out to Persian Gulf potential donors, especially Saudi Arabia? I mean the \$60 million could be a downpayment for what could be a very huge amount of money that they are absolutely capable of providing. They have no debt like we do. Their profits, we estimate, or it is estimated, is \$500 million per day. Sixty million dollars is a portion of a day's profits in that oil-rich country. Have the NGOs ever thought of sending a joint letter to the government and to the King asking for a very serious contribution, like \$0.5 billion?

Ms. SCRIBNER. That's an excellent question and one that's important. You know, I think Congressman Payne was the one to mention that the Organization of Islamic Cooperation has had a conference and that was a very important conference and we've seen Turkey and Saudi Arabia come forward. Oxfam actually has an office in Saudi Arabia, so we actually have outreach with donors in that part of the world and it is a request that we're making and it's also a request that we make to their Embassies in the capitals

where we work. So it's something we have been pushing for and we will continue to push for. And in terms of Somalia, in particular, their assistance is very important just because of being able to fund the agencies in those areas that are Islamic, a lot of the agencies providing assistance.

Mr. HILL. Three points. It is an interesting idea and I would support and I don't see why InterAction and other NGOs could not encourage the U.S. Government to do it. Now it's their role as a government and a government-to-government negotiation or you know, discussion, to do that. But your question raises a very interesting idea that I hadn't thought about before, but I think I'm going to pursue. A few months ago I spent 4 hours with a World Vision International executive meeting with Islamic Relief in northern Virginia. They do several million dollars of assistance. I addressed the group. We talked about ways that World Vision and Islamic Relief could work together.

And it just occurs to me that we ought to follow up on that and talk real specifically about they might be able to do some things that we can't do in some of these areas here. We talked specifically about that before, but I could—we could also talk to them about the possibility of finding out what, if anything, they are doing to encourage Islamic governments to play a more active role, because I think it was maybe, it was one of the folks here today that said it really is odd that there isn't more assistance coming from that part of the world. But I think one way into that discussion could be through Islamic Relief and we have good relations with them and I think it's worth pursuing a discussion with them.

Mr. SMITH. Does the Red Cross have access? And how much?

Ms. ZIMMERMAN. Just from what I've seen out of reports, Islamic Relief is active in southern Somalia and also the Red Cross, both Iranian Red Cross and then other local international organizations that are tied to the Red Cross. So there are organizations that can operate in southern and central Somalia.

Just from the security perspective, al-Shabaab has made it very clear that local Somali NGOs are the ones it trusts most to do the humanitarian relief work and so I think both Oxfam and World Vision, having faced security issues with al-Shabaab themselves, have gone that route because it's the safest for both their workers and it's also one of the more effective ways to deliver the assistance into the areas that need it. Thank you.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. Mr. Payne?

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. I couldn't agree more that I do think that the countries that are doing well should certainly step up to the plate. We have seen that Turkey has taken more of a leadership. Of course, they're not necessarily one of the wealthier countries in the group, but I think that their willingness to help with the educational system in Somalia and they're simply starting to take more of a leadership role and hopefully they can become more active in the Arab League to try to get them to do more.

I think that the African Union could also play a stronger role by urging the rich Arab countries to participate more. I think they've had a nice, close relationship and there has been sort of I guess a working relationship. But I do believe that the Islamic countries, especially as it relates to Somalia could certainly do much more

than what they're doing. The African Union did speak out about the treatment of Africans in Libya, finally, to the Islamic Arab League that they need to talk to the rebels and tell them that they need to stop this persecution of persons from sub-Saharan African who are being brutally treated by the rebels, feeling that they were part and friendly, I guess, to Ghadafi. So I think if they start to step up to the plate a little bit more that would be helpful to the overall cause.

Let's see, where to start? Ms. Scribner, Oxfam and other organizations have argued that while weather conditions contribute to the severity of the crisis, the poor policies and planning that cause the region to be more susceptible, that poor policies and planning have been as big a factor. I wonder if you would want to highlight what factors you think have led to the humanitarian crisis and what are ways, if any that these might be prevented and addressed in the future. I know you talked about the U.S. policy of Feed the Future which is certainly a well-drafted plan, but could you go into a little detail on that?

Ms. SCRIBNER. Sure, on agriculture and pastoralism, it provides livelihoods for 237 million people in East Africa who live in the rural areas, yet, globally, the share of official development assistance that supports agriculture has declined by 77 percent. And it accounts for only 7 percent of the total official development assistance today. So I would say agriculture is an area where the international community has not done enough investment in and we've actually declined in our investments.

But it's also up to national governments, of course, to play a role in directing investments toward agriculture. And both Kenya and Ethiopia have committed to direct 10 percent of their national budgets to agriculture. However, Kenya and Ethiopia lack investment in livestock production in the region. For Ethiopia, only 1 percent of their overall—sorry, 0.3 percent of their overall budget goes to investment and livestock production. And for Kenya, it's less than 1 percent of their budget. So I think that is an area in terms of agriculture and livestock production where the international community can invest more, but also national governments.

Both Ethiopia and Kenya are taking steps to do disaster management approaches and that should be commended. That's good news. But both Ethiopia and Kenya also need to look at the early warning systems and take the data that they're seeing and act sooner. And they do need to invest more in disaster-risk reduction.

And in terms of the disaster-risk management approach, it needs to be built up in terms of the capacity of the governments at all levels in Ethiopia and Kenya. So today and tomorrow there is the Nairobi conference that has been happening, where governments are submitting their national plans to prevent drought in the future. The U.S. Government should look at those plans and see how we can support those countries going forward. And most importantly, I think for Ethiopia and Kenya is to implement, and there are some ratifications of legislation that actually needs to happen. So even though these proposals are out there, they need to be implemented. And as soon as they do that, the U.S. Government should be behind that and supporting that effort.

Mr. PAYNE. On the question of al-Shabaab, you know they have changed their policy it seems over the course of 6 or 7 months, once they, I guess initially said there was no drought and then they agreed that yes, it was a drought, but you couldn't bring food aid in. Then they allowed it to come in. What is the current—and any one of the three of you might want to pitch in. What is the current situation, especially in south-central Somalia and where in the recent disappearance of al-Shabaab from Mogadishu, they're certainly not gone. They just away, but how do you see that whole area playing out?

Ms. ZIMMERMAN. The official line from the spokesman from al-Shabaab is still that there is not a famine in Somalia, that there is a drought, but that al-Shabaab is able to feed and help the people under its territories. And what the group has actually done is through a news channel that it has is when it hosts food distributions in refugee camps and displaced persons camps that al-Shabaab militants run, it will use that as promotional material and take pictures of the food aid being distributed and of the families being fed, and broadcast that throughout southern Somalia and into the diaspora as well saying that al-Shabaab is doing good work and this is Islamic charity at its heart. Through this and through coming together and trusting in al-Shabaab that people can survive this drought.

More broadly, however, access still remains very limited into southern and central Somalia because of this denial of a crisis. And in my opinion, what has happened is that more local al-Shabaab leaders, who have greater ties to local communities needed to be more responsive to their populations, have increasingly put pressure on the leadership and actually openly put pressure on the leadership to change its policies toward major international aid organizations, recognizing that there is a drought and that people are dying in southern and central Somalia.

From what I saw, I think the first signs were really in April where local clan leaders told local al-Shabaab officials that if they did not permit food assistance in now that people would die later and it's later and people are dying. And I don't think that al-Shabaab has fully recognized the effect that this has had on its public perception within the Somali population.

Mr. PAYNE. There was—I don't know whether World Vision has tried it, but there was at one point a move to attempt to have some Somali community here, in Minnesota, to try to get word to some of the al-Shabaab leadership that they ought to reconsider their policies.

Have any of you worked with the local Somalia community and attempted to get them to try to persuade the al-Shabaab people to have a different—the leadership to take a different tack?

Ms. SCRIBNER. Oxfam, we have not, but we have been talking about the importance of the diaspora and that exact role. And so it's something we are discussing and something we are considering doing. But maybe to add a point to what Ms. Zimmerman said, but also to your question, the diaspora could potentially help, but it's really the communities where the partners, Oxfam partners and other agencies that are operating on the ground are working who are that defense for organizations. If you get that community buy-

in and if the community protects the aid projects, then they're the ones to put the pressure on the local leaders.

So our first defense through our partners and working on the ground are the communities themselves.

Mr. PAYNE. Have your agencies worked with partners that have been able to get into Eritrea, has Oxfam—how have you found the situation?

Ms. SCRIBNER. I don't have a lot of information about Eritrea. Oxfam does have programs in Asmara and in southern Eritrea, but the operations are limited and we have very few staff, so we don't get a lot of information coming out of Eritrea. But in Tigray and northern Ethiopia, we are seeing people that are crossing the borders that have been affected by the drought and we have heard stories about livestock that have died. So from the information we're getting in the Tigray region, people seem to be affected by the drought in Eritrea as well.

Mr. PAYNE. And Somalis are going into Ethiopia. I know they are allowing them in which is good, humanitarian, although Ethiopia is having its own problems with its own drought situation so it's really complicated and then on the long-term problem as I mentioned before, the Ogaden region which is a whole separate issue for decades, tends to be having its own kind of situation.

On one hand, the Ethiopian Government is embracing people coming into their area, even though they're having difficulty with the drought, but then on the other hand you hear in another area that it's not working. So I guess we have to continue to just do the best we can and try to keep the pressure on.

Let me just commend all three of you for the outstanding work that each of your organizations continue to do. Thank you.

Mr. SMITH. If I could just have one final question to Ms. Zimmerman. In your testimony, you say there are reports that school-aged children have been forced to attend sessions with al-Shabaab officials to receive either religious or military training, and we know that Joseph Kony and Charles Taylor have relied, relied past tense in Taylor's case, on children to do some horrific things to other people, including violence. And I'm wondering how widespread is that, child soldiers? Do we know?

Ms. ZIMMERMAN. From what I've seen actually, the use of child soldiers is prolific on both sides in Somalia. Al-Shabaab conscripts children from regions that it controls, but there are indications that the Transitional Federal Government has used child soldiers in the past and it says that it's trying to take efforts to ensure that they are of proper age before enrolling young boys into its programs to train them as soldiers.

However, I think that Somalia and the U.S. could look further into the issue of the use of children as soldiers in the Horn of Africa. It's an on-going problem. Thank you.

Mr. SMITH. Would any of you like to add anything before we conclude? I too, would like to thank you for your leadership and your extraordinary testimony which will be very helpful to us and I do believe the administration. And I look forward to working with you going forward. The hearing is concluded. Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 4:37 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515-0128

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, AND HUMAN RIGHTS
Christopher H. Smith (R-NJ), Chairman

September 8, 2011

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, to be held by the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, and Human Rights, to be held in **Room 2200 of the Rayburn House Office Building (and available live, via the WEBCAST link on the Committee website at <http://www.hcfa.house.gov>)**:

DATE: Thursday, September 8, 2011
TIME: 2:00 p.m.
SUBJECT: USAID's Long-Term Strategy for Addressing East African Emergencies

WITNESSES: Panel I
Ms. Rajakumari Jandhyala
Deputy Assistant Administrator
Bureau for Africa
U.S. Agency for International Development

Panel II
Ms. Katherine Zimmerman
Gulf of Aden Team Lead
Critical Threats Project
American Enterprise Institute

The Honorable Kent Hill
Senior Vice President of International Programs
World Vision

Ms. Shannon Scribner
Humanitarian Policy Manager
Oxfam America

By Direction of the Chairman

The Committee on Foreign Affairs seeks to make its facilities accessible to persons with disabilities. If you are in need of special accommodations, please call 202/225-5021 at least four business days in advance of the event, whenever practicable. Questions with regard to special accommodations in general (including availability of Committee materials in alternative formats and assistive listening devices) may be directed to the Committee.

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

MINUTES OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON Africa, Global Health, and, Human Rights HEARINGDay Thursday Date September 8, 2011 Room 2200 RayburnStarting Time 2:00 p.m. Ending Time 4:37 p.m.Recesses (to) (to) (to) (to) (to) (to)

Presiding Member(s)

Rep. Chris Smith

Check all of the following that apply:

Open Session ☒Executive (closed) Session ☐Televised ☒Electronically Recorded (taped) ☒Stenographic Record ☒

TITLE OF HEARING:

USAID's Long-Term Strategy for Addressing East African Emergencies

SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT:

Rep. Chris Smith, Rep. Donald Payne, Rep. Jeff Fortenberry, Rep. Russ Carnahan, Rep. Karen Bass

NON-SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: (Mark with an * if they are not members of full committee.)

HEARING WITNESSES: Same as meeting notice attached? Yes ☒ No ☐

(If "no", please list below and include title, agency, department, or organization.)

STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD: (List any statements submitted for the record.)

*Prepared statement from Ms. Jandhyala**Prepared statement from Ms. Zimmerman**Prepared statement from Hon. Kent Hill**Prepared statement from Ms. Scribner**Prepared statement from Mr. Carnahan**Letter submitted for the record by Hon. Kent Hill of World Vision**Report submitted for the record by Ms. Shannon Scribner of Oxfam*

TIME SCHEDULED TO RECONVENE _____

or

TIME ADJOURNED 4:37 p.m.

 Subcommittee Staff Director

**STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD
THE HONORABLE RUSS CARNAHAN (MO-03)
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, AND HUMAN RIGHTS
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES**

**Hearing on
Addressing the Humanitarian Emergency in East Africa
Thursday, September 8, 2011, 2:00 P.M.
2200 Rayburn House Office Building**

Chairman Smith and Ranking Member Payne, thank you for holding this hearing on the humanitarian situation in east Africa. This topic is exceptionally urgent, especially given this week's announcement that famine has now spread to six areas in Somalia, including the Bay region, one of its most productive regions.

The increasingly deteriorating conditions in the Horn of Africa and spreading famine in southern Somalia mark the worst drought the region has faced in the last 60 years. With crops and livestock destroyed and food prices continuing to soar, this humanitarian crisis is becoming exceptionally dire. The United Nations estimates that at least 12.7 million are in need of emergency assistance and 750,000 people living in famine-affected regions are at risk of starvation in the next four months.

The situation in southern Somalia reflects the undeniable link between instability and the exacerbation of humanitarian crisis. Those areas where famine has hit are the same as those controlled by Al Shabaab, and long plagued by lack of governance and destabilizing conflict. Such circumstances have complicated aid distribution and served as a catalyst for the magnitude of internally displaced persons and refugees fleeing into neighboring countries.

I am interested to hear today about the status of response efforts from the U.S. and international community, particularly those to meet the needs of women and children, and all those most vulnerable to malnutrition, disease, fatalities, displacement, and violence. Indeed, we have already seen a spike in sexual and gender-based violence, and children account for over half of all deaths to date.

I also hope to discuss the vital role that the United Nations has played in the delivery of aid through the World Food Program (WFP), the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF). As a longtime advocate of a strong U.S. relationship with international organizations, I believe this crisis exemplifies the vital importance of our commitments to and engagement with the UN. I am interested to hear how we are working with UN agencies on the ground in the Horn of Africa, and ways we might better strengthen coordination and leverage further support from other donor countries.

In closing, I would like to thank the witnesses for their presence and testimony here today. I look forward to your expertise and recommendations on the critical situation in east Africa.

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE KENT HILL, SENIOR VICE
PRESIDENT OF INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS, WORLD VISION

September 6, 2011

Dear Representative/Senator:

As more than 12 million lives hang in the balance in the drought-ravaged Horn of Africa, we write to express our deep concern about fiscal year 2012 funding for humanitarian assistance programs.

Given the extreme severity of the unfolding disaster in east Africa—in which tens of thousands of lives are expected to be lost in the next few months—and pressing humanitarian needs in other areas of the world, we strongly urge Congress to fund the Migration and Refugee Assistance, International Disaster Assistance, and Title II Food Assistance accounts at fiscal year 2010 enacted levels—\$1.85 billion, \$1.3 billion, and \$1.84 billion respectively. We also ask that Congress ensure that the Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance account is fully funded at its authorized ceiling of \$100 million. Increased funding for these accounts should not come at the expense of other relief and development accounts that fight poverty and often help prevent the need for emergency spending down the road.

The people supported by these accounts are women, children, the disabled and the elderly whose lives have been devastated by war and natural disasters. Most cannot survive and their communities cannot recover without help from the international community. Our country, with strong bipartisan support from Congress and the American people, has traditionally been the leading donor of humanitarian assistance. The choices our country makes in its funding decisions save millions of lives, influence the entire international community to do more, and reassure refugees and the many impoverished countries hosting them that we will not abandon them. Congress should make clear its unwavering commitment to providing the resources necessary to address urgent humanitarian needs.

Recent emergencies combined with a number of protracted humanitarian situations will require strong humanitarian funding in fiscal year 2012. The drought in the Horn of Africa is the worst in six decades. Famine conditions already prevail in several areas and are spreading to new ones, with more than two million children estimated to be acutely malnourished. Tens of thousands of Haitians remain in tents eighteen months after the earthquake. Women and children need our help in places like Darfur and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Burmese and Iraqi refugees cannot return home safely at this time.

For all of these reasons, we respectfully request that you strengthen and expedite the approval of humanitarian funding as the appropriations process moves forward. The most vulnerable people in the Horn of Africa and around the world depend on it.

Thank you for your consideration.



Sincerely,


ActionAid USA
Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA), International
Alliance for Peacebuilding
AME-SADA
American Friends Service Committee
American Jewish World Service (AJWS)
(list continued on next page)

American Refugee Committee
 Asylum Access
 Buddhist Tzu Chi Foundation
 CARE
 The Center for Victims of Torture
 ChildFund International
 Church of the Brethren
 Church World Service
 Columban Center for Advocacy and Outreach
 Conference of Major Superiors of Men (CMSM)
 Congressional Hunger Center
 Counterpart International
 The Episcopal Church
 Episcopal Migration Ministries
 Ethiopian Community Development Council
 Friends Committee on National Legislation
 Global Health Council
 Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society
 Helen Keller International
 International Medical Corps
 Investors Against Genocide
 IRD (International Relief & Development)
 International Rescue Committee
 Jesuit Refugee Service/USA
 Kurdish Human Rights Watch
 Life for Relief and Development
 Lions Clubs International
 Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service
 Lutheran World Relief
 Massachusetts Coalition to Save Darfur
 Mennonite Central Committee U.S.
 Mercy Corps
 Mercy-USA for Aid and Development
 Organization for Refuge, Asylum and Migration
 Oxfam America
 Physicians for Human Rights
 Presbyterian Church (USA), Office of Public Witness
 Refugees International
 Relief International
 Resolve
 Save the Children
 Southeast Asia Resource Action Center
 United Methodist Church, General Board of Church and Society
 United Methodist Committee on Relief (UMCOR)
 U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops – Migration and Refugee Service
 U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants (USCRI)
 Women's Refugee Commission
 World Concern
 World Food Program USA
 World Relief
 World Vision


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**Massachusetts Coalition
to Save Darfur**



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MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY MS. SHANNON SCRIBNER, HUMANITARIAN
POLICY MANAGER, OXFAM AMERICA



Briefing on the Horn of Africa Drought 2011

August 2011

Disaster Risk Reduction – fundamental to saving lives and reducing poverty

East Africa is facing the worst food crisis of the 21st Century. Across Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya, over 12 million people are in dire need of food, clean water, basic sanitation and shelter. Suffering and death are already happening on a massive scale, and the situation will worsen over the coming months.

It is no coincidence that the worst affected areas are those suffering from entrenched poverty due to marginalisation, conflict and lack of investment. While severe drought has undoubtedly led to the huge scale of the disaster, this crisis has been caused by people and policies, as much as by weather patterns. An adequate response to the current crisis must not only meet urgent humanitarian needs, but also address these underlying problems.

Overview

The Horn of Africa is highly vulnerable to natural hazards, particularly drought, and climate variability is expected to increase in the future, which will have major impacts on livelihoods and food production. Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) seeks to analyse, manage and address the causal factors of disasters and their impact on men and women, and as such should be a core feature of humanitarian, rehabilitation and development programming.

This crisis is testament to the lack of priority given to resilience building in the region. In Oxfam's view:

1. Greater investment and leadership on DRR by national governments and the international community is needed

DRR is effective and cost effective - investment levels must be increased. This should be coupled with greater political leadership by national governments and UN agencies to drive a step change in ambition and progress.

2. There must be a new humanitarian and development compact to take DRR seriously

In areas of protracted crisis and chronic vulnerability, the current division between humanitarian and development funding is not appropriate. DRR is the responsibility of both humanitarian and development sectors and there needs to be a clear shift to funding which seeks to bridge this gap:

- Humanitarian funding should be longer-term (ideally 36 months) and flexible (programmatically and geographically);
- Development funding must incorporate a risk reduction approach;
- Greater coordination between humanitarian and development financing streams to improve the coherence, effectiveness and potential to bridge or link interventions;
- Donors and national governments should refuse to fund or support programmes – whether humanitarian, rehabilitation or development – which do not seek to reduce risk.

1. Disaster Risk Reduction in the Horn of Africa – addressing immediate needs and underlying vulnerability

The Horn of Africa is and will continue to be highly vulnerable to natural hazards. Drought is a common feature in the region and climate variability such as high temperatures and low and erratic precipitation is expected to increase. This disaster has been triggered by extremely low rainfall, a natural hazard, but the scale of this crisis has been caused by a huge increase in the number of people exposed to risk. Disaster risk is generated by inequality and injustice, hitting poor and marginal groups hardest; this is often women who eat last and least. The cost of this disaster both in lives and livelihoods lost and dollars spent is too high and could have been reduced. More should have been done to build effective early warning systems and the ability of pastoralists and other drylands dwellers to better endure drought and other shocks.

The tragedy of the unfolding crisis in the Horn of Africa demands a response to the immediate need as well as addressing these shortcomings. Disaster Risk Reduction – the nexus between emergency and development assistance – provides an effective and cost effective approach to build resilience and address underlying vulnerabilities, through systematic efforts to analyse, manage and address the causal factors of disasters (see note on terminology).¹

Crucially, taking a DRR approach means ensuring that **both humanitarian and development work** incorporates an analysis of disaster risk and seeks actions to reduce it. However, as with most countries, there is a sense that DRR efforts in Kenya and Ethiopia have focused more on emergency preparedness and early warning systems rather than the developmental challenge of addressing underlying vulnerabilities.²

For this to be the last famine that Africa suffers, DRR must be taken seriously.


1.1 DRR in the current humanitarian response

All humanitarian assistance related to the current crisis in the Horn of Africa should reinforce resilience and reduce the risk of disaster by considering the long-term implications. Interventions should be carefully constructed to ensure that women's assets are supported and interventions may also require a conflict-sensitive approach, and be negotiated with traditional leaders and across clans. Key interventions include:

- Water resource management. Sustainability is a core consideration, including where/whether to situate boreholes, rehabilitation of water points and their ongoing maintenance and management.
- Work programmes. If cash or food for work programmes are being implemented, the public works element should be developed using a DRR approach, which builds community ownership and focuses on vital communal assets such as rangeland, water harvesting etc.
- Food availability. Where markets are working, providing support to traders to bring in essential food and strengthen delivery networks is an essential complementary activity to cash for work.
- Herd mobility. Emergency responses should support mobility where possible, for example, by providing mobile services. This is key to ensure the sustainability of pastoralist livelihoods. A conflict-sensitive approach may also be required to ensure responses reach all vulnerable sections of the community and are negotiated with traditional leaders and across clans.
- Veterinary services. Vaccination and other animal health interventions are important to prevent death and disease in the herd and strengthen livestock resistance to drought. Humanitarian response should use and strengthen private sector actors in developing sustainable services, to support development efforts.
- Supporting community structures. Emergency interventions should work with and strengthen local organisations and community leaders who are best placed to identify the most vulnerable and deliver aid where it is needed.
- Preparation for predicted floods. Rains are expected from September and with them come a significant risk of flash floods and disease. It is vital to undertake contingency planning for public health and veterinary services alongside the pre-positioning of essential supplies to prevent outbreaks of water-borne disease amongst people and vector-borne diseases in animals.
- Recovery. Given the relatively light September-December rains in some areas, the recovery phase will not start until June 2012, meaning that long-term recovery plans must stretch to late 2012 and beyond. Recovery activities should complement cash or re-stocking responses with veterinary and rangeland management services, support to those who are interested in leaving pastoral livelihoods to develop alternative incomes and continued efforts to strengthen water and marketing infrastructure.

1.2 DRR as long-term development - applying the Drought Cycle Management model

Unlike some natural hazards, droughts in this region are not one-off disasters requiring a short emergency response, followed by a swift rehabilitation programme, and then back to 'normal' development activities. The frequency of severe drought means that development work is increasingly disrupted and often undermined by the shift to emergency response. For example, an education programme may be completely stalled during a drought crisis, as children – often girls – are particularly affected – are no longer able to attend school. Governments, UN agencies, donors and NGOs must accept that drought is a normal occurrence in pastoral/dryland areas, not a rare or intrinsically disastrous event, and they should develop and adapt their programmes accordingly.



Whilst there are other natural hazards in the Horn of Africa – notably flooding – drought is by far the most widespread and long-term hazard. Its very nature – a slow-onset hazard – both enables and requires a particular programmatic response. The Drought Cycle Management Model is a very useful model as it conceptualises drought as a cycle of four phases: normal, alert/alarm, emergency, and recovery. It guides implementation of different interventions at each of these four phases thus ensuring that they are appropriate, effective and ultimately reduce the risks and consequences of any drought.

Source: Oxfam Learning Companion, Drought Cycle Management

2. Insufficient investment in DRR

DRR is both effective and cost-effective. Despite this, governments have not taken responsibility to address the issue and donors have not invested enough in DRR.

It is clear that DRR is **cost-effective**. Whilst it is too simplistic to assume an overarching cost benefit ratio (often quoted are 1:4 or 1:7), studies have shown time and time again that appropriate prevention saves lives and money. For example, protecting core livestock herds is much cheaper than rebuilding them once they have been decimated by drought; one study found that in northern Kenya, it was three times more expensive to restock a core herd than keep animals alive through supplementary feeding; in the Afar region of Ethiopia, restocking sheep and goats cost 6.5 times more than supplementary feeding, and restocking cattle cost 14 times more.³

DRR is also key to **effective** aid and government investments. Developing an analysis and response to risk is essential if aid and other investments are to remain effective. Otherwise hospitals, schools, roads and water points can be damaged or washed away in flash flooding, and developmental gains can be lost if rangeland and water resources are not managed effectively to protect livestock-based livelihoods from drought. In the absence of a DRR approach, the dividends from these investments will not be realised. For example, between 1997 and 2007, Ethiopia lost on average US\$1.1bn to drought every year; this almost eclipses the US\$1.3bn per year that Ethiopia received in international assistance to tackle poverty and emergencies over the same period, and is more than the amount Ethiopia invested in agriculture, a sector that is clearly crucial for ending food shortages.⁴ Recognising this, the Government of Ethiopia now has ambitious targets for investment in food security and agriculture, building to a projected expenditure of \$1.5bn by 2014.

In Ethiopia, the Government has committed to the Disaster Risk Management⁵ approach, developed a draft policy and a strategic programme and investment framework. Its Productive Safety Net Programme has meant that 7.5 million chronically food insecure people across the country are no longer in need of humanitarian assistance. However, there is still a need to invest more heavily in

building capacity for DRM at all levels of Government and all sectors and in making the DRM system better able to deliver early and appropriate responses to protect livelihoods. Despite the policy commitments made by the Government, lack of investment and limited capacity for translating early warning into early action, delivering non-food responses and addressing disaster risks through long-term development are major challenges.

Box 1: DRR works - Examples of Oxfam's risk reduction programmes in the Horn of Africa

Reducing disaster risk in Turkana District

Oxfam is working in the Turkana District of Kenya to help pastoralists respond to animal disease epidemics and drought. Support has been provided to local level Livestock Marketing Associations to make livestock markets more equitable – including marketing, improving sanitary standards relating to animals, and financial support to develop new livestock markets. Four livestock markets have been established, helping many pastoralists to sell their animals at decent market prices, even in times of drought. The livestock marketing system is now more efficient and more capable of responding effectively to disaster events.

Some Ethiopian communities no longer requiring emergency aid

As a result of Oxfam's HARO interventions to build and preserve livelihood assets in Ethiopia, communities which received emergency aid in previous droughts no longer require it. For example, a small-scale irrigation project was developed in Liban district of Guji zone. This pumped water from a major river to enable pastoralist households to produce grain not only for their own consumption but also for local market supply. Women report that they no longer worry about milk and food shortages for their children and family. In contrast to last year and neighbouring pastoralists outside the scheme, this community is no longer included in food aid targeting and livestock have not migrated due to the availability of crop residue.

Rebuilding ecosystem services and pastoralist livelihoods in Somaliland

Income and livelihoods were collapsing in Ga'an Libah, as fodder became scarce, due to drastic environmental degradation as a result of conflict and drought. Participatory community-based land-use planning was key to addressing this problem. Working with Somali partner Candlelight, Oxfam supported the construction of stone terracing to minimize water runoff, the revival of grazing management system and reforestation. Now livestock herd sizes and body weights have increased resulting in greater income, with many benefits, including more children attending school.

Micro-insurance schemes to build resilience

By buffering losses in a predictable way, insurance can build resilience and potentially also enable risk-prone households to take on 'high risk-high return' activities that increase these household's chances of moving out of poverty. Oxfam's R4 programme in Ethiopia, working with WFP, REST (Relief Society of Tigray), Swiss Re and local insurance companies, enables people to work for their insurance premium (rather than paying cash). These works are DRR-based, thus providing a tangible benefit even without payout. Now the threat of debt has been removed, farmers are more willing to borrow and invest.

For international donors, DRR funding represents a very small percentage of overall humanitarian and development activity and expenditure. New global data shows slowly increasing expenditure, but still to only extremely low levels. Global expenditure on DRR in 2009 reached US\$835m in 2009 – this represents a mere 0.5 per cent of total annual ODA. This overall fact is reflected in the response to the crisis in the Horn.

- Disaster prevention and preparedness (DPP – see note 1 on terminology): donors spent less than one per cent of humanitarian aid on preparedness and the prevention of disasters – see Table 1. This reflects significantly less than one dollar per beneficiary in the current drought.
- Disaster risk reduction (DRR – covering DPP and also risk reduction interventions embodied in longer-term development programming): the figures improve but are still extremely low, considering the acute vulnerability of this region to drought and other hazards.

Somalia's figures are particularly low – in real and percentage terms. Considering the importance and proven cost effectiveness of DRR the extremely low values here represent neither good planning nor good value for money and expose men, women and children to unacceptable levels of risk.

Table 1: Donor spend on DPP and DRR

	Average annual donor spend on DPP US\$	Average donor spend on DPP as a percentage of humanitarian aid	Average annual donor DPP spend per beneficiary of the current drought US\$	Donor spend on DRR as a percentage of total ODA
Kenya	2.22m	0.91%	59 cents	1.4%
Ethiopia	3.3m	0.59%	69 cents	0.9%
Somalia	0.7m	0.19%	19 cents	0.3%

See note 1 on terminology for definitions of DPP and DRR

Source: Donor spend figures adapted from Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2011⁶

3. The need for long-term flexible funding

Cost-effective DRR is the collective responsibility of both development and humanitarian communities, and how it is funded is as important as the need for adequate funding. DRR funding requires the best of both communities – funding flexible enough to deal with emergency need, and predictable and long term enough to ensure underlying vulnerabilities are addressed.

Humanitarian financing is often restricted to 12 months or even less and has a clearly delineated humanitarian mandate. Whilst this may allow the immediate emergency needs to be met, it severely limits opportunities to address the root causes of emergencies and build resilience of communities or capacity of national actors. It also often necessitates downscaling or removing of presence and capacity, which creates problems when needs spike again. This is in contradiction to the Principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship which stress the need for predictability and flexibility in funding, as well as longer-term funding.⁷

Developmental financing is much longer-term but is generally not flexible enough to re-allocate for emergency response in the event of need. In the Horn of Africa, it is fairly certain that both drought and flooding will occur within a three to five year timeframe yet, more often than not, there is little real contingency planning or analysis on how to respond to this risk.

There have been moves to start to bridge the humanitarian-development divide in the Horn of Africa. For example, the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) programmes now typically last for three years, and ECHO's Regional Drought Decision incorporates a crisis modifier. However, this good practice is not sufficiently widespread and has not resulted in permanent changes in donor funding architecture. For example:

- USAID's Pastoralist Livelihood Initiative in Ethiopia included an innovative crisis modifier that was widely applauded, but this was cut from USAID's ELMT/ELSE programme, severely constraining the effectiveness of contingency planning and early response.
- The EU is funding a three year regional pastoral and agro-pastoral programme in Uganda, Ethiopia and Kenya led by FAO. Greater impact could be achieved if the programme was longer-term (three years is insufficient to embed resilience and build capacity), more holistic (rather than focusing on cross-border issues), more bottom-up and fostering innovation (to fully understand and meet the needs of communities) and with more advocacy (to achieve change at all levels).
- Most UN Emergency Response Funds only fund lifesaving activities in response to a humanitarian emergency. In Kenya however preparedness activities have started to be funded and this represents an important opportunity.⁸ However, there is still a need to extend the project lifecycle from six months and encourage DRR activities.

4. Recommendations

Oxfam recommends a greater focus on Disaster Risk Reduction for the Horn of Africa. This crisis is testament to the lack of priority given to resilience building in the region.

5.1 Greater investment and leadership required from national governments and the international community on DRR

Greater investment:

- National governments: DRR requires much greater investment, as a reflection of the actual and long-term cost of disaster losses. As effective DRR must be delivered at the local level, governments must invest to strengthen the capacity of officials and provide increased budget at the local level, so that at-risk communities are involved in decision-making around planning and spending
- Donors: currently, for every \$100 spent on humanitarian aid, less than one dollar is spent on preparedness and the prevention of disasters. Much greater investment is required to reflect the Principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship and current donor best practice, where 10 per cent of humanitarian aid is channelled to DRR work.

Greater political leadership. At all levels there is a need for increased drive to reduce the human and financial toll of disasters and to achieve the goals of the Hyogo Framework for action. Whilst some progress has been made, there is a need for a step change in the level of ambition, including:

- National level: governments are responsible for leading and coordinating at national level. They need to provide an enabling environment (policy, funding mechanisms and institutions) to support effective DRR work, as well as a clear public statement of commitment from the highest level of government.
- Greater UN focus and priority on DRR. At country level, UNDP has a mandate for linking relief, recovery, and development operations within the UN but this has not yet translated into an organisational priority. The UNDP should take a stronger role in Ethiopia and Kenya and other major UN players such as FAO and WFP also need to do more.

5.2 A humanitarian and development compact to take DRR seriously

The international community has tended to interpret its responsibility to developing countries as reacting to emergencies and supporting longer-term development, seemingly blind to the crucial link between the two. In areas of protracted crisis and chronic vulnerability, the current division between humanitarian and development funding is simply not viable. DRR must thread through all programming and is the responsibility of both humanitarian and development sectors. There needs to be a clear shift to funding which seeks to bridge this gap and specifically seeks to address and reduce disaster risk:

- **Humanitarian funding should be longer-term and flexible** – In accordance with the principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship, funding should be longer-term (18 months minimum, ideally 36 months) to replace sequential multiple projects, and flexible (in both programmatic and geographic terms). This would streamline the process, overcome access constraints to ensure more timely responses and support resilience building.
- **Development funding must incorporate a risk reduction approach**, along Drought Cycle Management lines. This would ensure that programmes fully reflect the reality of drought in the region and make programmes flexible to respond to humanitarian crises as they occur – incorporating a crisis modifier or similar, to allow the programme to shift focus in the event of a crisis.
- **Greater coordination between humanitarian and development financing streams** to improve the coherence, effectiveness and potential to bridge or link interventions. Donors with both humanitarian and development funding wings should systematically and proactively facilitate links and test or create new mechanisms to bridge the humanitarian-development divide.
- **Insisting on a DRR lens to all programming.** Donors and national governments should refuse to fund or support programmes – whether humanitarian, rehabilitation or development – which do not seek to reduce disaster risk because they will be neither wholly effective nor cost-effective.

¹ **Note on terminology**

The vast majority of this briefing refers to Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR), which is the most comprehensive approach. UNISDR define this as: systematic efforts to analyse and manage the causal factors of disasters, including through reduced exposure to hazards, lessened vulnerability of people and property, wise management of land and the environment, and improved preparedness for adverse events. <http://www.unisdr.org/we/inform/terminology>

The government of Ethiopia uses the term Disaster Risk Management (DRM), which focuses more on the management aspects. UNISDR define this as: the systematic process of using administrative directives, organizations, and operational skills and capacities to implement strategies, policies and improved coping capacities in order to lessen the adverse impacts of hazards and the possibility of disaster.

The term Disaster Prevention and Preparedness (DPP) is a subset of DRR. In this briefing, it is only used in relation to funding. Expenditure on DPP can be extracted easily using the financial codes for humanitarian spend whereas DRR in its fullest sense, is often mainstreamed into other programmes and is much more challenging to calculate.

² Mousseau F and Norton J (2010) Addressing Chronic Food Insecurity in the Horn of Africa: Good Practice Identified but Commitment Needed? REGLAP. Significant investment in social protection in both countries is a very important step in reducing underlying vulnerabilities, but much more is required.

³ Pastoral Livelihoods Initiative (2007). Food for thought: livestock feeding support through drought. Policy Brief Number 2, November 2007. Akilu and Wekesa (2002). Drought, livestock and livelihoods: lessons from the 1999–2001 emergency response in the pastoral sector in Kenya. HPN Paper 40

⁴ Oxfam (2009) Band Aids and Beyond Tackling disasters in Ethiopia 25 years after the famine. Oxfam Briefing Paper No 133 http://www.oxfam.org.uk/resources/policy/conflict_disasters/downloads/bp133_band_aids_beyond_161009.pdf. Recognising this, the Government of Ethiopia now has ambitious targets for investment in food security and agriculture, building to a projected expenditure of \$1.5 bn by 2014 (according to the Growth and Transformation Plan)

⁵ DRM – Whilst DRR focuses on reducing the risks of disaster, DRM focuses more on disaster management. DRM is the systematic process of using administrative directives, organizations, and operational skills and capacities to implement strategies, policies and improved coping capacities in order to lessen the adverse impacts of hazards and the possibility of disaster. <http://www.unisdr.org/we/inform/terminology>

⁶ Development Initiatives (2011). Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2011, pg 79, 80 and 103

<http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/gha-report-2011.pdf>

Annual DPP figures - calculated from 5 year figures (2005-2009) given in GHA: DPP per beneficiary - calculated using OCHA figures of numbers of people affected – 3.725m in Kenya, 4.8m in Ethiopia, and 3.7m in Somalia

⁷ <http://www.goodhumanitariananddonorship.org/gns/principles-good-practice-ghd/overview.aspx> Principles 12 and 13.

⁸ Nicholson N and Desta S (2010) Final evaluation report of ELMT/ELSE 2007-2009. Pg 47

⁹ Development Initiatives (2011). Global Humanitarian Assistance: Emergency Response Funds (ERFs). Profile. July 2011

