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(Original Signature of Member)

116TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION

H. R. 8438

To reauthorize the Belarus Democracy Act of 2004.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey (for himself, Mr. ENGEL, Mr. McCAUL, Ms. KAP-
TUR, Mr. KINZINGER, and Mr. KEATING) introduced the following bill;
which was referred to the Committee on

A BILL

To reauthorize the Belarus Democracy Act of 2004.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “Belarus Democracy,
5 Human Rights, and Sovereignty Act of 2020”.

6 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

7 Section 2 of the Belarus Democracy Act of 2004
8 (Public Law 109-480; 22 U.S.C. 5811 note) is amended
9 to read as follows:

1 **“SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

2 “Congress finds the following:

3 “(1) The Government of Belarus, led by
4 Alyaksandr Lukashenka, continues to engage in a
5 pattern of clear and persistent violations of human
6 rights and fundamental freedoms.

7 “(2) The Government of Belarus, led by
8 Alyaksandr Lukashenka, continues to engage in a
9 pattern of clear and uncorrected violations of basic
10 principles of democratic governance, including
11 through a series of fundamentally flawed presi-
12 dential and parliamentary elections undermining the
13 legitimacy of executive and legislative authority in
14 that country.

15 “(3) The Government of Belarus, led by
16 Alyaksandr Lukashenka, continues to subject thou-
17 sands of pro-democracy political activists and peace-
18 ful protesters to harassment, beatings, and imprison-
19 ment, particularly as a result of their attempts to
20 peacefully exercise their right to freedom of assem-
21 bly and association.

22 “(4) The Government of Belarus, led by
23 Alyaksandr Lukashenka, continues to suppress inde-
24 pendent media and journalists and to restrict access
25 to the internet, including social media and other dig-
26 ital communication platforms, in violation of the

1 right to freedom of speech and expression of those
2 dissenting from the dictatorship of Alyaksandr
3 Lukashenka.

4 “(5) The Government of Belarus, led by
5 Alyaksandr Lukashenka, continues a systematic
6 campaign of harassment, repression, and closure of
7 nongovernmental organizations, including inde-
8 pendent trade unions and entrepreneurs, creating a
9 climate of fear that inhibits the development of civil
10 society and social solidarity.

11 “(6) The Government of Belarus, led by
12 Alyaksandr Lukashenka, has pursued a policy un-
13 dermining the country’s sovereignty and independ-
14 ence by making Belarus’ political, economic, cul-
15 tural, and societal interests subservient to those of
16 Russia.

17 “(7) The Government of Belarus, led by
18 Alyaksandr Lukashenka, continues to reduce the
19 independence of Belarus through integration into a
20 so-called ‘Union State’ that is under the control of
21 Russia.

22 “(8) On August 9, 2020, the Government of
23 Belarus conducted a presidential election that was
24 fraudulent and did not meet international standards.
25 There were serious irregularities with ballot counting

1 and the reporting of election results. The Govern-
2 ment of Belarus also put in place restrictive meas-
3 ures that impeded the work of local independent ob-
4 servers and did not provide sufficient notice to the
5 OSCE to allow for the OSCE to monitor the elec-
6 tions, as is customary.

7 “(9) After the August 9, 2020, presidential
8 election, the Government of Belarus responded to
9 the peaceful opposition protests, which are the larg-
10 est in Belarus’ history, with a violent crackdown, in-
11 cluding, according to the United Nations Special
12 Rapporteur, the detention of more than 10,000
13 peaceful protestors as of September 18, 2020.

14 “(10) Thousands of employees at Belarusian
15 state-owned enterprises, who have been seen as
16 Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s traditional base during his
17 26-year rule, went on strike across the country to
18 protest Lukashenka’s illegitimate election and the
19 subsequent crackdowns, including at some of
20 Belarus’s largest factories such as the BelAZ truck
21 plant, the Minsk Tractor Works, and the Minsk
22 Automobile Plant.

23 “(11) Women have served as the leading force
24 in demonstrations across the country, protesting the
25 police brutality and mass detentions by wearing

1 white, carrying flowers, forming ‘solidarity chains’,
2 and unmasking undercover police trying to arrest
3 demonstrators.

4 “(12) After the August 9, 2020, presidential
5 election, the Government of Belarus has sought to
6 stop the work of the Coordination Council, which
7 was formed by the leading opposition presidential
8 candidate, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, to facilitate a
9 peaceful transition of power by subjecting the Coun-
10 cil’s senior members to violence, detention, and
11 forced exile.

12 “(13) After the August 9, 2020, presidential
13 election, the Government of Belarus restricted the
14 free flow of information to silence the opposition and
15 to conceal the regime’s violent crackdown on peace-
16 ful protestors, including by stripping the accredita-
17 tion of journalists from major foreign news outlets,
18 disrupting internet access, limiting access to social
19 media and other digital communication platforms,
20 and detaining and harassing countless journalists.

21 “(14) Before the European Parliament on Au-
22 gust 25, 2020, Tsikhanouskaya stressed that a
23 ‘peaceful revolution’ was underway in Belarus, and
24 that ‘It is neither a pro-Russian nor anti-Russian
25 revolution. It is neither an anti-European Union nor

1 a pro-European Union revolution. It is a democratic
2 revolution.’.

3 “(15) Against the will of the majority of the
4 Belarusian people, Russian President Vladimir Putin
5 has propped up the Alyaksandr Lukashenka regime,
6 including by offering security assistance, providing
7 significant financial support, and sending Russian
8 propagandists to help disseminate pro-regime propa-
9 ganda on Belarus’ state television.

10 “(16) After the August 9, 2020, presidential
11 election, the United States, the European Union, the
12 United Kingdom, and Canada condemned the violent
13 crackdown on peaceful protestors, refused to accept
14 the results of the fraudulent election and called for
15 new free and fair elections under independent obser-
16 vation.

17 “(17) On September 8, 2020, Secretary of
18 State Michael R. Pompeo said, ‘The United States,
19 in coordination with our partners and Allies, is con-
20 sidering additional targeted sanctions to promote ac-
21 countability for those involved in human rights
22 abuses and repression in Belarus.’.

23 “(18) Following Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s Sep-
24 tember 23, 2020, secret inauguration, the United
25 States, the European Union, numerous European

1 Union member states, the United Kingdom, and
2 Canada announced they did not recognize him as the
3 legitimately elected leader of Belarus.”.

4 **SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY.**

5 Section 3 of the Belarus Democracy Act of 2004
6 (Public Law 109-480; 22 U.S.C. 5811 note) is amended
7 to read as follows:

8 **“SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY.**

9 “It is the policy of the United States to—

10 “(1) condemn the conduct of the August 9,
11 2020, presidential election and crackdown on opposi-
12 tion candidates, senior members of the Coordination
13 Council, peaceful protestors, employees from state-
14 owned enterprises participating in strikes, inde-
15 pendent election observers, and independent journal-
16 ists and bloggers;

17 “(2) continue to call for the immediate release
18 without preconditions of all political prisoners in
19 Belarus, including all those individuals detained in
20 connection with the August 9, 2020, presidential
21 election, a leading opposition figure Maryia
22 Kalesnikava, and United States citizen Vitali
23 Shkliarov;

1 “(3) continue to support the aspirations of the
2 people of Belarus for democracy, human rights, and
3 the rule of law;

4 “(4) continue to support the aspirations of the
5 people of Belarus to exercise their religion freely, in-
6 cluding the head of the Catholic Church in Belarus
7 Archbishop Tadeusz Kondrusiewicz who was barred
8 from entering the country after criticizing
9 Belarusian authorities;

10 “(5) continue to support actively the aspirations
11 of the people of the Republic of Belarus to preserve
12 the independence and sovereignty of their country;

13 “(6) not to recognize any incorporation of
14 Belarus into a ‘Union State’ with Russia, as this so-
15 called ‘Union State’ would be both an attempt to ab-
16 sorb Belarus and a step to reconstituting the totali-
17 tarian Soviet Union;

18 “(7) continue to reject the results of the fraud-
19 ulent August 9, 2020, presidential election in
20 Belarus, and to support calls for new presidential
21 and parliamentary elections, conducted in a manner
22 that is free and fair according to OSCE standards
23 and under the supervision of OSCE observers and
24 independent domestic observers;

1 “(8) refuse to recognize Alyaksandr
2 Lukashenka as the legitimately elected leader of
3 Belarus;

4 “(9) continue to call for the fulfillment by the
5 Government of Belarus of Belarus’s freely under-
6 taken obligations as an OSCE participating state
7 and as a signatory of the Charter of the United Na-
8 tions;

9 “(10) support an OSCE role in mediating a
10 dialogue within Belarus between the government and
11 genuine representatives of Belarusian society;

12 “(11) recognize the Coordination Council as a
13 legitimate institution to participate in a dialogue on
14 a peaceful transition of power;

15 “(12) urge an expanded United States diplo-
16 matic presence in Belarus to advocate for the aspira-
17 tions of the people of Belarus for democracy, human
18 rights, and the rule of law;

19 “(13) continue to work closely with the Euro-
20 pean Union, the United Kingdom, Canada, and
21 other countries and international organizations, to
22 promote the principles of democracy, the rule of law
23 and human rights in Belarus; and

24 “(14) remain open to reevaluating United
25 States policy toward Belarus as warranted by de-

1 monstrable progress made by the Government of
2 Belarus consistent with the aims of this Act as stat-
3 ed in this section.”.

4 **SEC. 4. ASSISTANCE TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY, CIVIL SO-**
5 **CIETY, AND SOVEREIGNTY IN BELARUS.**

6 Section 4 of the Belarus Democracy Act of 2004
7 (Public Law 109-480; 22 U.S.C. 5811 note) is amended—

8 (1) in the section heading to read as follows:

9 **“ASSISTANCE TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY, CIVIL**
10 **SOCIETY, AND SOVEREIGNTY IN BELARUS.”;**

11 (2) in subsection (a)—

12 (A) in paragraph (1), by striking “Euro-
13 pean” and inserting “Trans-Atlantic”; and

14 (B) by redesignating paragraphs (2) and
15 (3) as paragraphs (3) and 4, respectively; and

16 (C) by inserting after paragraph (1) the
17 following:

18 “(2) To assist the people of Belarus in building
19 the sovereignty and independence of their country.”;

20 (3) in subsection (b)—

21 (A) by inserting “and Belarusian groups
22 outside of Belarus” after “indigenous
23 Belarusian groups”; and

24 (B) by inserting “and Belarusian sov-
25 ereignty” before the period at the end;

1 (4) in subsection (c)—

2 (A) by striking paragraph (8);

3 (B) by redesignating paragraphs (3)
4 through (7) as paragraphs (4) through (8), re-
5 spectively;

6 (C) by inserting after paragraph (2) the
7 following:

8 “(3) countering internet censorship and repres-
9 sive surveillance technology that seek to limit free
10 association, control access to information, and pre-
11 vent citizens from exercising their rights to free
12 speech;”;

13 (D) in paragraph (8) (as redesignated), by
14 striking “and” at the end; and

15 (E) by adding at the end the following:

16 “(9) supporting the work of women advocating
17 freedom, human rights, and human progress;

18 “(10) supporting the development of Belarusian
19 language education;

20 “(11) enhancing the development of the private
21 sector, particularly the information technology sec-
22 tor, and its role in the economy of Belarus, including
23 by increasing the capacity of private sector actors,
24 developing business support organizations, offering

1 entrepreneurship training, and expanding access to
2 finance for small and medium enterprises;

3 “(12) supporting political refugees in neigh-
4 boring European countries fleeing the crackdown in
5 Belarus;

6 “(13) supporting the gathering of evidence on
7 and investigating of the human rights abuses in
8 Belarus;

9 “(14) supporting the public health response, in-
10 cluding filling the information void, in Belarus dur-
11 ing the COVID-19 pandemic; and

12 “(15) other activities consistent with the pur-
13 poses of this Act.”;

14 (5) by redesignating subsection (d) as sub-
15 section (g);

16 (6) by inserting after subsection (c) the fol-
17 lowing:

18 “(d) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
19 gress that, in light of the political crisis in Belarus and
20 the unprecedented mobilization of the Belarusian people,
21 United States foreign assistance to Belarusian civil society
22 should be reevaluated and increased to carry out the pur-
23 poses described in subsection (a) and to include the activi-
24 ties described in subsection (c).

1 “(e) COORDINATION WITH EUROPEAN PARTNERS.—
2 In order to maximize impact, eliminate duplication, and
3 further the achievement of the purposes described in sub-
4 section (a), the Secretary of State shall ensure coordina-
5 tion with the European Union and its institutions, the gov-
6 ernments of countries that are members of the European
7 Union, the United Kingdom, and Canada.

8 “(f) REPORT ON ASSISTANCE.—Not later than one
9 year after the date of the enactment of the Belarus De-
10 mocracy, Human Rights, and Sovereignty Act of 2020, the
11 Secretary of State, acting through the Office of the Coor-
12 dinator of U.S. Assistance to Europe and Eurasia, and
13 in coordination with the Administrator of the United
14 States Agency for International Development, shall submit
15 to the appropriate congressional committees a report on
16 the programs and activities carried out to achieve the pur-
17 poses described in subsection (a), including an assessment
18 of whether or not progress was made in achieving those
19 purposes.”; and

20 (7) in subsection (g) (as redesignated)—

21 (A) by striking “AUTHORIZATION OF AP-
22 PROPRIATIONS” and all that follows through
23 “There are” and inserting “AUTHORIZATION OF
24 APPROPRIATIONS.—There are”;

1 (B) by striking “fiscal years 2007 and
2 2008” and inserting “fiscal years 2021 and
3 2022”; and

4 (C) by striking paragraph (2).

5 **SEC. 5. INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING, INTERNET FREE-**
6 **DOM AND ACCESS TO INFORMATION IN**
7 **BELARUS.**

8 Section 5 of the Belarus Democracy Act of 2004
9 (Public Law 109-480; 22 U.S.C. 5811 note) is amended
10 to read as follows:

11 **“SEC. 5. INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING, INTERNET FREE-**
12 **DOM, AND ACCESS TO INFORMATION IN**
13 **BELARUS.**

14 “(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
15 gress that—

16 “(1) the President should support and reallo-
17 cate resources to radio, television, and internet
18 broadcasting in languages spoken in Belarus by
19 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty to the people of
20 Belarus;

21 “(2) the United States should also support
22 other independent media providing objective infor-
23 mation to the Belarusian people, particularly in the
24 Belarusian language;

1 “(3) the President should provide the United
2 States Agency for Global Media with a surge capac-
3 ity (as such term is defined in section 316 of the
4 United States International Broadcasting Act (22
5 U.S.C. 6216)) for programs and activities in
6 Belarus;

7 “(4) the Chief Executive Officer of the United
8 States Agency for Global Media, working through
9 the Open Technology Fund and in coordination with
10 the Secretary of State, should expand and prioritize
11 efforts to provide anti-censorship technology and
12 services to journalists and civil society in Belarus in
13 order to enhance their ability to safely access or
14 share digital news and information without fear of
15 repercussions or surveillance; and

16 “(5) the United State should continue to con-
17 demn the Belarusian authorities’ crackdown on inde-
18 pendent media, including the harassment and mass
19 detentions of independent and foreign journalists
20 and the denial of accreditation.

21 “(b) STRATEGY TO PROMOTE EXPANDED BROAD-
22 CASTING, INTERNET FREEDOM, AND ACCESS TO INFOR-
23 MATION IN BELARUS.—

24 “(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 120 days
25 after the date of the enactment of the Belarus De-

1 mocracy, Human Rights, and Sovereignty Act of
2 2020, the Chief Executive Officer of the United
3 States Agency for Global Media and the Secretary of
4 State shall jointly submit to the appropriate congress-
5 sional committees a comprehensive strategy, includ-
6 ing a cost estimate, to carry out the following:

7 “(A) Expand independent radio, television,
8 live stream, and social network broadcasting
9 and communications in Belarus to provide news
10 and information, particularly in the Belarusian
11 language, that is credible, comprehensive, and
12 accurate.

13 “(B) Support the development and use of
14 anti-censorship and circumvention technologies
15 by the Open Technology Fund and the Bureau
16 of Democracy Human Rights and Labor that
17 enable the citizens of Belarus to communicate
18 securely and undertake internet activities with-
19 out interference from the Government of
20 Belarus.

21 “(C) Assist efforts to overcome attempts
22 by the Government of Belarus to disrupt inter-
23 net access and block content online.

24 “(D) Monitor the cooperation of the Gov-
25 ernment of Belarus with any foreign govern-

1 ment or organization for purposes related to the
2 censorship or surveillance of the internet, in-
3 cluding an assessment of any such cooperation
4 in the preceding ten years.

5 “(E) Monitor the purchase or receipt by
6 the Government of Belarus of any technology or
7 training from any foreign government or orga-
8 nization for purposes related to the censorship
9 or surveillance of the internet, including an as-
10 sessment of any such purchase or receipt in the
11 preceding ten years.

12 “(F) Assist with the protection of journal-
13 ists who have been targeted for free speech ac-
14 tivities, including through the denial of accredi-
15 tation.

16 “(G) Provide cyber-attack mitigation serv-
17 ices to civil society organizations in Belarus.

18 “(H) Provide resources for educational ma-
19 terials and training on digital literacy, bypass-
20 ing internet censorship, digital safety, and in-
21 vestigative and analytical journalism for inde-
22 pendent journalists working in Belarus.

23 “(I) Build the capacity of civil society,
24 media, and other nongovernmental and organi-
25 zations to identify, track, and counter

1 disinformation, including from proxies of the
2 Government of Russia working at Belarusian
3 state television.

4 “(2) FORM.—The report required by paragraph
5 (1) shall be transmitted in unclassified form but
6 may contain a classified annex.”.

7 **SEC. 6. SANCTIONS AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT OF**
8 **BELARUS.**

9 Section 6 of the Belarus Democracy Act of 2004
10 (Public Law 109-480; 22 U.S.C. 5811 note) is amended—

11 (1) in subsection (b)—

12 (A) by striking “December 19, 2010” each
13 place it appears and inserting “August 9,
14 2020”;

15 (B) in paragraph (2), by inserting “,
16 peaceful protesters,” after “all opposition activ-
17 ists”; and

18 (C) by striking paragraphs (3) and (6) and
19 redesignating paragraphs (4), (5), and (7) as
20 paragraphs (3), (4), and (5), respectively;

21 (2) in subsection (c)—

22 (A) in the subsection heading, by inserting
23 “AND RUSSIAN INDIVIDUALS COMPLICIT IN
24 THE CRACKDOWN THAT OCCURRED AFTER

1 THE AUGUST 9, 2020, ELECTION” after
2 “BELARUS”;

3 (B) by redesignating paragraphs (4) and
4 (5) as paragraphs (5) and (6), respectively;

5 (C) by inserting after paragraph (3) the
6 following:

7 “(4) is a member of the Central Election Com-
8 mission of Belarus or assisted the Commission in
9 manipulating the presidential election of August 9,
10 2020;”;

11 (D) in paragraph (5) (as redesignated) to
12 read as follows:

13 “(5) is a member of any branch of the security
14 or law enforcement services of Belarus, including the
15 KGB, Interior Ministry and OMON special police
16 unit, and is responsible for, or complicit in, ordering,
17 controlling, materially assisting, sponsoring, or pro-
18 viding financial, material, or technological support
19 for, or otherwise directing, the crackdown on opposi-
20 tion leaders, journalists, and peaceful protestors that
21 occurred in connection with the presidential election
22 of August 9, 2020; or”; and

23 (E) by adding at the end the following:

24 “(7) is a government official, including at the
25 Information Ministry, responsible for the crackdown

1 on independent media, including revoking the ac-
2 creditation of journalists, disrupting internet access,
3 and restricting online content;

4 “(8) is an official in the so-called ‘Union State’
5 between Russia and Belarus (regardless of nation-
6 ality of the individual); or

7 “(9) is a Russian individual that has signifi-
8 cantly participated in the crackdown on independent
9 press or human rights abuses related to political re-
10 pression in Belarus, including the Russian
11 propogandists sent to replace local employees at
12 Belarusian state media outlets.”;

13 (3) in subsection (d)(1), by striking “the Over-
14 seas Private Investment Corporation” and inserting
15 “the United States International Development Fi-
16 nance Corporation”;

17 (4) in subsection (e), by striking “(including
18 any technical assistance or grant) of any kind”; and

19 (5) in subsection (f)—

20 (A) in paragraph (1)(A), by striking “or
21 by any member or family member closely linked
22 to any member of the senior leadership of the
23 Government of Belarus” and inserting “or by
24 the senior leadership of the Government of
25 Belarus or by any member or family member

1 closely linked to the senior leadership of the
2 Government of Belarus, or an official of the so-
3 called ‘Union State’ with Russia’; and

4 (B) in paragraph (2)—

5 (i) in subparagraph (A), by adding at
6 the end before the semicolon the following:
7 “, or an official of the so-called ‘Union
8 State’ with Russia’; and

9 (ii) in subparagraph (B), by inserting
10 “, or the so-called ‘Union State’ with Rus-
11 sia,” after “the Government of Belarus”.

12 **SEC. 7. MULTILATERAL COOPERATION.**

13 Section 7 of the Belarus Democracy Act of 2004
14 (Public Law 109-480; 22 U.S.C. 5811 note) is amended
15 to read as follows:

16 **“SEC. 7. MULTILATERAL COOPERATION.**

17 “It is the sense of Congress that the President should
18 continue to coordinate with the European Union and its
19 institutions, European Union member states, the United
20 Kingdom, and Canada to develop a comprehensive, multi-
21 lateral strategy to—

22 “(1) further the purposes of this Act, including,
23 as appropriate, encouraging other countries to take
24 measures with respect to the Republic of Belarus

1 that are similar to measures described in this Act;
2 and

3 “(2) deter the Government of Russia from un-
4 dermining democratic processes and institutions in
5 Belarus or threatening the independence, sov-
6 ereignty, and territorial integrity of Belarus.”.

7 **SEC. 8. REPORTS.**

8 Section 8 of the Belarus Democracy Act of 2004
9 (Public Law 109-480; 22 U.S.C. 5811 note) is amended
10 to read as follows:

11 **“SEC. 8. REPORTS.**

12 “(a) REPORT ON THREAT TO SOVEREIGNTY AND
13 INDEPENDENCE OF BELARUS.—

14 “(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 120 days
15 after the date of the enactment of the Belarus De-
16 mocracy, Human Rights, and Sovereignty Act of
17 2020, the Secretary of State, in coordination with
18 the Director of National Intelligence, shall transmit
19 to the appropriate congressional committees a report
20 on the threat the Government of Russia poses to the
21 sovereignty and independence of Belarus.

22 “(2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report
23 required by paragraph (1) shall include the fol-
24 lowing:

1 “(A) An assessment of how the Govern-
2 ment of Russia is exploiting the current polit-
3 ical crisis in Belarus to push for deeper political
4 and economic control of or integration with
5 Belarus.

6 “(B) A description of the economic and en-
7 ergy assets in Belarus that the Government of
8 Russia, including Russian state-owned or state-
9 controlled companies, controls.

10 “(C) A description of Belarus’ major en-
11 terprises that are vulnerable of being taken over
12 by Russian entities amid the country’s wors-
13 ening financial crisis.

14 “(D) A description of how and to what
15 ends the Government of Russia seeks to aug-
16 ment its military presence in Belarus.

17 “(E) A description of Russian influence
18 over the media and information space in
19 Belarus and how the Government of Russia
20 uses disinformation and other malign tech-
21 niques to undermine Belarusian history, cul-
22 ture, and language.

23 “(F) A description of other actors in
24 Belarus that the Government of Russia uses to

1 advance its malign influence, including vet-
2 erans' organizations and extrajudicial networks.

3 “(G) A description of efforts to undermine
4 Belarusian language, cultural, and national
5 symbols, including the traditional red and white
6 flag and the ‘Pahonia’ mounted knight.

7 “(H) An identification of Russian individ-
8 uals and government agencies that are signifi-
9 cantly supporting or involved in the crackdown
10 on peaceful protestors and the opposition or the
11 repression of independent media following the
12 August 9, 2020, presidential election.

13 “(3) FORM.—The report required by this sub-
14 section shall be transmitted in unclassified form but
15 may contain a classified annex.

16 “(b) REPORT ON PERSONAL ASSETS OF
17 ALYAKSANDR LUKASHENKA.—

18 “(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days
19 after the date of the enactment of the Belarus De-
20 mocracy, Human Rights, and Sovereignty Act of
21 2020, the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation
22 with the Secretary of State and the Director of Na-
23 tional Intelligence, shall submit to the appropriate
24 congressional committees a report on—

1 “(A) the total assets under the direct or
2 indirect control of Alyaksandr Lukashenka, in-
3 cluding estimated assets and known sources of
4 income of Alyaksandr Lukashenka and his im-
5 mediate family members, including assets, in-
6 vestments, bank accounts, and other business
7 interests; and

8 “(B) an identification of the most signifi-
9 cant senior foreign political figures in Belarus,
10 as determined by their closeness to Alyaksandr
11 Lukashenka.

12 “(2) FORM.—The report required by this sub-
13 section shall be transmitted in unclassified form but
14 may contain a classified annex.”.

15 **SEC. 9. DEFINITIONS.**

16 Section 9 of the Belarus Democracy Act of 2004
17 (Public Law 109-480; 22 U.S.C. 5811 note) is amended—

18 (1) by striking paragraph (1) and inserting the
19 following:

20 “(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-
21 TEES.—The term ‘appropriate congressional com-
22 mittees’ means—

23 “(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs,
24 the Committee on Financial Services, and the

1 Committee on Appropriations of the House of
2 Representatives; and

3 “(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations,
4 the Committee on Banking, Housing, and
5 Urban Affairs, and the Committee on Appro-
6 priations of the Senate.”; and

7 (2) in paragraph (3)(B)—

8 (A) in clause (i), by inserting “members of
9 the security and intelligence services,” after
10 “prosecutors,”; and

11 (B) in clause (ii), by inserting “, electoral
12 fraud, online censorship, or restrictions on inde-
13 pendent media and journalists” after “public
14 corruption”.